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Abstract of Thesis 
This study seeks to explore the relationships among competitive viability, 
accountability and record keeping in private sector entities. These relationships are 
explored both theoretically and empirically using a case study of Jamaican 
commercial bank failures. The study builds upon earlier research on the relationship 
between record keeping and public sector reform initiatives in Africa, which found 
that poor record keeping has undermined the success of these initiatives. The study 
aims to show how poor record keeping similarly can undermine the competitive 
viability of private sector entities and thereby economic development initiatives 
dependent on the private sector. The study employs a Grounded Theory-based 
methodology using data on Jamaican commercial bank failures to develop a 
theoretical argument for linkages among competitive viability, accountability and 
record keeping. The study argues that effective records accountabilities and controls 
are critical to the operation of accountability systems that provide the basis for 
internal control and sound decision-making in private sector entities. When 
accountability systems are weakened because of ineffective record keeping, 
management is unable to access information needed to maintain operational control 
and make sound decisions. This leaves the business weakened and vulnerable to 
collapse. The study illustrates this dynamic with reference to the failure of several 
Jamaican commercial banks, showing how an absence of effective records controls 
undermined the quality and availability of accounting and management information in 
these banks which, in turn, weakened the systems of accountability that the banks' 
directors, managers and supervisors relied upon to manage and control the banks I 
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balance sheets and business risks. The study concludes by drawing out general 
management lessons from the experience of the failed banks and offering policies and 
strategies to strengthen records accountabilities and controls. 
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Preface 
It is now axiomatic to say that we live in an information economy and that knowledge 
is a strategic resource. Nevertheless, the causes of information related problems 
within organisations often are misunderstood, being based more on received wisdom 
than empirical evidence. 
In my over fifteen years of experience as a professional archivist/records manager 
working in a wide range of organisations in several different countries, I have seen 
many a case of mistaken diagnosis of information problems. Often the prescriptions 
for these problems are equally misdirected - costly technological solutions and 
corporate reorganisations, for example - that fail to solve the underlying problem 
because of the original misdiagnosis. 
Many times, through close involvement in specific cases, I have been able to see that 
an organisation s information related problems originate with poor record keeping 
practices and thus how, by introducing better record keeping systems and controls, the 
problems could be solved. It also has been possible for me to see the deleterious 
effects on corporate bottom lines of unresolved information problems or ineffective 
solutions. 
In essence, these professional observations are what initially interested me in 
conducting a study on the linkages among competitive viability, accountability and 
1 ive record keeping. I wanted to explore a situatlon in which corporate competit 
viability was at issue. This would allow me to determine if poor record keeping could 
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be implicated and, in this way, to gather some hard evidence to support or nullify my 
professional working hypotheses about the relationships among these three 
phenomena. The Jamaican financial crisis and the collapse of several indigenous 
commercial banks in the 1990s presented me with an opportunity to explore these 
ideas. 
In addition, through my consulting work for the International Records Management 
Trust, I have been involved in several public sector reform initiatives. My work on 
behalf of the Trust has entailed improving record keeping systems and controls to 
enable governments to operate more efficiently and effectively in support of good 
governance and economic development. As a result of this work, I began to see 
linkages between the role of good record keeping in promoting efficiency and 
effectiveness in government adminIstration and its role in the efficient and effective 
operation of private sector entities. I also saw that development agencies and 
governments increasingly viewed the private sector as an engine of economic growth 
and surmised that, if the private sector suffered from the same record keeping induced 
information problems as found in the public sector, economic growth and 
development could be thwarted. Again, I wanted an opporturnty to explore these 
ideas in a more systematic way. 
The opportunity to do so arose when the Jamaican financial crisis occurred. At the 
time I was University Archivist for the University of the West Indies and based in 
Kingston, Jamaica. It occurred to me, as I watched the financial crisis unfold, that 
these bank collapses offered a unique opportunity to study the relationships among 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. Thus was born this study. 
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There are many people without whom this study would never have been completed, 
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First, I would Eke to thank my thesis supervisors at University College London: NEss 
Elizabeth Shepherd, Professor John McIlwaine and Mr. Geoffrey Yeo. It is an 
understatement to say that their guidance throughout the researching and writing 
process was invaluable. 
I owe a debt of gratitude also to Dr. Anne Thurston, ORE., of the International 
Records Management Trust, who encouraged me to undertake this study and has been 
a source of inspiration to me in many ways, not the least of which because of her 
pioneering research on the subject of accountability and record keeping in developing 
countries. I must also thank Stephney Ferguson, University Librarian, University of 
the West Indies, for her support and encouragement. 
I would also like to extend my appreciation to Shirley Tyndall, Financial Secretary, 
Ministry of Finance and Planning, Government of Jamaica, and Patrick Hylton, 
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Without their interest and support of my research topic and their wiffingness to open 
doors for me this study simply would not have been possible. Let me also take this 
opportunity to thank the many individuals in Jamaica and the UK who, for reasons of 
confidentiality, cannot be named but who took the time to meet with me and share 
their experiences and ideas. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Background to the Study 
One of the ainis of science is to discover relationships among phenomena previously 
thought to be unconnected. It is in that spirit that this study amis to establish the linkages 
among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. It also has a normative 
ami, which is to draw out lessons In order to create better policy and strategy for the 
management of organtsational records and information. 
The existence of a causal chain of linkages among competitive viability, accountability and 
record keeping may seem a preposterous proposition given typical conceptuahsations of 
record keeping as a low level clerical function usually associated with the mundane task of 
filing. After all, how could bad filing possibly be responsible for the failure of a business? 
However, this study argues that the relationship is not as preposterous as at first glance it 
may seem- 
I 
The study seeks to illustrate linkages among competitive viability, accountability and 
record keeping both theoretically and empirically by drawing upon data from Jamaican 
commercial bank failures. For the past several years the Jamaican financial sector has been 
in a state of crisis. Like dominoes, that favourite Jamaican pastime, one after another 
banks and other financial institutions have suffered collapse or near collapse, start Mig with 
the demise of the Blaise financial entities in 1995. Sad as this situation has been for the 
country, the collapse of all of Jamaica's indigenous commercial banks, save one very small 
one, has afforded a unique opportunity to explore the relationships among competitive 
viabihty, accountabihty and record keepmg. 
Jamaica presents an ideal site for a case study on the relationships among these three 
phenomena because of the availability of data on both healthy and failed commercial banks 
operating under the same external conditions. As such, the events of the Jamaican 
fmancial crisis offer a num-laboratory from which to see how record keepmg may have 
been implicated in weaknesses that led to the collapse of several banks. The assumption is 
that knowledge gained from a study of local experience and conditions in Jamaica can be 
extracted to learn something of value that, hopefully, will not only help strengthen the 
Jamaican financial sector but also strengthen financial sectors in other countries, and 
perhaps even other types of business enterprises. 
The collapse of the Jamaican financial sector has had devastating effects on the local 
economy and society. Against the background of human misery brought on by hard 
2 
economic realities arisiMng from the financial crisis, Jamaican people have sought answers 
to why the financial sector collapse occurred. Conunentators at the time have tended to 
give two reasons. Members and supporters of the opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) 
have pointed their fingers at the Government of Jamaica's macroeconomic policy. The 
Government, on the other hand, has pointed a finger of blame squarely at the owners and 
managers of the failed financial institutions, citing management mcompetence and 
dishonesty as the root cause of the sector's coUapse. The Government's arguments 
suggest that the collapse of so many Jamaican banks was the result of a crisis of 
accountabihty In bankmg management. 
This study examines the Government's claim that internal management practices were at 
the root of the Jamaican financial sector's problems. That being said, it would be difficult, 
and perhaps even futile, to attempt to identify a single cause of the failure of so many 
Jamaican banks. Banking failures take place in the context of complex financial systems in 
which many variables interact in different ways. Although analysts agree that internal 
management practices are an important factor in bank failures, macroeconomic instability 
and banking regulation are also important potential causes. Rather than attempt to draw a 
definitiVe conclusion about the causes of problems in the Jamaican banking sector, this 
study explores the relationship between two areas of internal management in Jamaican 
commercial banks, namely, record keeping and accountability, and their relationship to the 
competitive viabihty of the banks. The basic argument being advanced is that both 
deliberately and unintentionally poor record keeping by directors, managers and 
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employees of the failed Jamaican commercial banks contributed to a lack of accountability 
in and on the part of the banks. Lack of accountability, in turn, led to poor risk 
management, facilitated fraudulent activities, and prevented proper tracking of the banks' 
financial positions. As a result, these banks ultimately became weakened and vulnerable to 
coUapse. 
Purpose of the Study 
Broadly speaking, this study alms to provide greater insight into the nature of 
organisational information related problems. More specifically, however, the purpose of 
this study is twofold. First, it amis to establish that there exists a causal cham of 
relationships among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping in the 
Jamaican commercial banking sector in particular and in commercial enterprises in general. 
The study aims to show, using a case study of Jamaican commercial banking, how record 
keeping affects the ability of commercial enterprises and their regulators to obtain 
information required as inputs for the effectiVe operation of accountabifity systems and, in 
turn, how accountability systems support internal control and effective decision making m 
an enterprise, both of which this study maintains are critical to continuing competitive 
viability. The second aim of the study is to draw out management lessons from the 
experiences of failed Jamaican commercial banks that also may be applicable to other 
'banks and commercial enterprises and, on the basis of those management lessons, to 
recommend record keeping policies and strategies that support the effective operation of 
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accountability systems and thereby support competitive viability. 
Objectives of the Study 
This case study of the Jamaican commercial banking sector is used to explore the 
relationships among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping in commercial 
enterprises. The study critically examines two main areas of the Jamaican commercial 
bankmg sector: 
Banking operations, specifically record keeping and accountability systems 
in selected Jamaican commercial banks 
11 lCa a Banking supervision and rehabilitation, specifically the Bank of Jama*--"- 
use of records in the fulfilment, of its supervisory function and the Financial 
Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) Limited's use of records In the 
intervention and rehabilitation of failed Jamaican commercial banks 
These areas are exammed m order to gather empirical data to establish that the effective 
operation of the banks' own internal and the Bank of Jamaica's systems of accountability 
were dependent on the availability of quality inforniatiOn, which, in turn, requires banks to 
ensure proper record keeping practices. 
The study has three mam objectives: 
To define the relationships among record keeping, accountability and 
competitive viability in commercial banking 
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To establish clearly that accountability systems cannot function effectively 
without deliberate and systematic accountabilities and controls over record 
keeping processes 
To recommend best practices for managing records in support of 
accountabflity systems. 
Limitations of the Study 
This study does not aim to explain what caused the collapse of the Jamaican financial 
sector. Rather, its purpose vs to show how record keeping is impticated as a factor 
contributIng to the dynamics, of the banks' fadures. The argument IS that weak record 
keeping contributes to information failures that undernune the effective operation of 
accountability systems needed to monitor and control risk exposure, bank balance sheets 
and fraud. When accountability systems falL competitive viability is compromised and 
failure can occur. 
In making the case that effective accountability and control of record keeping processes is 
a precondition for the availability of the information required by managers, directors, 
shareholders and regulators to support internal control and sound declsion-makmg, the 
study does not focus on a detailed evaluation of the effectiveness of Jamaican commercial 
banks' management or supervisory practices and their use of infon-nation. To undertake 
such an evaluation would have been outside this researcher's area of expertise. Rather, 
the evaluation of the banks' systems focuses on the effectiveness of their record keeping 
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practices 'in delivering the information required to support existing management and 
supervisory accountabilities and controls. 
In undertakmig this evaluation, the need for empirical detail demanded that the research be 
broadly case study based. The depth needed for the case study approach restricted the 
number of sites that could be covered. Both the case study approach and the study's 
focus on only the Jamaican experience raise a question about the degree to which 
generalisations can be made from the empirical data. In this regard, the following 
observation by B. H. Spicer about case study research is relevant: 
... the objective of explanatory case research is not to draw inferences to some larger population based on sample evidence, but rather to generalize back to 
theory. In this sense generalization from case studies proceeds in a way that is 
analogous to generalization from experiments. An attempt is made to match the 
pattern of observation made in the case back to those suggested by theory. 
Replication may be sought by studying sets of similar and dissimilar cases. If these 
additional cases yield patterns of evidence which match back to theoretical patterns 
then it is possible to build support for the generalizability of the theory. I 
Thus, it is argued that some generahsations to other banks and other types of conunercial 
enterprises will be possible from the results of this case study. 
The case study research itself was limited by such practical issues as gammg access to 
Jamaican commercial banks willing to participate in the study, to supervisory officials at 
the Bank of Jamaica and to FINSAC officials. Within each of the commercial banks, it 
was not possible to achieve an identical level of access due prunarily to differences M the 
management structures of the banks (eg, in a foreign-owned bank an interview with a non- 
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executive director was not possible as the bank has no local board of directors) and to the 
availability of persons fillmg specific positions within the management structure at the time 
of the field research. Only limited access was possible to one of the viable commercial 
banks, as permission was denied to conduct interviews with staff of the bank's Jamaican 
operations. Data, therefore, were drawn from interviews with staff of the foreign parent 
company of the bank. Although the research plan included conducting interviews with 
Bank of Jamaica supervisory authorities, this proved to be impossible. Instead, the Bank 
agreed only to respond in writing to a linlited number of questions (see Appendix 1). In 
light of the Bank of Jamaica's refusal to agree to interviews and to release relevant 
information, the discussion on the relationship between record keeping and Bank of 
Jamaica supervisory practices is not as comprehensive as it might have been if the 
interviews had been granted. 
Significance of the Study 
This study builds upon and extends research on the relationships among economic 
development through good governance, public sector reform initiatives in Africa and 
record keepMg, discussed m detail m chapter four of this study. The results of research by 
Justus Wamukoya and Pino Akotia on the relationship between record keeping and 
economic development through good governance in Africa show how governments have 
been unable to achieve the accountability needed to properly manage or reform their 
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affairs when information is not available or easily accessible, a problem which these 
researchers attribute to poor record keepmg. 2 The authors of these studies show how 
when records are not controlled properly, vital information needed for decision-makmg, 
the detection of fraud, and the protection of citizens' rights is unavailable. They also show 
how donor support to governments has tended to neglect or worsen records control 
systems In the public sector, thereby deepening government information problems. 
intecords and their management have remained a neglected area of public sector reform 
programmes despite the fact that realisatiOn of reform programme objectiVes depends on 
efficient record keeping systems, often beyond what existing systems are able to proVide. 
Donors have taken for granted the availability of accurate and reliable records. Further, 
donors' misistence on running parallel systems for their own projects and computerising 
without first ensuring that source data are complete and reliable has undermined the 
recording and reporting systems of recipient governments. 3 The authors of these studies 
make a strong case that good record keeping is necessaty to build accountability systems 
that strengthen governance in developing countries. 
This study alms to make a contribution by showing how the relationships among 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping of private sector enterprises 
mirror those among economic development through good governance, accountability and 
record keeping as discussed by Wamukoya and Akotia. -In essence, 
it is a project to insert 
record keeping into ideas about the dynamics of corporate failure in general and 
conunercial bank failure in particular. This will be an iniportant contribution given that 
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banks and other commercial enterprises are essential to both national and international 
econornic processes, particularly in developing country contexts. 
It might not have been so important to understand the dynamics of bank faflure even just 
over a decade ago when only a few countries *in Latmi America had experienced any major 
collapses; now, however, bank failure has become a global epidemic. According to Morris 
Goldstein, 67 banking systems have encountered crises since 1980, and 52 of these have 
been in developing countries. 4 All of these collapses have cost taxpayers dearly. ' As 
Gerard Caprio has noted, Ii ize t-N -. - "When large fiscal bills have to be repaid, they can destabili 
the best laid macroeconomic programs. .. 
" which clearly poses econoMIC challenges for 
developed and developing countries alike and places banking crises high on the public 
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policy agenda. 
Understanding and preventing bank failures IS particularly IMPortant in the context of 
developing countries, like Jamaica, for two reasons. First, development policies and 
strategies now aim at stimulating economic growth by reducing the overall siZe of the 
public sector and its involvement in the economy while simultaneously increasing the role 
of the private sector in econoMIC development. The financial sector plays an unportant 
role m these economic development plans as a mechanism for the allocation of capital 
needed to support local business enterprise and foster econoMic growth The World Bank 
World Development Report for 1998/99 states that research confirms that countries with 
more developed fmancial mstitutions grow faster, and those with weak 
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ones are more likely to experience financial crises. Second , in 
lower income countries, 
"almost all financial intermediation. .. is accomplished through the banking system. ,7A 
weak banking system in developing countries can derail plans to achieve niacroecononuc 
stability. It is thus critical that in lower income countries banks, as the primary financial 
intermediaries, remain competitively viable. ' In recognition of this fact the International 
Monetary Fund has now placed banking issues on its macroeconomic adjustment 
programme agencla. 9 
Current analyses of banking failures recognise the role of imperfect information in markets 
as being a factor in bank collapses. 10 Nevertheless, the focus of these theories is on the 
absence of good quality information in credit markets (le, lack of creditor information 
about borrowers' ability to repay loans) and in bank runs (ie, depositors' lack of 
information about the safety of their deposits and their ability to make withdrawals on 
demand). Little attention has been giVen to imperfect information or information gaps 
within the banks themselves as being a factor in bank failures. Moreover, there has been 
no explicit recognition of a link between the problem of Imperfect information and banks' 
internal record keeping practices. The aim of this study, therefore, is to present evidence 
to support the view that organisational record keeping practices can be a significant factor 
in internal information gaps that undermine accountability and internal control and thereby 
contribute to the dynamics of bank coflapses. 
II 
Hypothesis and Analytical Framework 
OwMig to the qualitatiVe, Grounded Theory-based research methodology used in this study 
(discussed more fully in the following section), the study did not begin with a set of 
research hypotheses to be proven, as would be the usual procedure in a quantitative 
research project. Rather, the study began with a general proposition - that there was a 
causal chain of relationships among record keeping, accountability and competitive 
viability - and a set of more specific assumptions and ideas reflecting these relationships. 
These assumptions and ideas derived from literature on record keeping and social 
accountability and were framed from the perspective of those in the field of banking and 
banking supervision. As such, it was anticipated that many would be proven false. The 
assumptions were as f6flows: 
Banking Operations - Records Availability and Use in Fraud Prevention, Risk 
Management and Assessment of Financial Position 
The necessary information is available to manage risks, prevent fraud and 
accurately assess a bank's financial position 
Bank shareholders, directors, managers and supervisors know what 
informatiOn they need 
Shareholders, directors, managers and supervisors use records for decision- 
making, to manage risks, assess their financial position and monitor 
banking practices 
Banks In good financial standing have better record keeping practices than 
those that have failed or are in poor financial health 
Banks with foreign connections have access to more information about the 
importance of good record keeping and good record keeping systems than 
local banks and therefore have better record keeping practices 
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Complete financial transactions can be tracked easily through records (this bears particularly on banks' ability to detect fraud) 
Due to tight regulatory control, banking administrative structure matches 
the typical "'machine bureaucracy" (hierarchical, with highly structured 
vertical flows of information) and consequently information often reaches 
the executive level of the organisation too slowly or in too digested a form 
to be of use 
Internal accountability systems are clearly defmed, well-documented and 
specify the types of records that must be kept to sustain them 
13'anking Operations - Attitudes to Records Use andManagement 
Shareholders, directors and bank managers understand the importance of 
good information management practices and, in particular, good record 
keeping in terms of establishing accountability to manage risks, prevent 
fraud and monitor their financial position 
KeepMig records is not an issue as bank managers and employees will 
automatically want records to be kept that document their actions and 
decisions 
No special systems need to be put In place to ensure that, once 
documented, information about actions and decisions is maintained in a 
retrievable and reliable form 
Attitudes and approaches to accountability and record keeping are the 
same at all levels of the organisational hierarchy 
Introduction of automated technology, that is more computers, will 
automatically solve information problems for commercial banks and their 
regulators 
Useful information is seen as being 'in automated form, while the term 
records connotes useful hardcopy papers. Similarly, information 
management IS seen in terms of computensation and something of value to 
the strategic position of the orgarnsation, while records management is seen 
as being primarily to do with filing 
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Jan B -- king Operations - Training ofBanking Professionals 
Training of banking professionals influences attitudes and approaches to 
the use and management of information and records in banking operations 
Training of banking professionals covers management control systems and 
their relation to information management 
Banking Operations - Information and Records Management Practices 
Responsibility and authority for record keeping is clearly designated and 
documented 
File control and trackmig procedures have been articulated and documented 
Guidelines on the creation, maintenance, use and disposition of records 
have been articulated and documented 
Correspondence is delivered, actioned and filed promptly 
Incidents of rMsfiling are low 
Incidents of file loss are low 
Information flows with ease through the organisation 
Officers appropriately share relevant information and information systems 
support such sharing 
Valuable information can easily be retrieved from one integrated source M 
one medium 
Poor or unethical organisational cultures spawn poor or unethical record 
keeping subcultures. Alternatively, poor and unethical record keeping is a 
sign of poor or unethical organisational cultures 
Responsibility for all aspects of record keepmig is clearly defined and 
documented, both at the management and operational level 
The organisational structure is designed with a clear distmiction between 
specialist record keeping staff and users 
The orgarusational structure I*LS designed so that at the operational level 
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there i*Ls a separation between record keeping, custody of assets and system 
design 
Systems and procedures are M place to prevent unauthorised access to 
record stores 
Disaster preparedness and recovery plans are clearly defined and 
documented 
Banking Operations - Information and Records Management Practices - 
Technology Use (eg, in Transaction Processing, Gathering and Analysis of 
Customer Information and Credit Histories, in Approval Processes, in Audit 
Trails, etc) 
Introduction of computer technology is focused on the allocative aspects of 
information and records (te, information as resource to improve the overall 
efficiency and effectiveness of the business), not on the authoritative 
aspects of information and records (le, information as evidence of business 
transactions in support of internal management control and accountability) 
New computer systems have been introduced as separate projects and as a 
result there LS little coordination between them 
Officials create and manage records in electronic form according to their 
own practices 
Computer systems, particularly Management Information Systems, are 
linked to the paper-based records from which their data are drawn so that 
the data may be easily verified 
Personal user security systems have been established 
Ap Ing and output controls have been clearly 
, ppropriate 
input, process 
established and documented 
In the area of banking supervision, the study examined these assumptions- 
Banking Supervision - Records Availability and Use 
The necessary information is available to monitor commercial banking 
operations to the extent required under Jamaican law 
Bank inspectors/supervisors/auditors experience problems M access Mig the 
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necessary information to monitor commercial banks 
Existing Jamaican law, in providing a firamework for the supervision of 
commercial banks, is sufficiently explicit on the subject of sources of 
infon-nation to support effective supervision 
Banking Supervision - Attitudes to Records Use andManagement 
Bank MiSpectors/supervisors/auditors are aware of the ]Importance of good 
internal information management practices, particularly good record 
keeping, in commercial banks in terms of managing risks, preventing fraud 
and monitoring the banks' financial status 
Banking Supervision - Training of Supervision Professionals 
Training of banking supervisory professionals influences attitudes and 
approaches to the use and management of information and records In 
banking operations 
Training of banking superviSory professionals covers management control 
systems and their relation to information management 
These assumptions provided a framework to explore the posited relationships among 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping according to the methodology 
outlined in the next section. Ultimately, this process resulted in the formulation of the 
central argument of the study, which is that record keeping practices in commercial 
enterprises must be controlled carefully in order to support both the internal and social 
accountabilities that form the basis of effective internal control and 
decision making 
necessary to continuing competitive viability. 
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Research Methods 
The research conducted for this study can be divided into three phases. The study 
commenced with a review of relevant literature. One of the primary purposes of the 
literature review was to gain an orientation to the subject matter with a view to developing 
a list of assumptions about record keeping practices and their role in accountability and 
competitive viabihty within the commercial banking sector in Jamaica. 
This phase was followed by exploratory field research conducted on UK-based banking 
enterprises. The airn of the exploratory field research was threefold. First, the research 
provided valuable background information supplemental to the literature review, which 
fed into the process of developing initial ideas about the relationships among record 
keeping, accountability and competitive viability in commercial banking. This turned out 
to be particularly iMPortant because literature specifically about banking records and 
record keeping is sparse. Second, it offered a useful opportunity to pilot test the initial 
assumptions derived from the literature review and, where necessary, to modify or add to 
them in advance of the main fieldwork. Finally, it provided a source of data from which to 
draw comparisons with the Jamaican data. 
The next phase of the research project entailed conducting field research in Jamaican 
commercial banking enterprises *in order to gather detailed qualitative data about the 
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relationships among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. For the 
purposes of determining whether record keeping practices differ between banks that 
performed weH durmg the fmancial crisis and those that fafled, the study exammed record 
keeping practices in both competitively viable banks and those that collapsed. Further, to 
deterrmne whether there were differences In record keeping practices between local banks 
and those that have foreign connections (le, local subsidiaries of foreign banks), the study 
also exammed the record keeping practices of banks in both groups. During the field 
research, data were gathered prlrmrily from ýiterviews with directors, managers and other 
officals of both vable and failed Jamaican commercial banks, FINSAC officials, and 
forensic auditors as weH as from surveys of records and records management systems in 
both viable and failed Jamaican conunercial banks. 
The field research also entailed gathering information from the examination of official 
reports and other forms of documentation. These sources included Jamaican statutes 
relating to banking supervision and financial reporting; Bank of Jamaica internal 
documentation relatM*g to bank inspection; annual reports of various Jamaican commercial 
banks and enterprises; Government of Jamaica reports on the financial sector coflapse and 
the work of FINSAC; and relevant newspaper articles. Choice of data sources was 
deternuned by two factors. Since this study aims to build and expand on studies by 
Warnukoya and Akotia, it was thought that it would be appropriate to use similar 
qualitative methods and data sources. Second, the methods and data sources employed in 
the studies by Wamukoya and Akotia are the most common used in records 
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management studies. " 
The interviews consisted of a series of highly structured, open-ended questions developed 
to elicit responses that would provide data related to the assumptions outlined in the 
previous section. These questions appear at Appendix I of this study and the hst of 
assumptions to which they were matched appears as Appendix 4. Open-ended questions 
were preferred over closed questions to give the interview subjects scope to introduce 
new themes and issues. In order to determine whether attitudes and approaches to record 
keeping, accountability and the competitive viability of the banks varied by level within the 
orgarnsational hierarchy, interviews were conducted with senior managers, nuddle 
managers and line managers. Where the interview subject had no objection (in most 
cases), interviews were tape-recorded for later transcription. Transcriptions and notes of 
interviews were entered into and managed using QSR NUD*IST qualitative data 
management software. Use of this software provided an important advantage in managing 
the data generated by the study and permitted rapid generation, testing and revision of "if- 
then" relationships and evidence of linkages to produce more robust theory. This may not 
have been possible using manual methods of analysis. Use of this software is discussed in 
greater detafl In Appendix 2. 
A data collection instrument was developed to guide the surveying of records and record 
keeping practices conducted as part of this study. The data coffection instrument 
consisted of a series of questions answered by the researcher during on-site 
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investigations. Questions InCluded on the survey fonn also were keyed to the initial 
assumptions of the study (see Appendix 4). The survey instrument appears at Appendix 3. 
Throughout, the study employed qualitative research methods informed by Grounded 
Theory. Grounded Theory was developed in the 1960s by two sociologists, Barney 
Glaser and Anselm Strauss and is a methodology particularly well suited to generating 
new theory. 12 Glaser defines Grounded Theory as ". --a general methodology of analysis 
linked with data collection that uses a systematically applied set of methods [author's 
emphasis] to generate an inductive theory about a substantive area. "" In Grounded 
Theory research, data collection, analysis and theory have a reciprocal and iterative 
relationship. 14 The applied set of methods used in this study is discussed in Appendix 2. 
A range of research methods could have been chosen. " Qualitative research methods 
informed by Grounded Theory were chosen over and above quantitative methods (le, 
stawtically analysed survey data) for a number of reasons. First, many researchers now 
criticise the value of quantitative methods, particularly in accounting research, and 
advocate the use of qualitative methods, such as case studies, in which theory and 
observation interact reflexively. 16 Second, as there is no pre-existing theory on the 
relationships among the three main objects of analysis in this study (record keeping, 
accountability and competitive viability), Grounded Theory presented a good fit. Lee 
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Parker and Bet Roffey write: grounded theory IS "... oriented towards identifying and 
articulating overarching concepts and their causal linkages as explanations of patterned 
behaviour. " 17 Another significant benefit of Grounded Theory IS that it perrnits the use of 
multiPle data sources. Parker and Roffey note that "Grounded theory. .. admits a greater 
range of data sources [than ethnomethodology and ethnography], *including naturally 
occurring verbal exchanges, interviews, reports, minutes of meetings, correspondence and 
so on. " 
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Organisation of the Study 
The study is organised into two broad sections. The first section estabhshes the 
theoretical linkages among record keeping, accountability and competitive viability. 
Chapter two maps the relationship between two of these core concepts: competitive 
viability and accountability. It defines competitive viability and accountability, showing 
how these are integrafly linked. Chapter three then rnaps the relationship between 
accountability and record keeping, arguing that accountability is dependent on a variety of 
records to operate effectively and that the manner of record keeping determines whether 
the quality of these records will be sufficient to meet accountability requirements. Chapter 
four draws an analogy between the relationships among economic development, public 
sector reform and record keeping and the relationships among competitive viability, 
accountability and record keeping. The chapter also uses research on public sector reform 
and record keeping in Africa as evidence of the plausibility of the theoretical framework 
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outlined in chapters two and three. 
The second section of this study focuses on the commercial banking sector in general and 
record keeping, accountability and competitive viability in the Jamaican commercial 
banking sector in particular. It begins in Chapter five with a discussion of commercial 
banking operations and the role of accountability systems in managing and monitoring 
risks, assessig financial position and preventing fraud. Chapter six moves to a discussion 
of the Jamaican financial crisis, exploring exogenous and endogenous factors contributing 
to commercial bank collapses and concluding that weaknesses M the banks' systems of 
accountability can be implicated. Chapter seven goes on to explore poor information and 
communication as a cause of the banks' weak accountability systems, arguing that these 
weaknesses were the result of the banks' records creation and keeping practices and 
illustrating the effect of these practices on management 11 s ability to monitor and manage 
the banks' financial positions and risk exposures. Chapter eight then explores the reasons 
underlying the banks' records creation and keeping practices., making the case that these 
practices were the result of an absence of clear bank-wide accountabilities and controls 
over record creation and keeping that, ultimately, encouraged the banks' officials to create 
and keep records according to personal values, beliefs and norms not always In tune with 
what was required to produce the quality of information needed to support effective 
operation of the banks' systems of accountabihty. Chapter rune goes on to examine how 
the banks' record creation and keeping practices also undernuned the work of banking 
supervisors and FINSAC officials, thereby also affecting social accountability. 
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The study concludes with a chapter that summarises how the Jamaican empirical data 
illustrates the theoretical relationships among competitive viability, accountability and 
record keeping outhned in chapters two and three and, drawing upon the Jamaican 
experience, makes a number of recommendations concerned with strengthening record 
keepM'g practices and the use of records in accountabflity systems. 
Exchange Rate Calculations 
Throughout this study numerous references are made to Jamaican doflar amounts. As the 
Jamaican dollar is not a commonly traded international currency, in order to giVe the 
reader an appreciation of the value of the Jamaican amounts they are indicated M US 
dollars as well. However, during the Jamaican financial crisis, the Jamaican dollar suffered 
rapid devaluation in relation to the US dollar and, indeed, continues to decrease in value. 
Thus, for the sake of simphcity, m most cases this study uses a standard rate of $J40: $US I 
to calculate US dollar equivalencies,, a rate that obtained roughly throughout 1999. '9 
However, where this figure ryught present a rmsleadmg view of the value of a loss or an 
asset, an historically accurate exchange rate has been used. In such cases, the actual rate 
of exchange used to calculate the US dollar equivalency is indicated next to the Jamaican 
doflar amount. 
Review of Related Literature 
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Literature from a wide range of disciplines was reviewed throughout this study. The 
purpose of this review is not to discuss all of the literature but to give the reader a sense of 
the approach taken in conducting the literature review. In addition, the review presents a 
discussion of the most influential works and how they relate to the development of the 
central themes of this study. Chapters two through five will discuss these works in much 
greater depth. 
Critical to the idea that there exist relationships among competitive viability, accountability 
and record keeping has been the body of literature on the relationship between public 
accountability and record keepmg that has emerged over the last decade. This literature 
grew out of Canadian archivist Terry Eastwood's 1989 Australian Society of Archivists' 
conference presentation calling for archivists to "spirit an understanding of archives as 
C arsenals of democratic accountability and continUity. 
v'20 Eastwood's paper was followed 
by a series of articles and research papers that linked accountability with records and 
information management, subsequently published in 1992 in Sue McKemmish and Frank 
Upward's Archival Documents: Providing Accountability Through Recordkeeping. 21 
In 1996 Justus Wamukoya presented the first research exploring hnks between public 
sector reform initiatives in developing countries and record keeping M his doctoral 
dissertation on records management and administrative reform programmes in Kenya. 
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Warnukoya's study was of major significance because it was the first such study to place 
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discussion of the relationship between record keepmig and accountability In the context of 
literature on development econormcs and adn-finistration thereby indicating that poor 
record keeping had negative repercussions for the competitive viability and econormc 
development of a country. His study was followed by the 1997 doctoral dissertation of 
Pino Akotia on the management of public sector financial records and their implications 
for good goverment in Ghana, showing once again how poor records management can 
undermine public sector reform. 23 More recently, the International Records Management 
Trust has conducted research into the relationship between good governance and record 
keeping. 24 Like Wamukoya and Akotia's research, its study of the management of public 
sector financial records In sub-Saharan Africa shows how poor record keeping practices 
undermm*e accountabihty and pubfic sector management. Chapter four argues that this 
body of research lends empirical support to the central argument of this study. 
Development policies, particularly those of the World Bank, that place increasing 
emphasis on the role of the private sector in economic development stimulated an interest 
in exploring whether the way in which poor record keeping undermined accountability and 
public sector reform similarly undermined accountability and private sector competitive 
viability. Works such as Beatriz Armendariz de Aghion and Francisco Ferreira's survey of 
the 1980s literature on the Third World Debt Crisis, Paul Mosley's general overview of 
the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's structural adjustment programmes and 
Howard Stem's look at structural adjustment in Aftica as well as World Bank publications 
were all useful In tracing this trend toward greater reliance on the private sector as an 
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engine of econornic growth for developing countries. 25 Of particular interest is the 
1998/99 World Bank World Development Report because of its clear attention to the 
private sector as an engine of economic development, its focus on financial institutions 
such as banks as private sector entities of particular importance to growth and 
development In Third World countries, and its recognition of infon-nation problems as 
barriers to the success of development initiatives. 26 However, as will be discussed in 
chapter four, despite linking failures In development initiatives with information problems, 
the report still does not identify poor record keeping in private sector entities as a source 
of such problems, which this study contends is a gap in the World Bank's analysis and 
weakens its overall approach to solving information related problems that stifle economic 
development. 
In citing information problems as a barrier to success in development initiatives, the World 
Bank report draws on a well-defined body of econornIc theory that links market 
imperfections with information related transaction costs. This body of theory has 
influenced formation of the theoretical framework of this study. The argument that poor 
record keeping contributes to information related problems that undermine accountability 
and competitive viability in private sector entities rests upon the underlying argument that 
not only external market conditions but also the way in which a firm operates plays an 
important role in its continuing competitive viability and that internal information related 
problems can create operating inefficiencies in a firm which undernune its competitive 
position. Support for this line of thinking is found in the writings of econornic and 
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organisational theorists influenced by the ideas of decision theorist Herbert Simon, in 
particular the "new institutional economics" (NIE) theorists, whose ideas have been well 
surnmarised ma colIection of papers edited by John Haff iSs, Janet Hunter, and Colin Ni 
Lewis entitled 7-he New Institutional Economics and Third World Development, and in 
the writings of econonllC and organisational theorist Roy Radner, who focuses on the 
operational inefficiencies that arise from information related problems in large, hierarchical 
orgarnsations . 
27 Like the World Bank report, although these writers recogruse that 
information related problems create operational inefficiencies In organisations and 
markets, they do not attribute informatiOn problems to poor record keeping. 
Nevertheless, this study airns to show that poor record keepmg is a source of such 
information related problems and, furthermore, that these problems undermme 
accountability and competitive viability in private business enterprises. 
Aa noted previously, a decision was taken to employ a Grounded Theory-based approach 
using a case study of Jamaican commercial bank failures to explore the possible linkages 
among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. Works such as W. 
Lawrence Neuman's Social Research Methods provided a useful overview of the range of 
methodological possibilities. 29 Other works, such as Christopher Humphrey and Robert 
W. Scapens', "Theories and Case Studies of Organizational accounting practices: 
Limitation or Liberation? " and Jane Broadbent and Richard Laughlin's, "Developing 
empirical research: an example informed by a Habermasian approach, " 
influenced the 
methodological direction taken in this study by illustrating an evident trend away 
from 
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more quantitative approaches in accounting research toward more qualitative empirical 
studies. 29 In terms of the Grounded Theory approach, B. Glaser's Basics of Grounded 
Theory Analysis provided a general guide to the methodology while Lee D. Parker and 
Bet H. Roffey, "Back to the drawing Board: revisiting grounded theory and the everyday 
30 accountant's and manager's reality" offered a useful applied example of the method . 
Harold Garfinkel's Studies in EthnomethodoloýT was also useful In shapmg the 
methodological approach employed m the study. " 
The decision to use a case study of Jamaican commercial bank failures to explore the 
relationships among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping necessitated 
an extensive review of the hterature on banking. Works such as Shelagh Heffernan's 
Modem Banking in Theory and Practice; Geoffrey Lipscombe and Keith Pond's book on 
the busmess of banking; Joel Bessis' Risk-Management in Banking, Mervyn King's book 
on back office functions in banking; and numerous papers produced by the Basle 
Committee on Banking SuperviSiOn all provided valuable general information about the 
busmess of banking. 32 Background information about banking in developing country 
contexts was drawn from Chris Baltrop and Diana McNaughton's publications on banking 
institutions in developing countries; Wilbert 0. Bascom's book on bank management and 
supervision in developing financial markets and Howard Palmer's Bank Risk Analysis in 
M Emerging arketS. 33 
important to the process A review of literature related to the causes of bank failures was i 
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of analysmg what banking experts understand about competitive viability III banking. In 
this regard, a series of papers edited by Gerard Capi-10 Jr. entitled Preventing Bank Crises: 
Lessonsfrom Recent Global Bank Failures proved an invaluable source for as wide range 
of perspectives on the causes of bank failures and numerous case studies of bank failures 
in different countries. 34 R- Glenn Hubbard's Financial Markets and Financial Crises was 
also a useful source. 35 Common causes cited as leading to bank failures Included: 
macroeconomic instability; excessive exposure to a single sector; poor asset management; 
inappropriate or ineffective governance, management and mcentive structures; lack of 
internal control mechanisms; fraud; a decline in franchise value; weaknesses In the 
regulatory framework; and regulatory forbearance. A review of this literature revealed 
that cited causes of bank failures tended to be related to either exogenous factors, such as 
the macroeconomic environment and bank regulation, or those that were endogenous, 
such as management failure to control various types of risks, poor credit risk management 
being among the most common of problems. 
A number of works on the field of banking pointed to the importance of information and 
communication in managing bank balance sheets and risks and lent support to the thesis 
that operational problems in organsatiOns can be linked to information related problems. 
Among these works were several papers in Ray Kinsella's Internal Control in Banking 
and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision's papers on a framework for evaluating 
internal control in banking, enhancing bank transparency and operational risk 
management. 36 The literature on banking in developing countries suggested that relatively 
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poor quality accounting and management information often contributes to operatmg 
problems In banks In these countries. As a rule, however, this literature did not link the 
availability of good quality accounting and management information with good record 
keeping practices. The Basle Committee's paper on internal control is the only one of 
these works to associate the avoidance of information related problems with the need to 
establish record keeping controls; but, even so, it does so in a very limited way - record 
keepmg is conceptualised as being synonymous with records retention scheduling. This 
view is not so far from that of records manager Nan Heldenbrand Morrisette whose book 
Setting Up a Bank Records Management Program largely concentrates on issues of 
records retention scheduling. 37 Nevertheless, this study argues for a much broader 
conceptualisation of record keeping in the banking context and the types of controls 
necessary for the production of quality records, a conceptualisation encompassing all 
aspects of the creation and keeping of records III different media. 
In advance of conducting the field research, a review also was carried out of literature on 
jinanci I and accountability including the related areas of corporate governance, f ia 
management accounting and auditing. This literature provided a sharper picture of 
accountability and a clearer understanding of its operation in the context of the case study 
setting, namely, commercial banking. Keith Hoskin's "The 'awful idea of accountability': 
inscribing people into the measurement of objects, " links the rise of accountability in 
business settings with the need to prevent internal control problems and poor decision 
making that nught cause business failures, as does Alfred Chandler's The 
Visible Hand 
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and James Beruger's The Control Revolution . 
38 In contrast, Harold Garfinkel, In his 
Studies in Ethnomethodology, views accountabflity as holding organisations together not 
by virtue of supportIng internal control and decISIon making but by virtue of beM9 the 
actual mechanism of social relations that gives rise to and perpetuates organisations. 39 
This study accepts both views, but places emphasis on accountability's role in supporting 
internal control and dedsion-making. 
The works on accountabihty also brought into sharper focus the differences and 
similarities between accountabihty in busmess versus goverment settings. While 
accountability III each setting essentially functions according to the same mechanisms and 
alms to establish controL the interests which they serve are different: in the case of 
accountability In business settings, the interests of shareholders, directors, and managers 
are primary while in democratic accountability it is the public interest or a "collective 
good". Nevertheless, accountability can serve the public good in the case of private 
industries in which the public has an interest. This is because accountability provides an 
effective basis for the internal control and efficient operation of such private sector 
enterprises. Internal control and efficient operations are essential to the attainment of 
goals benefiting the common good, such as economic development. Due to the 
importance of banks to economies, in particular in developing countries, banking is an 
industry in which accountability does serve both public and private interests. 
Some of the literature on accountability chaflenges its effectiveness as a management tool. 
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In particular John Roberts in "From Discipline to Dialogue: Individualizing and 
Socializing Forms of Accountability" argues against the traditional view that 
accountability supports the competitiveness of a business enterprise . 
40 He points out that 
traditional, hierarchical forms of accountability can result in mdividualismg behaviour that 
is counterproductrve in a business environment that demands a team-oriented approacli 
Roberts calls for less formal "lateraF' forms of accountability and trust to replace more 
traditional accountability relationships. This study takes the view that in a setting 
characterised by rapid external and organisational change there may be insufficient tune to 
build trust relationships and that, therefore, formal accountabilities still will be necessary 
to achieving internal control, sound decision making and competitive viability. 
The accountability literature also touches on the significance of the account - the point at 
which accountability and record keeping intersect - in the accountability relationship, 
viewing accounts as critical to the operation of accountability. The literature points to 
growing support for the idea, influenced by post-modernist thinking, that accounts are 
socially produced "re-presentations" of organisational transactions. This View challenges 
the traditional view of accounts as objective reflections of reality. Chief among these 
works in terms of its influence on the ideas presented in this study is Joni I Young's 
"Getting the Accounting 'Right': Accounting and the Savings and Loan Crisis" which 
Mustrates how definitions of "right" accounting and accounting numbers shifted with the 
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interests and policies of bank regulators. 41 
Recent archival theory also reflects the trend in the literature toward viewmg the account 
as a socially produced representation. Among the writings drawn upon to develop the 
ideas In this study are Brien Brothman's, "Orders of Value: Probing the TheoretiCal Terms 
of Archival Practice" and "'Declining Derrida': Integrity, Tensegrity, and the Preservation 
of Archives from Deconstruction, " Tom Nesmith's review of Trevor Livelton's Archival 
Theory, Records and the Public and Verne Harris' Exploring Archives: An Introduction 
to Archival Ideas and Practice in South AMca. 42 These writers all see the archival record 
not as objective evidence of facts but as text, that is, socially and technologically produced 
accounts of "reality". As such, they view the social and technological means of 
msCription, transnussion and contextualization as weH as subsequent readings of the 
record throughout its life span as shaping the record's ultunate meanmg. This study also 
draws upon social theory, particularly Ernile Durkheium's study of threats to the social 
stability of industrial society and the ideas of conflict theorists such as Ian Carib, to flesh 
out the ways In which different interests M record creation and keeping wiff influence the 
meanmg of a record over time in a manner that may not be intentional nor supportive of 
broader organtsational goals and requirements. 43 In the final analysis, this study accepts 
Brien Brothman's argument that record keeping accountabilities and controls are essential 
to controlling social and technological influences and interests as well as preventing a 
natural deconstruction in the meaning of records over time, though it is acknowledged that 
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even best record keeping practices cannot definitively control the meaning of accounts. 44 
Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the purpose of this study, which is to explore the relationships 
among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping both theoretically and 
empirically using a case study of Jamaican commercial bank failures, and then to learn 
management lessons from what is discovered about the relationships among these three 
phenomena. The expectation is that the results of this study will reveal that the 
relationships are similar to those shown by research conducted on the relationship between 
record keeping and public sector reform In Africa, that is, that poor record keeping 
undermines accountability and, by extension, competitive viability. This is thought to be 
significant because of the increasing emphasis placed on private sector entities, In 
particular banks, Mi economic development initiatives as well as because, though 
acknowledgmg that information problems contribute to orgamsational and market 
ineffiCiencies, current theories do not attribute these problems to poor record keeping. If 
poor record keepmg Ls a source of such problems - as this study argues - then record 
keeping must be improved if organtsational and market inefficiencies are to be prevented 
or corrected. In developing this argument, this study now turns to presentmg a theoretlcal 
. C-- framework linking competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. 
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Chapter Two: Competitive Viability and Accountability - Mapping the Relationship 
Introduction 
This study seeks to establish a chain of links among competitive viability, 
accountability and record keeping in the context of private sector business entities. 
The purpose of this chapter and the one that follows is to map out a theoretical 
relationship between these three phenomena. As discussed in the introduction, the 
study adopts a Grounded Theory-based methodological approach. As such, the 
theoretical frarnework presented in this chapter and the next began with the 
assumptions and broad orienting concepts outlined in chapter one. Mapping of 
the theoretical relationships among competitive viability, accountability and 
record keeping progressed as the field research data were gathered, analysed and 
then related to the work of many theorists from fields as diverse as economics, 
sociology, computer science, accounting, literary criticism and archives 
administration. In this sense, the theoretical framework presented in this and the 
following chapter both draws inductively upon the field research data and 
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provi es a framework for analysis and discussion of these data in later chapters. 
Defining Competitive Viability 
What makes a business entity competitively viable? To remain viable - to survive 
-a firm must operate efficiently. Optimally efficient operation occurs when firms 
use all of their available resources and technology to produce with the least 
amount of waste the products or services that customers most want. 1 Firms that 
operate most efficiently, that is to say those with high productivity, will have a 
comparative market advantage and therefore will be the most competitive. Firms 
that do not operate efficiently will be relatively disadvantaged and less 
competitive, and in extreme cases will become non-viable. 2 Competitive viability 
therefore means the ability of a firm to operate with sufficient efficiency to avoid 
failure and ensure survival in a competitive market. 
This study avoids attempting to measure degrees of competitiveness, instead 
focusing on viability, because of the conceptual difficulties associated with 
measuring a firm's overall or relative productivity. For instance, as economists 
Phillipe Aghion and Peter Howitt observe, if we measure the output of hospital 
services in terms of the number of patient days spent in hospital, when one 
hospital introduces a new computer assisted surgical procedure that increases the 
hospital's efficiency by curing people in fewer days it can actually seem as if the 
more efficient hospital is less productive. 
3 Similarly, analysts typically use 
profitability as a comparative measure of productivity, but this can be misleading 
40 
as well. Investments in research and development may be necessary for the firm 
to continue to grow and remain viable and profitable over the long-term while 
4 
reducing short-term profitability. In other words, optimal efficiency is not 
always achieved by short-term profit maximisation. Even assuming profitability 
accurately reflects productivity, however, there are many different methods used 
to measure profitability each of which results in a slightly different ranking of a 
5 firm's relative market position. Thus, in order to avoid the analytical 
complications associated with attempting to measure degrees of competitiveness, 
this study focuses on the basic question of survival in a competitive market place. 
Using this approach, it is easier to determine whether a firm is or is not 
competitively viable. Those that are continue to exist. Those that are not fail. 
According to the neo-classical economic model, efficient operation of the firm 
occurs almost effortlessly and naturally. As Kenneth Boulding has written of 
general equilibrium theory, the firm is "a strange bloodless creature without a 
balance sheet, without any visible capital structure, without debts, and engaged 
apparently in the simultaneous purchase of inputs and sale of outputs at constant 
rates. "6 In this economic model, the "invisible hand" of market forces operating 
according to the law of supply and demand, achieves a balance between what 
consumers want (demand) and what firms produce 
(SUPPI Y). 
7 The market operates 
perfectly and naturally to achieve equilibrium, and thereby efficient production. 
The reason is that firms are discouraged by the profit motive from using inputs 
wastefully. The market mechanism also guides firms' output decisions. 
theoretically, a rise in the price of product because of high demand will lead firms 
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to produce more of that product, and vice versa, thereby optimally balancing 
demand and supply once more. Finally, the market assists, through a price 
system, in the distribution of goods among consumers in accordance with their 
tastes and preferences through a series of voluntary exchanges. 
If we accept this model, to remain competitively viable firms must strike a balance 
between supply and demand in a given market. However, there are many factors 
that cause imbalances. These factors may either cause a shift in demand or 
supp Y. 
8 Typically, such factors as a change in the incomes of consumers, a 
population change, a shift in consumer preferences, and a shift in the price and 
availability of related goods all affect the demand side of the equilibrium 
equation. 9 Conversely, shifts on the supply side usually result from changes in the 
size of the industry, technological progress, changes in the price of production 
inputs, and changes in the price of related products. 10 When these changes occur 
they can destabilise a firm's competitive position. 
The factors affecting market equilibrium and thus a firm's competitiveness can be 
divided into two broad categories: 1) exogenous and 2) endogenous. Exogenous 
factors are those that originate outside the firm. A change in population provides 
an example of an exogenous factor. Exogenous factors may have an impact on 
either demand or supply. In contrast, endogenous factors originate within the firm 
itself as a result of the strategies and methods of conducting business pursued in 
response to exogenous factors. Consequently endogenous factors always affect 
the supply side of the market equilibrium equation. Choice of markets in which to 
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operate serves as an example of an endogenous factor. 
Though exogenous factors are important, studies such as the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development's examination of economic transition in Central 
and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the Conunonwealth of Independent 
States also have found that more important than the objective status of these 
factors are managers' perceptions of them, as this will impact upon the decisions 
they make in managing their firms. 11 Implicit in the findings of the ERBD study 
is a rejection of the neo-classical view of the firm as a "bloodless creature. "' 
Instead, the study sees managers' decisions as crucial in the running of businesses. 
Herbert Simon pioneered this approach to understanding organisations, now 
known as "the decision-making approach, " in the 1940s to 1950s. 12 flis work 
inspired economists such as Ronald Coase, Douglas North and Oliver Williamson 
to develop a new economic model that came to be known as the New Institutional 
Economics. 13 From the perspective of this model, external factors are triggers for 
the decisions and actions that managers take in running their businesses. The 
environment in which they operate forces managers to respond and adapt or see 
their businesses become non-viable. Adaptation may involve the development of 
new products and services; the upgrading of existing products and services; 
modification of existing or acquisition of new plant and equipment; the retraining 
of existing or hiring of new employees to meet new or upgraded product 
requirements; the attraction of new customers; or changing the business's 
organisational structure. In short, managers must innovate. They may decide to 
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implement all or any number of the above changes in order to adapt to altered 
market conditions, thus, to remain competitively viable. 14 
According to neo-classical economic theory, premised as it is on the notion of 
rationa economic actors operating in the context of perfect markets, managers' 
decisions should be perfectly rational responses to environmental changes, and we 
should expect them to respond in the same manner all things being equal. In 
contrast to the neo-classical theory, however, managers' choices are not always 
rationa , that is to say, adaptive or optimal given existing external conditions, as 
judged in terms of the goals of the firm. Indeed, Ronald Coase has written that the 
neo-classical model "only lives in the minds of economists but not on earth. "15 
Why are managers' choices not always rational? Economic theory offers two 
schools of thought in answer to this question. On the one hand, there is the 
perspective of New Institutional Economics. This model starts within the neo- 
classical framework, that is, the assumption of scarcity and therefore of 
competition, but holds that market imperfections prevent the market from 
operating as it naturally should operate (ie, achieving general equilibrium). One 
such market imperfection is the cost associated with each transaction in the 
marketplace. Oliver Williamson, a leading theorist of the New Institutional 
Economics model, has developed a theory of what constitutes transaction costs 
based on the work of Herbert Simon and Kenneth Arrow. Arrow argued that 
market imperfections arise from the problem of information asymmetry, that is, 
when the motivations and integrity of one party to a transaction is unknown, 
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transaction costs will rise. Simon argued that organisations are never perfectly 
rational because their members have limited information-processing abilities. 
Members of an organisation usually have to act on the basis of incomplete 
information about possible courses of action and their consequences, are able to 
explore only a limited number of alternatives relating to any given decision and 
are unable to attach accurate values to outcomes. Thus, Simon concluded that, in 
contrast to neo-classical economic theory in which the individual is assumed to 
make perfectly rational choices, individuals settle for "bounded rationality. " 16 
Information related limitations introduce transaction costs. Williamson's thesis is 
that such problems work together to create the transaction costs that make the firm 
necessary: "... what links opportunism and bounded rationality is uncertainty 
created by both the cognitive limitations of corporations and the unforeseen 
disturbances which create opportunities for one party to the exchange to take 
advantage of the other. " 
17 
There is another school of thought the roots of which predate the New 
Institutional Economics model and which economist Howard Stein therefore calls 
the Old Institutional Economics. This school rejects the neo-classical notion of 
rational-maximising self-seeking behaviour and the naturalism of markets. 
Instead, it holds that markets operate in specific historical and cultural contexts, 
not according to universal principles. As such, the Old Institutional Econon-fics 
views firms as less instrumental and more as "the habits and iroutines that allow 
corporations to deal with the complexity of production and exchange and to 
develop expectations of the future in a world of uncertainty. " 18 According to this 
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model, the choices of economic actors may not seem rational because they are 
conditioned by actors' historical and cultural contexts. 
The two schools of thought - New and Old Institutional Economics - are not 
mutually exclusive as explanations of why the choices of economic actors are not 
always rational. '9 Rather, they are complementary. Arrow's premise that 
economic actors make choices according to their own motivations opens the door 
to a synthesis of these two models in that individuals' motivations will bear the 
stamp of their historical and cultural influences. A deeper exploration of the 
concepts of information asymmetry and bounded rationality that underpin the 
New Institutional Economics model will shed further light on this point. 
Competitive Viability, Information Asymmetry and Bounded Rationality 
Information asymmetry and bounded rationality are information related problems 
that firms develop as they grow. The irony is that, although growth introduces 
these information related operating inefficiencies, it is necessary for a firm to 
remain competitively viable in the long-term. This is because there are 
diminishing returns to the accumulation of capital. In other words, if "you 
continue to equip people with more and more of the same capital goods without 
inventing new uses for the capital, then a point will be reached eventually where 
the extra capital goods become redundant except as spare parts in the event of 
multiple equipment failure, and where therefore the marginal product of capital is 
negligible. , 20 Thus, in order to avoid dissolution by diminishing returns, 
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managers often pursue growth as a competitive business strategy. 2 1 For example, 
traditionally firms have sought to grow by diversifying into new geographic 
markets or expanding the range of products or services that they offer. 
However, growth as a competitive strategy leads to an increase in the number of 
decisions to be made and the number of transactions for processing. In order to 
handle increased throughput, firms usually must take advantage of the 
productivity gains that can be achieved through decentralisation and 
specl sation. It was Adam Smith, the founder of modem economics., who first 
identified that specialisation and division of labour could result in tremendous 
productivity gains. 22 Departmentalisation and specialisation increases 
productivity because fragmentation and bounding the decision-making process 
can render work more manageable. 
Thus, competitive strategies such as the introduction of new products and services 
or the acquisition of new customers also have a tendency to produce more 
hierarchical, decentralised and specialised organisations. This is not to suggest 
that all organisations are hierarchical, nor that all the interactions in an 
organisation are hierarchical, decentrafised or specialised, even if the formal 
organisation chart suggests that this is the case. Indeed, the so-called organic 
organisational structure which features lateral forms of communication and 
limited amounts of specialisation has become a favoured organisational form. 23 
However, as economist Roy Radner notes, hierarchy, and we may extend this to 
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decentralisation and specialisation, is an important principle of organisation, both 
in its prevalence and in the prevalence of attempts to circumvent it. 
24 
Building on Simon's theory, Roy Radner argues that that there are three different 
types of decentralisation in hierarchical organisational structures. These are- 
decentralisation of information processing, decentralisation of information, and 
decentralisation of incentives. Each of these will be discussed in turn. 
First, there is decentralisation of what Radner refers to as "the processing of 
infonnation. , 2' As he writes- 
Although managers in a firm have many different functions, one of their 
most important functions is that of processing information. We might 
think of the information processing part of the firm as one huge decision- 
making machine, which takes signals from the environment and transforms 
them into the actions to be taken by the "real workers. " Of course, as I 
have already pointed out, every worker on an assembly-line or lathe, and 
every salesperson in the field, makes many decisions every day that are not 
precisely dictated by management ... 
The point I am making here is that 
in the modem corporation a large part of the information processing 
activities are highly decentralized [author's emphasis], i. e., assigned to a 
large number of persons in the corporation who specialize in these 
activities. 26 
So, essentially, what Radner is speaking of when he refers to decentralisation of 
information processing is the decentralisation of decision-making that leads to 
concomitant decentralised transaction processing in a given organisation. 
Second, Radner argues that large-scale business entities experience 
"decentralisation of information" because different decision makers in a firm will 
typically have access to different information. This is so because in a large firm in 
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which decision making and the taking of action is departmentalised and 
specialised, so too may be the storage of information about those decisions and 
actions. In other words, each information processor creates, and often possesses, 
only information about his or her own decisions and actions. This information 
may represent only a portion of the total information about a single transaction. 
Radner, however, argues that the information limitations created by 
decentralisation of information are mitigated by the fact that different decisions 
require different sets of data. He comments that it is not economical for afl 
decisions and resultant transactions to be based on the same data or all the 
information available to the firM. 
27 There is no need for each member to have full 
access to information in order to make effective decisions, as most decision 
problems require a relatively small amount of information to make a fairly good 
choice. Radner writes, 
A small decision about the maintenance of a machine can be made quite 
well based on information local to the production unit; similarly, a good 
decision about the order in which to visit customers can be made on the 
basis of information local to the sales office. 28 
He goes on to say that: 
On the other hand, a decision to change the rate of production should be 
based, in part, on information about conditions at other production units, as 
well as on information about demand for the product. But even in this 
case, completely detailed information about all other production units and 
all sales units is not really needed; certain aggregate measures will be 
adequate. 29 
While managers will not need to, indeed cannot, refer to all of an organisation's 
information in the making of a specific decision, relying instead on aggregate 
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measures or selections of information, the workers that produce the aggregate 
measures and selections on which managers depend for their decision making still 
need to know about and have some mechanism to pull together a view based on 
all relevant information. Thus, we must conclude that full information is needed, 
although managers themselves may require only selections or aggregations of it 
for decision-making. Furthermore, whatever mechanism is used to select or 
aggregate the data must reasonably draw upon a full view of all relevant 
information if poor decision-making is to be avoided. The inadvertent 
overlooking of relevant information that is not easily accessible could lead to 
misleading selections or aggregations of data that cause poor decisions. 
This pulling together of fragmented information is not easily done and presents a 
serious chaflenge to organisations. As Michael Hammer and James Champy have 
written in their popular book Reengineering the Corporation: A Manifestofor 
Business Revolution, the problem with many contemporary businesses is that 
departmentalisation, specialisation and routinisation create "functional silos" or 
"stovepipes" built on narrow pieces of a process in which each person only 
possesses information about his or her part. Without some kind of coordinating 
and integrating mechanism within an organisation to pull together all the pieces, it 
is very difficult for aggregations to reflect a full view of the organisation or for a 
selection of data to consist of all information relevant to a given decision. This, 
Hammer and Champy argue, has led to contemporary performance problems in 
companies such as a lack of customer focus, weak competitiveness and the 
inability to change. 
30 Likewise, in their book on organisational learning, Gilbert 
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Probst and Bettina Bilchel discuss how "operational islands" in many 
hierarchical, specialised and routinised organisations prevent managers from 
having access to all the information they need for decision making, which presents 
a significant barrier to organisational learning. 31 
The quest to overcome problems associated with the fragmentation of information 
that occurs with decentralisation has led experts to recommend two main 
remedies: 1) corporate restructuring and 2) computerisation. It must be noted that 
these strategies have been introduced also to address the need to speed up 
information processing within firms. The first remedy, restructuring, seeks to 
redress the fragmentation of information by reorganising transactions and their 
processors. For example, the multi-divisional organisational structure arose as a 
means of resolving the information inefficiencies of its predecessor organisational 
structure, the functionaUy organised firm. However, as Steve Thompson and 
Mike Wright note in an article on the role of restructuring transactions in 
corporate governance, many of the perceived advantages of the multi-divisional 
structure in terms of resolving information problems have not materialised. 32 
Information inefficiencies remain. 
This begs the question why restructuring the transactions in hierarchical 
organisations has had less than satisfactory results as a remedy to information 
inefficiencies. Here it is posited that the reason for its failure is that all large 
orgarusations must have some level of departmentalisation, specialisation and 
routirusation, even if reduced. Whenever these characteristics are present, the 
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organisation unavoidably experiences fragmentation of information as a natural 
state. While it is true that certain organisational structures reduce the level of 
structural complexity (ie, those that "flatten" the organisational hierarchy) and 
therefore have a tendency to ameliorate the problem of information fragmentation 
by reducing its severity, no amount of tinkering with a large organisation's 
structure can ever do away with the problem of communication costs completely 
as long as more than one person in an organisation is responsible for transacting 
its business. 
Recently, organisations with flattened structures have gained favour as a solution 
to reducing the fragmentation of information associated with the hierarchical firm. 
In their book on endogenous growth theory,, Phiffipe Aghion and Peter Howitt 
draw upon the work of P. Bolton and M. Dewatripont to provide a formalised 
explanation of why flattening the organisational. structure reduces the degree to 
which information is decentralised within an organisation and thus also reduces 
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communication and processing delays. 
While flatter organisations arguably do address some of the information 
inefficiencies of the hierarchical organisational form, Aghion and Howitt also 
make the point that "hierarchical structures appear to be better suited to firms 
facing infrequent and/or predictable innovation opportunities, to the extent that 
they allow the organisation to take better advantage of the existence of economies 
of scale in direct information processing. r)34 In other words, there may be 
instances when a hierarchical structure is preferable to a flatter one. Moreover, 
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even assuming that in a given context it is preferable for an organisation to adopt 
a flattened organisational form, the costs of corporate restructuring may be 
prohibitively high. Thus, there remains an incentive to explore solutions to the 
problems of decentralisation of information within the hierarchical organisational 
form that look beyond restructuring. If acceptable solutions can be found , it may 
be possible to "level the playing field, " so to speak, between the hierarchical and 
flatter organisational forms. Moreover, the flattened organisational form does not 
do away with the problem of fragmentation of information completely, but merely 
reduces it by reducing the number of processors and moving them around within 
the organisational structure. Apparently, then, even in flatter organisations, there 
is a need to explore strategies for reducing the information inefficiencies 
associated with the decentralisation of information. 
The other commonly recommended remedy to the information fragmentation 
problem is computerisation. Aside from the capacity to increase the efficiency of 
transaction processing, managers often view computers as bringing together 
information from disparate sources and making it more accessible. For example, 
in a recent article for Financial World, Bernard Hom writes of the importance for 
bank competitiveness of harnessing customer information: "... in today's 
competitive market, " he states, "customer information must be managed, so every 
customer interface with the bank can be handled just as if the bank's employees 
have full - and personal - knowledge of every customer. Given the size of the 
customer base and the number of transactions and interactions, this is at the 




Yet, as in the case of restructuring, computerisation as a solution to the 
information inefficiencies of large, hierarchical organisations often has proved to 
be disappointing. Many organisations have invested millions in information 
technology only to find that information is no more accessible than under previous 
systems. 36 This often is as a result of design, system and software limitations that 
prevent the interoperability of organisational computer systems. Many 
computerised systems operate on different software and hardware platforms, 
contain ormation in a variety of formats (eg, application specific files, PDF, 
HTMEL, TIF, etc. ) and store information on a variety of storage media (eg, hard 
drive, floppy disk, CD-ROM, magnetic tape, etc. ). Not all of these platforms, 
formats and methods of storage can be seamlessly and effectively integrated. 
Even with the best planning these limitations often cannot be overcome. 
Consequently, they often prevent organisations from defragmenting their 
information through the introduction of one organisational computer system or 
several functionally integrated computer systems. Instead, organisations are 
limited to several computer systems that often do not communicate well with one 
another. As a result, the introduction of computerisation into an organisation 
rather ironically can cause additional splintering of information because 
information storage becomes more segmented (ie, must be stored in many 
different computer systems or is divided between manual and computer storage 
systems). For instance, the head of internal audit for one international financial 
institution interviewed for this study noted that his company had as many as 100 
different computer systems until quite recently. Most of these systems did not 
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share information, thus preventing organisational decision makers from easily 
accessing information on which to base their decisions. 37 
While design, system and software limitations may soon be swept away as a result 
of new technological innovations thereby reducing the additional fragmentation of 
information that computers often create, it is unlikely that computerisation alone, 
even if systems are My interoperable, can succeed in eliminating information 
fragmentation and its attendant problems. This is because systems that specialise 
in performing one type of function may be better designed and more flexible than 
those general systems designed to perform many different functions. Thus, there 
may always be an incentive for organisations to invest in more specialised, 
functionaRy targeted systems. Furthermore, the introduction of standards, such as 
communications protocols and systems interfaces, is unlikely to keep pace with 
the rate of technological innovation. As a result, there always may be some initial 
difficulty in interoperability among specialised systems and therefore some level 
of information decentralisation and fragmentation. 
The above discussion is not meant to suggest that restructuring and 
computerisation should be discounted as solutions to the problems associated with 
the decentralisation of information but rather to illustrate their shortcomings and 
to suggest that organisations need to supplement these strategies with other 
remedies. This study argues that organisations should look to a controlled and 
coordinated approach to record inscription, transmission and contextualization as 
a complimentary solution to the information problems of large, hierarchical firms. 
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Computers can be used as a tool to achieve this objective, as in the case of 
methodologies of data warehousing which uses computer technology to collect 
and share data from a diversity of systems . 
38 The subject of controffing and 
coordinating the inscription, transmission and contextualization of recorded 
information is discussed further in the f6flowing chapter. 
Returning to Radner's discussion of decentralisation, the third form of 
decentralisation that he describes is "decentralisation of mcentives, 
71) 
which arises 
because all members of a firm will not have exactly the same goal. The 
decentralisation of incentives ranges from members who are greedy and self- 
interested to simple and innocent disagreements over what is best for a given firm. 
Of course, the larger the number of employees, the greater the decentralisation of 
incentives. Thus, it is easy to see how growth, which requires that a firm take on a 
greater number of employees, also introduces more uncertainty because of greater 
decentralisation of incentives. It is the-notion of decentralisation of incentives that 
permits a synthesis of New Institutional and Old Institutional Economics, for 
individuals' incentives, and by extension the choices they make based on those 
incentives, are influenced, among other things, by the particular historical and 
cultural context (both organisational and social) of the individual. 
The combination of decentralisation of information processing, decentralisation of 
information and decentralisation of incentives which Radner describes and which 
this study accepts as accurately reflecting the state of large organisations, results 
in a paradox. That is, at the same time as a business entity must grow and expand 
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in order to stay competitive, its very growth and expansion sows the seeds of its 
own deconstruction. This is because decentralisation and speciahsation coupled 
with the hiring of new employees required to handle increased volumes of 
decisions and transactions leads to operational inefficiency. Radner writes - 
I have argued that, in any but the smallest firms, no one person has all of 
the information relevant to the firm's activities. It follows that no one 
person can completely control all of those activities. This is so even in 
firms that are described as highly "centralized. " From this fundamental 
observation, it follows that the individual members of the firm will have 
some freedom to choose their own actions. If in addition, there is some 
divergence among the members' goals or objectives, then one can expect 
some inefficiencies to arise in the firm's operations. 39 
Thus, growth and innovation create a situation in which a principal is forced to 
delegate decisions and actions to a greater number of agents in order to keep pace 
with rising throughput. The agents to whom principals delegate decisions and 
actions have their own incentives that may not be in harmony with the goals of the 
principal or the organisation, Furthermore, because information is also 
decentrafised the principal lacks information with which to monitor the quality 
and appropriateness, that is, the outcomes, of the decisions and actions taken by 
the agent. 40 Lack of full information on the part of the principal may allow agents 
to shirk their duties or play information games. 41 Information games include: 1) 
free-riding (incompleteness of information makes it difficult to assign 
responsibility to individual agents for the occurrence of unsatisfactory 
outcomeS42 ) 2) moral hazard (a failure to take decisions and actions with due 
diligence because there exists no incentive to do so) and 3) adverse selection (poor 
quality decisions and actions crowd out high quality decisions and actions because 
the incentive system rewards only average quality decisions and actionS43). 
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Moreover, even when agents do not shirk their duties or play information games, 
their decisions and actions will reflect their historical and cultural predilections. 
These, if not in keeping with organisational values or goals, may cause operational 
inefficiencies. 
Thus, as soon as the principal can no longer control the decisions and actions of 
the agent, agents can take decisions and actions that are deliberately or 
inadvertently detrimental to the business entity (eg, fraud), thereby undermining 
internal control and the foundations of that business entity. Moreover, 
irrespective of whether an agent takes decisions or actions that are at odds with the 
objectives of the principal or the organisation, lack of full information about what 
decisions and actions the agent has taken prevents the principal fi7om making fully 
informed decisions as the basis of actions to be taken in his or her own right. 
The problems of information asymmetry and bounded rationality not only impact 
upon managers' ability to control internal operations but also impact upon the 
ability of a firm's owners and "governors" to control senior management. In 
theory, the ownership and corporate governance of a firm influence its decisions 
and performance by appointing its managers and specifying its objectives, 
management compensation and incentive packages. 44 The authority to hire or 
dismiss senior management of a company rests largely with shareholders and 
boards of directors. Owners' and boards' decisions about a finn's senior 
management will be influenced by the performance information they receive. In 
the context of decentralised information processing, information and incentives, 
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the information received by the board may be inadequate to permit it to make the 
best decisions about senior managers. Setting aside possible incentives for 
managers to cover up poor performance, if managers themselves have inadequate 
information they are not in a position to report with any accuracy to owners and 
boards. Moreover, owners and boards will face the same problems that managers 
face in independently accessing adequate infonnation if they see a need to 
supplement what senior managers have provided. 
The same conditions hold true for firms wherein there is sufficient public interest 
to warrant external regulation. Regulators establish rules that set operational 
parameters designed to influence the range, type of decisions and actions that 
managers can take so as to ensure that a given firm operates in a manner that is in 
keeping with broader social interests. In order to ensure that firms do operate 
within established parameters, regulators require information about the 
performance of a firm. If that information is inadequate, regulators will be unable 
to assess the appropriateness of a firm's decisions and actions and to protect the 
public interest. In an environment that promotes growth and innovation (ie, an 
increase in the number of firms to be regulated or the types of products and 
services requiring rules), regulators may find it increasingly difficult to obtain 
adequate information to establish and maintain effective control. 
Clearly, loss of organisational control, resulting from decentralisation of 
information processing, decentralisation of information and decentralisation of 
incentives presents a serious threat to the competitive viability of any business 
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entity and, more widely in the case of regulated industries, to the public interest. 
This begs the question of what to do as a remedy to this inherent organisational 
danger? The avoidance of decentralisation would seem to be out of the question 
because of the necessity for firms to grow, expand and innovate in order to remain 
competitive and because departmentalisation, specialisation and routinisation are 
usually necessary to support such growth and innovation. Decentralisation of 
information processing is a necessity because it is that which brings the 
productivity gains associated with departmentalisation and specialisation; that is., 
departmentafisation and specialisation are decentralisation's raison detre. 
Similarly, human nature being what it is, decentralisation of incentives is difficult, 
if not impossible, to avoid, unless one is able to influence individuals' behaviour 
through some mechanism. This brings the discussion to the subject of 
accountability, for it is by means of accountability systems that behaviours 
ostensibly can be influenced. 
Accountability and Accountability Systems 
Before turning to a discussion of how accountability systems alleviate inherent 
problems of decentralised organisations, a brief discussion of accountability and 
accountability systems is in order. The literature defining and describing 
accountability is extensive and interdisciplinary. 
45 Despite the diverse definitions 
and descriptions of accountability, there exist certain commonalities in how it is 
conceptualised. Accountability generally is pictured as having four 
interdependent dimensions: 1) the "who" dimension, 2) the "to whom" dimension 
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3) the "for what" dimension and 4) the "how" dimension. That is to say, 
accountability implies there is someone to whom we (being the who) are 
accountable for something (the what) and mechanisms for how we are accountable 
(the process of accounting). For example, the Oxford English Dictionary defines 
"accountability" as: "liability to give account of, and answer for the discharge of 
duties or conduct. "46 Thus, to be "accountable" means to be answerable in some 
way for something to someone. It requires that explanations, or accounts, of 
something be given and, on the basis of those accounts, that actions or decisions 
be judged for their merit against a predefined standard of performance. 
Accountability rests upon a relationship between a giver of the account (the who) 
and a receiver (the to whom). J. D. Stewart writes that this relationship involves 
"both the account and the holding to account, [and that it] can be analysed as a 
bond linking the one who accounts and is held to account, to the one who holds to 
account. That bond can be defined by reference to the persons or institutions who 
are accountable and those to whom they are accountable. -)747 
Traditional definitions of accountability conceive of this bond as existing between 
a higher authority vested with the power of oversight and supervision of a 
subordinate. For example, the HarperCollins Dictionary ofAmerican 
Government and Politics defines accountability in one sense as. "The extent to 
which one must answer to higher authority - legal or organizational - for one's 
actions in society at large or within one's organization. "48 It is possible to picture 
the traditional view of accountability in a corporate setting as a vertical tree in 
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which accounts move up through the different hierarchical levels of the 
corporation: from the individual worker to management, from management to the 
board of directors and, mediated through external auditors, from the board of 
directors to shareholders. In addition, in cases where the corporation's activities 
have a wider public impact, accounts will flow to regulators who serve as proxies 
for the interests of the wider society. 
While the traditional view of hierarchical accountability relationships is not 
incorrect., it must be acknowledged that this is not the only form in which 
accountability exists. John Roberts writes of "socializing forms" of accountability 
involving informal personal lateral networks and, similarly Kristian Kreiner 
explores non-hierarchical forms of accountability characterised by mutuality and 
lateral forms of accountability. 49 Clearly we must acknowledge both formal, 
hierarchical and less formal, non-hierarchical forms of accountability as well as 
the possibility of some interplay between both modes of accountability. 
For accountability to exist, then, there must be a bond of accountability between 
one person and another. Furthermore, the person who is accountable often is 
subordinate to the person who receiVes the account. There also must be a standard 
of measurement to which the accountable person is held and by which they are 
judged by the receiver of the account. Finafly, there must be a mechanism by 
which the actions or decisions of the accountable person are communicated to the 
person to whom they are accountable, that is, there must be an account. These 
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four dimensions working interactively comprise what we shall refer to as an 
accountabflity system. 
Linking Competitive Viability and Accountability Systems 
Having discussed accountability and accountability systems, it is now possible to 
relate these concepts to competitive viability. A review of the historical 
development of formal, hierarchical systems of accountability in the US reveals 
that such systems came about as a means of addressing the problems of large 
decentralised organisations. It was in their capacity to prevent the natural loss of 
control as organisations decentralised and specialised that accountability systems 
supported the continuing competitive viability of bureaucratic organisations 
during America's Industrial Revolution. 
Increasing widespread adoption of formal accountability systems in the world of 
work occurred simultaneously with the rise of the modem business enterprise, as 
economist Alfred Chandler has outlined in -The 
Visible Hand with respect to 
economic developments in the US. 
50 The modem business enterprise, 
characterised by decentralisation and specialisation, became increasingly 
prevalent in the US from the n-ýd-nineteenth century in response to a need for new 
methods of work coordination and control brought about by what economic 
historian Jaines Beniger refers to as a "crisis of control. " This crisis was the result 
of new technologies arising out of the Industrial Revolution. The growth that took 
place in the US in the mid-nineteenth century - spurred on by the technological 
63 
innovations of the Industrial Revolution - required new control technologies in 
order to handle increased throughput in material processing. According to 
Beniger, this requirement gave rise to "the most important control technology" of 
the age: bureaucracy, that is, organisational forms that, among other things, were 
characterised by more decentralisation and speciahsation. He notes that: 
"Although bureaucracy had developed several times independently in ancient 
civilizations, Weber was the first to see it as the critical new machinery - new, at 
least, in its generality and pervasiveness - for control of the societal forces 
unleashed by the Industrial Revolution. 
The increasing pervasiveness of accountability systems alongside the rise of the 
modem business enterprise in the US was no coincidence: accountability was 
necessary in order to maintain control over the new decentralised organisational 
structures, especially since ownership and management were now separate. In an 
organisational setting comprised of many hierarchical levels wherein boards of 
directors delegated the decisions about the operation of the firm to professional 
managers and these managers increasingly delegated decisions and actions to 
workers at lower levels of the firm's administrative hierarchy, there existed a need 
to have some means for boards to control managers and managers to maintain 
discipline over workers. It was this need to which the men who devised the 
modem formal and hierarchical organisational accountability systems 
responded. " For example, Colonel Roswell Lee when he took command of the 
Springfield Armoury in 1815 centralised authority and responsibility in the Office 
of the Superintendent and devised and put into operation a set of controls that 
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53 assured accountability for material and for the quality of the end product. The 
introduction of these practices into the nineteenth-century world of work led to a 
transformation that subsequently resulted in the development of the modem 
system of work coordination and control through financial and management 
accounting, reporting and auditing. 54 Accountability systems are, therefore, 
inextricably a part of and linked to internal control in decentralised and specialised 
organisational settings. 
How Accountability Systems Function to Maintain Organisational Control 
and Support Competitive Viability 
When they operate effectively, accountability systems make human performance 
visible through processes of writing and examination. In making human 
performance visible, they permit the evaluation or grading of that performance 
against assigned measures. In this way, by capturing and quantifying human 
performance, accountability systems work to reduce the uncertainty of less precise 
methods of assessment. The point of examination, grading and writing is not only 
to permit assessment but also to encourage performance that conforms to the 
prescribed standards of assessment. As Philip Tetlock writes: "... accountability 
is a critical rule and norm enforcement mechanism ... The 
fact that people are 
accountable for their decisions is an implicit or explicit constraint upon all 
consequential acts they undertake. , 55 In this sense, accountability is both a 
combination of the "is" (assessment of performance) and "ought" (prescribing 
what that performance should be). 56 The threat of some undesirable consequence 
of failing to achieve the prescribed level of performance (eg, humiliation, 
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expulsion from the organisation, etc) or a sense of responsibility is, ostensibly, 
what drives individuals to conform. 
Figure I summarises how accountability systems function as feedback 
mechanisms by which organisational control and coordination - and by extension., 
organisational stability and viability - are achieved and maintained. In this 
diagram, workers are shown as being one of the inputs of organisational 
transformation systems, that is, systems designed to perform the organisation's 
operating functions. In a bureaucratic setting, transformation systems exist at 
each level of the organisational hierarchy. Those involved in the decisions and 
actions that result in transformations comprise the "who" aspect of accountability. 
The "to whom" aspect is built into management and control systems in the form of 
those who govern transformation systems. In a corporate setting, for example, 
these might include the organisation's management, its shareholders, and external 
regulators in organisations undertaking activities that have a broader social 
impact. Goals, standards and organisational norms, shown as feeding into 
management and control systems at the top of the diagram, comprise an important 
part of the "what" aspect of accountability as the measures against which 
individuals' actions and decisions are judged. These goals, standards and 
organisational norms in turn will reflect broader societal goals, standards and 
norms. The "how" dimension is represented by the feedback loop which carries 
information about actions and decisions taken by the people producing outputs 
(the "who" of accountability) to the system governors (those "to whom" others 
are accountable) and back to those producing outputs. This loop performs a 
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critical organisational. function, for without it the organisation's governors would 
be unable to detect and correct problems in actions and decisions taken by those 
within the organisation. Moreover, they would have no basis upon which to make 
decisions of their own. 
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Fig. 1. The Accountability System 
Mechanisms) 
Outputs (products/services) 
So critical has maintaining control become to the viability of organisations that 
most of a certain size now have an internal audit department with responsibility 
for ensuring that internal control systems operate effectively. Internal audit serves 
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as a sort of controller of the controllers. Figure I shows how internal audit 
functions as the negative feedback mechanism that maintains control over an 
organisation's management and control systems, including accountability systems. 
It is by means of internal audit that imbalances and problems in management and 
control systems usually can be detected and fixed. Once again, accountability is 
critical to the operation of this negative feedback loop, as it provides the conduit 
for information about how well internal controls are functioning and the 
effectiveness of decisions and actions taken by the members of the organisation. 
Without this conduit, the regulators of business systems would be less likely to 
detect internal control issues before serious consequences begin to materialise. 
With effective systems of accountability, internal auditors can detect issues in 
advance of the occurrence of "life" threatening organisational problems and 
thereby make corrections to internal controls before the organisation's operations 
become seriously impaired. 
Debating the Usefulness of Accountability Systems in Maintaining Internal 
Control and Supporting Competitive Viability 
While modem systems of accountability were introduced into the business 
environment to help maintain organisational control by constraining and 
monitoring workers' actions and decisions, there is some debate in the literature as 
to whether these systems actually achieve this goal. Despite Tetlock's assertion 
that accountability constrains consequential acts, Katrine Kirk and Jan Mouritsen 
point out that knowledge of being controlled through accountability may cause 
people to behave subversively. For example, they may try to evade discipline 
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through structuring the account so that it presents a more favourable picture of 
performance or by explaining, justifying and excusing performance as represented 
in the accounting numbers by challenging the standards by which they are 
measured. 57 The realisation that members of an organisation may engage in 
cccounter-disciplinary" tactics has given rise to strategies such as standard 
accounting procedures aimed at limiting the ways in which accountable persons 
can manipulate accounting figures. Another strategy is evident in more recent 
management trends such as the development of organisational vision statements, 
team building and the like that seek to strengthen organisational culture so that the 
individual internalises organisational performance standards. Despite the 
introduction of strategies to bolster the effectiveness of accountability in the face 
of individuals' subversive actions or to more closely align organisational and 
individual objectives, there is still no guarantee that accountability will succeed in 
constraining individuals' acts. 
Accountability also fails to achieve its goal if individuals are not concerned with 
adhering to prescribed standards of measure, which Kristian Kreiner suggests may 
sometimes be the case. Lack of concern with meeting performance targets may 
result if incentives or sanctions for failing to meet targets do not outweigh other 
incentives or motivations influencing the individual. For example, if an individual 
sees an opportunity to gain financially through fraud and also sees that this act is 
unlikely to be detected or punished, the individual may have sufficient incentive 
and motivation to commit the fraudulent act despite organisational policies and 
societal laws that forbid 
it. 5' However, this suggests some inherent weakness in 
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the accountability system, since in effective systems, individuals' actions are 
detected and judged and appropriate consequences (ie, those that are likely to 
encourage certain behaviours and discourage others) are meted out. 
This study argues that accountability systems support the competitive viability of 
organisations by counteracting inherent control problems of decentralised 
organisational forms. However, might accountability actually undermine the 
competitiveness of a firm? John Roberts makes just this case, arguing that 
traditional hierarchical forms of accountability encourage workers to develop a 
highly individualised (ie, selfish) mentality) defensive patterns of communication 
and a lack of wholehearted commitment that can threaten commercial success 
rather than enhance it because the work of contemporary business enterprises 
demands and benefits from collaboration and teamwork. 59 He writes: 
Against the backdrop of an intense, pervasive and highly complex 
interdependence of action both within organizations, and between 
organizations and the communities within which they operate, the 
individualized mentality that is the condition and consequence of 
hierarchical forms of accountability seems simply inadequate and 
inappropriate. 60 
However, Roberts does not go as far as to suggest that accountabflity systems be 
abandoned, merely that organisations adopt more socialising, lateral forms to 
bring the "instrumental" and "moral" aspects of accountability back into 
alignment. This, Roberts argues, will better support competitive viability because 
lateral forms of accountability promote the collaboration and teamwork so 
necessary to success in the current business environment. 
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At times Roberts waxes a little too lyrical on the virtues of lateral forms of 
accountability, suggesting that these informal networks (. ýpotentially offer 
alternative sources of identity and most importantly confirm self in a manner that 
emphasizes the interdependence of self and other. -). )6 
1 Nevertheless, he does 
acknowledge that lateral forms of accountability can suffer from their own 
schisms and confficts, such as "... possibilities of deep personal animosity that 
can infect relationships between colleagues, or the local abuse of power in the 
form of favouritism, or victimization. The possibility of racial or sexual abuse or 
other forms of 'scapegoating' in which a group can engage, or of group collusion 
or corruption that can threaten its responsibilities to the wider organization. 
Though probably not typical of lateral accountability relationships, Roberts gives 
these rather serious organisational afflictions a passing nod. In the final analysis, 
it is only possible to conclude that both hierarchical and lateral forms of 
accountability may have their "dark" sides. The side that manifests likely depends 
upon the values underpinning human interaction within the organisation (ie, 
whether accepted values promote competition or cooperation), no matter if that 
interaction is worker to co-worker as in lateral forms of accountability or worker 
to management as in hierarchical forms of accountability. 
The writings of Roberts, Kirk and Mouritsen, and Kreiner aH suggest that 
accountability systems are imperfect instruments for maintaining organisational 
control and point to another means of resolving the organisational dilemma caused 
by decentralisation of information processing, information and incentives, that is: 
trUSt. 63 if principals could simply trust the agents to whom they delegate authority 
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for decisions and actions there would be no need to enforce organisational 
discipline by means of accountability. Relying on trust certainly would seem to 
be a more humanistic, less instrumental approach to management. In fact, some 
argue that formal accountability mechanisms are symptoms of social decay. 64 
Trust however, takes time to develop, and in a business environment that 
encourages rapid growth and thus the hiring of many new workers with unknown 
incentives, business survival may preclude the luxury of developing trust. That is 
to say, by the time those relationships have developed managers may have lost 
control over operations already. So, it seems that, imperfect as it is, accountability 
systems may be a "necessary evil" as a means of behavioural control. 
There is another reason why organisations cannot dispense with accountability. 
Accountability systems also serve as a crucial conduit of information, information 
that is needed for managers to make decisions and take action and which may be 
difficult to obtain in large, hierarchical organisations due to decentralisation of 
information. As noted earlier in the discussion, flattening the organisation 
hierarchy may reduce decentralisation of information and ease problems of 
information accessibility, but this is not always an appropriate option. Moreover, 
the introduction of computers, often seen as a solution to the problem of 
decentralisation of information, perversely may further fragment information 
rather than bring it together and make it more accessible. Accountability systems, 
and the process of accounting by which they operate, serve as a means of 
channelling information in a hierarchical organisation across its spatial and 
temporal barriers. That being said, however, accounts often fail to transcend 
72 
these barriers with the result that essential information does not flow to 
organisational decision-makers. Understanding why this should be so brings the 
discussion to the relationship between record keeping and accountability, which is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
Finally, accountability systems may be seen as being fundamental to the 
constitution and binding together of organisations. Social theorist George Herbert 
Mead has written that it is the process of becoming conscious of and answerable 
for how others see us that shapes the personality and constitutes the individual's 
"self -) . 
65 Accountability casts back a reflection that the individual uses as a means 
of self-examination and identity formation. Harold Garfinkel writes that 
accountability serves the same purpose for organisations: 
Any setting organizes its activities to make its properties as an organized 
environment of practical activities detectable, countable, recordable, 
reportable, tell-a-story-aboutable, analyzable - in short, accountable. 
Organized social arrangements consist of various methods for 
accomplishing the accountability of a settings' organizational ways as a 
concerted undertaking. Every claim by practitioners of effectiveness, 
clarity, consistency, planfulness, or efficiency, and every consideration for 
adequate evidence, demonstration, description, or relevance obtains its 
character as aphenomenon [author's emphasis] from the corporate pursuit 
of this undertaking and from the ways in which various organizational 
environments, by reason of their characteristics as organizations of 
activities, "sustain, " "facilitate '19 
". resistl" etc. these methods for making 
their affairs accountable-matters-for-afl-practical-purposes. 
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Through the process of accounting and accountability, the organisation evolves its 
identity and takes it shape. In holding the organisation together and, indeed, 
constituting it, accountability systems must be seen as fundamental to the ongoing 
existence and therefore competitive viability of any business enterprise. 
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Conclusion 
Tbýs chapter has presented the first part of a theoretical framework linking 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. It has argued that 
competitive viability is the ability of a firm to operate with sufficient efficiency to 
avoid failure and ensure survival in a competitive market. An organisation's 
ability to operate efficiently, it has been argued, naturally comes under pressure as 
it expands and innovates in order to maintain its competitive position. While 
strategies of decentralising and specialising help organisations to process a greater 
number of transactions as they grow and expand, these strategies also lead to 
information related problems - information asymmetry and bounded rationality - 
that undermine the efficiency of organisations by weakening managers' ability to 
control their business operations and make effective decisions. Drawing upon the 
historical development of formal accountability systems in the US, this chapter 
has suggested that such systems serve as critical mechanisms for mitigating the 
effects of information related problems associated with decentralisation and 
specialisation. Having established a theoretical link between competitive viability 
and accountability in this chapter, the discussion in the following chapter turns to 
the relationship between accountability systems and record keeping in order to 
complete the theoretical framework. 
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semi-oral systems of examination. Hoskin maintains that writing, examining and grading seeped into the practices of new institutional and economic forms, such as modem government and 
corporate business enterprises, as means of administrative coordination and control with the result that "... prisons, schools, hospitals, factories, universities, state bureaucracies and corporate 
oligopolies most resemble each other, as both the social world and the self become more and more 
subject to a writing, grading and examining which together ensure the meticulous and continual 
circulation of plans, examinations, reports, feedback and feed forward evaluations - knowing me, knowing you, in our respective truths. " [Hoskin, 265-2821. 
53 As Alfted Chandler explains: "Lee achieved control over production and accountability for work in two ways. One was through careful inspection. Each worker placed his 'private mark' on each 
piece he made. After the assistant master armorer had inspected and passed the piece, he put his 
mark on it next to that of the worker. The supervisor also submitted a monthly off-ice report which 
listed pieces passed and rejected ... The second method of control was through bookkeeping, that is, by accounting for each transaction carried on within the enterprise involved in production 
through the use of standard double-entry accounts. " [Chandler, 73-74]. 
54 Chandler, 266. 
55 Philip E. Tetlock, "Accountability: The Neglected Social Context of Judgement and Choice, " 
Research in Organizational Behaviour 7 (1985): 307, cited in Kreiner, 85. 
56 Hoskin, 270-273. 
57 See Joni J. Young, "Getting the Accounting 'Right': Accounting and the Savings and Loan 
Crisis. " Accounting, Organizations and Society 20.1 (1995): 55-80 and Katrine Kirk, Katrine and 
Jan Mouritsen, "Spaces of accountability in a multinational firm, " Accountability: Power, Ethos 
and the Technologies ofManaging, Rolland Munro and Jan Mouritsen eds. (London: International 
Thompson Business Press, 1996), 25 1. 
58 Kreiner argues that individuals' lack of concern for meeting performance targets does not 
necessarily have to have negative repercussions for an organization, as it would in the case of 
fraud; instead, she argues that it may spur additional interaction that circumvents the limitations of 
a given situation. In this way, accountability becomes an "inspiring constraint" that promotes 
dialogue as opposed to a hiniting one, as in Tetlock's conceptuahsation. See Kreiner , 98. 
59Roberts, "From Discipline to Dialogue", 55. 
60 Roberts, "From Discipline to Dialogue", 56. 
61 Roberts, "From Discipline to Dialogue", 55. 
" Roberts, "From Discipline to Dialogue", 5 1. 
63 See also Nfichael Power, "The Audit Society, " 4 ccounting as Social and Institutional Practice, 
Anthony G. Hopwood and Peter Nfiller eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press, 1994), 299- 
3 16. This paper, drawing on post-modernist sociological theory, argues that the audit function is as 
much a social and economic construction as a technical practice. It suggests that audit is emerging 
as a principle of social organisation in the UK. The conditions of emergence for this audit society 
are in transformations in public sector management and newly prominent ideals of quality, 
governance and accountability. The audit society is theorised in four primary themes: new rhetoric 
of accountability and control; new obscurities in the name of transparency; a politics of regulatory 
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failure; and the construction of auditees. Audit is part of the new cosmetics of risk in which newly 
perceived dangers and risks can be minimised or neutralised through audit. Audit is a conservative 
force in the sense of being a knowledge system which filters and appropriates environmental 
disturbance under the norm of auditability, in the process displacing structures of trust. More 
recently, Onora O'Neill has challenged the uscft&ess of accountability and advocated a return to 
the philosophy of trust [See Onora O'Neill, "The Philosphy of Trust, " BBC, Radio 4, Reith 
Lecture Series, http: //www, open2. net/trust/oneill on trust/oneill on trustl. accessed May 17., 
20021. 
64See for example, Roberts, "From Discipline to Dialogue" and Hoskin. 
6' George Herbert Mead, Mind, Seýf and Society, Vol. 1, edited by Charles W. Morris (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1934). 
66 Harold Garfmkel, Studies in Ethnomethodology (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), 33-34. 
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Chapter Three: Accountability and Record Keeping - Mapping The Relationship 
Introduction 
The previous chapter made the case that organisational growth, spurred on by the 
requirement to innovate in order to remain competitively viable, often results in 
some degree of decentralisation and specialisation in an organisation. In turn, 
decentralisation leads to a natural loss of organisational control due to the 
problems of information asymmetry and bounded rationality. Formalised 
accountability systems have come into increasing use as a remedy to the inherent 
loss of control that accompanies decentralisation because they facilitate the 
internal control and decision-making necessary to maintain organisational stability 
as organisations grow and decentralise in order to remain competitively viable. 
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The Reliance of Accountability Systems upon Records 
The effective operation of accountability systems relies upon the communication 
of information. That is to say, communication of information is the basis of 
producing and reproducing the structures and procedures of organisational 
accountability systems and the means by which standards of accountability are 
conveyed. It is also the means by which reports on actions and decisions, on the 
one hand, and judgments on these actions and decisions, on the other, are 
exchanged between parties in an accountability relationship. 
In relatively uncomplicated organisational settings, such as small owner-operated 
business enterprises or single units of a large industrial conglomerate, information 
needed to support accountability can be communicated orally, such as by means 
of one person telling another what they have accomplished. However, across 
large, complex organisations the oral communication of information generally is 
insufficient to maintain adequate accountability and control over operations 
because those who hold others to account are spatially and temporally at a 
distance from those they hold to account. That is to say, workers may be 
reporting to organisational. regulators (internal or external) fi7om which they are far 
removed either physically - as when managers in branch offices are accountable 
to managers at a head office - or structuraffy - as in the case of workers whose 
accountability to senior management is mediated through several organisational 
layers. 
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Spatial distances introduce temporal distances as well. In other words, it takes 
longer for accounts to reach organisational centres of regulation across geographic 
and organisational spaces. Moreover, in large, relatively formal and complex 
organisations and social settings, the temporal distance between the moment when 
an accountable person takes an action or decision and the moment when that 
person is held to account becomes increasingly attenuated. 
Given the spatial and temporal distances over which business rules and accounts 
must travel to support the operation of accountability systems in complex social 
and organisational settings, sole reliance on oral forms of communication can give 
rise to blockages or unintended distortions in communicated meaning. ' As a 
result, large, relatively formal and complex organisations rely upon written 
communication to supplement oral forms by virtue of its generally accepted 
greater capacity for reliably communicating meaning over spatial and temporal 
distances. Large, hierarchical organisations therefore depend upon the 
production, distribution and preservation of recorded information as a form of 
communication that has greater potential to deliver authoritative information 
about an organisation's operating rules and expected standards as well as to 
provide relatively trustworthy accounts of the actions and decisions of accountable 
persons. 
The types of recorded information that support systems of accountability can be 
separated into two categories in keeping with the purposes they serve: 1) 
constitutive and 2) instrumental. That is to say, recorded information serves both 
as a means of establishing the structures and procedures of accountability systems 
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(constitutive) and the means by which accountability systems operate 
(instrumental). 
First of all. the framework of accountability systems must be constructed or 
constituted as part of the systems for governing an organisation. 2 Systems of 
organisational governance, or management and control, set forth all of the various 
dimensions of accountability: who will be accountable to whom, for what and 
how. The structure of accountability systems in large organisations is usually set 
forth in written policies, procedures, directives, objectives and related forms of 
documentation. 
These types of documents also provide a vital means of communicating an 
organisation's operating standards for production and internal control in that they 
codify business rules so that there is less confusion about how work within an 
organisation is to be done. In most cases, internal standards and expectations 
inform an organisation's rules of operation; however, in organisations in which 
there is a public interest external regulators may set standards and expectations 
that inform the organisation's business rules. Without codification of the rules of 
operation, confusion, inconsistency or ambiguity about, expected performance 
levels can arise, leading to operational inefficiencies that undermine competitive 
viability. 
As discussed in chapter two, accountability is intended to serve both to constrain 
individual action as well as to measure and evaluate it. In the same way, written 
business rules serve both to constrain or guide the action of individuals as well as 
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provide a standard against which individuals' actions and decisions can be 
measured and judged. As such, these documents provide authoritative evidence 
about an organisation's operating rules and standards. This evidence is crucial to 
the effective operation of systems of accountability. without it there is always the 
possibility that individuals who fail to perform in accordance with organisational 
operating rules and standards, for example those involved in dishonest activities, 
can plead ignorance of expected levels of performance. Thus, lack of evidence 
that operating rules and standards have been clearly communicated to all relevant 
persons can render organisational accountability systems ineffectual. 
Just as directions on actions and decisions flow down the organisational hierarchy 
in bureaucratic settings in the form of policies, procedures, directives and the like, 
numerical and narrative accounts of actions and decisions flow up through the 
"chain of command" as part of the all-important feedback process that sustains 
orgarnsational control and decision making by means of accountability. 
An example drawing upon the accounting done for an organisation's financial 
transactions serves to illustrate the account production and communication 
process that takes place in the typical operation of organisational systems of 
financial accountability. An organisation will create and receive many different 
types of records in the process of transacting its financial business, for example, 
sales and purchases invoices; debit and credit notes for returns,, bank deposit slips 
and cheque counterfoils; receipts for cash paid out and received; and 
ormation. What traditionally is correspondence containing other financial inf 
3 
known as accounting for these transactions begins as they are grouped or 
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classified and entered into books of original entry, such as sales journals, 
purchases journals, return outwards journals, return inwards journals, cash books 
and so on, in which each transaction that has taken place is recorded. The entries 
in these books of original entry then are posted to various accounts in double entry 
ledgers, for example sales ledgers, purchases ledgers, general ledgers and the like. 
Periodically, the double entries in each of the ledgers will be balanced resulting in 
the production of a trial balance. Large organisations also may produce control 
accounts or total accounts that serve as a type of trial balance for each ledger. 
The process of balancing the accounts serves to verify the accuracy of the books 
of account, though it will not necessarily detect all types of accounting errors, 
such as errors of omission in recording a transaction. The correction of account 
imbalances may require researching individual financial transactions. It is 
considered extremely important that errors be corrected as quickly as possible, as 
any that go undetected will lead to inaccuracies in the organisation's balance sheet 
and may skew its calculation of profits. The process of detecting and correcting 
errors often entails returning to the source documents to gather additional 
information to discover the origin of a problem and thereby make corrections. 
Once the source of the error is found, the error is corrected using double entry 
accounting procedures. 
The trial balance forms the basis for preparation of the profit and loss account for 
the period and, subsequently, the balance sheet showing the organisation's 
liabilities, assets and capital, which together form the final accounts of the 
business. Production of the profit and loss account and the balance sheet also 
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requires the making of adjustments before computation of the final figures, such 
as for bad debts and the depreciation of fixed assets, following generally accepted 
accounting principles. These final accounts provide a basis for management 
decision-making and are presented to those to whom the organisation's managers 
and directors are accountable, for example, shareholders and external regulators. 
In addition to the production of financial accounting information in the final 
accounts, management may require and produce other management accounting 
information for internal use, such as cash flow analyses, capital investment 
forecasts, budget variance reports, excessive debt tracking and similar types of 
presentations or views of the accounts of the organisation's various business 
transactions. Such reports aid in monitoring organisational performance and 
provide an additional basis for decision-making. 
As this example illustrates, the production and communication of accounts 
required to support systems of financial accountability is a complex process. We 
might think of this process as an accounting and accountability chain, in which the 
creation of documents while transacting financial business is the first fink in the 
chain and each successive record produced in accounting for that financial 
transaction another link. Using this analogy, it is easy to see how one weak fink, 
or a weakness in one type of record, can affect all the others and, ultimately, break 
the accountability chain. 
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Table 3-1: Types of Recorded information and How They Support Accountability 
Systems 
Class of Function Description of Function Documentary Form(s) 
Constitutive Function Records and Communicates the Policies, procedures and directives 
structure and operating rules of the 
accountability system 
Instrumental Function Communicating operating Policies, procedures and directives 
standards (informed by legislation, 
regulation, professional standards 
and other relevant extemal 
guidelines coupled with 
documented internal management 
practice and organisational goals 
and objectives, etc. ) 
Instrumental Function Reporting on actions and decisions Records of business transactions 
(the giving of an account) (Source documents) 
Reports on actions and decisions 
related to business transactions 
produced using management 
information and other reporting 
systems 
Instrumental Function Assessment of actions and (Changes to) policies, procedures 
decisions based on accounts and and directives 
instructions for corrective 
measures, where appropriate 
The above table shows the types of documentary forms typically associated with 
and supporting the operation of accountability systems. Here it must be noted that 
by certain archival definitions, policies, procedures, standards and similar types of 
recorded information needed to support accountability systems do not actually fall 
within the class of documents known as records. For example, in her study on 
Diplomatics, Luciana Duranti, refers to these documents as literary sources 
providing the basis of juridical sYstems. 
4 She reserves the use of the term records 
for those documents that constitute a juridical act or those that constitute written 
5 
evidence of a juridical act that was complete before being documented. That is5 
87 
use of the term records is limited to documents that effect and/or provide evidence 
of an official transaction. in a similar vein, Australian archivists Frank Upward 
and Sue McKemmish define the "archival document" (a term they use to refer to 
both records and archives) as fbHows. 
The archival document can be conceptualized as recorded 
information arising from transactions. It is created as a by-product 
of social and organisational activity in the course of transacting 
business of any kind, whether by governments, businesses, 
community organisations or private individuals. It is therefore 
defined by its contextuality and its transactionality. The 
documentation of transactions may be in any storage media and is 
increasingly an electronic process. 6 
With definitions of the record traditionally emphasising transactionality, it is 
possible to argue that policies, procedures and similar types of documents are not 
records because they establish the terms and conditions of official transactions but 
are not themselves involved in or outcomes of those transactions. On the other 
hand, traditional archival definitions of the record also focus on the record's 
evidential quality. Thus, it is also possible to argue that such documents are 
records because they provide evidence concerning the terms and conditions of 
organisational transactions. In addition, standard records management texts 
typically cite the management of policies, procedures and directives as being 
within the records manager's purview. 7 Since these types of documents are the 
concern of the records manager, it is possible to argue that they should be 
included in that class of documents known as records. In the final analysis, 
however, it does not matter whether we describe these documents as records, as 
literary sources or as something else. Their inclusion in the scope of this study is 
justified by the important role they play in the constitution and operation of 
accountability systems. 
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As in the case of written business rules, it is a matter of perspective as to whether 
the types of recorded infonnation generated as a result of the typical financial 
accounting process qualify as records. In the accounting literature, the types of 
documents that accountants describe as source documents are what by traditional 
archival measures would be considered records, since they are documents 
produced in the course of carrying out particular financial transactions and 
provide evidence of those transactions. 8 In accounting, on the other hand, the 
record is the entry documenting a financial transaction in an organisation's books 
of account. 9 By strict archival definitions of the term record, however, these 
entries would not qualify as a record. It is even dubious whether subsequent 
management and financial reports based on an organisation's books of account 
would be considered records by archival standards. The archivist Hilary 
Jenkinson asserted that records are unique because they are not created in the 
interest of or for the benefit of posterity. 10 Accounting reports, in comparison, are 
created with a mindfulness and attention to an audience removed by space and 
time from the transactions to which the reports refer. This difference between 
archival and accounting terminology is not simply a question of semantics. 
Rather, it reveals the important point that there is no aýsolute record, that the 
meaning and conceptualisation of the record is dependent upon an individual or 
group's perspective and context. 
Taking this view, the important question becomes not "what is a record? " but 
"how does this particular individual or group perceive of a record? " As archivist 
Preben Mortensen writes, "the meaning of words and concepts are not, as in the 
89 
Platonic tradition, secured by the shared form of things to which we apply the 
same name, but are a matter of the ways in which we use concepts in practice. "" 
Why is Mortensen's viewpoint significant? It is because this viewpoint permits a 
broader scope for analysis, as it frees us from the limitations of traditional archival 
or accounting conceptualisations of the term that, because they do not encompass 
certain documentary forms, can limit understanding of the relationship between 
these documents, the types of documents that archivists or accountants 
traditionally view as being records, and the operation of accountability systems in 
particular settings. However, by also viewing these documents through the lens of 
traditional archival and accounting conceptualisations of the record, we are, at the 
same time, able to see the limits of other discipline, group, or individual 
understandings of the relationship between the creation and keeping of certain 
forms of recorded information and the operation of accountability systems. This 
approach permits an exploration of the relationship between financial 
accountability and record keeping that goes beyond what is immediately 
observable by strictly adhering to either archival or accounting conceptualisations 
of the record to uncover underlying assumptions that mask deep structures 
beneath the surface of organisations as social systems, structures with effects 
which generally may be unobserved and unintended by those within these 
organisations. 
The Qualities Required of Records for Effective Accountabdity 
It has been established that systems of accountability depend for their operation 
upon the communication of organisational 
business rules and standards as well as 
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accounts of actions and decisions of accountable persons. These systems will 
only operate effectively if records - such as policies, procedures and accounts - 
possess the characteristics that effectively communicate an organisation's business 
rules and permit its management to see what they need to see of their business 
transactions in order to hold organisational actors to account and make sound 
decisions. 
It is difficult to point to any definite set of qualities that records must possess in 
order for accountability systems to work effectively without reference to a 
particular context, though a number of qualities, such as trustworthiness, 
timeliness, relevance, and comparability, can be mentioned. 12 Rather than there 
being a number of standard characteristics which records must always possess in 
the service of effective accountability, the purpose and context of the 
accountability system must determine what qualities are required of the records 
needed to support it. As South African archivist Verne Hams states in re ation to 
the use of records as evidence of societal processes, "... the requirements for 
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,. )13 evidence are specific to time and place ... In the same manner, the 
requirements of records for accountability are specific to the purpose and context 
of the accountability system. 
For example, for the purposes of effective financial management, managers of a 
business enterprise may want to track their bad debts. In order to do so, they will 
need to communicate reliably how the organisation defines a bad debt and the 
level of such debt that is acceptable. They also will rely on subordinates to pull 
together reports on the status of customer accounts in relation to the organisation's 
definition of bad debt. In order to meet management's internal control and 
decision-making needs, the organisation's bad debt reports will need to possess 
certain characteristics. For instance, the reliability of the report may be 
determined by the extent of its comprehensiveness, accurateness and completeness 
in depicting the status of the organisation's customer accounts in relation to 
organisational definitions of what constitutes bad debt. Bad debt reports also may 
need to present information in a form that permits comparisons over time so that 
managers can determine whether the number of bad debts is increasing or 
decreasing in relation to organisational limits and past experience. Depending on 
the level of risk, managers also may need these reports. to reflect daily, weekly, 
monthly or quarterly bad debt positions, that is, whatever time frame permits them 
to take action to correct deviations from acceptable levels of bad debt quickly 
enough to avoid operating problems. 
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Though an organisation's management may require records to possess certain 
characteristics in order to support effective accountability, most often the 
identification of these requirements is not an explicit and conscious organisational 
exercise. Moreover, managers seldom explicitly and consciously identify the 
kinds of record keeping systems that wifl be required to actuafly produce records 
of the necessary quality. Rather, they generally assume that such systems are in 
place. Oftentimes, these systems are not in place, and, as a result, the 
organisation's record making and keeping practices fail to produce records of the 
quality needed to support organisational accountability systems. 
The Trustworthiness of Records 
The above noted problem is especially evident in relation to the quality of 
trustworthiness. Trustworthiness is arguably one of the most common and 
important qualities required of records for accountability purposes no matter what 
the organisational context. Ironically, it is a quality often taken for granted in 
records. 
As previously noted, records generally are perceived as having greater capacity to 
convey intended meaning reliably across space and time and it is for this reason 
that the giving of an account, in large, hierarchical organisations has come to 
depend on the production, distribution and preservation of many forms of written 
communication. Generally, archival thinking on the relationship 
between records 
and accountability rests on a belief that the usual circumstances of record creation 
93 
give assurances of reliability and authenticity, and therefore of trustworthiness, a 
quality essential to giving of and holding to account. 
The ideas underlying this belief are succinctly expressed in the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule (ie, the rule of law that allows for the legal 
admissibility of what would normally be considered second-hand information), 
the origins of which signalled society's growing reliance on records in the 
transaction of social and organisational business. Under this rule, courts generally 
accept business records as trustworthy evidence of transactions for the following 
reasons: 
-Their form would have had to have been complete to affect the business 
transaction for which the record was created; 
-The regular making of a particular record calls for accuracy; 
-The record creator generally would have had no reason at the time to 
manipulate, substitute or falsify the record for some future, unthought 
of purpose; .1 
-The business enterprise had to have been relying on the record for its 
business purposes, so would have noticed that the record was not 
reliable or authentic if that were the case; and 
-The record was created under a duty to an employer and therefore 
there is the risk of censure or disgrace if errors are made. 14 
A record created in the normal course of business thatis contemporaneous to the 
events to which it refers, for example a voucher, is therefore usually accorded a 
level of documentary truthfulness. Even those records that are not created to 
effect a business transaction but are written up afterwards as a record of an event 
or transaction, such as minutes of a meeting or financial ledgers, if created 
reasonably close to the events or transactions to which they refer generally are 
considered to reflect the documentary truth. 
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To say that the courts, and by extension society, generaHy consider records to be 
trustworthy because they meet the above described criteria is not the same as 
saying that records are trustworthy and always meet these criteria, of course. A 
record's documentary truthfulness may be challenged legally through 
demonstrating the ways in which it fails to meet the criteria of the business 
records exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, what we might want or require a 
record to be (ie, trustworthy evidence of a business transaction) should not be 
confused with what a record may, in reality, be (ie, less than trustworthy evidence 
of a business transaction). Deliberate or unintentional deviations from the 
conditions of record inscription that ensure reliability can mean that records are 
quite unreliable as evidence of a business transaction. 
Yet, traditional archival conceptualisations of the record have fused ought with is 
by suggesting that reliability and authenticity are somehow inherent in an 
immutable nature of the record, that is, they somehow define its recordness. 
Archival theorist Hilary Jenkinson argued that the impartiality of records arises 
from the circumstances of their creation as a means of carrying out activities and 
not as ends in themselves and that, consequently, records are "inherently. . 
capable of revealing the truth about those activities" and bearing "authentic 
testimony of the actions, processes, and procedures which brought them into being 
...,, 
15 Following Jenkinson's line of thought, Canadian archivist Heather MacNeil 
writes "To protect the value of records as evidence , it 
is necessary to preserve 
their originary [sic] qualities, that is, the qualities with which the records are 
endowed by the circumstances of their creation, accumulation, and use in the 
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conduct of personal or organisational activity. These qualities include naturalness, 
uniqueness, interrelatedness, authenticity, and impartiality. -16 Along similar fines, 
the literature on accounting generally portrays the preparation of accounts as a 
neutral technique that does no more than objectively record and produce a "true 
and fair" view of the results of organisational. activity. 17 
These conceptualisations reify records and accounts. They separate records and 
accounts from the social and technological contexts that lead to their creation until 
they are no longer recognisable as socially and technologically constructed entities 
but, instead, become imbued with an almost god-like power and objectivity. 
However, the traditional archival and accounting viewpoints leave an important 
question unanswered: why it should be necessary to protect a quality that is 
apparently already part of the inherent nature of the record and the account? If, 
these qualities define records and accounts, then they should exist in them as a 
natural state and need no protection. But clearly these qualities in records and 
accounts do require "protection, " or rather, careful cultivation. 18 Thus, instead of 
being immutable aspects of the nature of records or accounts, impartiality and 
authenticity are ideals. Like Plato's shadow images, actual records and accounts 
exist as pale and imperfect reflections. They are, however, no less records or 
accounts. 
In both the accounting and archival fields, there is a growing body of literature 
influenced by philosophers such as Michel Foucault, Eirgen Habermas, Anthony 
Giddens, and Jacques Derrida that offers a cntique of the view that records and 
accounts of organisational activity provide impartial and objective evidence. 
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Rather, authors of this body of literature clearly see records and accounts as social 
and technological constructs. 
Critiques of the traditional view of accounting have focused on explorations of the 
use of accounting information in the production and reproduction of systems of 
orgamsational accountability to show how accounts are constructions that issue 
and express relations of power. This revisionist view of accounting sees the 
function not as a set of practices that mirror organisational reality but rather as 
practices that shape organisational reality, along the lines of Harold Garfinkel's 
ideas discussed in the previous chapter. John Roberts writes, for example that "As 
a vehicle for hierarchical forms of accountability, accounting information appears 
as just one means of negotiating and defining the significance of events, as a 
method for expressing and enforcing expectations, and as a resource in the 
enactment of particular power relations. "'9 
Roberts goes on to explain that the way accounting information has been 
institutionalised as the most important, authoritative and telling means whereby 
organisational activity is made visible ironically has rendered invisible social and 
technological influences on the meaning of accounting records and given rise to 
acceptance of accounting information as objective numerical representations of 
facts . 
20 He states* 
... this 
invisibility lies in accountings [sic] capacity to present 
information as if it were objective fact; the detail can be contested 
but not its basic capacity to reflect the truth. Like the scientific 
method it imitatesl the knowledge that accounting produces is 
presented as somehow independent of the interests of those who 
produce and use it. 21 
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Recent accounting and archival research reveals, however, that accounts and 
records are anything but neutral, objective and disinterested. 
Much of the literature critiquing accounting's claim to neutrality and objectivity 
has focused on accounting standards, regulations and conventions that govern 
accounting measurement and classification and how these construct accounting 
"facts". Joni J. Young's article on the American savings and loan crisis, for 
example, discusses how accounting standards and regulations reflected changing 
political interests and objectives of regulators. " 
Arguably, the tendency to focus on the way in which accounting data are 
classified, aggregated and presented in accounting reports using interpretations of 
accounting standards and regulations has led to two important gaps in 
understanding accounting records as social and technological constructs. First, it 
overlooks the ways in which other aspects of the complex process of accounting 
construct the meaning of accounting records. Second, it leads to a tendency to 
overestimate the degree to which construction of the meaning of accounts, and 
expressions of power relations in the construction of meaning, is a conscious and 
intentional process. Though the manner in which accounting data are reported 
undeniably is an important and essential feature of the production of meaning in 
accounts and the production and reproduction of accountability systems in 
organisational settings, it is only one aspect of a complex account production 
process. The meaning of accounts evolves not just as a result of the conscious 
process of classifying and reporting financial transactions but throughout the 
complex process of record inscription, transmission, contextualization and 
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interpretation over space and time. Thus, the meaning of the account at any given 
moment may be less the result of a social actor's conscious intention to portray the 
"facts" in a particular light than the unintentional result of colliding interests 
underlying mediations that take place over time throughout the account production 
and communication process, particularly when the effects of these interests and 
mediations on the meaning of accounting records is not consciously understood 
nor subject to explicit managerial coordination and control. 
In explorations of cracks in the image of accounting records as neutral and 
immutable recent archival literature challenging traditional positivist views of the 
record provides a framework for looking beyond just the way in which data are 
classified according to accounting principles and standards. The traditional 
archival view of the record is that its author creates it to effect consequences as 
part of official transactions. 23 The author of the record, therefore, fixes in the 
record his will in terms of the desired consequences to which he wishes to give 
effect . 
24 Assuming none of the problems that can affiect reliability are introduced, 
either deliberately or unintentionally, into the record's inscription, the traditional 
view holds that the record then becomes the stable vehicle by which the author's 
intended meaning and documentary truth about a transaction is communicated 
over space and time. Everything is nice and neat and linear. 
The ideas of communications theorist Mark Poster suggest that the traditional 
archival conceptualisation of records may have grown out of an era in which print 
media was the predominate form Of communication. As Poster writes: "print 
culture constitutes the individual as a subject, as transcendent to objects, as stable 
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and fixed in identity, in short, as a grounded essence. , 25 In contrast in the 
electronic age, "Electronic culture promotes the individual as an unstable identity, 
as a continuous process of multiple identity formation. .. 
-)-)26 In the same way as 
the electronic age shifts our understanding of the individual, so, too, does it 
change our conceptualisation of the record. 
The electronic age has moved the epistemological and ontological discussion 
surrounding the record away from viewing it as stable object toward seeing it as 
something mutable and unstable. In a recent review of Trevor Livelton's Archival 
Theory, Records and the Public, Canadian archival educator Tom Nesmith 
challenges us to think of the record as: 
... an evolving mediation of understanding about some phenomena -a 
mediation created by social and technical processes of inscription, 
transmission, and contextualization. 27 
Essentially what Nesmith and a growing number of archivists influenced by post- 
modernist theory are saying is that the record is a vessel for communicated 
meaning, a meaning that is socially and technically constructed and that is not 
28 
static but evolves over time as the record is created, kept and used. 
From this perspective, the record appears to be the result of an endless set of 
choices made by social actors, those who originally inscribe the record as well as 
those who are involved in its subsequent transmission and contextualization, 
among them record keepers. These social actors make choices about whether to 
inscribe an account of a transaction, the form it will take, and the degree to which 
that inscription will be contextualized (eg, through preservation in an official 
orgarusational record store), how and in what form. They also make choices 
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about the technological means of inscribing, transmitting and contextualizing the 
record, whether they choose to use paper, computers or some other means, with all 
the limitations and problems inherent in the chosen technology. 
As noted in the previous chapter, individuals have different incentives for their 
actions and choices. In addition, a range of social factors will influence these 
incentives. The term socialfactors refers to afl factors pertaining to norms of 
behaviour and systems of belief in social settings. This might also be referred to 
as culture. 29 Culture relates both to the culture of the wider society, to the norms 
and beliefs of defined groups (ie, management or professionals), and to 
organisational culture. Together, the socially influenced choices social actors 
make in how they inscribe, transmit, contextualize and even interpret records have 
the effect of constructing the communicated meaning of the record over time. 
The effect of social mediations on the communicated meaning in records is further 
compounded by the specialisation and decentralisation that, to varying degrees, 
accompany all large, complex organisations. Decentralisation complicates the 
relationship between the "facts" of a transaction, the record creator's 
representation of those facts in a record, and the meaning communicated to 
subsequent readers of the record in the foRowing way. The greater the number of 
information processors in an organisation the greater the number of social actors 
involved in the creation or receipt and keeping of records of an organisation's 
business transactions. The greater the number of social actors involved in record 
creation and keeping, the more varied their motivations and choices concerning 
processes of record inscription, transmission and contextualization. Thus, the 
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more varied is organisational record creation and keeping behaviour. In this way, 
decentralisation increases the diversity of interests that shape the meaning of a 
particular record over time, as a number of different processors each with their 
own interests and record keeping behaviours will carry out processes of record 
creation and keeping for single records or groups of records documenting 
organisational transactions. These diverse influences on record making and 
keeping can, from a broader organisational perspective, cause intentional and 
unintentional, and often problematic, deviations in documentary truthfulness. 
When we peek behind the record as object, we are reintroduced to the human in 
the record, that is., to its "subject-ivity". Of course, whenever, human beings as 
social actors enter the picture things become messy, unruly and often conflict- 
ridden, as conffict theorists have observed. Ian Carib sums it up in the following 
way: "Society is like a more or less confused battle ground. If we watch from on 
high, we can see a variety of groups fighting each other, constantly forming and 
reforming, making and breaking alliances. 
'. )30 From this point of view, the 
meaning of records is a manifestation of the power struggle, both conscious and 
unconscious, between competing interests as the record is created, kept and used. 
In this confused battleground, it is a challenge to analyse what relation the record 
bears to the phenomenon it is about or to its inscriber(s)' original intended 
meaning. Each individual involved in record making, keeping and use is 
motivated by difTerent influences - personal interests, organisational culture, 
professional values, societal mores and so on - in the production of the account. 
Moreover, differing and often conflicting motivations can lead individuals to 
create and keep records in ways that are in direct conflict with what is required to 
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produce the quality of accounting information needed to sustain systems of 
organisational and social accountability. 
In addition, there is no watching fi7om on high for record keepers, as they are 
unavoidably pulled into the scrum. even as they try to observe from the sidelines. 
As one with responsibility for reserving and preserving records for future use, the 
record keeper does not simply passively hold the record but participates in shaping 
the terms of its original inscription and what happens to the record subsequently 
through processes of re-inscription for preservation, recurrent transýnission and 
contextualization. As such, the record keeper shapes the record's meaning and 
becomes its co-author. It was Brien Brothman, influenced by the ideas of 
postmodernist literary criticism and philosophy, in particular the French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida, that first disquieted archivists with the suggestion 
that record keeping was something more than an uninvolved act of custodianship. 
Reflecting on archival practice, Brothman has wntten that it "forms an integral 
part of the record, "' also asserting that the typical record keeping and archival 
function of ordering records "also served to transfigure, if not transform, the 
record. "" The interventions of the record keeper, therefore, can take the record 
further from the meaning intended by the record's original author and from 
providing the kind of evidence of business transactions required to meet 
organisational or societal objectives. 
To further highlight the record's shadowy relationship with documentary truth, 
Brien Brothman, in his exegesis of the writings of Jacques Derrida in relation to 
archival theory, asserts: "the writing that humans do functions as much to obscure 
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and defer [author's emphasis] meaning as to fix it permanently. , 32 Writing is a 
form of temporal delay that seeks to capture an intended meaning in some 
ineluctable form that transcends the vagaries of time. However, as such, it is 
incapable of suspending the effects of time: "Time, creator of difference, 
inevitably defers or postpones arrival at stable structure - whether of languages, 
wntmg, societies, records or record systems. -)-)33 Brothman adds: 
For Derrida, the very premises upon which our commitment to writing rest 
themselves establish limits to communication that writing cannot breach. 
To write is already to concede the necessity of placing our fate in others' 
hands, so to speak. Writing, by its nature, suspends its own consummation 
of meaning. The certification of meaning as "the meaning" of a particular 
piece of writing inevitably requires the endorsement of a subsequent 
reading. It is other readers' inte retations that ratify the "original" 
"genuine") meaning of the work. 3T 
Thus, each successive reading of the record undertaken as part of record keeping 
processes or by those who use the record to serve particular purposes (eg, 
organisational or social accountability) has the potential to imbue the record with 
new meaning, meaning that may be very different from that intended by the 
record's original inscriber. 
Clearly, post-modernist revisions of thinking about accounts and records have 
implications for accounting records as evidence of business transactions in support 
of accountability. Despite the expectation of greater trustworthiness of records as 
a form of communicating organisational accounts of actions and decisions, the 
post-modernist perspective calls the impartiality and objectivity of recorded 
accounts into question. This viewpoint forces us to see that the record does not 
offer objective impartial evidence of facts but is, after all, merely an account of 
organisational actions and decisions shaped both intentionally and unintentionally 
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by the interests of social actors involved in the record's inscription, transnýssion, 
contextualization and use over time. 
Nevertheless, impartiality and authenticity in records, as well as other desirable 
qualities, such as reliability and timely accessibility, are essential to the effective 
production and operation of accountability even as we recognise that these 
qualities are impossible to attain because of the mediated character of the record 
as a form of communication. As Verne Harris points out, at best the record serves 
only as one window on organisational. and social processes. '5 However, the 
record is, in the end, as Harris acknowledges, one of the best windows we have. 
To suggest that records are not trustworthy, therefore, is not to suggest that we 
should not and cannot rely upon them as evidence of business transactions. It is 
only to suggest that they must be seen as accounts of these business transactions, 
not as the undisputed "truth" of those transactions. In clinging to the idea of 
records as impartial and objective, archivists' traditional thinking about the record 
may be too limited to arrive at workable solutions to the problem of making sense 
of records as evidence of business transactions. Evidence of a business 
transaction the record can be, even by its absence or in a fragmented form, but in 
this regard it must be given a critical reading with an appreciation and 
understanding of the messy behind-the-scenes social interaction of often 
conflicting interests that goes into the record's evolving and mediated formation 
with every new inscription, transmission, Contextualization and reading. Archival 
theorist Enc Ketelaar describes this type of knowledge about the record as "social 
and cultural archivistics, " being the work of understanding the processes involved 
in the choices made about archiving. 36 This study aims to contribute to such an 
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understanding and appreciation of the processes of archiving by empiricaffy 
exploring record making and keeping in the context of Jamaican commercial 
banks in the course of exploring the relationships among competitive viability, 
accountability and record keeping. 
Of Record Keeping and the Quality of Records 
Having gained a deeper appreciation of the record as a socially and technically 
mediated form of communication that is much less trustworthy than we might like 
to think, what next? Are we simply to throw up our hands in despair, 
acknowledging, in the words of Brien Brothman, a record's unavoidable 
4(. unraveling into promiscuous textuality? '737 This attitude would be acceptable if 
we did not have to concern ourselves with the practical information requirements 
of effective accountability and the need to ensure that accountability systems 
operate well in order to keep our organisations from succumbing to a natural 
dissolution. 
But since we do have to concern ourselves with such matters, we must build our 
dams against chaos. This brings the discussion to the subject of record keeping. 
From the moment in time when the first record was created, the record keeping 
function also came into existence. For, as noted already, the making of a record 
seeks to fix meaning over space and time, and to fix meaning implies somehow 
keeping it intact in the face of forces that would lead to its erosion or obliteration. 
Hence, there can be no record creation without at the same time bringing into 
being record keeping. 
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The aim of record keeping is to ensure the preservation of records so as to 
"preempt the intrusion of any discordant elements from the past and present and 
foresee all future contingencies of interpretation or misinterpretation that might 
threaten or strain the binding conditionalities of textual meaning and challenge 
documentary truthfulness. 7-)38 The record keeper's role, then, is one of salvaging 
the record from its own deconstruction by fixing meaning and carrying that 
meaning forward through distance and time as evidence of the organisational 
business transactions to which the record refers. 
This way seems to suggest that record keeping is concerned with the record only 
after it has been inscribed or created. However, as record creation and record 
keeping are two sides of the same coin, the boundaries between the two activities 
and the individuals involved in undertaking them have always been blurred. 
From the outset of record making, scribes were responsible both for making 
records on behalf of others, the record's actual authors, as well as keeping them. 
Even now, record keeping may be simply a matter of the record's original 
inscriber retaining a file copy of a document for his or. her own reference in an 
individualised way with little consciousness about how this process shapes the 
record's evolving meaning for subsequent readers of the record, if there should be 
any. 
Alternatively, one person may create the record and another may be responsible 
for keeping it. This may be a simple case of a record creator delegating the 
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function of record keeping to a direct subordinate such as a secretary. On the 
other hand, the record keeping function may take place in the context of a 
systematic organisational records management programme concerned with the 
controlled management of all records throughout their life cycle from creation and 
receipt, to transmission, use, storage, retrieval and final disposition in the interests 
of administrative efficiency and organisational and social accountability. Just as 
with the record, the record keeping function varies according to context. It may 
be undertaken with differing degrees of systematisation in service of a variety of 
interests. 
Though it is now often the case that someone other than the original inscriber of 
the record performs the record keeping function, the record keeper who ignores 
the process of record creation risks failing to preserve the meaning of the record. 
In the electronic age, computers as a technology of inscription present new 
challenges to preserving and fixing the meaning in records. Digital records can be 
altered or deleted more easily or their content lost due to technological 
obsolescence and the fragility of methods and technologies of inscription and 
storage. As a result, record keepers find themselves becoming involved in 
prescribing the terms and conditions of record inscription so as to ensure that later 
preservation does not become a moot point. 
Beyond the need to ensure that the new electronic technology does not interfere 
with the preservation of the meaning of records, there exists another rationale 
for 
record keepers to become involved in the process of record creation. 
This is 
because the interests of record creators may prevent them, either intentionafly or 
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unintentionally, from creating the quality of records needed to support the 
effective operation of organisational systems of accountability. Thus, there is a 
need for the record keeper to address record creation as someone independent of 
the interests of the record's inscriber to ensure that organisational interests in 
record creation are served. The record keeper must intervene to assist the 
organisation to identify the quality of records required to support its accountability 
systems, to ensure that records are created in order that organisational transactions 
become visible for accountability purposes, and finally, to see that records are 
created and kept in a way that supports documentary truthfulness over space and 
time. None of these objectives may be the focus of records creators, who have 
their own interests and concerns and may therefore intentionally or unintentionally 
avoid creating records or create them in ways that undermine the trustworthiness 
of records as evidence of organisational transactions. 
This role of assisting in the identification and safeguarding of organisational 
interests in record creation is particularly important in large, complex 
organisations where the interests of record creators may be quite diverse and in 
conflict with those of the organisation. If organisational interests in record 
creation have not been identified or if no one is looking out for those interests, the 
quality of records may not support the requirements of effective accountability. 
Tl-ýs is a role that can hardly be undertaken when the record creator and keeper are 
one and the same or even when the record keeper is someone who primarily 
represents the record creator's interests (eg, a secretary keeping records on behalf 
of an employer) since there may be a conflict between the record creator's and the 
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organisation's interests. In addition, in undertaking both this task and the task of 
preservation of meaning over time, record keepers ideally must be capable of 
understanding the ways in which their own interests and actions shape 
documentary truthfulness and affect the quality of the record, for it is only through 
this awareness that record keepers can recognise the distortions in meaning that 
their own actions nfight introduce and how these actions subtly shape and shift the 
meaning of the record. Again, this mindfulness is unlikely to be a feature of 
record keeping undertaken by record creators themselves or by anyone less that a 
highly trained record keeping professional. 
Thus, in large, complex organisations the spatial and temporal distances that the 
communicated meaning in the record must span and new technologies of record 
creation and storage generally require a more systematic approach to record 
keeping if the information requirements of organisational accountability systems 
are to be met. Systematic record keeping refers to a record keeping system 
wherein organisational information requirements have been identified, systems 
have been established to support the attairunent of those requirements, and trained 
record keepers, as distinct from record creators, have the capacity to understand 
and control processes of record creation and preservation in support of meeting 
organisational information requirements. 
When record keeping is unsystematic there is the potential for a state of 
organisational record keeping anomie to develop. Anorme occurs when there 
is 
no widespread acceptance of clear organisational standards reflecting a set of 
shared values, beliefs and norms that consciously and systematically encourage 
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record creation and keeping behaviour that produces organisationaffy intended 
meaning in records. It is also due to the absence of a record keeping regulator to 
ensure that organisational record keeping interests and requirements are met. 
Significantly, such organisational anon-fie often occurs when there has been rapid 
social change, the very conditions that will be present as an organisation grows, 
decentralises and specialises in order to remain competitively viable. " In this 
state, record creation and keeping behaviour may become increasingly 
individualised as the number of information processors grows. This may make it 
increasingly difficult for an organisation's governors to direct social actors' record 
creation and keeping behaviour toward organisational ends. Thus, social actors 
are likely to create and keep records in ways that reflect an increasing diversity of 
values, beliefs and norms of behaviour, whether influenced by values of the wider 
society, a particular group or aspects of the organisation's culture. As such, their 
record creation and keeping choices may be in growing conflict with what is in the 
best interest of maintaining organisational accountability and control, even when 
that is not the individual record creator's or keeper's conscious intention. 
To the extent that record keeping is undertaken as a systematic function with an 
awareness of the interests and mediations that shape the meaning of records, even 
those of record keepers themselves, as well as an awareness of organisational 
information requirements, through controffing processes of record inscription, 
transmission and contextualization, record keeping offers the promise of 
overconung the forces of organisational record keeping anomie to ensure the 




This chapter has presented the second part of a theoretical framework linking 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. It has argued that 
accountability systems in large, hierarchical organisations depend on records as 
the means of constituting such systems as well as the means by which accounts 
are exchanged between parties in an accountability relationship. The chapter 
argued that, though the effective operation of organisational systems of 
accountability depends upon records having certain characteristics, such as 
trustworthiness, the many interests that shape the meaning of records as they are 
socially and technologically produced during processes of inscription or re- 
inscription, transmission, contextualization and use over space and time 
intentionally and unintentionally may prevent records from possessing the 
qualities needed to sustain effective accountability. Systematised record keeping 
is therefore needed as a means of understanding and controlling influences on the 
meaning of records at the point of creation and throughout the span of time for 
which they are kept and used in order to ensure production of the quality of 
records needed to support effective operation of accountability systems. 
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Chapter Four: Competitive Viability, Accountability and Record Keeping - The Public Sector Analogy 
Introduction 
The previous chapter presented a theoretical framework linking accountability and 
record keeping. To date, most research on the relationship between these two 
phenomena has been undertaken in the context of the pubfic sector, though JoAnne 
Yates' study of the use of communications technologies in American management 
indirectly touches upon the relationship between accountability and record keepi I Mg in 
a private sector context. ' The growing body of research linking development 
administration, specifically public sector reform initiatrves, and record keepmg can be 
viewed as analogous to the theorised. linkages among private sector competitive 
viability, accountability and record keeping. In establishing that these relationships 
are analogous, this chapter will demonstrate that the body of research on development 
administration and record keeping lends empirical support to the arguments advanced 
in this study. 
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Drawing the Analogy: Competitive Viability, Accountability and Record 
Keeping in Public versus Private Contexts 
In the previous chapter, competitive viability was defined as the ability of private 
I 
sector business entities to function and develop in a sufficiently efficient manner to 
avoid Eaflure and ensure survival in a competitive market. Chapter two went on to 
argue that both enviromnental and intemal orgamsational factors play a role M 
acbieving and maintaining competitive viability. Effective decision-making and 
internal control are two significant contributors to achieving and maintaining 
competitiVe viabifity. As orgarusations expand and decentrahse to maintam 
competitive market position, the quality of decision-making and internal control may 
become compromised unless supported by the effective operation of systems of 
accountability. Chapter three advanced the argument that availability of quality 
recorded information is critical to the effective operation of organisational systems of 
accountability and this objective is unlikely to be realised without appropriate record 
keeping accountabilities and controls. The chapter concluded that, In the absence 
good record keeping, the type and quality of recorded information needed to sustain 
effective accountability often will not be available. Without effective systems of 
accountability private sector entities are likely to experience operational inefficiencies 
and may, if these inefficiencies are serious enough, become non-viable and fall. 
Usually a business entity is no longer competitively viable if it becomes insolvent, 
that is, when it is unable to meet its debt obligations (over the long term). Similarly, 
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governments may be unable to meet their long-term debt obligations and therefore 
might be unable to function and develop in a competitive environment .2 This was the 
case for many developing countries in the 1980S. 
3 During this period a large number 
were unable to meet their debt obligations and, as a result, defaulted on their loans. 
The Third World debt crisis resulted from growing balance of payments deficits (ie, 
an increase in the net value of claims by nationals of overseas countri Ic 'es on domest' 
economies) to which external economic shocks M the form of the oil crisis and world 
depression of 1979-1983 contributed .4 This growmg debt burden hampered 
economic growth and development in poorer countries. 
The mounting debt crisis in developing countries, and the threat to the stability of the 
5 
global financial system that this debt crisis posed , 
led the Bretton Woods institutions 
(le, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) to offer loan packages 
linked to policy advice and technical assistance aimed at economic stabilisation and 
"structural adjustment. " Drawmg upon by neo-class, cal econormc theory m which 
markets are viewed as beig perfectly competitive and operate by means of voluntary 
transactions on an equal basis between large numbers of autonomous, fully informed 
entities motrvated by the desire to maximise their profits, Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs) sought to achieve a boost in the supply side of the economy by 
the removal of market imperfections to thereby redress balance of payments problems 
and bring prosperity to developing countries. 6 Though applied somewhat differently 
in each country, SAPs tended to consist of such measures as removal of import 
quotas, tax and tariff reductions, a scaling back on social subsidies, reducing 
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government expenditure, deregulation of private sector operation, privatisation of 
state-run enterprises, liberalisation of exchange rate policies, use of interest rates to 
attract savings and constrain credit, strengthening of external debt management, 
increases M agricultural prices and energy prices, and removal of price controlS. 7 
Very early on, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund concluded that 
public sector reform was a critical component of the economic reforms aimed at 
achievffig economic viability and development in Third World countries. The neo- 
classical economic theory that underpinned their development strategies supported 
the view that state intervention is a source of market iMPerfectiOn _8 The consensus 
was that the governments of developing countries were beset by problems that 
prevented them from effectively implementmg economic reforms. One World Bank 
publication noted in 1983 that: 
The disarray and ineffectiveness of sub-Saharan public administrations 
threaten development efforts of governments and undermine their ability to 
carry out basic governmental functions. Capacity to make and implement 
policy is reduced, revenues go uncollected, the little that is collected is poorly 
allocated and much needed public services are poorly or not provided. The 
engendered crisis of governmental administration is doubly serious at a time 
when structural adjustment programmes are requiring key central government 
institutions to plan and manage fundamental transformations in the economy. 9 
Thus, the generally accepted view was that economic development in developing 
countries was not possible without solving the problems presented by Third World 
governments. 
Early public sector reform initiatives concentrated on privatisation and contracting 
out of govemment services or, m cases where govemment services could not be 
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privatised or contracted out, introducing private sector management principles and 
practices to the public sector. 10 The early emphasis on private sector approaches 
reflected two interrelated influences on structural adjustment policies. First, it 
reflected acceptance of neo-classical econornic theory that saw state intervention as a 
factor in market imperfection. Thus, structural adjustment pohcles tended to focus on 
removal of market impediments caused by state interference in the operation of what 
would otherwise be perfect markets. " Second, there was a growing sense of 
discontent in both developing and developed countries with changes that had taken 
place in public administration since World War H. Governinents in many countries 
had evolved elaborate centraliSed bureaucracies in response to more complex systems 
of administration. Over time, these governance systems became dysfunctionaL being 
too bureaucratic and centrahsed to serve the purposes for which they were intended. 12 
In contrast, private sector entities were viewed as being more flexible and responsive 
to market imperatives and, hence, served as a model of efficiency and effectiveness 
for the public sector to emulate. 
Initially, therefore, in emulation of private sector business strategies, public sector 
reform initiatives often stressed cost containment and fiscal restraint over and above 
other objectiVes. 13 Reform measures were intended to diminish the role of 
goverm-nent M the economy, reduce the influence of permanent officials on policy 
and/or the policy process and make government managers emulate the private sector. 
The goal of these reforms was to provide greater efficiency, results, performance and 
value for the money spent on government operations. The new public sector 
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management para igm was characterised by themes such as "empowerment-, 
"improving service to clients" and "strengthening efficiency in government. 714 
The early emphasis of public sector reform initiatives on privatisation and private 
sector mamgement prmciples to bring about fiscal stabilisation did not lead to 
significant change, however. 15 More was needed to produce fundamental 
improvements in governance. As a result, public sector reform initiatives came to 
focus on the absence of accountability, transparency and the rule of law in developing 
countries. This shift in development strategy reflected not only the failure of earlier 
approaches but influences In development theory commg from the new mstitutional 
economics (NIE). Proponents of NIE, such as Ronald Coase, Douglass North and 
Oliver Williamson, reintroduced the state into development econornIcs. 'Tor North 
Third World countries provide examples of anti-development frameworks. Statist 
regulation, iff-defined property rights and other constraints restrict rather than 
stimulate economic activity. These conditions result in rent-seekmg and 
redistribution, not rising productiVity. Organisations that operate within Third World 
institutional frameworks are not inefficient; they are efficient at making a society 
more unproductive. . Y1 
6 In Africa, as Mamadou Dia observes, the colonial legacy 
meant that "new states became not only bureaucratic autocracies but also economic 
and political monopolies, lacking in accountability, transparency and the rule of IaNV' 
which prevented effective implementation of policies aimed at achieving economic 
reforms. 17 To bring about real change in the public sectors of these countries, there 
emerged a consensus that accountability, transparency and the rule of law needed to 
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be mcluded as cornerstones of public sector reform initiatiVes. For example, in 1997, 
the United Nations Development Programme published a policy paper - "Governance 
for Sustainable Human Development" - in which it stated that 
The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been at the forefront of the growing international consensus that good governance and 
sustainable human development are indivisible. And we believe that 
developing the capacity for good governance can be - and should be - the 
primary way to eliminate poverty. 
Reflecting the new consensus that good governance needed to go beyond an emphasis 
on fiscal restraint, the policy paper went on to define good governance as being 
... participatory, transparent and accountable. It is also effective and 
equitable. And it promotes the rule of law. Good governance ensures that 
political, social and economic priorities are based on broad consensus 'in 
society and that the voices of the poorest and the most vulnerable are heard 'in 
decision-makm*g over the allocation of development resources. 19 
As the UNDP policy paper mdicates, mitiatives directed toward strengthenig 
democratic accountability now figured largely In development strategies and reflected 
a growing view that governments Played an important role in establishing the rules of 
the game by which markets operate. Hence, development strategies needed to target 
cleanmg up these rules through reforms of overly bureaucratic and corrupt 
governinents M developing countries. 
Here, for the purposes of drawing an analogy between the linkages among economic 
development, accountability and record keeping and those among private sector 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping discussed in the previous two 
chapters, we must make a distinction between the notion of democratic accountabflity 
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and good governance as these concepts apply In the public sector, and accountability 
and good governance as they apply in the private sector. This study defines 
accountability as "liability to give account of, and answer for the discharge of duties 
or conduct. ),, 
20 In a democratic political system, elected officials govern on behalf of 
citiZens to whom they are expected to be accountable for the way In which they 
govern. Thus, normative definitions of good governance include the idea of 
democratic accountability or government's accountability to the people. In the 
private sector, by contrast, accountability to citizens, or the public, is only expected III 
industries that impinge upon the public interest, for example, banking (as will be 
discussed further in chapter five). In such cases, when democratic accountability 
intersects with the private sector, some form of regulation usually establishes a 
V--- 
framework for public accountability. Consequently, In the private sector context, 
notions of good governance do not usuaBy rest upon the idea of democratiC, or public, 
accountability, but rather on accountability to shareholders and other corporate 
stakeholders. 
In the public sector, below the level of the political directorate, public institutions (ie, 
government departments and agencies) theoreticafly serve as the administrative 
instruments of elected officials. Thus, public sector agencies are accountable to 
elected officials, and indirectly to citizens, for the way in which they operate to give 
effect to government policies. Similarly, in the private sector, senior managers of 
corporate entities are accountable to their board of directors who, in turn, are 
accountable to shareholders for the performance of the company. In both public and 
123 
private sector contexts there exist any number of internal administrative 
accountability relationships. 
The main point is that at the macro level there are differences between accountability 
as it applies M the public and private sectors. Only certain industries within the 
private sector, because of the public interest in what they do, are accountable to the 
people, whereas the basis of democratic goverment is built on accountability to 
cft]Zens. At the rmcro level, or administrative leveL however, accountabil4 M the 
public and private sectors operates in much the same way. NIAnagers are responsible 
to a directorate -m the case of the private sector, a board of directors and, M the case 
of the public sector, elected officials - and there exist numerous other internal 
accountability relationships. 
This chapter has so far been able to show that development administrators, through 
their pohcies, have recognised that there are hnks among continuing competitive 
viability which is necessary for economic development, good governance and 
accountability and that this link is analogous to the links that this study argues exist 
among private sector competitive viability, good corporate governance and 
accountability. Development administrators clearly acknowledge that both macro- 
(eg, interest rates, exchange rates, etc. ) and nucroecononuc factors were responsible 
for Third World balance of payments problems and debt and that they both play a role 
in the competitive viability and economic development of these countries. Further, 
their policies reflect an understanding that good governance -a cornerstone of which 
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is accountability - IS one of the microeconomic factors critical to establishing and 
sustaining competitive viability in the public sector, just as it is argued in tfiýs study 
that it is necessary to establishing and sustaining competitive viability in the private 
sector. Finally, recent policy initiatives reflect the view that accountability, being 
among other things a key mechanism for achieving efficiency in operations, is a 
precondition for economic viability and development. 
An Overview of Research Linking Economic Development and Accountability 
with Record Keeping 
-D 
Recent studies on development administration and record keeping provide empirical 
evidence of links among public sector reform initiatives in developing countries - 
with their goal of good governance, a key element of which is accountability - 
economic development and record keeping. Since, it is argued, the relationships 
among econofMc development, accountability and record keeping are analogous to 
those among private sector competitive viability, accountabihty and record keeping, 
the findings of this research offer some empirical support for the relationships posited 
m chapters two and three. 
The body of research on public sector reform and record keeping must be placed M 
the context of literature on wider issues of democratic accountability and record 
keeping that has emerged over the last decade or so. This literature grew out of a 
1989 chaflenge to archivists by Terry Eastwood, a Canadian archivist and former 
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Chair of the Master of Archival Studies Programme m the School of Library, 
Archival and Information Studies at the University of British Columbia, to "spirit an 
understanding of archives as 'arsenals of democratic accountability and 
-) , 21 contmulty . 
Australian archivists answered Eastwood's call to action in 1992. Against a 
background of goverment and corporate corruption in the 1980s, they set about to 
explore the links among record keepmg, accountability and the role of the archival 
and records management profession. 22 Archivists at Monash University's Graduate 
Department of Librarianship, Archives and Records, in developmg a definition of 
archives as the conceptual framework for the integrated archives and records 
programmes offered by the University, advanced the notion that the effective creation 
of archival documents is required to "underpin the public accountability of 
government and non-government organisations, freedom of information and privacy 
legislation, protection of people's rights and entitlements. .. 
). )23 A desire to explore 
this understanding of archival documents gave rise to a series of articles and research 
papers, subsequently published in Sue McKemnush and Frank Upward's Archival 
Documents: Providing Accountability Through Recordkeeping, that linked 
accountability with records and information management. 
Subsequently, in 1996, Justus Wamukoya presented the first of the pieces of research 
exploring the links between public sector reform initiatives 'in developing countries 
and record keeping in his study of records management and administrative reform 
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programmes in Kenya . 
24 While earlier literature on the relationship between 
accountability and record keeping, in focusing on public accountability, was 
concerned mainly with the question of protecting the public interest, Wamukoya's 
study, in placing the discussion of the relationship between record keeping and public 
sector reform in Kenya in the context of the literature on development econonUcs and 
adniinistration, was the first to indicate that poor record keeping had negative 
repercussions for the economic development of a country. His study was followed by 
a 1997 study carried out by Pino Akotia on the management of public sector financial 
records and their implications for good goverrunent. 25 More recently, the 
International Records Management Trust (hereafter referred to In this chapter as the 
IRMr) has conducted research into the relationship between good governance and 
record keepmg. The ERMT'S study on the management of public sector financial 
records In sub-Saharan Africa and its impact on accountability and public sector 
26 
management is of particular relevance and interest . 
This body of research, in 
linking record keeping with public sector reform initiatives aimed at good governance 
and thereby economic development, lends empilriCal support to the idea that there are, 
indeed, linkages among private sector competitive viability, accountability and record 
keeping as put forth in this study. It is to a detailed exploration of this research that 
this chapter now turns. 
The first of the three studies, and also the first to link development administration and 
record keepirig, is that by Justus Wamukoya completed m 1996. Wamukoya 
undertook an exanunation of the relationship between records management and 
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administrative reform as implemented in the Government of Kenya. He examined 
current policies, procedures and techniques for, and the attitudes of various agencies 
in the public service to, the management of records. Using data gathered from case 
studies of the Directorate of Personnel Management, the Civil Service Reform 
Secretariat and the Ministry of Finance, he was able to demonstrate the significance 
of records management M underpinning policy development, decision-making and 
accountabihty M the public service, notmg that: 
Because of poor or inadequate record keeping systems, many developing 
countries today find themselves constrained in their development efforts and 
unable to provide efficient public services. 27 
On the basis of his findings, Wamukoya caRed for the adoption of records 
management as a major component of administratiVe reform In Kenya and other 
developing countries as well as closer cooperation and collaboration between the 
Kenya National Archives and Documentation Service and the Directorate of 
Personnel Management in the development of policies and procedures aimed at 
promoting the efficient and effective management of records in the pubhc service. 
Following Wamukoya's study, Pino Akotia produced a critical examination of the 
relationship between public sector financial records management and good 
government through an analysis of the objectives, business processes and records 
systems of the central administration of finance in Ghana. Akotia's study offers a 
particularly relevant basis of comparison with the relationships explored in this study 
because of its specific focus on financial records. Akotia argued that public finance is 
a major instrument of constitutional, political and administrative control and that it 
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provides the basis for decision making and the implementation of goverment 
programmes. Accordmg to Akotia, fmancial records 
... provide evidence of 
how government has managed the nation's 
resources. Records are the only basis for holding the Government accountable 
for what it does or fails to do, why and how it does it and the results achieved 
or targets Missed. Records provide evidence of good and bad judgments 
displayed in adopting and carrying out public policies and of whether or not 
requirements for the custody and management of public resources have been 
met. Together with regular audits, financial records management provides the 
basis on which to measure government's adequacy and the degree to which it 
has presented itself as honest, efficient, well-meanig and accountable. 28 
He found that, where pubfic sector reform initiatives had included a records 
management component, "restructuring of the records management systems of 
goverment was crucial for improving efficiency of econorMc policy refon-ns and 
overall public sector management. , 29However, he goes on to argue that a whole 
range of wider reforms In relation to strengthening planning and organisational 
capacity In the civil service would have been enhanced had the Govemment of 
Ghana's Records Management Improvement Project been introduced earlier and been 
giVen a wider remit. 
30 
Akotia notes, in particular, that the records management reform project did not 
address financial records and draws the conclusion that "As a result, despite the 
various policy measures implemented to strengthen financial management, the overall 
ability of government to manage the Consolidated Fund remained weak 
due to the 
very poor and chaotic state of the existing paper-based financial records systems. 
,, 31 
According to Akotia, the costs associated with failure to manage fn=cial records 
included impediments to efficiency enhancements and the process of 
introducing 
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accountabihty and transparency (as a means of preventing corruption) and pohcy 
formulation. 32 
The IRMT's 1998 study of the link between records and financial accountability in 
sub-Saharan Africa is also of interest. " This research marked a significant step 
toward establishing, in a practicaL concrete manner, the hnk between records systems 
and financial accountability. The results of this research are instructive for 
addressing the issues on which this study focuses. The IRMT study based its 
conclusions on data collected in The Gambia, which, until 1994, was recognjised as 
one of the most successful democracies on the continent with a government officially 
committed to a programme of good governance. Despite this view, many Gambian 
officials and ordinary citizens recognised that there were abuses of Public expenditure 
and that, In reality, the government was not accountable to the people. The 
government's lack of accountability led directly to its overthrow in a coup on 22 July, 
1994. The Armed Forces Provisional Ruling Council (AFPRC), which took over the 
government, inunediately set about enhancmg transparency and prornoti Ing 
accountability by strengthening the role of the Auditor General and holding 
commissions of inquiry to identify the perpetrators of econornic crime. 
The ERMT research team was able to work directly alongside the investigating 
lawyers for the conun'Lssions of inquiry, which provided a unique opportunity to see 
first hand how financial records management affects financial accountability. Their 
work led them to conclude that lack of control of documentary evidence contributed 
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to weak fmancial controls that permitted corruption and fraud to flourish in The 
Gambia. 34 
Main Findings of the Studies 
The studies outlined above all provide empirical data that clearly establishes links 
among economic development, good governance, accountability and record keeping. 
Each of the studies present a number of specific findings which, because of the 
analogy that can be drawn between the links among econorMc development, 
accountability and record keeping in the public sector and those among competitive 
viability, accountability and record keeping in the private sector, shed light on how 
poor record keepmg might affect private sector accountabihty and competitive 
viability. What follows is a discussion of the main fmdmgs of these studies organised 
into several broad thematic groups matching the assumptions discussed in chapter 
one. 
Records Availability and Use 
Each of the three studies presented findings on the availability and use of recorded 
information in support of good governance, particularly those processes and policies 
seen as being central to restoring national econornic viability (ie, public sector 
financial and personnel management). In the main, all three studies concluded that 
important information was not available in support of these processes and policies as 
a result of poor records management practices. The result was that governments were 
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not able to fully effect public sector reforms aimed at strengthening public sector 
management and, in consequence, were unable to fully effect practices and policies 
aimed at achieving a greater level of economic development. The studies highlighted 
a number of critical government functions and processes negatively impacted upon by 
poor record keepmg. These include: deciSion-making; personnel management; 
implementation of donor funded projects; expenditure control and reporting; revenue 
collection; economic planning; debt management-, internal control and audit; 
corruption and fraud prevention; financial reporting; and monitoring of adherence to 
financial regulatiOn and standards. 
In addition to the fact that poor record keeping prevented records from being 
available to support key govermnent processes and policies, these studies also found 
that public sector managers often did not have a clear idea of what information they 
actually needed in order to efficiently and effectively execute governinent functions, 
processes and policies. The same was true of donor agencies accordmig to 
Wamukoya, who wrote: "... neither the governments nor donors fufly apprecmte the 
ý, 35 
need to link government policy mechanisms and the information sector ... 
Both 
Wamukoya and Akotia attributed this lack of understanding to governments' and 
donor agencies' failure to analyse the information required to support business 
processes as part of restructurmg and reengineering exeruses. 
These studies also found that public sector officials often did not use recorded 
information in decision-making or analysis. Wamukoya points out that the attitudes 
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of senior administrators toward the use of information for decision-making 
under-valued the role of information and the importance of records and information 
management. He cites a comment by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, administrative 
reform gurus, as indicative of these attitudes. Osborne and Gaebler have observed 
that "... government managers are not, for the most part, used to having or using 
information, especially for fOrward-looking purposes. And on many Issues, political 
pressures are often so great that data seem to be beside the point when decisions are 
made. , 36 Similarly, Akotia notes that within the Ghanaian civil service computers 
generally were not used for analysis. Citing a study by Peterson, he pointed out that 
the low level of computer-based analysis relates to the fact that senior officers limit 
the use of information in decision-making. 37 
Attitudes to Records Use andManagement 
The three studies also present revealing data concerning the attitudes of goverment 
and donor agency officials to record keeping and the value of recorded information as 
a strategic resource. 
All three studies present data that support the view that records management is 
seldom an organisational priority and is not viewed as being a professional 
discipline 
-level clerical function. As evidence of these widely 
held but instead, is seen as a low 
attitudes about records management in government, Wamukoya pointed to the 
challenges he experienced in conducting his own research. 
He encountered extreme 
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difficulty collecting data for his study due to the indifference public administrators 
had to records management and the generally low priority with which they accorded 
it 
. 
38 His experiences led Wamukoya to write that "... despite growing awareness 
about the importance of records management, most senior officials in the public 
service accord it little recognition, treating it more like a clerical fiinction. 
Consequently, poor organisation of records and ineffective control and retrieval of 
information has become a ma . or problem for most agencies III the public service. Y, 
3 9 j 
Warnukoya's findmgs are echoed in those of the IRMT and Akotia. Akotia found 
that "... throughout the central administration of finance, records services tend to be 
viewed as a siMPle support function which will take care of itself. With little or no 
management support, general registry services have gradually deteriorated and are 
presently a pale reflection of what they should be. 40 
Wamukoya also observes that most senior public officials contmue to give record 
keeping a lower level ranking in relation to other govermnental priorities because 
they remain unaware of the potential benefits of records management to public 
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adnunistration. Uotia found a lack of awareness on the part of governmental 
authorities of the value of information as a strategic resource, which along with lack 
of appropriate policies, resources and procedures, could be blamed for the poor record 
keeping in respect of financial records. 42 The HWT study found that accountants, 
auditors and other senior public officials understand that records are needed for 
accountabdity, but are only just begmning to recognise the need for records 
management. 43 The study makes the additional observation that "There is a 
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widespread belief that the [record keeping] problem is so prevalent, ingrained and 
thankless that little can be done to IMProve the situation 
"44 
Wamukoya and Akotia also found that donor agency attitudes failed to recognise 
sufficiently the importance of good record keeping. Despite policies and aid 
programmes that acknowledge the criticality of information to the state, Wamukoya 
observes that In Kenya no donor agency was involved in a records management 
project m 1996 '45 notmg that economic recovery programmes and pubfic sector 
reform programmes implemented with donor financial support have still not included 
records management among the areas that should receive urgent and significant 
support. 46 Akotia agrees, makmg the observation that, in Ghana as elsewhere, donor 
agencies mistakenly focused on the introduction of computer technology as the sole 
solution to information management problems In the civil service. 47 Moreover, they 
did not provide a broad enough remit to Ghana's Public Sector Records Improvement 
Project to support major changes M the management of public finances. 
Consequently, public sector financial management improvement initiatives have had 
a much more limited impact than they might otherwise have done. 
48 
Training in Records Management 
The HZMT study found that records professionalism in developing countries is 
10 limited. Ac a result, records staff do not understand how legislati n affects the 
creation and use of records, how to translate changing 
legal and regulatory 
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requirements into practical systems and how new teclinologies impact upon records 
system design. 49 The study attributes this lack of professionalism to the absence of 
appropriate education and training in records management. 
Warnukoya's study found that staff in government registries had received little, if 
any, training M registry operations. He noted that this problem related to the fact that 
registries were often used as dumping grounds for clerical officers who had failed In 
other areas. Moreover, the situation was often worsened by lack of career prospects 
for registry personnel and the absence of opportunities for training in records 
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manage e. 
In regard to the management of public sector financial records, Akotia's and the 
HZW studies both pointed out that goverment accountants create and maintain 
accounting records but have little or no background in records management. As a 
result, they do not manage their records effectively which, in turn, negatively affects 
the preparation of accounting information and financial reporting. 
" This discovery 
has prompted the ERW to develop records management guidelines for financial 
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recor s. 
All three studies noted that attitudes of senior public officials, auditors and donor 
agencies can only be improved if work is done to educate them about the role of 
records in support of good governance and economic development. 
" 
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Information and Records Management Practices 
The three studies found an entire range of shortcornings with the way In which 
recorded information was being managed in Kenya, Ghana and The Gambia. 
Among the most fundamental problems identified was the absence of clearly defined 
responsibility and authority for the record keeping function. More often than not, 
there was no one agency with the authority to coordinate and regulate records 
management. Instead, responsibility for record keeping was fragmented, usually 
between a national archives authority and other government agencies. The studies 
found that national archives services lacked the mandate and capacity to take on the 
function of controlling and coordinating records management throughout the public 
service. For example, M Kenya, Wamukoya found that the National Archives needed 
to broaden its focus, as it only concentrated on scheduling files for permanent 
id preservation and destroying ephemeral material. This approach di not adequately 
provide for the management of current and semi-current records. Records were 
therefore not being managed as a key strategic resource of tmjor significance for 
54 
good governance, accountabflity and efficiency. Yet, as the IRMT study found, 
good record keeping requires the existence of a strong records management regulator. 
It also gathered data that showed that the absence of a strong internal records 
management regulator contributed to widespread non-compliance with legislative 
requirements for financial record keeping. 
55 
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Lack of a sufficiently well structured policy and procedural framework for the record 
keeping function also led to weaknesses In records systems. Akotia notes that 
Colonial Financial Orders did not adequately define the statutory arrangements for 
managing financial records. 56 Moreover, there was an absence of policy on the 
significance of information to public financial management and no procedural manual 
to provide clear and detailed guidelines on financial records management. 57 
Wamukoya observed that ". .. although the Kenya Government has made 
commendable efforts in supporting the Kenya National Archives and Documentation 
Service *in its role as custodian of public records, a more comprehensive policy 
mechanism embracing the management of records through their entire life-cycle is 
urgently required ... 
"8The ERMT study found that although government 
procedures In The Gambia were comprehensive in describing the purpose, creation, 
use and distribution of certain financial records, they provided little or no guidance on 
the control, storage or disposal of records m order to meet audit, accountability and 
financial management needs. '9 
All three studies observed the almost complete collapse of registry systems 
throughout the civil service. Each study noted the ways In which collapse of the 
registry systems has led to a host of common record keepMg problems such as 
ineffective supervision of registry operations; difficulties in tracing file movements 
and the location of closed files; delays in filing correspondence resultmig in huge 
backlogs; and inconsistency in file numbering systems. 
60 All of these problems 
compromised the integrity of recorded information as evidence of public sector 
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business transactions and hindered its retrieval for use iii support of efficient, 
effective and uncorrupted public administration. 
The studies by Akotia and the H?, MT found that the coflapse of registry systems was 
part of a general decline in public administration wherein informal practices 
supplanted formal rules and which saw an institutional culture emerge which made 
little use of records .61 
As the ERAff noted: "Indeed the failure to create and maintain 
records systems was sometimes motivated by the desire to conceal financial and other 
uTegularities. 1,, 
62 
Wamukoya's study also revealed the existence of information flow problems. For 
example, in the Nfinistry of Fmance, all information flowed through one central 
registry, a registry that did not operate weH to begM with. This practice both 
reflected and reinforced the rigid, bureaucratic and centralised decision-making and 
commurucation structures m the nunistry. These structures undennined the 
objectives of the Civil Service Reform initiatives and fi-ustrated attempts to improve 
the country's governance systems . 
6' Akotia also found that difficulties in the flow of 
information contributed to problems, particularly in terms of budget preparation, with 
monitoring and control. 64 
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The Introduction and Use of Computers 
All three of the studies found that although donors recognised that the public service 
suffered from information related problems they saw solutions being provided 
through the introduction and application of computer technology, which led to a 
growing emphasis on computertsed. information systems as a component of civil 
service reform . 
6' For example, many developing countries have introduced new 
computerised personnel and financial management information systems with 
assistance from the World Bank and other donor agencies. Wamukoya states that 
... since the advent of public sector reforms, the policies adopted by most 
governments M developing countries and donors alike have tended to accord 
information technology a high priority, with records management receiving a 
low priority in terms of organisational placement, staffing and budget 
allocation. 
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He goes on to note that 
... 
both government and donors defme information narrowly in terms of 
computerization and tend to view computers increasingly as 'solutions to the 
management of the information required to deliver effective public services. "' 
However, the three studies poirit to the fact that many of these MitiatiVes have met 
with limited success for a number of reasons. One such reason is a failure to link 
computer systems with paper-based systems. This has resulted m several problems as 
follows: data in management information systems frequently have been unreliable 
and inaccurate and paper record keeping systems undermined; there is no framework 
for managing records in electronic form; there is a lack of integration of computer 
systems; and there is httle capacity for computer systems. 
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All three studies attribute many of the shortcomings of computer technology to the 
fact that these systems have been developed without consultation with records and 
information managers. Programmers and information technology specialists are 
principally concerned with issues of access and retrieval. 68 This has meant that 
important issues such as linkage with older paper-based systems and the integrity of 
electronic records have been overlooked. Akotia argues that govermnents would 
have avoided many of these problems if they had involved records managers In 
planning for the introduction of computer technology. He goes on to make the point 
that their involvement would have dealt with issues such as the accuracy of the source 
data, managMig paper-based input and output data, and management of electronic 
records. They would also have raised issues concerning the protection of vital 
records and disaster planning and recovery. In addition, they would have ensured the 
availabihty of system documentation and a safe storage environment so as to 
strengthen the reliability and trustworthiness of electronic records. 69 
Record Keeping and the Development Agenda 
Recent development programmes and initiatives reflect an emerging recognition that 
good record keepmg supports accountabihty and that this, m turn, supports the 
objectives of good governance and the attainment of economic development. 70 In 
Ghana, Phase Two of a World Bank civil service reforin programme included the 
improvement of records and information management as a means of strengthening the 
institutional and operational structure of the Office of the Head of the Civil Service 
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and the Management Services DiVision. 71 By 1990, the UNDP had established its 
Aid Accountability Initiative (later known as the Programme for Accountability and 
Transparency [PACT]). This programme recognised the need to account for public 
funds to meet accountability requirements and that lack of accountability constituted 
72 
a major obstacle to good governance and economic development . Through 
its 
PACT Progranune, the UNDP forged links with organisations working toward 
records management on a global scale, Including the International Council on 
Archives (ICA), the IRMT and the Association of Records Nbnagers and 
73 The UNDP's interesti f Administrators (ARMA) International . in orgmg alliances 
with records management associations evidenced recognition of the fact that well 
managed records are needed to support accountabihty and provide the basis for 
transparency. 
As encouragmig a sign as these initiatives are, very little has changed in terms of 
Wamukoya's and Akotia's observations that development agencies fall to recognise 
sufficiently the importance of record keeping in terms of the success of development 
initiatives even though they may recognise lack of quality information as a problem. 
Development administrators still pay scant attention to record keeping in the policies 
and strategies they recommend. As evidence of this, we need only cite the 
1998/99 
World Bank World Development Report. 
The report identifies knowledge related problems as presenting obstacles to 
advancing economic and social well-being. One such problem relates 
to what the 
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authors of the report define as "information problems", that is a lack of knowledge 
about such attributes as "the quality of a product, the diligence of a worker, or the 
creditworthiness of a firm. .. " which is critical to effective markets. 
" The report's 
authors point out that mechanisms to alleviate information problems, such as product 
standards, training certificates, and credit reports, are fewer and weaker in developing 
countries. 
The report acknowledges that information failures are a common problem for 
financial mstitutiOns. The inabihty to properly assess and monitor dfferent types of 
financial risks, such as the risk that an asset or loan will become unrecoverable or that 
there will be a delay in the servicing of a loan, is an important cause of bank failures. 
Failure to process information effectiVely can contribute to bank collapse. For 
example, the authors of the World Development Report cite research that IMPlicates 
information deficiencies of this type, coupled with market failure to fully and 
efficiently process available information, in the collapse of East Asian financial 
75 
rmrkets m 1997 . 
Thus, the report's authors argue, the ability of banks and banking regulators and 
supervisors to gather information and accurately assess it IS vital to the overall health 
of banks In partiCular and financial systems In general. The authors of the report 
make the further point that effective information processing is supported by strong 
systems of accountability, which, in turn, ensure the flow of required information. 
They see systems of accountability as being strengthened by the introduction of 
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accepted accountmg standards and regular audits. For example, they maintain, 
accounting standards help in the accurate assessment of the health of banks by 
providing reliable information on loan classification and concentration, on the 
realistic valuation of collateral, and on loan loss provisionmg. 76 They point to 
empff ical studies showing that there is a high correlation between weak legal and 
accounting systems and countries with low incomes, suggesting that a better 
information environment, aided by strong accountability systems, leads to healthier 
banks which, in turn, contribute to financial market growth and stability. 
Though accountMig and audit standards and regular internal audits will no doubt 
strengthen accountability, the research by Warnukoya, Akotia and the M-Nff suggests 
that to follow only these strategies will not Yield the desired results. Effectivehy, 
managed record keeping prograrnmes also will be needed to strengthen 
accountability. These studies of the public sector linking poor record keeping, 
information problems, and lack of goverriment accountability with failure to effect 
public sector reform suggest that research into the causes of banking failures must not 
overlook the important role of organisational record keeping practices as a source of 
information problems. Even where strong accounting standards and auditing 
practices are in place, poor record keeping may prevent banks and bank regulators 
from obtaining the information they need to manage risk, effectively monitor 
bank 
a lu practices and prevent financial crises. Empirical exploration of cases of 
bank f1 res, 
as the Jamaican financial crisis affords, can reveal whether these assertions 
hold true. 
Armed with a better understanding of the relationships among record keeping, 
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accountability and competitive viability, it is possible to develop more effective 
policy and strategies to avoid the causes of collapse in banks and, possibly, other 
types of commercial enterprises as well. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that relationships among economic development, 
accountability and record keepIng M the public sector are analogous to those among 
private sector competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. The concept 
of competitive viability is applicable to the public sector if viewed as a country's 
ability to remain competitive in a global marketplace and avoid being unable to repay 
its debts. Though there are many definitions and paradigms for economic 
development, competitive viability is an unportant precondition. SMce the early 
1980s, development strategies have placed an emphasis on economic reforms aimed 
at improving the chances that developing countries could reduce and repay their debt 
obligations. However, there has been early recognition that macroeconomic reform 
alone would not lead to significant improvements in the competitive viability of these 
countries. Institutional reforms dedicated to strengthening governance also would be 
needed. This ILS analogous to the argument, advanced in -chapter two, that 
macroeconomic factors alone do not support the competitive viability of private 
sector entities; endogenous factors, in particular, effective systems of accountability, 
are also significant. In the public sector, donor agencies have come to view 
accountability as underpinning good governance. This study argues that this iLs 
equally true of good corporate governance. 
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There is a growing body of empirical evidence to show that clear relationships exist 
among economic development, accountability and record keeping. Studies concerned 
with record keeping and public sector management 'in developing countries by Justus 
Wamukoya, PMo Akotia and the IRMT provide data to demonstrate the links. 
Recently, some donor agencies have taken steps to establISh programmes that midicate 
their acknowledgement of these relationships although, overall, development policies 
and strategies still focus little on eliminating poor record keeping as a means of 
resolving information problems that undernune economic development. Based on 
this argument, the fmdmgs presented in the three studies discussed in this chapter 
have been used to provide empirical support for the posited relationships among 
private sector competitive viability, accountability and record keeping outlined in 
chapters two and three. 
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Chapter Five: Competitive Viability, Internal Control and Accountability in the 
Banking Industry 
Introduction 
The first two chapters of this study set out a theoretical framework linking 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping, while chapter four found 
empirical support for the theorised. link in research on the relationships among record 
keeping, public sector reform initiatives and economic development in Africa. 
Further empirical support for this link is sought in the experiences of collapsed 
Jamaican commercial banks in later chapters. However, in advance of exploring the 
Jamaican field research data., some background information on the banking industry is 
necessary. 
Aside from aiming to familiarise the reader with significant aspects of the banking 
industry, this chapter seeks to illustrate that the literature on banking lends support to 
the ideas put forth in chapters two and three about the relationships among 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. Based on the literature, this 
chapter presents examples of how failures of bank internal control systems, a major 
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component of which is accountability, have contributed to bank failure. It is argued 
that accountability structures, systems and procedures, as an important means of 
managing and controfling a range of risks associated with banking operations and 
maintaining an accurate picture of financial performance and position, underpin 
banks' competitive viability. This chapter then goes on to discuss how quality 
information and communication, a prerequisite of which is good record keeping, is 
viewed as being a critical element of banks' systems of accountability and internal 
control. 
What Banks Do 
Traditionally, banks have played an important role in the economy as intermediaries 
between depositors and borrowers. Arising ftom their role as intermediaries, banks 
offer two main products: 1) deposit products and 2) loan products. Banks generally 
use deposit products to fund their loan products. Thus, we may view the business of 
banks as both managing liabilities (liabilities being deposits that pay out money on 
demand or at some future date) and managing assets (assets being loans and 
investments)-' Payment systems are by-products of and facilitate banks' role as 
intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. 2 
The Economic and Social Role of Banks and the Need for Banking Supervision 
in virtually all countries around the world, whether developed or developing 
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economies, the banking industry is one of the most heavily regulated commercial 
sectors. Banking is regulated from "cradle to grave" - from processing of applications 
for licensing for as long as a bank remains in business. The need for tight regulatIon 
of the banking industry is due to the crucial role financial intermediation plays in the 
economy and to the fiduciary responsibility banks have to those for whom they hold 
money. In acting as intermediaries in the mobilisation of resources, banks are able to 
influence the direction, pattern and flow of national resources thereby affecting the 
rate of economic development. They are able to fulfil this role because they help to 
provide savers with highly liquid assets at lower levels of risk while giving investors 
access to a larger pool of resources for investment finance at a lower cost and in a 
more suitable form than would be possible by relying on savers and investors to find 
one another. Banks' role as financial intermediaries is particularly important in 
economies with relatively undeveloped capital markets such as in developing 
economies because investors do not have access to other sources of funding through 
equity financing. Banks also have a central role in the execution of the goverment's 
monetary policy and in preserving overall balance in the economy. 
It is for these reasons that regulation of the banking industry is considered important. 
Whether banks perform their functions well may determine "the degree of success of 
the development efforts, particularly if they make conscientious efforts to mobilize 
reservoirs of funds for allocation to entrepreneurs for investment in projects with the 
highest rates of social return. -)1,4 In performing their financial intermediation function, 
in the best interests of their depositors and society, banks are expected to ensure 
prudent management of assets and to guarantee the safety of depositor's funds. They 
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are expected to adhere strictly to safe and sound banking practices and maintain 
adequate internal control measures to prevent incidences of fraud, forgeries and other 
financial rnisdemeanours in order to ensure stability and engender the public's 
confidence in the financial system. The argument for prudential regulation lies in the 
fact that bankers, not always being motivated by depositors' and society's interests, 
do not necessarily operate their banks in a manner that will guarantee the safety of 
depositors' funds, the viability of the bank, and the health of the financial system. 
Types of Banks 
There are two major categories of banks: wholesale banks and retail banks. 
Wholesale banking usually entails the provision of services to a small number of very 
large customers, such as corporations or governments. This type of banking is largely 
inter-bank; that is, banks use the inter-bank markets to borrow from and lend to one 
another. American investment banks and UK merchant banks offer examples of 
wholesale banking activity. 5 Retail banking, on the other hand, entails the provision 
of basic services to a large number of small customers. This type of banking 
traditionally has been made possible by having a high number of branches in places 
like shopping centres, college campuses, industrial estates and high or main streets of 
cities and towns. 6 Increasingly, these types of banks also deliver their services 
through channels such as the telephone and the internet. 
Commercial banking is actuafly an American term referring to both wholesale and 
154 
retail banking activities, but not investment banking. 7 In Jamaican law, a commercial 
bank is a bank licensed under the provision of the Banking Act to carry out banking 
business. 8 The Banking Act of Jamaica defines banking business as "the business of 
receiving from the public, on current account or deposit account, money which is 
repayable on demand by cheque or order and which may be invested by way of 
advances to customers or otherwise; and such other business of like business as the 
Nfinister may, by order, prescribe. "9 Thus, this study concentrates on the traditional 
role of the bank as deposit taker, lender and maker of payments, primarily to small 
customers as in retail banking. 
Types of Banking Systems 
There are two basic models for banking systems: universal and non-universal. The 
banking laws of each country reflect which model has been adopted in that country. 
The universal bank model permits banks to engage in a wide range of financial 
activities , including a 
full range of traditional banking and securities activities. 
Universal banking refers to the provision of all or most of financial services under a 
single, largely unique banking structure. 10 This type of banking activity may include 
intermediation; trading of financial instruments, foreign exchange, and their 
derivatives; underwriting new debt and equity issue; brokerage; corporate advisory 
services, including mergers and acquisitions advice; investment management, 
insurance; and holding equity of non-financial firms in the bank's portfolio. 
" An 
increasing number of countries follow universal banking practices, for example, 
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Canada, France and the UY, and the European Union allow universal banking. " In 
these countries, banks are permitted to operate as fully integrated universal banks that 
supply a complete range of financial services from one institutional entity. 
In banking systems that are not universal, the same types of financial services may be 
offered, but not under the auspices of a single banking structure. In fact, the laws of 
countries with non-universal banking systems will prohibit the degree to which banks 
may become directly involved in non-banking activities. The underlying reason for 
these prohibitions is to establish what might be called fire walls to prevent banks from 
engaging in highly risky activities that may affect the soundness of their banking 
operations and thereby the safety of depositors' funds. This bank model reflects the 
theoretical situation in Japan and, until very recently, the US. In practice, in the US 
and, to a lesser extent Japan, market and competitive forces have largely displaced the 
narrowly defined specialised bank models. Indeed, these pressures led to passage of 
new banking legislation in the US in 1999 that has seen the country adopt a more 
universal banking approach. 13 In theory the Jamaican banking system is non- 
universal but, as shall be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, in reality 
it became universal by default during the financial crisis as a result of the formation of 
large financial conglomerates owning both banking and non-banking subsidiaries in 
which there was considerable interconnection of both transactions and lending. 
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Competitive Viability in Banking 
In chapter two, competitive viability was defined as the ability of private sector 
business entities to function and develop with sufficient efficiency to avoid failure and 
ensure survival in a competitive market. In the context of banking, competitive 
viability simply refers to the ability of a bank to function and develop in a way that 
avoids failure and ensures the continuing operation of the bank. 
In many cases banks do fail and are liquidated (ie, their assets are sold off). However, 
in other cases banks actually are not allowed to fail because of concerns about the 
effects of failure on the stability of the financial system. Often, if governments or 
regulators perceive that a bank is "too big to fail" they may step in to rescue it. For 
this reason, bank failure usually is defined as insolvency leading to liquidation, 
merger with a healthy bank under government supervision, or rescue with the help of 
state financial support. 14 This is the definition of bank failure to be used in this study. 
Banking -A Risky Business 
The competitive viability of banks essentially rests on their ability to manage a range 
of risks arising in the normal course of bank business activities of lending, deposit 
taking and making payments. As one banking authority has noted: "Banking is about 
taking risks ... without taking risks, 
bankers cannot make money. " 15 Banking is so 
much about risk that banking expert Joel Bessis describes the bank as a "risk 
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machine. " 16 It is particularly important for banks to manage these risks, however, 
because banks are more highly leveraged or geared than other types of businesses. 
That is to say that banks have a higher ratio of risk assets to shareholder capital than 
most other types of enterprises. 17 This financial structure makes banks relatively 
more susceptible to insolvency if risks are not managed properly. 
The traditional areas of banking risk generally identified in the literature are: 1) credit 
risk, 2) liquidity risk, 3) market risk and 4) interest rate risk. 18 These are discussed 
below. Despite the compartmentafisation of risks in the banking literature, many of 
these risks are inter-dependent and, consequently, bank risk analysis and management 
now places greater emphasis on assessing groups of risks. 19 
Credit Risk 
Credit risk is one of the oldest types of risk in banking and, as Joel Bessis points out, 
"is paramount in terms of the importance of potential losses. 
). )20 Each time a bank 
makes a loan, it takes a risk, known as credit risk. Credit risk commonly arises as a 
result of the risk that a customer will fail to comply with their obligation to service a 
debt. Failure to comply may refer simply to a delay in making a payment or to 
outright default on the loan. 21 Credit risk also occurs when the customer's credit 
standing declines in any way. 
A conunon cause of credit risk is large exposure to a single borrower or group of 
related borrowers. Large exposures can also arise as a result of concentrations of 
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lending to a particular type of industry, economic sector, or geographical region, or by 
having sets of loans with other characteristics that make them vulnerable to the same 
economic ctors. 
22 
Connected lending, which is the extension of credit to individuals or firms connected 
to a bank through ownership or through the ability to exert direct or indirect control - 
also poses credit risks, as such lending decisions are not always made on the basis of 
an objective assessment of the risks involved and therefore can lead to defaults on 
loans. Connected parties include a bank's parent organisation, major shareholders, 
subsidiaries, affiliated entities, directors, executive officers, and firms controlled by 
the same groUp. 23 
Increasingly, credit risk also arises in a bank's investment and trading portfolios and 
in other banking activities as a result of new methods for minimising, or hedging, 
against traditional forms of credit risk and the provision of new banking services (eg, 
asset securitisation 
24 
, interbank lending and overnight deposits). 
25 In either case, the 
value of the bank's assets decline as a result, which can threaten solvency. 
Banks manage credit risk by means of knowing their ctýstomers in order to be able to 
assess their credit worthiness; effective board and senior management oversight of 
credit decisions; written policies and procedures on lending; assessment of asset 
quality and loan loss provisioning; creating and maintaining appropriate loan 
documentation; establishing processes and analytical capabilities for ongoing 
monitoring of the condition of the loan book and other assets, including loan 
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concentrations; and establishing processes for dealing with problem loans. 
Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity is an excess of current assets over current liabilities. When a bank has 
insufficient liquidity it may experience insolvency and bankruptcy. Joel Bessis notes, 
however, that extreme illiquidity is often the result of other risks, for example, 
important losses due to the default of a high-end customer . 
26 This, in turn, can cause 
a run on the bank or the closing of credit lines by other institutions that creates a 
shortage of funds leading to extreme illiquidity and fatal risk. 
Liquidity risk also refers to difficulties raising funds at a reasonable rate in retail or 
wholesale markets. Problems with raising funds on the markets may arise due to 
temporary periods of illiquidity in the market itself, which forces the cost of money 
up, or as a result of the characteristics of the bank: its funding needs, stability, 
reputation and so on. 
27 
Liquidity risk is usually the normal outcome of daily banking transactions. These 
transactions produce a maturity gap between assets and liabilities. For example, a 
bank may collect short-term deposits but lend long-term. Given the gap between 
maturities (when the bank must pay out on the deposit and when it wiH receive funds 
28 
from the loan) there exists the potential for a lack of liquidity. Thus, banks must 
carefully manage maturity gaps in order to avoid problems with liquidity. 
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D- 
Responsibility for ensuring adequate levels of cash and working capital to meet daily 
liabilities and unexpected circumstances usually falls within the treasury management 
function. This function generafly has the responsibility of managing maturity gaps 
as well by means of a process known as asset and liability management (ALM). Most 
banks also have Asset and Liability Committees (ALCOs) that facilitate board and 
senior management oversight and overall coordination of the ALM function. 
Market Risk 
Market risk is the risk of declines in market rates or prices, including interest rates, 
foreign exchange rates and equity and commodity prices. The value of a bank's 
portfolio of traded instruments - such as equity shares or bonds - will be a function of 
its market price, coupon 29 , coupon 
frequency, time, interest rate, and other factors. 
Fluctuations in the price of an instrument may be due to broad changes in market 
prices or from a shift in the price of a particular instrument. Market risk is becoming 
an increasingly significant risk for banks as they move into more off-balance sheet 
banking involving the trading of market-based instruments (eg, futures, forwards, 
options, and swapS)30 to protect, or hedge, against other types of risks. While treasury 
management, and in particular Asset and Liability Management (ALM) functions, 
traditionally have included only the management of liquidity and interest rate risk 
discussed below, recently they have expanded to include the containment of market 
risk using such techniques as value at risk (VaR), stress simulations and capital at risk 
(CAR) calculations. 31 
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Interest Rate Risk 
Interest rate risk is a type of market risk. In market-based economies, most of the 
activities of a bank generate revenues and costs that are related to interest rates. 32 The 
instability of interest rates is what generates the risk. Thus, interest rate nsk is the risk 
that there will be a decline in earnings due to movements in interest rates. It arises 
primarily from mismatches in both the volume and maturity of interest- sensitive 
assets (eg, loans), liabilities (ie, interest earning deposits) and off-balance sheet 
items. 33 For example, a bank will experience a reduction in its earnings if there is a 
mismatch between its fixed and variable rate loans. If the bank has an excess of fixed 
rate loans, it will be vulnerable to rising interest rates because it will lose the 
additional revenue that could have been generated from the loan as a result of the 
higher rates but still have to pay out more on variable rate deposits. Conversely, if a 
bank has an excess of fixed rate deposits, it will be vulnerable to falling interest rates. 
Interest rate risk can arise as a result of rate fluctuations, imperfect correlation in the 
adjustment of the rates earned and paid on different instruments with otherwise 
similar characteristics in the maturity and re-pricing of assets, and express or implied 
portf IiOS. 
34 
options imbedded in bank assets, liabilities and off-balance sheet 0 An 
unexpected shift in interest rates can have a serious impact on the profitability of a 
35 bank 
. Consequently, 
banks must maintain a good balance of assets and liabilities by 
carefully managing interest rate risks. Again, banks use the ALM process to achieve 
this objective. 
In addition to the major types of bank risks discussed above, there are many 
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additional and related risks that must be mentioned since these risks also can threaten 
bank solvency. Many of these risks are not unique to the banking sector. The 
following are but a few of the more significant additional areas of risk: 
settlements/payments risk, which occurs when one party to a transaction pays money 
or delivers assets before receiving its own cash or assets thereby exposing it to 
potential liquidity problems; foreign exchange or currency risk, which arises under 
any system of flexible exchange rates as a result of the fluctuation of those rates and 
can be categorised as a type of market risk; sovereign risk, which may be viewed as a 
special class of credit risk wherein a loan to a government may not be repaid; fraud; 
operational risks, which can encompass many different types of risks but generally is 
associated with the risk of loss arising from human or technical error; legal risks, 
which encompass any risk arising from violations of or non-conformance with laws, 
rules, regulations or prescribed practices; reputational risks, being the risk of 
significant negative public opinion that results in critical loss of funding or customers.; 
macroeconomic risk, which is the risk that instability of such macroeconorf& factors 
as inflation rates, foreign exchange rates and reserves may threaten a bank's stability; 
and political risk, being the risk of political interference in a private bank. 36 It should 
be noted that there is no general agreement in the literature on the classification of 
these risks into categories. For example, some banks view settlements or payments 
risk as a form of operational risk, while others do not recogruse operational risk as a 
37 
separate category of nsk at all . 
The classification of these risks is, therefore, 
somewhat arbitrary. 
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Explaining Bank Failures 
The incidence of bank failures has been growing since the early 1980s. The literature 
on the causes of bank failure offers so many different reasons for bank collapse that 
one commentator has said that the reasons are "so complex and so country- specific 
that generalizing a solution [to bank failure] was impossible. 7-)38 However, as 
theorised in chapter two, the factors affecting the competitive viability of banks, like 
other commercial enterprises, can be grouped in to two broad categories: 1) 
exogenous factors, or those factors originating outside of the bank itself and 2) 
endogenous factors, or those originating within the bank and relating to bankers' 
strategies and methods of conducting business. These factors threaten the competitive 
viability of banks by either increasing the types or degree of risks banks face or 
through failure to manage those risks effectively. 
W-Y 
. E. ogenous 
Factors 
The literature suggests that exogenous factors further break down into two sub- 
categories. 1) macroeconomic instability and 2) bank supervisory weaknesses. 
An unstable economy is implicated in most bank failures . 
39 The performance of the 
national and, increasingly, global economy can determine bank survival. Quantitative 
studies of the causes of bank failure indicate a positive correlation between such 
factors as rising nominal interest rates, increases in the real exchange rate, rising 
irfflation and increasing incidence of bank failure. 
40 Qualitative case studies also 
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implicate macroeconomic factors in a number of bank failures, for example, declining 
oil prices in the case of collapsed Texan banks, rising interest rates in the failure of 
US thrifts, the collapse of the "bubble economy" in Japan and the deterioration of 
loan quality in Poland and former Soviet Union countries. 41 Karin Lissakers points 
out that emerging markets, such as the Jamaican market, are both more likely to be 
subjected to macroeconomic shocks and less able to absorb them. 42 However, as 
most observers agree, although macroeconomic shocks may initiate most banking 
failures, these failures often are made significantly worse by ineffective banking 
supervision. 
A number of factors can undermine effective banking supervision. These include: a 
weak regulatory framework, government interference in the operation of bank 
supervision, and a weak or ineffective supervisory authority. For example , in a 
number of the cases involving poor asset management, regulatory authorities 
overlooked credit exposures even though they exceeded well-defined regulations 
(This is a phenomenon generaUy identified as regulatoryforbearance). 43 In the 
collapse of the US thrift industry, some commentators have argued that regulators put 
the interests of the regulatory body ahead of those of taxpayers and failed to close 
insolvent banks 
-44Moreover,, most agree that overly restrictive regulation contributed 
to the collapse of the US thrift industry in the first place by exposing it to substantial 
45 interest rate risk . The 
Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) failure 
illustrates the problems that can anse as a result of the difficulties associated with 
regulatory oversight of a global financial concern with a complex administrative 
structure. 
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Aside from overly restrictive regulation and regulators simply failing to do their jobs 
effectively, some analysts argue that banking regulation in and of itself can have 
unintended perverse consequences leading to bank failure (generafly referred to as 
moral hazard). As Sam Jaffa states "Thrift deposits were and still are insured by the 
federal government, something which made regulators' burden that much heavier, 
since depositors, safe in the knowledge that they could not lose their money, took 
little notice of how thrifts were run, or of whether or not their life savings were being 
prudently invested. r)46 George Kauffman argues deposit insurance legislation can 
cause riskier behaviour by banks that lead to higher numbers of failures and greater 
systernic risk. As a result, he contends that govemments should use regulation 
sparingly. 
47 
In light of the potential moral hazards of banking regulation, many experts now see 
market discipline as a more effective means to regulate the sector . 
48Market discipline 
essentially relies upon corporate shareholders to monitor and discipline banks. 
Proponents see market discipline working essentially as follows: if shareholders know 
that a bank is not prudently managed they can discipline the bank by selling their 
shares. The directors and managers of the bank then must either improve 
49 
management or see the bank's market value decline. In a country such as Jamaica 
where capital markets are not well developed, however, government regulation will 




Poor corporate governance and bank management can weaken a bank's position by 
allowing what might be relatively minor problems in the first instance (le, a difficult 
period as a result of a macroeconomic shock) to become major causes of irreparable 
damage. For example, excessive exposure to a single sector was the main cause of 
the failure of Johnson Matthey, Banco Ambrosiano, Canadian Commercial Bank and 
the Calgary-based Northland Bank, the US thrift and commercial bank sectors and of 
a number of banks in Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden and Japan .51 Bank 
managers simply made poor lending choices that left them over-exposed in certain 
sectors and vulnerable to macroeconomic shock. 
Poor asset management often also includes a poor choice of collateral. The collateral 
might be closely linked to the performance of the sector where the excessive exposure 
lies. When the sector collapses, so too does the value of the underlying collateral 
thereby preventing a bank from recovering its losses. This was the case with the 
coflapse of a number of Texan banks heavily exposed in the oil sector for which 
Texan real estate was the main source of collateral. When oil prices collapsed, so did 
the value of the real estate. 
52 
Often., a weak loan portfolio is symptomatic of larger operational problems related to 
governance, management and incentive structures. This was the case in state banks in 
Central Eastern European and fonner Soviet Union countries, where these larger 
operational problems manifested in poor lending decisions based on non-commercial 
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criteria. " 
In several cases, inexperience with new procedures has been at least a contributing 
factor in bank collapses. Inexperience in dealing with a relatively new product - 
foreign exchange services - led to fatal losses at Franklin National Bank and 
Bankhaus Herstatt. Limited understanding of the effects of volatile interest rates on 
the price of mortgage-backed securities contributed to the collapse of many US 
thrifts. 54 Barings collapsed in part because its management was primarily comprised 
of older bankers unfamiliar with the new derivatives market that the whiz kid Nick 
Leeson was so ingenious at dealing in. This led them to place too much control in 
55 Leeson's hands. 
Lack of adequate internal control mechanisms, employee performance reward systems 
that encourage risky behaviour, and a "herd instinct" that reflects sub-standard 
management have also been identified as contributing to bank failure. In the Barings 
collapse, for example, British Chancellor, Kenneth Clarke, in connection with his 
investigation into the bank's collapse, blamed management errors that led to a failure 
to spot Nick Leeson's unauthorised dealing. In commenting on the collapse, Clarke 
stated: "It's a picture of total collapse of management control ... It 
is incredible that 
such a system of control should exist in a bank like this [Barings]. 
56 
General managerial or bank supervisory deficiency often leaves the door open to and 
encourages fraud, which has figured prominently in a number of bank failures. 
Among these were Banco Ambrosiano, Bankhaus Herstatt, Franklin National Bank, 
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BCCI, the US thrift industry and Barings. 57 However, in modem times fraud as a 
58 
primary cause of bank failure is rare. The collapse of BCCI is the only clear 
example of a bank failure where fraud was the primary cause. 
A decline in franchise value contributed to the collapse of the US thrift industry. 
Where the economic value of a bank's capital declines, shareholders and managers 
have incentives to take greater risks as they have more to gain in doing so than they 
have to lose. Not only is there an incentive for them to take greater risks, declining 
59 franchise value often encourages self-dealing transactions and outright fraud. In the 
case of the US thrifts, when the mutual firms were sold to shareholders, the reserves 
were used to finance risky ventures thereby threatening capital adequacy. 60 
Several cases of bank failure have occurred hand in hand with organised crime 
penetration. For example, organised crime penetration was evident in the collapse of 
a number of Russian banks. It is also an issue with respect to many smaH banks in the 
Caribbean and Pacific operating in tax havens where the laundering of money through 
electronic funds transfers is not unconunon. These countries often have weak 
regulatory regimes with no teeth to prevent illegal transactions. 61 
In examining the failure of a given bank, it is impossible to identify a single, and 
sometimes even a primary, cause with absolute certainty because there are so many 
independent variables that interact in complex ways. MacroeconornIsts may have a 
tendency to focus blame on macroeconomic factors-, credit risk managers will tend to 
blame the quality of the loan book; treasury managers Will be inclined to blame failure 
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on lack of liquidity, and internal auditors will tend to focus blame on the absence of 
effective internal controls. T. Mouck of the Anderson School of Management at the 
University of New Mexico characterises capital markets as complex adaptive systemsý- 
that is, they consist of a network of interacting agents, processes and elements from 
which a dynamic, aggregate behaviour emerges. 62 Financial systems should be 
viewed in much the same way. 
That being said, however, experts increasingly agree that endogenous factors, 
specifically corporate governance and internal control, of which accountability 
systems form an important part, play a major role in bank failure. For example, in 
information asymmetry-based theories of banking crises, banks' inability to assess 
and monitor different types of financial risks often is attributed to weaknesses in 
credit and financial reporting. These weaknesses, as the 1998/99 World Development 
Report suggests, can arise from ineffective accountability systems that limit the 
amount of information flowing to banks and their regulators about different risks and 
reduces the trustworthiness of financial reports used to monitor and control those 
risks. 
63 
Banking - Riskier Than Ever 
Corporate governance and internal control also have become more of an issue in part 
because banking has become riskier, and as the risks increase, the need to effectively 
manage and control them also increases. There are a number of interrelated changes 
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in the environment of the banking sector that make the banking business riskier and 
threaten banks' competitive viability. Among these changes are a more demanding 
client base; rising shareholder expectations; increasing competition from non- 
financial institutions encroaching on traditional areas of bank business against a 
background of banking as a maturing industry; growing interdependence of world 
economies and financial markets (globalisation); and rapid technological innovation. 64 
All of these factors, linked together, have made banking in the current environment 
more complex, higher risk, lower profit and less predictable. 
To remain competitively viable in the current environment, banks have been forced to 
expand and innovate. For example, they have responded to the challenges of the 
current business enviromnent by spreading into new banking activities in the 1980s, 
for example, trading. These new areas of activity have brought new areas of risk. As 
Brian Quinn notes in respect to trading, "[trading] moves literafly at the speed of 
sound - and computer-driven trading nearer to the speed of light. To suggest that 
more responsiVe risk management tools are necessary is a considerable 
understatement. , 65 Banks also have introduced new products and services by 
unbundling risks through trading; that is to say, risks that were previously bundled 
together in a loan are now being unbundled and manipulated. Fix-rate lending is 
switched into floating rate, and vice versa. Loans are securitised and bought and sold 
in secondary markets. With these new developments, banking has become much 
more technical. Bank executives can no longer understand to any degree of depth the 
transactions that take place in their banks; therefore, there is a greater need for control 
systems. The banking sector has also moved to consolidate, a move that has 
led to 
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more international banking, including cross-border lending and banking and 
investment in subsidiaries and branches in other countries. International banking 
increases country and exchange rate risk and requires new methods for managing 
these risks. 
66 
In innovating and expanding to remain competitively viable in the current 
environment, banks, like other business enterprises (as discussed in chapter two), have 
introduced new computer systems as a means of dealing with the rising number and 
complexity of transactions and to gain a strategic advantage over competitors. 
However, these systems also have carried with them new risks. For example, 
computerise systems and controls mean that transaction processing and control 
systems are less tangible. Brian Quinn argues that in this environment it is less easy 
for a person to understand how the parts fit together to produce the whole. 67 In 
addition, a recent Basle Committee paper on risk management for electronic banking 
and electronic money activities points to the fact that, while electronic commerce 
opens up new opportunities for competitiveness, it also opens the door to increased 
68 
operational, reputational and legal risk . 
Additionally, banks have turned to another typical strategy (as discussed in chapter 
two) used to deal with the organisational side effects of growth and innovation, that is, 
they have flattened their organisational structures to reduce some of the operational 
inefficiencies associated with large, hierarchical organisational forms. In a recent 
article in Financial World, Kevin Thomson noted: "From re-engineering to mergers, 
organisations are going to extreme lengths to survive in an increasingly competitive, 
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fast-moving global environment. There's been a shift away from nice, tidy structures, 
with clear reporting fines and an obvious hierarchy - where communication is fairly 
straightforward - to something altogether different. 7769 He observes that organisations 
are now flatter and more streamlined, and that reporting lines are less clear, job roles 
and titles blurred, decisions made more quickly and business messages more 
complex. 
70 
As these examples illustrate, there is a greater level of inherent risk that now exists in 
banking as a result of changes in the business environment coupled with the 
industry's response to those changes. Consequently, banks must pay greater attention 
to managing and controlling their risks through establishing effective systems of 
internal accountability and control or face an increase in operational inefficiencies 
that naturally accompany growth and innovation and which can lead to failure. 
Banking on Internal Control 
Brian Quinn, former Executive Director and Head of Financial Supervision at the 
Bank of England, has observed that ten years ago internal control systems were of 
little concern to bank executives and supervisors, noting that "Of course, control 
systems existed then, but they were taken for granted. -)-)71 Times have changed, 
however. In a recent paper on internal controls in banking, the Basle Committee 
commented that the 
heightened interest in internal controls is, in part, the result of 
significant losses incurred by several banking orgai-Latlons. An 
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analysis of the problems related to those losses indicates that they 
could probably have been avoided had the banks maintained effective internal control systems. Such systems would have prevented or 
enabled earlier detection of the problems that led to the losses, thereby 
limiting damage to the banking organization. 72 
In support of the Basle Committee's observations, W. J. McDonough has noted that 
virtually all the most serious trading related losses have involved internal control 
breakdowns. 73 A number of high profile cases illustrate the point. The collapse of 
Barings bank, which cost il. 27 billion, was attributed to flaws in the financial 
controls of the Singapore operations. 74 Another example of the failure of internal 
control systems is the case of Sumitomo Corporation, Tokyo -a failure that cost a 
reported $US2.5 billion. In June 1996, Yasuo Hamanaka went from being the world's 
most successful copper dealer to "rogue dealer. " Evidence revealed that Hamanaka's 
trading activity was known only to himself and one other employee and that the 
London metal exchange had twice warned Sumitomo that Hamanaka appeared to 
have falsified transaction records. 75 There is evidence to suggest, then, that banks 
without effective systems of internal control cannot effectively manage their risks and 
may, as a consequence, fail. Ray Kinsella has observed that "Where controls are 
deficient fraud, and even failure, are seldom far behind. -76 
While it is not the intention here to argue that failure of internal control systems in 
and of themselves trigger bank insolvency, clearly the evidence shows that lack of a 
good system of internal controls can definitely exacerbate other problems and 
contribute to a bank's decline. Cyril Bennett argues that. 
... no single risk management approach or commercial philosophy 
will insulate a financial institution from the effects of unexpected 
events on an ongoing basis. However, good management practice and 
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business-focused controls are likely to afford long-term protection to 
an organization. Furthermore, they are essential core 
values/mechanisms required tojacilitate commercial risk taking in the 
context of uncertain markets [author's emphasis]. 77 
In this sense, effective internal control systems serve as buffers against exogenous 
factors contributing to bank failures. Brian Quinn supports this view. He states* 
The results are evident: a small number of banks have consistently 
prospered in the last two decades since 1979, almost whatever the state 
of the economy. Many others have at best stood still and still others 
have left the sector altogether. Much, perhaps, most, of the difference 
between the more and less successful has been the strength of their 
systems and controls. 78 
There is now a new emphasis in banking on internal control reflected in what is 
commonly referred to as the "compliance culture" or what Ray Kinsella has called a 
4(. shift in the operational centre of gravity within banks" to internal audit/compliance 
functions 
. 
79 This new focus has arisen in many banking jurisdictions in response to 
public concern over bank crises as well as heightened expectations on the part of all 
stakeholders regarding the integrity and relevance of financial statements, 
80 
accountability and corporate governance. 
Basle Committee Framework for ]Internal Control 
In response to the growing importance of internal control, the Basle Committee on 
Banking Supervision has developed a recommended framework for internal control in 
banks. The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision is a Committee of banking 
supervisory authorities that was established by the central bank governors of the 
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Group of Ten countries in 1975 . 
81 In January of 1998, the Committee issued a 
"Framework for the Evaluation of 1nternal Control Systems" as part of its ongoing 
efforts to address issues in banking supervision and improve the supervision of banks 
in the area of risk management practices. In issuing the framework, the Comn-iittee 
stated that 
A system of effective internal controls is a critical component of bank 
management and a foundation for the safe and sound operation of 
banking organizations. A system of strong internal controls can help to 
ensure that the goals and objectives of a banking organization will be 
met, that the bank will achieve long-term profitability targets, and 
maintain reliable financial and managerial reporting. Such a system 
can also help to ensure that the bank will comply with laws and 
regulations as well as policies, plans, internal rules and procedures, and 
decrease the risk of unexpected losses or damage to the bank's 
reputation. 82 
The framework, drawing on the experience of member countries, sets out a number of 
principles that comprise the essential elements of a sound system of bank internal 
controls. In so doing, the framework describes how accountability should be 
established and maintained to ensure effective internal control and prudent decision- 
making in the operation of banks. These principles, which fall into broad-based 
categories consistent with an earlier general internal control framework developed by 
the Conunittee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) 
include: the establishment of a sound management oversight and control culture; 
proper risk assessment; the establishment, implementation and monitoring of control 
activities; effective information and communication; and continual monitoring of the 
efficacy of internal control systems. The Basle Committee 
document notes that the 
objective of the principles is to ensure that "all 
banks, regardless of size, have an 
effective system of internal controls which is consistent with the nature, complexity, 
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and risk of their on- and off-balance- sheet activities and that responds to changes in 
the bank's environment and conditions. 7-)83 
The Relationship between Internal Control and Accountability Systems 
Though not precisely the same, internal control systems and accountability systems 
are closely related. Inherent in the Basle Committee's framework is the recognition 
that one of the primary mechanisms for maintaining internal organisational control is 
accountability, for it is through accountability that the feedback and feed-forward 
mechanisms which organisations require to maintain stability and control operate. 
Without these mechanisms, as was shown in chapter two, organisations must 
eventually succumb to natural forces of disintegration as they grow and expand. 
In setting out the requirement for effective management oversight, the framework 
establishes the essential "who/to whom" bond of accountability starting at the very 
top of the organisational hierarchy with the board of directors, who are accountable to 
shareholders and regulators, and layered throughout the organisation from senior 
management to the individual worker. The framework document also identifies the 
importance of organisational. culture as setting forth values consistent with good 
corporate governance which those within the organisation must be held accountable 
for upholding, again starting at the top of the organisation. The principles concerned 
with risk assessment address the need to develop accountability standards consistent 
with perceived levels of risk and organisational objectives through the establishment 
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of appropriate activity controls for different departments or divisions; physical 
controls; approvals and authorisations; and verifications and reconciliation. The 
prescribed control activities set out important aspects of how the actions and decisions 
of accountable persons are to be judged in the banking environment, namely top level 
reviews and periodic checking for compliance with exposure limits, both of which 
rely on the availability and flow of trustworthy and timely management information. 
The final set of principles in the framework document acknowledges the need to 
monitor and control the control system itself, by means of an internal audit function. 
As such, it is possible to conclude that the Basle Committee's framework clearly 
operates on the basis of the idea that it is only through establishing the structures, 
systems and procedures that achieve accountability that the objective of internal 
control over banking operations can be met and that bank risks can be managed 
effectively. The framework, therefore, is imbued with the notion of accountability, 
and the principles address all of accountability's various dimensions. 
The Importance of Information, Communication and Record Keeping in 
Internal Control and Accountability Systems 
The Basle Comn-fittee framework recognises quality information and communication 
as being critical to how internal control and accountability operate within banking, 
addressing the issue in Principles 8,9 and 10 of the document. For example, the 
Conunittee states that information should be reliable, timely, accessible, and provided 
in a consistent format. 
-). )84 The details of these principles are discussed more fully in 
chapter seven. 
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In referring specificafly to information and communication in its frameworký the 
Basle Comn-ýittee has recognised the unequivocal importance of managed information 
in the establishment of organisational. accountability and internal control. This is of 
particular note in relation to the focus of tl-ýs study as it lends support to the posited 
fink between competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. Though 
information and communication is mentioned as only one element of an effective 
internal control system in the framework, it is assigned equal importance to other 
aspects. Moreover, the framework acknowledges that the quality of information and 
communication in a banking enterprise is linked to how records are created and kept 
and that, therefore, there is a need to manage records as part of record keeping 
systems. Specifically, the framework prescribes that "Internal information [must be] 
part of a record-keeping process that should include established procedures for 
records retention. , 
85 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of banking as an industry as background to 
field research to be presented in the chapters that follow on Jamaican commercial 
bank failures. In doing so, it has been argued that in the course of performing their 
core functions - lending, deposit taking and making payments - 
banks are open to a 
number of risks. Moreover, changes in banks' operating environment and banks' 
responses to those changes (ie, growth and expansion, computerisation and 
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restructuring) have introduced additional risks and threats to their internal control. In 
order to avoid failure and to remain competitive, banks increasingly must manage and 
monitor these risks carefully, together with their financial positions and perfon-nance. 
The careful management and monitoring of risk and financial position and 
performance requires that banks maintain effective control over internal operations, 
which is essentially tantamount to ensuring that accountability systems, as described 
in chapter two, are established and operate effectively. The Basle Comn-fittee on 
Banking Supervision has laid out a framework consisting of basic principles of 
effective internal control in banking. The principles of internal control outlined in the 
Basle Committee framework recommend accountability structures, systems and 
procedures as a means of establishing and maintaining effective organisational 
control. Accountability, it must be concluded therefore, is essential to effective risk 
management and, thereby, competitive viability in banking. Finally, the Basle 
Committee framework lends support to the theoretical framework advanced in 
chapters two and three in its inclusion of information and communication as an 
important aspect of effective internal control systems and by its acknowledgement 
that good record keeping underlies effective infon-nation and communication. 
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Chapter Six: The Jamaican Financial Crisis - Explaining the Collapse of Jamaica's Indigenous Commercial Banks 
Introduction 
This is the first of four chapters that presents the findings of the field research 
conducted for this study on the collapse of several indigenous Jamaican commercial 
banks. The central question that this chapter and the others that follow seek to 
explore is: To what extent, if any, can poor record keeping practices be implicated In 
the collapse of failed Jamaican commercial banks? The purpose of seeking an 
answer to this question is to use the case study of the fafled Jan-mican conunercial 
banks to provide empirical evidence of the theoretical linkages among competitive 
viabflity, accountabflity and record keeping as discussed in chapters two and three of 
this study. 
Discussion of the research findings begins in this chapter with an overview of the 
field research- Background information is then provided on the Jamaican financial 
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crisis, presentmg the argument that weaknesses in the banks' accountabifity systems 
contributed to their downfall. This discussion is used as evidence of the relationship 
between competitive viabihty and accountability outlined in chapter two. In support 
of the theoretical relationship between accountability and record keeping put forth in 
chapter three, the arguments In this chapter are foflowed in chapter seven by 
empirical evidence that shows how poor quality information, the result of the banks' 
records creation and keeping practices, weakened their accountability systems and 
resulted in a loss of internal control and poor decision making that eventually led, in 
combination with exogenous and other endogenous factors, to the banks' downfall. 
Chapter eight then explores why the banks' records creation and keeping practices 
were so poor. In chapter nine, discussion of the research fmdmgs focuses upon how 
the banks' record creation and keeping practices affected bank supervision and, 
subsequently, government intervention in and rehabilitation of the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks. Finally, discussion of the research findings concludes in chapter 
ten with observations about the lessons to be learned from the Jamaican experience. 
An Overview of the Field Research 
This particular chapter and the others which follow present and analyse field research 
data primarily collected between May 1999 and November 2000 on four failed and 
two viable Jamaican commercial banks as a means of exploring the relationships 
among competitive viability, accountability and record keepMg. The data on which 
the findmgs in this chapter are based include interviews with officials at the Financial 
Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) Limited and officials in both failed and 
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viable commercial banks, physical examination of records and record keeping 
systems of both failed and viable commercial banks, and review of relevant 
documents, such as commercial bank policies and procedures. As the data collected 
relate to four of six failed Jamaican commercial banks, they are considered to be 
reasonably representative of the entire population of failed Jamaican commercial 
banks. The data were coded and analysed using qualitatiVe data analysis software III 
accordance with the Grounded Theory-based methodology set out in Appendix 2. 
The interviews constitute, by far, the most important source of information about the 
operations of Jamaican commercial banks, both those that failed and those that did 
not. Approximately 50 ethnographic interviews were conducted with FINSAC 
officials (8 interviews); with former directors (3 inter-views), senior executives and 
our failed operational managers (19 interviews), and other staff (3 interviews) of f 
Jamaican commercial banks; with senior executives and operational managers (12 
interviews) and other staff (2 interviews) in two viable Jamaican commercial banks; 
with external and forensic auditors and with other individuals close to the institutions 
involved in the Jamaican banking crisis (3 interviews). These people were 
surprisingly candid in discussing the problems encountered during the Jamaican 
financial collapse. More detailed information about the nature of the interview 
subjects and the types of questions they were asked is provided in AppendLX 1. 
Given the sensitivity of the research topic, the identity of interview subjects and the 
mstitutions for which they work has had to be protected; therefore, m citations of 
interviews, subjects are identified only by an assigned alphanumeric code, not by 
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name or institution, and all references that would link them to a particular institution 
have been removed. 
The Collapse of the Jamaican Financial Sector 
From the beginning of the 1990s symptoms of fundamental problems in the Jamaican 
financial sector began to appear. ' By nud 1996, it was apparent that the financial 
sector was in a state of crisis, a crisis that would lead to the insolvency and technical 
failure of all of Jamaica's indigenous commercial banks, save one, in the span of two 
years (see Table 6-1 below). 2 In response to the growing crisis, in January 1997, the 
Government of Jamaica established the Financial Sector Adjustment Company 
(FINSAC) Limited to address the liquidity and solvency problems being experienced 
within the sector through a process of intervention, rehabilitation and divestment. As 
of 1998, FTNSAC had become Jamaica's largest holding company with some 158 
companies and investments in nearly all domestically owned financial institutions. It 
also had provided support to the fmancial sector by way of acqutSitiOns and soft 
lendmg totaRing $J73.5 bfllion ($US 1.8 bilhon), of this $J68 bilhon ($US 1.7 blUlon) 
was in support of the banking sector covering 1.5 million depositors. Through Its 
intervention in the financial sector, FINSAC came to own or control all domestic 
banks (with the exception of the very small Trafalgar Commercial Bank) or 
approximately 60 percent of all the country's banking assets. 
' 
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Table 6-1 -. Summary of Failed Jamaican Commercial Banks and GORFINSAC 
Intervention 
Bank Intervention 
Century National Bank Placed under temporary management by the Minister of Finance 
in July 1996. 
Citizens Bank FINSAC acquires controlling interest in September 1997 by 
virtue of its 84% purchase of ordinary shares. FINSAC also 
acquires the banks' non-performing loan portfolio to provide 
additional liquidity and solvency. Now merged to form Union 
Bank, which subsequently has been sold to the Royal Bank of 
Trinidad and Tobago (hereafter referred to as RBTT) 
FINSAC provides J$553.3 million ($USI. 4 million) in financial 
Eagle Commercial Bank assistance and additional assistance for the payout of advances 
from the Bank of Jamaica in November 1997 and later 
purchases at a nominal price in 1998. Now merged to form 
Union Bank, which subsequently has been sold to RBTT. 
FINSAC purchases the bank for J$8.5 billion ($US212.5 
Island Victoria Bank million) and transfers its shares to Eagle Commercial Bank in 
1998. Now part of Union Bank, which subsequently has been 
sold to RBTT. 
National Commercial Bank FINSAC acquires controlling interest in February 1997 with the 
acquisition of 40% of outstanding ordinary shares of NCB plus 
43.8% of NCB Group for a total holding of 68%. FINSAC also 
purchased $Jl 2.7 billion ($US67.5 million) M non-performiing 
loans to provide additional liquidity and solvency. November 
2000 NCB shareholders vote for a restructuring of the bank. 
Under the arrangement, all public shareholders in NCB Group 
receive one share in NCB for each Group share they own. 
FINSAC's preference shareholding of $J5.3 billion ($US 132.5 
million) M the Group is converted to a 76% holding of ordinary 
shares in the Bank. NCB sold to Canadian-based AIC Limited 
for $6.034 billion ($US 150 million) in January 2002. 
Workers Savings and Loan Bank Placed under temporary management by the Ministry of 
Finance in February 1997 and FINSAC provides $J8.5 billion 
(SUS212.5 million) in overdraft support loan in February/March 
1998. Now merged to form Union Bank, which subsequently 
has been sold to RBTT- 
Sources: Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) Limited, Auditors' Report and Financial 
Statements, January 29,1997 to March 31,1998; FINSAC, Annual Report, 1998,15-25; Government 
of Jamaica, Ministry of Finance, "Public Sector Response to the Problems of the Financial Sector, " 
Ministry Paper No. 13/98,8 April, 1998; Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Finance, "FINSAC, " 
Ministry Paper No. 31/98,27 October, 1998; Bank of Jamaica, Annual Reports, 1996-19971 
"Shareholders Back NCB Scheme, " The Gleaner, November 9,2000, A-3; "Union Bank Sold,. " The 
Gleaner Wednesday, March 14,2W 1, Online, Internet www. jamaica-ja_leaner. com II September, 
2001; "NCB Sale Settled, " Saturday, 12 January, 20002, Online, Internet www. jamaica-gleaner. com, 
12 January, 2002. 
191 
The financial crisis has driven the country into an enormous debt trap from which, at 
present, it is difficult to see how it will recover. 4 FINSAC's initial $J73.6 billion 
($US 1.8 billion) infusion of capital into the country's financial sector represented 60 
percent of the Government of Jamaica's total budget for the year (1998) and raised 
the country's burden of debt servicing to approximately 65 percent of its annual 
revenue (see Table 6-2). 5 As of 2000, the FINSAC ball out had cost the Jamaican 
Government and taxpayers an estimated $JI 30 billion (roughly $US 3.2 billion), 
which equates to roughly 44 percent of GDP, during the longest period of negative 
econorMC growth in the country's history. 6 Not only has the econonUc cost of these 
bank failures been high, there has been a high social cost as well. In 1999, the 
Government's efforts to raise funds to cover the debt through placing higher taxes on 
gasoline led to riots and protests across the country that had serious econornic and 
social ramifications .7 Moreover, the Jamaican Government has had to reduce 
spending drastically on critical social programmes, education, health and maintenance 
of the country's infrastructure of roads, water and waste disposal systems. In 
addition, the bank collapses have tightened up credit, which has hampered the growth 
of the productive sector and limited employment. Given the econorMC and social 
impact of these bank failures, it is clearly important to understand fully all of the 
factors contributmg to their coflapse. 
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Table 6-2: Jamaican Public Debt 
Item 96/97 97198 98/99 99/00 July 2000 
Domestic Debt 85.2 101.5 139.2 175.3 189.2 
(M billions of 
Jamaican dollars) 
External Debt 111.2 117.7 123.1 133.4 128.9 
(M billions of 
Jamaican dollars) 
Total Debt Stock 196.4 219.2 262.3 308.7 318.1 
(M billions of 
Jamaican dollars) 
Domestic 38.2% 42.1% 53.1% 60.5% - 
Debt/GDP 
External Debt/GDP 49.9% 48.8% 48.2% 47.6% - 
Debt service/total 57.0% 61.1% 65.8% 82.5% - 
revenue 
Debt service/total 38.8% 37.6% 42.8% 52.4% - 
spending 
Total debt/GDP 196% 97% 110% 120% 
Source: "Domestic debt jumps again, " Financial Gleaner, October 27,2000,3. 
Explaining the Collapse of Jamaica's Indigenous Commercial Banks 
A number of cumulatiVe and dynamically interrelated factors can be cited as sources 
of the problems experienced by the Jamaican commerClal banks. These problems 
ultimately saw the country's entire financial system become a "weak and vulnerable 
'house of cards' ready to fall to the ground. . )8 The following discussion summarises 
emerging debate about the reasons for the sector's problems, drawing upon 
observations of Jamaican academics, financial analysts, bankers, regulators, 




In keeping with the theoretical framework outlined in chapter two, the contributory 
factors can be grouped into two broad categories: 1) exogenous, that is, those factors 
originating outside of the banks and 2) endogenous factors, those factors originating 
inside the banks and relatmg to the business strategies bankers pursued and the way 
that they conducted their business in response to exogenous factors. Though it is 
possible to discern these two categories when analysing the factors contributing to the 
banks' problems, such factors do not exist In isolation and therefore cannot be looked 
at entirely independently of one another. 
Many explanations of the bank failures, not surprisingly those most often given by 
supporters of the Government Opposition Jamaica Labour Party (JLP), typically have 
focused on exogenous factors such as the state of the country's economy and weak 
regulatory framework. Though partly to blame, this study contends that these factors 
do not provide fuUy satisfactory explanations for the coHapse of the country's 
indigenous commercial banks. Rather, in keeping with the theoretical framework set 
out In chapter two, this study presents empirical evidence to support the argument that 
the external operating environment gave rise to conditions that prompted directors 
and managers of the failed banks to increase the size and scope of their banking 
operations. With growth and innovation came a level of decentralisation and 
specialisatiOn that weakened directors' and managers' control over their 
banks. 
These internal control problems could have been dealt with had directors and 
managers of the failed banks established and maintained effective systems of 
internal 
accountability and control for all aspects of the banks' 
busmiess actlivities- In many 
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cases, however, they failed to understand the need to establish systems of internal 
accountability and control to address new business areas and risks. Equally 
importantly, their existing systems of internal accountability and control did not 
function effectively for a variety of reasons which will be discussed fully further 
along in this chapter. As a result, the banks succumbed to the inevitable dissolution 
that results from uncontrolled growth and innovation as discussed in chapter two. 
The case for this argument begins in this chapter with a review of factors typically 
cited as having contributed to the Jamaican bank failures. 
Exogenous Factors 
Analysts and commentators point to a number of exogenous factors as having 
contributed to the collapse of Jamaica's indigenous commercial banks. In particular, 
commentators identify the Government of Jamaica's macroeconomic policy and 
failure to properly regulate the financial sector as principal among the sector's 
problems. It must be emphasiSed that because the purpose of this study is not to 
present a definitive causal explanation for the Jamaican banking crisis, but rather to 
implicate poor record keeping as a factor in the collapses, ' the discussion encompasses 
only areas of general consensus about miterrelatlonships between these exogenous, 
factors and the bank failures as opposed to presenting a more exhaustive and detailed 
set of arguments and counter-arguments relating to the relative significance and 
interrelationships among the factors. 
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As mentioned in chapter five, quantitative studies of the causes of bank failures 
indicate a positiVe correlation between bank failures and macroeconorMC Instability, 
marked by indicators such as rising norninal interest rates, increases in the real 
exchange rate and rising inflation. 9 All of these signs of trouble were in evidence in 
the years leading up to the recent problems in Jamaica's financial sector (see Table 6- 
3). A number of reasons for the country's macroeconomic instability have been 
advanced; however, there is a growing consensus that liberalisation pohcles that 
formed part of International Monetary Fund (IN4F) programmes and World Bank 




From the mid- I 980s to the early I 990s, in accordance with the conditions of EMT and 
World Bank involvement in the country, the Jamaican Government introduced a 
number of structural reforms leading to liberalisation of the country's trade regime, 
foreign exchange markets and financial markets. " With liberalisation and structural 
adjustment came a devaluation of the Jamaican dollar. In 1989, the exchange rate 
was $US I to $J6.50, but throughout the 1990s the Jamaican dollar began to slide 
drasticafly to reach its 1999 resting point of approximately $US I to $J40. Not only 
did the exchange rate increase, between 1990 and 1993 inflation was averaging 
49%. 12 In 1991, it reached its highest point of 80%, but declined thereafter. 
" The 
necessity of supporting the Jamaican dollar and the existence of an inflationary 
environment led the Jamaican Goverment to raise interest rates. In December 1993 
short-term lending rates rose to as high as 61.32* 6.14 
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Table 6-3: Macro-econornic Indicators 1991-1997 
Year % Change in 
Money 
Supply 15 




Rate $J: $US 
1991 63.5 80.2 40 12.85 
1992 76.7 40.2 46.4 23.01 
1993 43.7 30.1 61.3 25.68 
1994 24.3 26.9 56.1 33.35 
1995 25.2 25.5 55.2 35.54 
1996 18.8 15.8 55.2 37.02 
1997 14.0 9.2 44.2 35.58 
Source: Paul Chen Young, With All Good Intentions: The Collapse of Jamaica's Domestic Financial 
Sector, Policy Papers on the Americas, Volume IY, Study 12 (Washington, DC: Centre for Strategic 
and International Studies, 1998), 9. 
Although the Goverment had hoped that interest rate increases would buttress the 
faltering Jamaican dollar and "cool off' the inflationary economy by tightening the 
money supply, its policy had the opposite effect. Banks, rather than taking the signal 
to tighten up lending, speculated that the Government's high interest rate policy was a 
short-term measure and continued to lend freely, attracted by the profit potential of 
high interest bearing loans. In fact, in the same year that the bank lending rate 
reached its peak (1993), commercial bank loans and advances increased by 67.5%. 
16 
It was prunarily these loans, made at exceptionally high and ultimately unsustainable 
interest rates, that later became non-performing. 
17 From the rni d- I 990s, several 
commercial banks began to experience a sharp decrease in the quality of their 
loan 
portfolio. In 1994 the number of non-performing loans rose 
by 7.4% of total loans 
against 5.7% the previous year. In 1996, the Bank of Jamaica 
Annual Report noted 
that some institutlons had sought hquidity support to meet cash 
flow needs resultmig 
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from a general deterioration in the quality of assets (11.3% non-performing loans). 
Bank of Jamaica statistics for the same year indicate that banks' profitability was 
begmnmg to fall sharply. " 
The banks' problems were compounded by the fact that high inflation resulted in an 
overvaluation of assets, especiafly property. Many of the banks were over exposed in 
this area because borrowers tended to pledge real estate as collateral on loans and 
many of the banks had made loans to connected parties (eg, investment arms and 
insurance companies that were offering investment or lump-sum policies that allowed 
them to take deposits disguised as prenuums. These funds were used to finance 
longer-term MVestments in the real estate and tourism sectors) that were heavily into 
the real estate market. 19 When the Government's liberalised monetary policies began 
to take effect around 1994 and inflation declined, the value of real estate plummeted, 
resulting in a lack of liquidity and under capitalisation in many Jamaican commercial 
banks. The Governor of the Bank of Jamaica had warned bankers of the effect of 
liberalisation but many took no notice, having been used to an inflationary 
environment where the value of even fixed assets such as cars increased over time 
20 
rather than depreciating. 
The high Jamaican-dollar short-term lending rate also encouraged many persons and 
commercial enterprises to seek loans denominated in foreign currency, for which 
lending rates were lower. This flight to foreign capital eventually placed added 
pressure on the Jamaican dollar causing further depreciation in value. 
Moreover, the 
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increased capital flows between Jamaican and international markets associated with 
globalisation more readily transmitted international econon-uc fluctuatlons into the 
Jamaican economy, which again contributed to pressure on the Jamaican doflar . 
2' As 
the dollar continued to drop, many of those who had received foreign currency loans 
were unable to keep up payments, further eroding the quality of the banks' assets. 
The high interest rate environment also encouraged individual investors to place their 
money In short-term, high-yielding instruments, such as time deposits. In 1994, time 
deposits grew by 71.5% over the previous year. 22 Ultimately, the mix of short-term 
high-yielding time deposits and long-term loans created a mismatch between assets 
and liabilities in several banks and sowed the seeds of the banks' liquidity problems. 
Moreover, high interest rates encouraged the development of the commercial paper 
market as, rather than seek loans to finance their activities, business enterprises were 
able to attract financing more easily by floating short-term, high-Yielding lending 
instruments. Some banks were happy to back these instruments In order to avoid 
taxes and to reduce the amount they needed to set aside to meet statutory reserve 
requirements. In the long run, however, many of these business enterprises were 
unable to pay MVestors the sums owed on maturity of the commercial paper. The 
banks, which had guaranteed the commercial paper issues, were left "holding the 
bag. " 
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Another of the elements of the Government's hberahsatiOn policy InVolved bank 
regulatory reform. Prior to Jamaica's aidependence from Great Britani, its fmancial 
system was dominated by foreign-owned banks that operated in accordance with their 
home countries' prudential regulations and operating standards. Around 
independence (1962), the Goverm-nent of Jamaica passed indigenous legislation 
governing banking operations. 23 
Although the Government introduced periodic amendments to the 1960 Banking Act 
in response to the changing sectoral. landscape, Jamaica's regulatory framework 
remained insufficient to address the new circumstances of the financial sector. The 
existirig legislative framework made it all too easy for fmancial iiistitutions to take 
advantage of regulatory arbitrage. For example, the Bank of Jamaica had no 
regulatory control over building societies and many conunercial banks took 
advantage of this legislative loophole by selling problem loans to connected building 
societies in order to remove bad loans from their books. 
24 
To address regulatory weaknesses, in 1992 the earlier Banking Act was repealed and 
replaced with a new act and new legislation was passed to better monitor building 
societies. 25 According to many analysts and commentators, however, the 1992 
Banking Act had a number of major design faults that contributed to the financial 
crisis. One Jamaican commentator, Dennis Boothe, argues that it encouraged wanton 
mvestments. Unlike the 1961 Act that stated that banks' fixed assets 
(eg, prenuses 
and real estate) could not exceed 40% of their capital base, the 1992 
Act allowed a 
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bank to invest up to 100% of its capital in fixed assetS. 26 This opened the door to the 
capital adequacy and liquidity problems the banks experienced when real estate 
devalued. The 1992 Act also allowed mvestment m non-fmancial assets up to 100% 
of a bank's capital base thus, according to Boothe, allowing banks to invest wildly in 
such things as hotels, agricultural enterprises and works of art in which they had no 
management expertise. 
27 
Ansord Hewitt, another analyst of the Jarmican financial collapse, argues that by not 
expressly prohibiting investment in financial activities in the list of banking activities, 
the Act essentially "made allowance" for the formation of financial conglomerates. 
As a result, while the legislation frowned on universal banking, there was recognition 
m 1992 when amendments to the Banking Act were made that banks were already 
28 heavily into other areas and that this situation was to be tolerated . The 
legislation 
encouraged some Jamaican commercial banks, "near banks" and *insurance companies 
to form large, complex financial groups, in many cases to take advantage of loopholes 
in the regulatory framework respecting taxes and reserve requirements (eg, buildmg 
societies were created to hide bad loans from commercial banks and thereby reduce 
the level of funds banks had to set aside for loan loss provisioning). Thus, by the 
early 1990s an unhealthy pattern of interlocking institutional ownership had emerged 
and by 1995 there was an established pattern of groups boasting ownership of 
insurance companies, commercial banks, merchant banks, trust companies and 
mvestment houses. 
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According to econonust Wilberne Persaud, these group structures destroyed corporate 
"fire walls, " placing added financial strain on the commercial banks. 29 In some cases 
the insurance companies pressured banks within their group of companies to approve 
dubious projects and provide loans on favourable terms and in excess of legal lending 
limits. Such loans to related parties contributed to contanunation and decline of the 
financial sector (eg, Crown Eagle Life had an overdraft of $J 13.3 billion - $US 332 
million - with Eagle Commercial Bank at the time of FINSAC intervention. National 
Commercial Bank, it was discovered when FINSAC intervened, held a $J7.5 billion - 
$US 187.5 million - overdraft by Mutual Life) . 
30 This practice, ultimately, created 
liquidity problems in the banks, eventually leading to insolvency. 
The 1992 Act also did not property control entry into the sector, despite the 
Government's stated intentions. In order to gain a licence applicants had to meet two 
conditions: they had to be "fit and propei" to run a bank and meet capital adequacy 
requirements (V60 miUion or approximately $US2.6 miffion at 1992 rates of 
exchange). " Hewitt points out that inflation. eroded the capital adequacy limits set in 
1992 and these were not changed again until 1997. Furthermore, as determination of 
who was fit and proper to start a bank was left solely to the Minister of Finance, some 
argue that it became largely a political decision. 32 
Due to regulatory weaknesses, the Bank of Jamaica established a special task force in 
1995 to "fast track" appropriate amendments to the Bankmg Act. These came into 
force in 1997. W'hile the 1992 Act and its 1997 amendment, together with a series of 
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prudential guidelines on areas of operational and risk management introduced 
throughout 1995 and 1996 provided a more standardised legal framework of 
operations for commercial banks and introduced provisions aimed at enhancing 
prudent practice in the banking sector and strengthenig the powers of supervisory 
authorities, many commentators believe that it came too late. 
Besides these legislative weaknesses, the supervisory structure was designed only to 
deal with a small number of commercial banks. As the sector grew m size, 
inspections were not carried out on a regular basis and the time lag between 
inspections and issuance of reports became too long. 33 Moreover, supervisors could 
not deal adequately with specialist areas, particularly the loopholes and gaps In the 
legislation. The fact that there was no "super authority" to regulate the rising number 
of financial conglomerates and no legal regulations to facilitate the exchange of 
information between authorities or to permit the disclosure of information to the 
public and analysts also prevented proper supervision of Jamaican commercial banks 
34 
accor mg to some. 
Whether it was as a result of an inability to take action due to a weak regulatory 
P-- - framework, lack of staff capacity, or political pressure, regulatory forbearance also is 
cited as a factor m the collapse. For example, Dennis Boothe notes that the Bank of 
Jamaica was aware that Century National Bank was experiencing major problems 
well before the Minister of Finance put it under temporary management and argues 
31 
that the Bank of Jamaica should have taken action three years earlier than it did . 
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Ansord Hewitt notes that a Ministry of Finance press release indicated that as early as 
1984 the Caldon Group had refused to provide information to the Bank of Jamaica 
but that supervisors allowed it to continue to operate until 1996-97.36 The financial 
statements of many merchant banks and some commercial banks clearly indicated 
that there were breaches of provisions of the 1992 legislative framework revealing 
that the banks had seriously exposed themselves in real estate and large amounts of 
connected lending as far back as 1992.37 Still the Bank of Jamaica failed to address 
these problems. Moreover, former Jamaican banker Paul Chen Young argues that 
even when the regulators fimlly did take action they did not provide adequate 
leadership and planning. 
38 
V13,1 
Regulatory forbearance also encouraged bankers to take decisions and actions with 
less than due diligence (the problem of moral hazard as discussed in chapter frve). 
The Bank of Jamaica, as domestic lender of last resort, extended overdrafts to 
commercial banks during the height of the financial crisis. Jamaican financial analyst 
Jason Abrahams argues that this created a "total absence of moral hazard" because 
"high net worth depositors in Century, Eagle and Workers, for example, all enjoyed 
extraordinary premiums over the risk free interest rate of the day confident 'in the 
knowledge that if things got sticky the government would bail them OUt.,, 
39 
A failure on the part of the banks' external auditors to enforce international best 
practices in accounting only exacerbated regulatory and supervisory weaknesses 
contributing to the sector's problems. Financial analyst Jason Abrahams notes one 
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particularly apt example of auditors' laxity in citing the case of a local financial 
institution that managed to convince its auditors that a $J200 billion ($US5 billion) 
unreallSed loss it was facing on an investment need not be booked as the company's 
directors had a "high level of confidence" that these assets would soon recover in the 
international markets. 40 Many believe that auditors' laxity allowed a number of 
Jamaican financial institutions to get away with reporting their assets in a manner that 
proved misleading to shareholders, supervisory authorities and the public. In an 
attempt to address this perceived weakness, the Government of Jamaica passed an 
amendment to the Banking Act M 1997 that made it a duty for auditors to report to 
the chief executiVe officer of the bank, each director of the bank and the Bank of 
Jamaica any transactions or conditions that misrepresented the financial position of 
the bank, could jeopardize a bank's financial viability, or any financial 
irregularitieS. 41 The act also made provision for the Bank of Jamaica to appoirit 
special auditors in cases where there was reasonable cause to believe a bank's 
42 
ordinary auditor should not conduct a particular audit . 
Again, these amendments 
arguably came too late. 
Endogenous Factors 
Though many of the failed banks' problems clearly were triggered by the economic 
and regulatory environment in which they operated, as the Government Of Jamaica 
was quick to point out in its own defence, the fact that some banks failed while other, 
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foreign-owned, banks, such as the Bank of Nova Scotia, profited during the same 
period and under the same operating conditions requires investigation and further 
explanation as it suggests that exogenous factors alone cannot account for the bank 
failures. Rather, it implicates the decisions and actions of directors and managers of 
the failed banks taken in response to their external environment. 43 Indeed, Jamaica's 
Minister of Finance, Dr. Omar Davies, has referred to decision-making and 
judgments of directors and managers In the failed banks during the period as "warped 
and twisted. 1,44 
it is, nevertheless, possible to argue that decision-makmg was no better in some of the 
foreign banks and that their success is really due to the fact that they siMPly had 
deeper pockets and bigger reputations to trade on . 
45 This must not be dismissed as an 
explanation, since a senior treasury official in one of the foreign-owned banks 
admitted in an interview conducted for this study that the bank had received what 
amounted to a "ball out" from its parent company. As this official commented, the 
Jamaican subsidiary ran into the same liquidity problems as the banks that failed; 
however, unlike the failed banks, which were all indigenous, this foreign-owned bank 
was able to tap into the reserves of its parent company in order to avoid insolvency. 46 
In contrast, another foreign bank included in the research sample needed no 
additional liquidity support from its parent. In addition, though some of the foreign 
banks had well-establiShed island-Wide branch networks and enjoyed low cost of 
funds, the same can be said of the indigenous National Commercial Bank that failed. 
Indeed, in 1998 the Bank of Nova Scotia had 44 branches and the National 
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47 Commercial Bank had 42 
. 
In addition, one of the viable commercial banks had only 
one branch- This Indicates that directors and managers In at least some of the viable 
banks made very different, obviously more prudent, decisions faced with arguably the 
same external operating conditions as other banks. 
However, a case also can be made that the external operatMig conditions of the 
indigenous Jamaican banks that failed and the foreign-owned banks that remained 
viable during the financial crisis were not precisely the same by virtue of the fact that, 
in addition to Jamaican regulatory and supervisory requirements, foreign owned 
banks were subject directly and indirectly to the regulatory requirements of the 
country out of which the parent company operated. It can be argued that these 
additional, and more stringent, regulatory and supervisory requirements encouraged 
more prudent decision-making on the part of directors, managers and employees of 
the foreign banks and prevented them from engaging in the speculative and 
sometimes corrupt business practices that characterLsed the failed indigenous banks. 
There is some support to be found for this line of argument in the results of the field 
research conducted in one of the foreign-owned banks. In this bank, interview 
subjects' statements indicated a relationship between foreign supervisory 
requirements and the parent company's strong internal control culture, which in turn 
influenced the behaviour of managers and employees at the local level with respect to 
internal control and risk management practices . 
48 However, the fact that another of 
the foreign banks, despite being subject to foreign regulatory requirements, 
experienced operating problems similar to the failed banks suggests that the need to 
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meet foreign regulatory and supervisory requirements may not have been that 
significant a factor. More detailed comparative analysis of the regulatory and 
supervisory frameworks under which the foreign banks operated and how these 
influenced the banks' internal control systems would be needed before any definitive 
conclusions could be reached about the significance of this factor. 
If parent company support and access to a larger customer base does not account for 
the continuing viabihty of A the foreign-owned banks and it appears that, in many 
cases, the banks that did not fail took more prudent decisions and adopted better 
strategies - whether or not as a result of additional foreign regulatory requirements - 
we must ask what can account for the poor decision making and operating problems 
of the fafled banks? In the pubfic debate surrounding the bank faýures, many 
commentators have blamed bankers' decisions and actions on "sharp practice, " by 
which is meant practices that are fflegaL bordering on the iflegal or self-dealing 
motivated by a desire for short-term financial gain A Government paper citing the 
causes of the bank failures accused directors and managers of these banks, M certain 
instances, of "actions that were flagrantly dishonest and in the sole interest of the 
major beneficial shareholder and/or the latter's associates. ý49 Indeed, 
into accusations of fraudulent practices on the part of some directors and managers in 
several failed Jamaican financial institutions is ongoing. 50 Examples of directors' and 
managers' sharp practice include allegations that they took out loans for themselves 
or close associates at subsidised rates of interest with no intention of paying the loans 
back. Other observers of the Jamaican financial crisis have cited cases of directors 
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and managers taking advantage of weaknesses in the country's regulatory framework 
to increase short-term profit returns. 51 In addition, the Governor of the Bank of 
Jamaica has stated pubhclýy that the banks' problems arose because senior directors 
and managers deliberately used "creative accounting" with respect to asset valuation 
and income recognition in order to avoid having to set aside funds to provide for a 
growing number of non-performing assets, a practice motrvated by directors' and 
managers' desire for short-term profitability 
While there is evidence to support the argument that a number of directors and 
managers In the failed Jamaican banks were engaged in these types of sharp practices, 
on its own this argument fails to account for the sheer pervasiveness of internal 
operatmg problems M the failed banks. For example, a Ministry of Finance and 
Planning paper on the problems of the collapsed banks cites a wide variety of internal 
operating problems, such as inadequate credit/investment assessment and monitormg; 
excessive credit concentration; inadequate capital levels; high and non-income 
Ing ornung eammg levels of related party exposure; high and increasi levels of non-perf 
assets; and absence of, or failure to comply with proper internal control procedures 
and effectiVe risk management principles. 52 As this list of the banks' problems 
suggests, any line of argument that relies on the assumption that bank directors and 
semor managers knew exactly what they were doing and had adequate control over 
their operations and risks at all times is untenable. While it is true that directors and 
senior managers were aware, to some extent, of their non-performing loans as 
evidenced by the fact that a number of them took steps to hide these problems 
from 
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the regulatory authorities using various strategies, the very fact that the banks had 
such a high degree of non-performing loans coupled with public statements by several 
different conunentators and the data collected for this study equally indicate that the 
banks' directors and senior managers in many cases could not manage or did not 
recognise the full extent of the riSks they faced. 53 Far from being "masterminds", the 
failed banks' directors and managers apparently had lost control of their financial 
i, not to know institutions. They seemed not to know what was going on or, if they did 
how to deal with it. 
While the effects of sharp practice should not be underplayed, the field research 
results suggest that it is also possible to link directors and managers of the failed 
banks' loss of control over their financial institutions with the argument advanced in 
chapter two that growth and innovation, required to maintain their competitive 
position in a changing economic environment, led to decentralisation of information 
processing, information, and incentives. This, in turn, caused information related 
problenis leading to operational inefficiencies. 
During the period of the financial crisis, the failed banks experienced growth and 
54 irst, li eralisation of the foreign exchange and innovation in a variety of forms. Fi lb 
capital markets opened the door for banks to become involved in areas of business 
activity, such as foreign exchange and commercial paper trading, in which they 
had 
not previously engaged. Second, the de facto easing of restrictions on 
licences for the 
establishment of financial institutions encouraged growth in the 
banking sector. 55 
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Between 1977 and 1994 annual growth in terms of financial turnover moved from 9% 
to 50% and the average annual growth rate was 17% at a period when the economy 
was experiencing negatiVe growth- 56 In 1980 there were 36 licensed commercial 
banks, building societies and financial institutions with total assets of $J2.5 billion 
($US62.5 million). By 1996 the number of licensed institutions stood at 57 with total 
assets of $J192.6 billion ($US4.8 billion). Increasing competition in the sector 
prompted directors and managers of the failed banks to establish additional branches 
in a bid to protect their market share. In 1987 there were 156 commercial bank 
branches. By 1994 the number had expanded to 201.57 Increased competition also 
placed pressure on banks with smaller customer bases to offer more attractive rates of 
return on deposits, which, in turn, increased their cost of operation and exposed them 
to greater market and liquidity risk. Finally, the regulatory framework in place at the 
time encouraged banks to diversify into non-core areas of business in which they had 
little or no management expertise, as already discussed. 
The banks' growth and expansion in terms of new products, services, branches and 
areas of operation throughout the 1990s resulted in a rising number of business 
transactions for processing that necessitated a conconutant level of decentralisation 
and specialisation. For example, M one bank with a large branch network credit 
administration was decentralised and delegated to branch staff in order to facilitate 
58 
increased transaction processing. 
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There is evidence to suggest that as the banks decentrahsed they experienced the 
types of problems discussed m chapter two as arismg from decentralisation of 
information processors, information and incentive is i s, that i, the problems of 
information asymmetry and bounded rationality. For example, after decentralising its 
credit operations, this same bank found it necessary only a few years later to re- 
centralise the function due to internal control problems that had developed during the 
period of decentralisation. 59 Under the decentralised. system of credit administration 
there had been too many bank officers making decisions about the extension of credit, 
each with their own motivations (ie, more interested in selling loans than in prudent 
credit risk management), and too little information flowing to managers and directors 
about bank officers' credit decisions and actions. 
Lack of inforination prevented managers and directors from holding these officers 
accountable for their decisions and actions in order to maintain internal control or 
acquiring te infon-nation they as managers requlred to take sound decisions and 
actions with respect to business strategy. Although this bank's experiences with 
managing its credit operations offers but one example, it is evident that other of the 
failed banks were experiencing similar internal control problems. In discussing the 
bank failures, the former Governor of the Bank of Jamaica described how the banks 
had poor credit practices and inadequate control environments . 
60 S imilarly, a 
Government of Jamaica paper pointed out that the failed banks suffered from absence 
of, or failure to comply with, proper internal control procedures and effective risk 
management prnClpleS. 61 Given that growth and mnovation had mcreased the level 
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of risk associated with many of the indigenous banks' transactions, the banks' 
absence of effective internal controls and risk management was extremely dangerous. 
Also of note in relation to the argument that growth and innovation destabilised 
internal control and decision making in the failed banks is the fact that the single 
foreign bank included in the field research sample that experienced similar rapid 
growth and decentralisation also experienced similar operating problems and required 
an infusion of funds from its parent company to avoid insolvency. 62 In contrast, a 
foreign bank that did not exhibit signs of internal operating problems remained 
relatiVely smaH during the period and did not expand its branch network, though it 
did operate subsidiary compameS. 63 Furthermore, though not included in the research 
sample, the only indigenous Jamaican bank not to fail during the period was one that 
was very small in terms of size and scope of operations in comparison to the banks 
64 
that failed . 
Thus, the results of the empirical research suggest that growth, 
innovation, and decentralisation contributed to the operational Mefficiencies that 
contributed to the collapse of almost all of Jamaica's indigenous commercial banks. 
As argued in chapter two, accountability serves as a remedy to the inherent 
operational problems introduced by decentralisation and specialisatiOn. Thus, the 
establislunent of strong systems of internal accountability would have served to 
counteract the operatmg problenis brought about by growth and innovation. 
Unfortunately, in many cases, directors and managers failed to establish such 
systems. 
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This brings the discussion to another popular argument that has been advanced to 
explain the bank failures. Many analysts have argued that Jamaican bankers failed to 
establish effective controls to manage areas of risk brought about by their expansion 
into new products and services M the context of a volatfle financial enviromnent. As 
already noted, the operating environment in which Jamaican bankers functioned 
became much more complex throughout the 1990s. Prior to hberahsatiOn and 
structural adjustment, foreign exchange and interest rates were steady and the value 
of assets was not subject to severe market fluctuations. Moreover, bankers were not 
involved in as many business activities sensitive to these risks. Many have argued 
that bankers In the failed Jamaican banks had little experience with managing new 
areas of risk brought about by changes In their operating environment and expansion 
into new products and services. For example, as already noted, increased competition 
forced the banks to offer higher rates of interest on deposit accounts. This situation 
reduced the comfortable interest rate spreads the banks previously had enjoyed 
between their assets and liabilities and required the banks to monitor asset and 
liability mismatches much more closely, particularly as interest rates were fluctuating 
widely during the period. Despite the need for tighter monitoring and control of asset 
and liability mismatches, it was late in the day (je, late 1990s, in some cases when 
already on the brink of failure) that the banks began to make serious efforts to 
undertake asset and liability management. 
214 
Many commentators have attributed directors' and managers' faflure to estabhsh 
accountabilities and controls to manage new areas of business risk to their lack of 
knowledge and experience. A number of the indigenous commercial bankers, 
accustomed as they were to large interest rate spreads and high rates of return, did not 
have the necessary exposure to risk and financial management techniques to avoid the 
new ris s. 65 Moreover, unlike their counterparts in foreign-owned banks, they had 
few, if any, external sources of expertise upon which to Call. 66 
Despite these obvious shortcommgs in the banks' accountability systems, not all 
internal control failures and poor decision making in the failed banks can be 
attributed to management's failure to establish suitable systems of internal 
accountability and control. It is clear from the field research that Jamaican 
commercial bankers were not totally remiss in establishing operating accountabilities 
to aid in the identification, assessment and management of their business risks and to 
manage their balance sheets. Indeed, by law the banks were required to have put 
some of these in place. For example, at the time, Jamaica's banking regulation 
required that they track and ensure adequate levels of cash reserves, liquid assets and 
loan loss provisions as well as submit to the Bank of Jamaica annual balance sheets 
and profit and loss statements plus various monthly and annual returns. 67 A more 
detailed discussion of the types of financial reports the banks were required to submit 
to the Bank of Jamaica can be found in chapter nine. 
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At the very least III order to meet the Bank of Jamaica's statutory reserve and 
reporting requirements, the banks had put in place basic accounting and management 
reportmg systerns, which to varymg degrees they had computerised. Usirig these 
accounting and management reporting systems, they also generated a number of 
internal reports to assist in identifying and managing their risks. Takmig the 
identification, assessment and management of credit risk as a specific example, the 
banks, to varying degrees and levels of effectiveness, were assessing the credit 
worthiness of borrowers, settmg lending lirnits for staff at different levels, securing 
loans, tracking past due and non-performing loans and monitoring asset and liability 
maturities . 
68 Admittedly, however, they were not adequately trackmg their 
guarantees (ie, contingent liabilities such as overdraft facilities and the backing of 
commercial paper). 
69 
Thus it can be seen that despite acknowledged weaknesses in the banks' internal 
control and risk management procedures the fact remains that they had put some 
policies, procedures and reporting systems in place. The data collected for this study, 
however, overwhelmingly suggest that, time and again, bankers in the failed banks 
were unable to control operations and manage their risks effectiVely despite the 
internal accountabilities and controls they had established, even when such controls 
should have been adequate and were not subject to override by managers and 
employees engaged in sharp or fraudulent practices. For instance, in terms of credit 
risk management, despite the controls and accountabilities noted above, the 
banks 
sti ailed to manage credit risks associ ted with their 
loan portfolios, as i dicated by ill E la in I 
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the high number of non-performing loans they had on their books. This raises the 
interesting and perplexing question as to why the banks' systems of internal 
accountability and control were not supporting effective internal control and decision- 
making? The answer to this question will be sought in the following chapter, which 
examines empirical evidence linkmig weak accountability systems and poor record 
keeping. 
Conclusion 
The failure of Jamaica's indigenous commercial banks has had a profoundly negative 
effect on the Jamaican economy and society. For this reason, it is imperative to fully 
understand all the reasons for the collapse. While macroeconornic instability and a 
weak regulatory framework have been cited as factors In the banks' collapses, this 
chapter has argued that, because other foreign-owned banks profited under the same 
external conditions, the decisions and actions taken by directors and managers of the 
failed banks must be implicated in the failures. The argument has been made that 
although sharp practice on the part of a few directors and managers accounts for some 
of the apparently imprudent decision-making characteristic of the f ailed banks it 
cannot account for the sheer pervasiveness of such poor decisions and the operating 
problems such decisions produced. The chapter pointed to other evidence gathered 
durm*g the field research which supports the theoretical framework outlined m chapter 
two suggesting that growth and imovation that gave rise to problenis of 
decentralisatiOn of information processing, decentralisation of information and 
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decentratisation of incentives led to operating inefficiencies, In the failed banks. It 
was argued that strong systenis of internal accountability and control would have 
mitigated the effects of increasing decentralisation; however, because of lack of 
management expertise in new areas of business risk, necessary accountabilities, and 
controls were not established. In addition, the chapter argues that the internal 
operating problems M the failed banks and the poor decisions of the banks' directors 
and managers was due not only to a management failure to establish accountabilities 
and controls for new areas of risk but also to a failure of their existing systenis of 
internal accountability and control. The next chapter explores the reasons why these 
systems were not functioning effectiVely. 
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Chapter Seven: Implicating Poor Record Keeping in the Failure of Jamaica's 
Indigenous Commercial Banks 
Introduction 
Using data from the field research on the failure of Jamaican commercial banks, 
the previous chapter provided empirical evidence in support of the theoretical 
relationship between competitive viability and accountability as discussed in 
chapter two. This chapter seeks to provide empirical evidence of the relationship 
between accountability and record keeping as posited in chapter three and to 
illustrate the effects that poor record keeping can have on accountability and 
competitive viability. Thus, following on fi7om the argument in the previous 
chapter that weak systems of internal accountability and control contributed to the 
internal control problems and poor decision-making that characterised the failed 
banks, this chapter contends that, in addition to more generally recognised 
weaknesses in the banks' accountabdity systems, the absence of adequate 
information to support the effective operation of the failed banks' established 
internal accountabilities and controls - the fault of poor record keeping - 
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contributed to the poor decision-making and operational problems experienced by 
the banks. 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of some of the factors contributing to 
weaknesses in the banks' internal control systems. It then goes on to focus on 
poor communication of business rules and the absence of trustworthy and timely 
accounting and management information, resulting from the banks' record 
creation and keeping practices, as factors contributing to poor decision-making 
and operational problems. 
Accounting for Weaknesses in the Failed Banks' Internal Accountability and 
Control Systems 
A useful place to begin exploring the factors contributing to weaknesses in the 
collapsed banks' systems of accountability and control is with a review of the 
Basle Committee framework for the evaluation of internal control systems 
discussed in chapter five. This framework defines the characteristics of an "ideal" 
internal accountability and control system and thus offers a point of comparison 
with the internal accountability and control systems found in the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks. To reiterate, the Basle Committee framework calls for internal 
control systems with sufficient management oversight and control; the proper 
assessment of risks; the establishment of various control activities to manage 
risks; effective information and communication; and finafly proper monitoring of, 
adherence to, and efficacy of internal controls. 
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Unquestionably, the field research data indicates that the failed banks' internal 
control and accountability systems had several weaknesses when compared with 
the Basle Committee fi7amework. Evidence suggests that, in a number of 
instances, the banks' directors and managers, some of whom were engaged in 
sharp practice, failed to set a tone of high ethical standards and integrity, which 
would have been needed to encourage and support a sound control culture. ' As 
such, in some cases, management overrode existing internal accountabilities and 
controls, which had the effect of undermining the efficacy of the banks' 
2 
accountability and control systems. Furthermore, as already mentioned, bankers 
in the failed banks did not identify or understand all of the areas of risk that they 
faced in their existing operating environment and therefore failed to take adequate 
3 
steps to address these risks. Management also failed to establish sufficient means 
of monitoring adherence to and effectiveness of internal controls and 
accountabilities, as evidenced by weaknesses in the internal audit function. 
While there is clear evidence to indicate that all of the above factors undermined 
the banks' internal accountability and control systems, this chapter examines 
another element of the framework that is critical to the effectiveness of such 
systems: information and communication. As noted in. the Basle Comnýiittee 
framework, quality information and communication are essential foundations of 
the other interconnected elements of internal accountability and control systems. 
Though the field research conducted for this study has revealed that the quality of 
information and communication in the failed banks was poor, in the public debate 
surrounding the collapse of the faded Jamaican commercial banks this problem 
has received little recognition as an important factor contributing to weaknesses in 
225 
5 the banks' internal accountability and control systems. Where the absence or 
quality of information and communication has been identified as a problem, the 
focus of the discussion has been limited to the need for inter-bank exchange of 
information about customers' credit history in order to support better credit risk 
analysis. 6 
In contrast to the relative silence in the public debate about information and 
communication as a factor contributing to weaknesses in the failed banks' internal 
accountability and control systems, FINSAC officials and consultants closely 
involved in intervention into and rehabilitation of the failed banks quickly 
identified poor quality information and communication as a significant problem in 
the failed financial institutions. Consequently, they have spent a great deal of 
time and resources on improving accounting and management information 
systems as a major part of their effort to improve internal control and decision 
making in these institutions. 
This chapter advances the argument that practices with respect to the creation and 
keeping of records undermined the quality and communication of information in 
the banks. As a result, directors and managers often were unable to obtain an 
accurate assessment of their financial positions as the basis of good decision- 
making, adequately assess their risks, and maintain proper control of operations 
throughout their organisations. The discussion focuses first on records needed to 
establish the structure of internal control and accountability systems and to 
communicate standards and procedures of operation and then goes on to discuss 
the creation, communication and keeping of records needed to support the giving 
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and holding to account. As each aspect of a system of internal accountability and 
control is dependent on another, this chapter also airns to reveal how weaknesses 
in the banks' information and communication interrelated with and undermined 
other aspects of their accountability and internal control systems. Finally, the 
chapter aims to show the impact of poor information and communication on the 
failed Jamaican commercial banks' decision-making and operations. 
Weaknesses in the Creation and Keeping of Constitutive Records 
Chapter three discussed the ways in which certain types of records serve as a 
means of establishing the structures and procedures of accountability systems. 
Policies, procedures, directives, strategies, organisation charts and job descriptions 
are all types of documents that organisations use to set out the structure and mode 
of operation of their internal control systems. In addition, these types of 
documents serve as instruments in the process of holding organisational actors to 
account in that they stipulate the performance standards intended to both constrain 
and measure the actions and decisions of these actors. Since the lines often are 
blurred between the dual constitutive and instrumental. purposes that policies, 
procedures and similar documents serve in relation to the operation of 
organisational systems of accountabifity both aspects of such documentary forms 
will be dealt with in this discussion of their role in the failure of the Jamaican 
commercial banks' internal accountability and control systems. 
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The Basle Committee framework, in its discussion of directors' and senior 
managers' responsibility for governance, guidance and oversight, highlights the 
importance of policies, procedures, directives and similar records in "setting the 
broad strategies and major policies of the organisation and approving the overall 
organisational structure. ,8 In particular the framework emphasises the importance 
of "operational procedures [that] are contained in clearly written documentation 
that is made available to all relevant personnel" for the purposes of establishing a 
strong control culture in which "every employee [is aware] of the need to carry 
out their responsibilities effectively and to communicate to the approprIate level 
of management any problems in operations, instances of non-compliance with the 
code of conduct, or other policy violations or illegal actions noticed" and to 
establish "an appropriate control structure ... 
defining the control activities at 
every business level. "9 
In a similar vein, the Bank of Jamaica's standards of best practice, issued in 1995- 
1996, call for the establishment of policies for each area of risk management and 
control as part of a bank's internal control system. These written policies, 
according to the standards, provide the necessary guidance to individuals 
responsible for the institution's policies, procedures and controls and assist in 
ensuring that the controls used are authorised, adequate and current. 
10 
In contrast to the ideal internal control system described in the Basle 
Conu-nittee 
framework and the Bank of Jamaica best practices guidelines, in many cases the 
failed banks did not develop and implement clearly defined business rules, 
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formally established and in writing, to set out control activities with respect to 
various risk areas. In the words of one interview subject. 
... when I saw the decline in the financial sector in the past two years 
that was the problem, you know. These guys had no system, they had no 
procedures, I mean credit analysis, I mean basic things to a bank, it was on 
a very haphazard fashion. I do this, you do that. Do we coordinate? 
Maybe we do. Do we have a pattern? Does the information flow to a 
certain point, is it documented, is it kept, is it reviewed, is it audited? That 
was the missing thing from the banks that failed. " 
This subject's views are supported by the views of Wilbeme Persaud, Professor of 
Economics at the University of the West Indies, who has commented that the 
banks that failed did not clearly delineate their rules of operation, whereas those 
that remained viable had well-established rule books. 12 
An interview subject from a viable bank commented on the problems banks face 
when business rules are not well documented: 
If we didn't have the policies in place, first thing we wouldn't 
even have an organisation because you have to have some level of 
consistencies in the way you deal with customers and the way you deal 
with systems. If you don't have, the whole thing is gonna fall ... apart, 
basically. One thing you don't want to do which I think is what has 
happened in the local market is to start dealing with people on a 
differential basis. In other words, I am manager; you come to the bank as 
a customer I waive this for you. I deal with this documentation differently 
because I know you,. type of thing. I accept this form of documentation 
because of who you are and so on. That's the one thing you don't want to 
do in a bank. Once you start to do that you open yourself up to risk 
because there is no similarity in the procedures anymore. The next person 
comes in you say okay I will waive this. Why don't you use this piece of 
documentation. You have to have a straight system. So if you don't have 
something documented, something that is thought through, something that 
is tried and been tested, you are bound to then run into problems with how 
you are managing your business down the road, you know. It's 
just got to 
come back to haunt you at some point in time and check from 
just checks 
and balances situation. How do you check yourself? How 
do you know 
that you are in fact on the right page all the time. You do that because you 
have a framework to check yourself against. So the framework is very 
important and this is why a lot of banks ran into trouble because they 
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had no framework to check themselves. It was well I know [name of 
person], she is good for it let me do this. That can't work. 
In the absence of clear, well-documented, current and accessible policies, 
procedures and directives, accountability in all areas of the banks' operations was 
difficult to achieve. This situation ftielled a weak internal control environment. 
Employees apparently experienced confusion about the need for and how to carry 
out different control activities, resulting in loss of control over bank operations. 13 
In addition, problems with the documentation of business rules in the failed banks 
made it impossible for directors and senior managers to determine if employees 
were abiding by established policy and to prove any wrong-doing in cases where 
employees had deviated from acceptable practice. 14 This situation promulgated an 
environment in which fraudulent activities could flourish. 
The field research clearly shows that an absence of written business rules 
contributed to the internal operating problems experienced by the banks that failed 
and was linked to their internal control problems. 15 Even when such documents 
did exist, however, performance standards were not being followed. 
Commentators typically have pointed to weak management oversight and control 
coupled with a weak audit function in the failed banks to explain why even 
16 
documented performance standards were not properly implemented. While 
there is certainly evidence to suggest that this was the case, it assumes that 
employees were sufficiently aware of and briefed on existing policies and 
overlooks the failure to communicate policies effectively as a factor that 
prevented their proper implementation. 
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Evidence collected for this study nevertheless suggests that weak compliance with 
internal operating rules and standards of performance in the failed banks also was 
linked to problems with how rules and standards of performance were managed 
and communicated. In commenting on the communication and management of 
the banks' written business rules one interview subject made the following 
comment about the problems encountered: 
In some cases they were there but you had to look for [them]. In that, 
although there is a procedures manual, a document that states how they 
should operate, you find that there are several amendments and these 
amendments are given in the form of a memo. [They] do not necessarily. . 
. 
hit the manual but [are] in a separate file. So the information is kind of 
sketchy in some cases. Where [there] is an issue you have to run the light 
to some extent on the people involved in the process. 17 
Another interview subject commented that: 
... somebody coming 
into the organisation would take up the policy 
manual and would certainly, when you look at it, you would realise that it 
is five years behind but the [amendments are] somewhere around in the 
organisation which you cannot find. " 
Policies, procedures and directives did not flow as they should have to those 
responsible for their implementation. Nor were they regularly reviewed to ensure 
their continuing relevance. 19 As a result, informal and predominantly oral "the 
way we do it around here"') practices prevailed with resultant ambiguity about 
organisational standards of performance. 
Problems with the communIcation and management of policies, procedures and 
directives can be linked to the fact that the failed banks were not systematically 
managing the creation, review, distribution and filing of these documents. In 
other words, problems arose from weak management of the record creation and 
keeping processes. Each operational area was separately responsible for codifying 
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policies, procedures and directives relating to the functions it performed. 
However, in the absence of a central coordinating unit with responsibility for the 
management of the organisation's codified business rules there was no way of 
ensuring that operating units codified consistently and regularly, and that they 
systematicafly reviewed existing documentation to incorporate changes necessary 
to correct operating problems or address new product innovations. 20 
Furthermore, the site investigations revealed that the banks had no single unit 
responsible for compiling all policies to maintain an official current version of the 
various policy manuals as well as an historical record of superseded policies in the 
event that questions arose about past decisions based on earlier rules. Nor was 
there a single distribution fist to ensure that all relevant persons received new 
versions or that new employees received important information about business 
rules and operating standards. Moreover, no clear procedures existed for updating 
policy manuals when amendments were issued, with the result that manuals 
became outdated and new policies, procedures and directives were difficult to 
find. In many cases, individuals continued to work in accordance with outdated 
business practice. 
21 
As the banks grew in size and came to have more complex organisational 
structures, lack of control over the management of their written business rules and 
22 
operating standards became more pronounced and detrimental to operations . 
There were more units creating policies and procedures and an increasing number 
of staff to whom these documents had to be distributed. In the absence of any 
coordination over the development and communication of documented business 
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rules and performance standards, the banks' documentation of policies, 
procedures and directives became more erratic and uncontrolled. Moreover, 
growth and product innovation also created a need for rapid revision of existing 
policies so that version control in this increasingly complex environment would 
have been of increasing importance. As there was little to no formal control over 
various versions of policy and procedural documentation, personnel were unaware 
of operational standards and requirements, and management was unable to hold 
staff to account in order to enforce compliance with operating standards. 23 
In comparison, in one of the viable banks included in the field research sample, 
the creation, communication and keeping of the bank's policy and procedural 
documentation was highly controlled and systematically managed. The bank had 
developed an intranet-based centralised storage system for its policies and 
procedures, which it updated on a monthly basis. Management had organised 
training courses for bank staff aimed at providing information about how to access 
the system to encourage its use. In addition, systems had been put in place to 
ensure that all employees were notified of policy and procedural changes; for 
example, management held regular meetings with staff to update them on 
amendments and sent out announcements about policy and procedural changes via 
electronic mail . 
24 As a result, this bank did not suffer fi7om the same degree of 
ambiguity in the structure of its internal accountability and control systems and 
communication of its business rules as in the case of the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks. Not surprisingly, its internal accountability and control 
systems were much stronger. 
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Weaknesses in the Creation and Keeping of Instrumental Records 
Effective operation of formal internal systems of accountability and control rely 
not only on communication of the structure of the system and operational 
performance standards but also on timely communication of trustworthy accounts 
of decisions and actions taken by accountable persons as the basis by which their 
decisions and actions are judged by those to whom they are accountable (eg, 
managers and directors). Timely and trustworthy accounts provide the basis for 
maintaining internal control by providing the information needed to monitor 
compliance with operating standards and performance targets as well as providing 
directors and managers with information needed to make sound decisions relating 
to the assessment and management of risks and the determination of appropriate 
business strategy. 
Basle Conunittee framework Principle 8 specifies that senior management must 
ensure that there are adequate and comprehensive internal financial, operational 
and compliance data, as well as external market information about events and 
conditions that are relevant to decision-making. The Committee states that such 
information should be "reliable, timely, accessible, and provided in a consistent 
.,, 
25 
ramework specifies that internal information should format In addition, the f 
be part of a record keeping process that includes established procedures for 
records retention. Principle 10 establishes that senior management must put in 
place appropriate management information systems covering all activities of the 
bank. These systems, including those that use and hold data in electronic form, 
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must be secure and periodically tested. The framework acknowledges that data in 
electronic form and computerised information systems also have risks that must 
be controUed. 
26 
Echoing the Basle Committee framework, the Bank of Jamaica's standards of best 
practice include a requirement for management information systems to provide 
qu ity i ormation at all levels within the institution to assist in making informed 
business decisions, to facilitate the effective management and control of the 
institution's operations and to facilitate external reporting. Moreover, the 
standards document calls for the establishment and maintenance of sufficient 
appropnate controls over the accounting and other record keeping processes of 
institutions. FinaUy, the Bank of Jamaica document states that information 
technology controls are an important part of banks' internal control systems as is 
the management of risk associated with loss of data or disruption of information 
systems. 
27 
Evidence gathered from four of the six failed Jamaican commercial banks reveals 
that accounting and management information was not available or of sufficient 
quality to support effective operation of their internal accountability and control 
systems. For example, several subjects interviewed for this study expressed 
frustration with the fact that information needed to monitor the banks' liquidity, 
deposit base, asset quality and loan loss provisions was not accessible on a timely 
basis or as far back as necessary for the purposes of trend analysis, and in some 
cases not available at all. 
28 
235 
It is worth noting at this point that interview subjects frequently identified these 
accounting and management information related problems as being due to poor 
C4 management information systems. " As discussed in chapter three in relation to 
the meaning ascribed to records, what a given term signifies can differ 
dramatically depending on the context of its usage. Typical theoretical definitions 
of management information systems, for examp'le, associate the term with 
computer-based systems, as in the f6flowing definition: 
a computer-based system that makes information available to users 
with similar needs. The users usually compose a formal organizational 
entity - the firm or subsidiary subunit. The information describes the firm 
or one of its major systems in terms of what has happened in the past, what is happening now, and what is likely to happen in the future. The 
information is made available in the form of periodic reports, special 
reports, and outputs of mathematical simulations. The information output 
is used by both managers and nonmanagers in the firm as they make 
decisions to solve problems. 29 
Sub ects' use of this terminology, however, indicates that they all had very j 
different ideas about what management information systems actually comprise. It 
also suggests that the banks' information related problems went much deeper than 
what, by the definition cited above, can be described as "management 
information. " For example, some interview subjects used the term to refer to the 
banks' transaction processing and core accounting systems. 30 Others used it to 
refer to the reporting functionality of information systems (whether computerised 
or manual) that supported management review and decision-making in the context 
of hierarchical organisational structures. 31 Still others used the term quite liberally 
to refer to aH computerised information systems in the banks. 32 In many cases, 
interview subjects' used the term management information systems, therefore, to 
encompass what, for the purpose of this study, are identified in chapter three as 
records, including types of documents typically identified in the accounting 
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literature as source documents, accounts, and management and financial 
accounting reports. 
Despite the different meanings that subjects ascribed to the term management 
information systems, they all pointed out pervasive problems in accessing 
trustworthy accounting and management Information on a timely basis for the 
purpose of management and financial accounting and accountability. In the words 
of one interview subject: 
I would have to say that one of the big problems that faced 
Jamaica is the management information systems ... were absolutely 
atrocious; nobody could get anything out of them and if I was a manager 
would not have a clue as to what was going on in my bank ... 
33 
Lack of trustworthy accounting and management information contributed to 
problems that had serious repercussions for the banks. Without timely and 
accurate information, bankers had no way of accurately determining their bank's 
financial position, assessing the quality of their asset portfolio, making adequate 
provisions against loss, preventing mismatches between assets and liabilities, 
managing their cash flow, keeping down the costs of their funds, and maintaining 
adequate levels of capital to support their operations. Here, it is appropriate to 
reiterate that many bankers did not undertake these important management 
functions out of either self-interest or ignorance; nevertheless, even when they 
sought to perform such functions, lack of appropriate information prevented them 
from doing so effectively. The banks' failure to perform these critical functions 
effectively, or even at all in some cases, in combination with market conditions at 
the time, resulted in a number of "life threatening" problems. For example, a 
rising number of non-performing assets funded by short-term liabilities led to 
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liquidity problems. The banks' profitability further declined as overhead expenses 
increased from losses due to fraud and the banks' inability to manage their cash 
flow effectively, which led to penalties for failing to adhere to statutory deposit 
ratios that again increased costs of operation. All of these factors taken together 
spelled disaster for these commercial banks. 
Interview subjects and commentators have tended to identify three main reasons 
to explain why the banks' information and communication was inadequate. One 
of the reasons traces back to the argument, discussed in the previous chapter, that 
the banks' managers were not experienced enough in new areas of risk to be 
aware of the need to track certain types of transactions. In other words, they 
failed to account for and, by extension, establish accountability for these 
transactions. While the research conducted for this study supports the contention 
that managers failed to establish systems to prudently track and account for all 
aspects of their banks' business, it still does not explain why accounting 
information coming from well-established accounting and management 
information systems was of such poor quality. 
Another theory that some commentators have advanced to explain why the banks 1) 
financial information and reporting was unreliable was that their accounting 
practices were suspect. In a paper presented at the Jamaican Institute of Bankers 
1998 Awards Luncheon, the Governor of the Bank of Jamaica cited creative 
accounting, particularly in respect of asset valuation and income recognition, as 
contributing to unreliability of the banks' financial information. 
34 Similarly, at a 
recent symposium on the collapse of the Jamaican financial sector, financial 
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analyst Jason Abrahams pointed to the "liberal" interpretation of accounting rules 
employed by some Jamaican bankers as a factor in the collapse. 35 While there is 
little question that the failed Jamaican commercial banks did play fast and loose 
with accounting rules and therefore produced some questionable financial 
reporting, this problem better explains why those external to the banks - 
shareholders, auditors, regulators and customers - were unable to obtain a clear 
picture of the banks' financial positions and risk exposures than it explains why 
the banks' own directors, managers and employees could not access reliable 
recorded information. Moreover, it is not helpful in discovering why even 
disaggregated financial information (eg, source documentation for financial 
transactions) was missing or unreliable, as was the case in the four failed banks. 
Nor does it offer a basis for understanding why non-financial recorded 
information was inadequate and unavailable. Thus, other explanations must be 
sought. 
Another of the reasons given to explain the poor quality of accounting and 
management information is that the banks' transactions were not sufficiently 
computerised. Proponents of this theory argue that greater use of computers 
would have resulted in better quality accounting records and management 
36 
reporting. It is certainly true that many of the banks still handled transaction 
processing and accounting manuafly and that , in the case of those processes that 
were automated, the banks' computerised systems had inadequacies, such as poor 
communications interfaces that caused system-generated accounting errors. 
37 
Nevertheless, the field research indicates that problems in the production of 
trustworthy and timely accounts cannot be attributed solely to lack of 
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computerisation or weaknesses in how the banks' transaction processing and core 
0 accounting systems functioned because, as will be discussed in more detail below, 
many of the problems arose from the absence of or poor quality source 
documentation. Thus, an understanding of the banks' information related 
problems, and by extension solutions to those problems, are not necessarily to be 
found only with computerisation. 
None of these reasons should be discounted completely as causes of weaknesses 
in accounting and management information supporting the failed banks' internal 
accountability and control systems, since there is evidence to suggest that all 
contn ute to the poor quality of information in the failed banks. In and of 
themselves, however, these cannot fully explain the banks' information and 
communication related problems. The field research data point to many other 
contributing factors having to do with the way in which the banks created and kept 
their accounting records. To fully understand the sources of weaknesses in the 
quality of the banks' accounting and management information and how these 
weaknesses affected internal control, risk management, evaluation of financial 
positions and the prevention of fraud in the banks, it is therefore essential to 
explore in detail how the banks produced their accounts. The following 
discussion presents a high-level overview of the account production process, 
beginning with a discussion of the banks' core business functions and touching 
upon three different types of records involved in the production of the banks' 
accounting and management information - source documentation, accounting 
records and financial and management reports. 
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In looking at how records were interpreted and re-interpreted to produce particular 
views of the banks financial positions and risks it would have been revealing to 
have been able to trace the processes of inscription, transmission and 
contextualization for a single document or group of documents involved in a 
single transaction. This type of approach is usually associated with an internal 
audit methodology, which is based on detailed sampling of certain transactions. 38 
However, given the limitations imposed by cultures of bank secrecy, the need for 
confidentiality in regard to pending litigation, and the impossibility of gathering 
data related to specific documents and transactions from ethnographic interview 
subjects, the researcher was unable to use an audit methodology and the 
discussion in chapters seven and eight is, of necessity, focused at a more systemic 
level of analysis. This level of analysis is broadly consistent with the archivist's 
usual methodological approach, which tends to focus more broadly on systematic 
issues. 
39 
The banks handled a wide range of financial transactions on behalf of a variety of 
parties. These included processing of transactions for both customers and non- 
customers conducted at ATM machines (in two of the failed banks only) and 
transactions on behalf of customers conducted at branches or processed through 
the branch network. The majority of transactions in the branches resulted from 
the banks' core functions of deposit taking and lending. However, with the 
structural reforms that took place in the 1990s in the Jamaican financial sector, 
banks also became licensed foreign exchange dealers and traders and so 
consequently handled a number of transactions involving the buying and selling of 
foreign exchange. In addition, the banks purchased funds and made investments 
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to support their other activities. As such, the banks' main business transactions 
included: 
Opening and administering various deposit accounts on behalf of 
customers (eg, current, savings, and time deposits) 
Processing of cash and cheque deposits to and withdrawals from 
those accounts 
Granting, disbursing, servicing and collecting credit, such as loans, 
overdraft facilities and guarantees (ie, of commercial paper for 
corporate clients) 
SeUing and purchasing foreign exchange 
Purchasing funds and investing 
In addition to their core functions) as noted earlier, throughout the period of the 
Jamaican financial crisis, the banks also increasingly became involved in non-core 
functions such as art collection and, indirectly through their lending activities and 
investments, real estate development and other types of business enterprises in 
which the banks had little management expertise. Although their involvement in 
these non-core activities contributed to the problems that eventually led to their 
failure, the focus of this discussion will be on the production of accounting 
records and management accounting information relating to the banks' core 
functions for the reason that the field research yielded a preponderance of data 
related to these areas. Despite the focus of the discussion on accounting records 
and management accounting information relating to the banks' core functions, the 
field research suggests that similar conclusions can be reached about the general 
quality and effect on accountability and accounting records related to non-core 
functions. 
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The process of accounting for the banks' core financial transactions, and thus the 
accountability for those transactions, began with the creation or receipt of records 
documenting each financial transaction. As discussed in chapter three, these 
records typically are referred to in the accounting literature as source 
documentation. The banks created and received many different types of paper 
source documents in the process of opening various types of deposit accounts. " 
These included application forms, agreements regarding the operation of the 
account, copies of customer identification, deposit slips and signature cards. 
Other relevant records were received from the customer, such as letters of 
reference in the case of personal accounts or copies of certificates of 
incorporation, memoranda of association and articles of association in the case of 
corporate accounts. Such documents generally were placed in customer account 
files. The banks also generated signature cards that were kept separately in card 
files. 41 In addition, at least one bank kept a customer account history card file, 
while in another of the banks this information was saved in a computer e. 42 
Throughout the operation of the account, the banks filed records related to the 
history of the account on the customer's account file, which generally was 
retained in the customer's branch. Examples of the type of documents placed on 
the file include letters concerning the printing and dispatch of cheques; stop 
payment orders; copies of statements; letters concerning lost or stolen cheques, 
drafts or passbooks; and letters concerning the use of facsimile signatures. 
Several subjects spoke of problems with incomplete and inaccurate customer 
records, particularly those on computer. As one interview subject explained, 
because the customer information files were incomplete and customer 
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documentation inaccurate, branch staff making credit decisions did not have 
access to important information about customers' credit history 
So you would ... So you would have a ----- they would put ---- at a 
certain address and ----- account. I would then quite easily go to another 
branch or even the same branch and try to open up a same account and 
they would never track that I had already had an account with that branch. 
They would open up another account and sometimes they would not even 
fill out an address or anything. So I could quite easily have a huge 
overdraft or non-performing input in one account and have some balances 
of funds in another account and walk out with that. 43 
The method of filing customer documentation also contributed to lack of access to 
important information about customers. Though it might be expected that all 
documentation related to a single customer would be grouped together and placed 
on a file relating only to that customer, the field research revealed that this was not 
necessarily the way in which customer documentation was organised. In one of 
the branches visited, customer documentation was simply placed on files 
organised in chronological order. Thus, retrieval of infonnation related to a 
particular customer was dffEcult if not impossible. Inadequate control over and 
organisation of customer records, coupled with the absence of a credit bureau that 
would have facilitated the exchange of credit information among Jamaican banks, 
left the banks open to abuses that, in turn, exposed them to increased risk of fi7aud, 
credit risk and, ultimately, to losses. 
44 
On the credit side, the granting of a credit facility, for example a loan, overdraft or 
guarantee, generated such documents as credit applications, credit assessments, 
correspondence related to the credit facility and, for corporate loans, notes on site 
visits and annual reports. The banks created and maintained credit files 
into 
which they placed documents relating to the opening of the credit facility. 
In 
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addition, most of the banks' credit was secured so they also created and kept 
securities documentation concerning collateral on credit. This documentation 
varied depending on the nature of the credit but included such items as debentures, 
mortgages, certificates of title, bills of sale , insurance, loan agreements, 
promissory notes, and exchange control approval (in the case of foreign currency 
credit only). The banks kept these documents in separate securities files that they 
generally stored in a safe area such as a branch vault. As with the deposit account 
files, throughout the operation of the credit facility any documentation relating to 
the customer's credit account was to be placed on the appropriate credit or 
securities file. 
A number of interview subjects noted that an extremely high percentage of the 
banks' securities and credit files were missing key documentation or contained 
45 documentation that was incomplete. In 1999, even one of the failed banks with 
a comparatively well-managed system for its securities files could claim 
documentation was complete on only up to 70 percent of these files. 46 So poor 
was the f"ed banks' record keeping that, in response to concern about the public 
release of individuals' financial details as a result of the banking crisis, Jamaica's 
Minister of Finance was prompted to remark of two of the banks that "Having 
seen the way that records were kept ... I 
have no doubt that they'd lose, if not all, 
at least most of the pieces of information. 
-)A7 
Nfissing credit and securities records contributed to the problems the banks (and 
subsequently FINSAC) experienced with effectively monitoring the credit- 
worthiness of their customers and collecting on loans that had become non- 
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performing. In the end, the high number of non-performing loans on which the 
banks could not collect had to be written off thereby weakening the banks' capital 
adequacy and contributing to their downward spiral. 
In addition, the banks made a number of guarantees, such as approving overdraft 
facilities 
, issuing letters of credit, and backing commercial paper. Often bank 
Lniarantees were made at the officer level and not reported, secured or documented 
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in the bank's official records. The failure to document guarantees opened the 
banks up to a source of credit risk that, because undocumented and unreported, 
could not be assessed and managed properly. 
Documentation was also poor in relation to other areas of the failed banks' 
activities. In the investment area, inadequacies in recording financial transactions 
led to financial losses. In a single case alone, the inability to validate an 
investment led to aA 100 million (US $2.3 million) loss for one of the failed 
banks 
. 
49 In another bank, an internal audit report noted that failure to properly 
record transactions in the treasury and foreign exchange trading operations 
resulted in fraud, late or non-booking of transactions, default under contractual 
obligations and exchange losses. 
50 
The banks processed numerous financial transactions on a daily basis with respect 
to their deposit and credit accounts. These included cash and cheque deposits and 
withdrawals, and credit disbursements or payments on loan accounts. Each 
transaction generated records, for example: deposit slips, savings account 
withdrawal vouchers, internal vouchers, cheques and other types of source 
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documents. Depending on the type of transaction and the way in which a 
particular bank structured its transaction processing, branch and/or central 
processing unit emp oyees recorded each transaction in various manual or 
computerised systems. The field research uncovered three separate problems 
associated with the processing of transactions. 
First, source documents often were missing, inaccurate or incomplete with 
obvious consequences for the reliability of the information entered into the bank's 
transaction processing systems. For example, incomplete vouchers often led to 
51 errors in recording and tracking inter-company transactions. Such transactions 
essentially remained invisible for accounting and accountability purposes. 
All banks were microfilming cancelled cheques and, to varying degrees, other 
types of source documents. In terms of the cheques, the banks microfilmed both 
those drawn on other banks which they received in the branches and forwarded 
via the Bank of Jamaica, the central clearing agency, back to the originating bank 
Cout-clearings") and those of their own bank received via the Bank of Jamaica 
from other banks to be processed and then forwarded to customers with their bank 
statements ("in-clearings"). Microfilming of cheques was important as, after the 
cheque left the bank, the microfilm copy constituted the only record of the cheque. 
Unfortunately, the banks' microfilming practices contributed to records retrieval 
problems. Officers often were unable to retrieve microfilmed cheques and other 
documents because of the poor quality of the microfilm (ie, completely black or 
blank). Owing to their inability to retrieve microfilmed copies of cheques as 
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evidence of transactions, in many cases the banks were unable to pursue cases of 
fTaud. 52 
Third, recording of transactions in the bank's manual or computerised books of 
account also often was inconsistent, inaccurate and incomplete. For example, 
loans were issued without being written up or booked (ie, recording the issuance 
53 
of the loan in the books of account). During intervention into the failed banks, 
FINSAC also found unrecorded liabilities dating from 1993 approaching $J200 
million ($US5 million). 54 Due to these inadequacies of the source documentation 
and original data input into the bank's accounting systems, management reports 
often were incorrect and rnisleading. As a result, the banks lacked trustworthy 
information to identify and manage their financial positions and risks. The 
underlying reasons for these three problems will be discussed in greater depth in 
the following chapter. 
Each of the banks had computerised their transaction processing to varying 
degrees. In some cases the item processing systems were standalone while in 
others they were modules of the banks' core accounting systems. Despite the use 
of computer systems in the banks, many of the accounting records in the branches 
still were manual at the time of the bank failures, which, as noted above, is cited 
as one of the factors contributing to poor accounting and management information 
in the failed banks. 
The oldest of the banks' computerised item processing systems captured 
information relating to only a limited number of front office transactions, such as 
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current and savings account deposits and withdrawals. Due to the system's 
limited functionality, the bank processed other transactions, such as loan 
payments, manually. As one interview subject explained: 
... 
in some cases however you had only a [computerised] system running 
the front office. The back office was manual. You had a situation where 
an entity was processing loan cards using a card system and you have a 
loans clerk going each month and calculating on a calculator and updating 
a ledger card. So you had systems wherein only the front office where 
they capture the information on the customer's account. ) regular savings or 
current account or a CD account, but there are certain facets Re loans that 
[were] manual ... 
55 
Thus, obtaining management information relating to a customer's portfolio of 
services and products or the overall quality of the loan portfolio became more 
complicated and difficult. One FINSAC official who later had the job of 
assessing the banks' financial position and risks as part of a due diligence exercise 
commented on the effects of these hybrid systems as related to obtaining adequate 
infonnation: 
In terms of computerisation of the accounts. I think, I am trying to break 
this down, in terms of different institutions. Each of them was 
computerised differently and some one like [name of bank] really had no 
computerisation, a lot of it was manual. So if you had to get any 
information out, what would have to happen is that the information request 
had to go out to each of the branches. They would have collated the 
information manually -a time-consuming operation - then it would be 
collated and given to you... You are given a sheet of paper with numbers 
which is inadequate and a lot of people have put an awful lot of time into 56 
that. 
Although this hybrid accounting system did generate information of use in 
tracking the status of the bank's assets, it was not easy to retrieve on a timely basis 
nor necessarily complete, comprehensive and available in a convenient form. 
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An 
Aner entering each financial transaction, the banks posted entries to various 
accounts in double entry ledgers, for example deposit account ledgers, credit 
ledgers, and general ledgers. Here again, some of these ledgers were 
computerised, forming part of the banks' computerised core accounting systems, 
while others were not. In the case of the computerised ledgers, like the transaction 
processing systems, the banks' core accounting systems used different software 
runrung on a variety o platforms. Two of the banks used EBM AS400-based 
systems of approximately five years in age. Another used a DOS-based system. 
Yet another had a system dating from the 1970s running on the now outdated EBM 
system 36 platform. 
In each bank the level and quality of integration between the item processing 
system and the core accounting system varied. In the bank running the oldest 
system there was no integration between the two. Transactions in the branches 
were recorded online; bank officials then had to load these transactions manually 
into the ledgers in the core system. Diskettes came daily in the afternoon from 
each branch into the bank's head office for batch posting to the core system. As 
this was a manual process, it introduced opportunities for errors. Moreover, it 
presented a problem in terms of the timeliness of information available to head 
office about the bank's financial position. At best, this information always ran at 
least a day behind. At worst, when the branches did not finish their work and send 
in their diskettes, the end of day position could not be determined until the 
following day, which meant that it was at least two days out of date. 57 Ultimately, 
lack of system integration prevented managers and staff in the banks from being 
able to access trustworthy information about positions and cash flows on a timely 
250 
basis. One interview subject commented that, as a result, staff often resorted to 
handling many transactions by fax and/or phone to obtain information they 
required to make decisions. 58 This further contributed to the information woes of 
the banks, since the information upon which decisions about such transactions was 
based fell outside the bank's normal information capture process. 
One subject described how a recurring communications problem between the item 
processing and core system in one of the four failed banks affected the bank's 
ability to gauge the quality of its loan portfolio accurately. This interview subject 
explained the system integration problem using the following example: A loan is 
made of $100,000 and interest of $20,000 is payable each month between January 
and July. On the retail side, the item processing system shows the initial loan and 
the interest payable even though the interest is not being paid. At the end of July, 
the system reclassifies the loan as non-performing and shows a balance of $0. It 
then automatically goes back and wipes out the earlier data on the loan. On the 
general ledger side of the core accounting system, however, the entry for the loan 
shows a value of $180,000 for April, but only $120,000 for July after the 
transactions had been wiped out on the retail side and the balances were carried 
59 
across, as well as a final balance of $200,000. This subject pointed out that a 
manager would have known that the information in the general ledger is wrong, 
but would have been unable to see that it was as a result of a non-performing 
loan 
because of the manner in which the item processing and core accounting systems 
communicated. Such inaccuracies obviously affected the reliability of 
information about the bank's financial position and level of credit risk. 
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Problems with system integration also led to treasury management difficulties, for 
without accurate information about their daily cash positions the banks were 
unable to manage their cash flow effectively. As one interviewee said- 
... what is one of the most important things in a bank? It is cash 
management, knowing your cash position at any point in time so that you 
can place funds, get funds because you find that Bank of Jamaica once you 
are over a certain amount of money they are going to slap a penal rate on 
you which was significantly high at the time. And it has a ripple effect of 
course because what happens is it pushes up your cost of funds throughout 
your system so cash management is one of the absolutely crucial things 
you must know. It is your pulse. You found that many banks ... never knew their true cash position until the following day ... 
60 
Lack of timely information on cash positions hampered the banks' efforts to 
effectively manage statutory cash reserve requirements. Failure to meet these 
requirements carried expensive fines for the banks and increased operating costs 
that reduced profitabifity. 61 However, more importantly, the inability to 
accurately determine cash positions negatively affected the banks' efforts to 
manage their liquidity. Shortfalls from such problems as non-performing loans 
forced the banks to raise funds at market premiums to cover operating expenses 
and losses and, eventually, to incur large overdrafts with the Bank of Jamaica, 
which again pushed up the cost of their operations and affected profitability and, 
eventually, liquidity. 
In another of the banks, the accounting system had serious shortcomIngs in how it 
presented information, not having been designed with the need to handle 
accounting for such a high number of non-performing loans. The manner in 
which the system presented information left the bank with an inaccurate picture of 
the status of its loan portfolio, which ultimately contributed to liquidity problems. 
As one subject explained- 
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Subject: [I will] speak to the non-performing loans and the way the 
bookings showed up there. Similar, the standard. .. was 180 days past due. Now it is switched to 90 days, but apart from accounting and 
regulatory issues that I don't think will be addressed right now ... it is very easy to evergreen a loan; that is to say, that if you paid $ 1.00 of 
interest then the loan was not considered a non-performing loan even 
though you owed $1 billion. They did not have an information system to 
track a percentage of interest that you had paid in order to track it and say it was non-performing or performing and so, quite fi7ankly, people just paid $ 1.00 and it was never deemed non-performing ... All non-performing loans need to be tracked and given to the Bank of Jamaica (BOJ). You 
need to set aside provisions accordingly for that, but if it is not considered 
non-performing then you still account for it as an income statement item 
and therefore you see the banks having huge profits and yet they are in 
overdraft position with the BOJ. 
Interviewer: So in other words it was ... on the books as a performing loan which then gave a distorted picture of the total financial position. 
Subject: Basically. We have to have clarifications, as it showed up as 
profit. Now, it was still functioning, and in terms of cash flow you still 
had the cash flow to service. 
Interviewer: So that [is how] we get into some liquidity problems. 62 
Had the system functioned differently, the bank's management might have 
detected and taken much earlier action on non-performing loans and, therefore, 
suffered fewer losses. 
In keeping with standard accounting procedures, the banks undertook to balance 
the double entries in each of their ledgers resulting in the production of trial 
balances, though admittedly many commentators have suggested that account 
balancing seems not to have been done with adequate timeliness and regulanty. 63 
Through the process of balancing the accounts, the banks sought to verify the 
accuracy of their books of account and detect any errors. The correction of 
account imbalances required bank employees to research individual financial 
transactions, which often necessitated retrieval and examination of original source 
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documents, such as vouchers. However, errors often remained uncorrected and 
thus the banks' accounts remained unreconciled. 
Here again, the banks' inability to balance accounts partly stemmed from 
inadequate record keeping. Retrieval of source documents for the purposes of 
clearing up transaction entry errors, account imbalances or to conduct 
reconciliation of accounts was difficult to impossible because of the manner in 
which the banks kept these records. Many interview subjects commented that 
retrieval of transaction records, such as deposit slips and vouchers, was difficult. 
In theory, transaction records were to be retained for a varying period (usually one 
year) in the branches or data centre. Interview subjects noted that retrieval of 
transaction records was difficult because records in the branches were 
disorganised. Out of the four failed Jamaican banks, a structured method of filing 
had never existed in the two newer banks, while in the two older banks the method 
of filing had broken down over time as the banks expanded. 64 
An 
After a period of retention in the branches or data centre, source documents 
generaHy were to be transferred to the banks' so-cafled archives for retention to 
meet ongoing operational needs, such as customer queries on accounts, and 
legislative retention requirements. In reality, transfers took place erratically, if at 
all, and the disorder of these records only worsened over time. 
65 
Interview subjects noted that disorder of records in secondary storage areas started 
at the point at which the records were transferred from branches and offices. 
Often records were "turned over" and placed in boxes that, for the most part, were 
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not properly labeled. Poor practices at the point of record transfer to secondary 
storage resulted in later retrieval difficulties. As one subject commented, '(what I 
found when I went there by looking on the boxes [was] a pile of papers just pulled 
out of drawers dumped in a box ... Regardless of what was in the drawer because 
I found all sorts of things in the boxes, all sorts of personal Stuff -)ý66 
These boxes were sent to the banks' "archives, " which were often little more than 
dumping grounds into which records were thrown in no particular order. 
Interview subjects for the study described the state in which one of the banks kept 
dafly transactions vouchers as f6flows: 
... we went on this occasion.... 
because we needed to get some 
documents for our lawyers, who had requested some specific files and we 
went with the lawyers to see how easy it would be to locate these 
documents. On arrival we saw the door was open and a number of boxes 
were scattered outside on the steps, We went up the steps and there was 
one guy at the back leafing through stuff in a box ... 
So we actually went 
there and what we encountered was a room filled with boxes, torn and 
untorn, all dumped in the middle of the room in no particular order ... 
So 
we had to climb on top of the pile and try and re-arrange the boxes in some 
sort of order to try and figure out what was what. We also had to compete 
with the rats. 67 
Another subject described the method of records storage in one of these facilities 
as being like "how you'd start a bonfire. ), 68 Under these conditions of storage, 
retrieval of the records for account verification purposes, and therefore the 
construction of trustworthy and timely accounts, was impeded if not impossible. 
In terms of the effect that records storage had on the banks' ability to reconcile 
their accounts,, a 1999 Mnistry of Finance and Planning paper stated that FINSAC 
discovered over 5,000 unreconciled accounts in four of the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks . 
69 A former director of one of the failed banks attributed the 
lack of reconciliation of accounts directly to a problem with locating source 
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documents. While, arguably, part of the problem the failed banks experienced 
with account reconciliation related to the fact that bank directors and managers did 
not take steps to ensure that this function was being performed on a timely basis, 
records related problems were certainly a contributing factor. This director 
commented that: 
We have accounts here that haven't balanced., been reconciled for years. 
Mainly because they just can't get the source documents. They are 
nowhere to be found. Either they were lost at the branches, they were not 
maintained at the branches or in transit they were lost or they were filed 
somewhere or destroyed. And we have had to write off millions. Literally 
millions of dollars because we just do not have the information to 
reconcile accountS. 70 
In 1998 alone the bank had to write off $J120 million ($US3 mflhon) because it 
was unable to complete reconciliation of its accounts . 
71 Had the bank's directors 
and managers ensured that source documents were properly maintained such 
losses might have been avoided. 
In addition to forcing the banks to write off vast sums, their inability to reconcile 
accounts meant that their accounting and management information lacked 
integrity. As one subject remarked. 
We are going back to the actual data that was in [the core accounting 
system]. A lot of it was very, very poor and still is very poor. This is what 
never ceases to amaze me. In terms of [name of bank], you have got so 
much of it which is unreconciled ... For 
instance, if your bank balance is 
X thousand dollars and you have paid a cheque out, which is in the 
clearing system for Y dollars or whatever, the cleared funds will not add 
up to these things. There was actually unrecociliation [sic] between 72 
everything ... 
In many cases the underlying reason for the unrefiability of accounting 
information produced by the banks' core accounting systems was not due to any 
failure on the part of information technology nor to bank officers' failure to 
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undertake timely transaction proofing and reconciliation but to an inability to 
correctly balance accounts and correct accounting errors because of the manner In 
which paper-based source documents were organised and stored. 
Production of the trial balance formed the basis for preparation of the banks' 
statements of profits and losses and, from this, the balance sheets that showed 
their liabilities,, assets and capital. Together, the profit and loss account and 
balance sheet comprised the banks' final accounts. Many commentators pointed 
to the unreliability of the banks' financial reporting, blaming the problem on 
creative accounting on the part of the banks' directors and managers. 73 While 
there is certainly evidence to suggest that bank directors and managers did engage 
in creative accounting, the extent to which distortions and inaccuracies in the 
banks' final accounts are attributable to this kind of manipulation should not be 
overemphasised. Flaws in the process of producing these accounting reports 
equally led to a deterioration in the reliability of the banks' accounts. As such, 
directors and managers often lacked the trustworthy and timely accounting and 
management information they needed as the basis of maintaining internal control, 
making sound decisions and meeting regulatory reporting requirements. 
In addition to the production of profit and loss accounts and balance sheets, from 
information in their accounting records, other financial and management reports 
were needed to assist managers and directors to meet statutory requirements, 
control operations and manage risks. Some of the reports that the banks did 
produce included liabilities with other institutions; assets with other institutions; 
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asset details; currency positions; asset and liability maturities; interest accruals, 
passed due loans; and non-perfbrnýng loans. 74 
Production of financial and management accounting reports was problematic in 
the failed banks, however. Though the accounting information generated in the 
banks' computer-based core accounting systems was an important source of 
management information, managers had little hope of using any but the most 
recent information in analysis for decision-making since "historical" data was 
either expunged or "archived" onto relatively inaccessible tapes. 75 One subject 
described how the inability to access historical management accounting 
information undermined effective financial and risk management. This subject 
noted that a particular bank had no historical information on loan loss provisions-, 
the bank could only give a rough figure. He also noted that the banks' interest 
rate policies were being driven by competitors, not analysis of hard data over time 
of the impact of interest rates on the bank's own product MIx. Thus, information 
needed for asset and liability management was not available. 
76 
Another reason for the poverty of the banks' management information lay in the 
fact that the banks' computensed. information systems lacked report-writing 
functionality and therefore could not provide managers with useful presentations 
of accounting data to support management information requirements. 
As one 
subject noted- 
The other major problem affecting the institutions even ones which were 
computerised ... was 
[that] 
... they 
had not got significant report-writing 
functionality within their management reporting tools. They could not get 
management data readily OUt. 
77 
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The difficulty of retrieving management information in meaningful reports from 
the banks' core accounting systems often discouraged directors and managers 
from proactively seeking out the information they should have had for financial 
and risk management. As one interview subject noted, "management suffered 
with or just put up with what they actually had rather than actually demanding, 
% 
'this is the kind of data we wanted'. ). )78 Lack of report writing functionality caused 
important gaps in management information with serious implications for the 
banks. As one subject explained: 
... if you have a gap there is a great risk because it means that I'm acting 
on incomplete information because what I have and what I believe is the 
total fact ... is not so and so my decision will not be as informed as it 
should be which leads to errors. 79 
Not only did lack of report writing functionality hamper risk analysis and 
management decision-making, in one case it also prevented managers from 
spotting irregularities that would have revealed a credit fraud involving a branch 
80 
manager who was in collusion with borrowers. 
Reporting limitations of the failed banks' existing systems led managers to create 
ad hoc management information systems using Excel or other spreadsheet 
software. While these management information systems facilitated some level of 
analysis (eg, looking at ratios such as deposit base to what the banks were paying 
out in interest to determine cost of sales), they did not provide the sophisticated 
models and simulations that the banks' management would have needed (had they 
recogrused the need) to perform risk management techniques such as value-at-risk 
(VaR) analysis or to prepare budget projections for different cost centres, products 
and markets. Where the need for more sophisticated analysis and reporting was 
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identified, want of proper management information systems limited 
management's ability to undertake financial and risk management with any degree 
of sophistication, which ultimately reduced the banks' ability to maintain 
competitive viability. 
Moreover, as these systems were ad hoc creations, their credibility was higWy 
suspect. There were no controls over the input and output of information fi7Om 
them, no controls to ensure that they produced consistent and reliable results, and 
no controls over system security and backup. As stand alone creations, these ad 
hoc systems became "islands of technology" only available to the single user or 
group of users responsible for their creation, although the infonnation they 
contained may have been of benefit to the decision-making processes of others. 
Conclusion 
Sound risk and financial management is essential to the competitive viability of 
any banking operation and is, in turn, dependent upon proper accountabilitles and 
controls to identify and manage areas of risk and set appropriate business strategy. 
Accountability, as a primary mechanism for achieving internal control and sound 
decision-making, is therefore vital to the continuing viability of banking 
operations. As the field research for this study has revealed, the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks' accountability and control systems suffered from many 
weaknesses. Though commentators have typicafly attributed these system 
weaknesses to sharp practice, management failure to establish appropriate controls 
or weak management oversight of established controls, the field research indicates 
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that poor information and communication also contributed to weaknesses in the 
banks' systems of accountability and control. 
Poor quality information and communication prevented bank directors and 
managers from effectively monitoring and enforcing compliance with operating 
standards, which was essential to preventing fraud and maintaining internal 
control over operations in the banks' increasingly decentralised operating 
environment. It also undermined effective decision-making with respect to the 
management of the banks' financial positions and risks. Together, these failures 
led to serious internal operating problems in the banks, such as the inability to - 
-Maintain sufficient capital to meet both strategic needs and regulatory 
guidelines. 
-Minimise losses incurred through investment, foreign exchange and 
lending activities. 
-Ensure the availability of reasonably priced funds to meet ongoing 
business needs and keep down operating costs. 
-Manage both balance sheet and off-balance-sheet positions to meet asset- 
liability management goals and contain risk within overall policy 
guidelines. 
-Minimise losses Incurred through unauthorised transactions, 
defalcations 
and the absence of policy enforcement. 
A full operational impact assessment appears at Appendix 6 of this study. 
The field research also found that explanations for poor information and 
commurucation in the failed banks have tended to overlook poor record 
keeping as 
C) a factor. For example, poor communication of business rules and operating 
standards typically was attributed to either a failure to establish wýitten po icies 
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and procedures or to weak enforcement of those in existence. In contrast, the field 
research also found that poor management of the creation, distribution and 
preservation of these types of documents also contributed to problems in the 
communication of the banks' business rules and performance standards. 
Similarly, contrary to common conception, neither "creative accounting" practices 
nor an inadequate level of computerisation fully explain the poor quality (ie, lack 
of trustworthiness and timeliness) of the failed banks' accounts. By looking in 
detail at what interview subjects identified as the source of the problem - that is, 
weak "management information systems" - and what they actuaHy meant when 
using this term as well as at how the banks' actually produced their accounts, the 
field research has shown that the source of the problem also stemmed from poor 
record keeping. That is to say, the manner in which the banks' records - from 
policies and procedures, to source documents, to traditional accounting records, to 
management reports - were created and kept. The banks' record keeping practices 
failed to support the production of the quality of accounts needed for effective 
operation of the banks' internal accountability and control systems. Inadequate 
computensation was just a specific aspect and manifestation of the broader 
problem. The next chapter explores the underlying reasons for the banks' poor 
records creation and keeping practices, as it is only through understanding root 
causes of the problem that solutions might be found. 
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Chapter Eight: Explaining Record Keeping in Failed Jamaican Commercial 
Banks 
Introduction 
The previous chapter iflustrated how poor records creation and keeping practices and 
systems contributed to an absence of quality accounting and management information 
in the failed Jamaican commercial banks. As a result, this information presented a 
misleading account of the banks' financial positions and risk exposures. This 
weakened the banks' systems of internal accountability and control and, along with 
other factors, led to operational inefficiencies in failed banks that contributed to their 
demise. The previous chapter did not, however, explore in any great depth 
explanations for the failed banks' record creation and keeping practices and systems. 
Why, for example, did the banks' directors and managers allow record creation and 
keeping that undermined the quality of information needed to support effective 
accountability and cpntrol? Would it not have been in their best interests, or at least 
the best interests of their banks, to ensure that record creation and keeping supported 
this important aim? This chapter seeks to answer these questions by discussing field 
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research data that accounts for records creation and keeping in the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks. 
In discussing the reasons for the banks' records creation and keeping practices and 
systems this chapter also aims to use the field research data to illustrate how, as 
discussed in chapter three, social and technological influences on the inscription, 
transmission, and contextualization of records over time shape the meaning of records 
and how that meaning may be less than what is required to support organisational 
accountability. In doing so, the chapter goes against received wisdom that 
weaknesses in the banks' accounting and management information in respect of what 
was required to support the banks' systems of internal accountability and control were 
primarily the outcome of deliberate efforts on the part of some directors and managers 
to conceal evidence of sharp practice or to present a rosier picture of their banks' 
financial positions. ' Instead, the chapter argues, in keeping with the ideas presented 
in chapter three, that because record creation and keeping was relatively uncontrolled 
in failed Jamaican commercial banks, individual, group and societal values, beliefs 
and norms influenced bank officers choices about if and how the banks' records were 
inscribed, transmitted and contextualized, the technologies used in doing so, and how 
these technologies were deployed. Thus, the meaning of the banks' accounts - that is, 
the misleading picture these accounts presented of the banks' financial positions and 
risk exposures as judged in the aftermath of the bank failures - was not always the 
result of deliberate efforts on the part of directors and managers to manipulate 
accounting numbers. Rather, the meaning of the banks' accounts was actually the 
consequence of a collectivity of individual unmanaged and uncontrolled record 
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creation and keeping decisions, some deliberately self-serving others not, made in the 
context of decentralised organisational settings. 
Since the explanation of the banks' record creation and keeping put forward in this 
chapter relies upon an understanding of social actors' motivations, it raises questions 
about the extent to which the field research data, mainly interviews, can be depended 
upon to reveal underlying beliefs, values and attitudes. Appendix 2 includes a 
discussion of this issue, arguing that, though providing no definitive answers, the 
interview data provide important clues and valuable insights about how social actors 
viewed and ordered their social world. It is to a discussion of this data that the 
chapter now turns, beginning with an exploration of sharp practice as an explanation 
of the banks' record creation and keeping and then moving on to explore lack of 
organisational control over record creation and keeping as an alternative explanation. 
Considering Sharp Practice as an Explanation for Record Creation and Keeping 
Practices in Failed Jamaican Commercial Banks 
This chapter begins with a discussion of self dealing behaviour on the part of directors 
and managers of failed Jamaican commercial banks as an explanation for the banks' 
record making and keeping practices, as this is widely accepted as having been a 
factor often to the exclusion of other reasons. Many of those interviewed for the 
research project, as well as public commentators, government officials and others 
have pointed to the fact that directors and managers in failed banks engaged 
in 
practice that was motivated by a desire to circumvent Jamaica's bank regulatory and 
supervisory framework or reap benefits for themselves and their "cronies. 
-)72 As a 
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result, at all organisational levels, there were times when individuals deliberately 
avoided the creation of an accurate and complete record, or even avoided the creation 
of any record at all, in order to keep the details of a transaction from being known. As 
one interview subject stated, there was a certain deliberate vagueness in 
documentation, the root cause of which was that directors and senior managers were 
out to "feather their own nests. 
One type of decision for which this failure to give account was most evident was the 
granting of loans. In many instances, loans were not properly documented and 
booked (ie, recorded in loan books of original entry). As revealed by one interview 
subject: 
There are certain cases. I won't mention any names. There are cases where 
directors would take out loans to themselves and never pay at subsidised 
interest rates and it is very hard to find it on the books. Because of course the 
directors know the system and know how to beat it. 4 
In some cases there was "wilful intention" not to document to get away with things. 
Others knew what was going on (eg, financial controller) but were instructed to turn a 
5 blind eye by senior managers. The failure to document and book loans made these 
loans "invisible" to those whose job it was to track the credit risks of the banks and to 
ensure assets and liabilities were appropriately matched and risks adequately covered 
by sufficient capital and liquidity. The absence of proper records of loan transactions 
contributed to a distorted picture of the banks' risks, the health of their loan portfolios, 
and their overall financial positions. This, in turn, prevented managers, directors and 
bank regulators from taking action to correct operating problems. Such problems 
could not be corrected since they were not known. 
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Not only must records be inscribed in order to support the operation of internal 
accountabilities and controls, they must be kept until such time as they are no longer 
needed to fulfil the requirements of organisational and broader societal accountability 
relationships. Several subjects looking to hold directors and managers to account 
after the collapse of the indigenous commercial banks have pointed out that records 
needed for accountability purposes were missing. These interview subjects strongly 
suspect that records were deliberately destroyed to cover up wrongdoing. 
Though the field research clearly supports the argument that sharp practice 
contributed to record creation and keeping practices in faded Jamaican commercial 
banks, it still leaves important questions unanswered. How, for example, could sharp 
practice on the part of a relative few explain the magnitude and pervasiveness of the 
banks' accounting and management information problems and the degree of non- 
compliance with established records management policies and procedures? Why did 
the banks' employees and managers neglect to manage source documents even when 
these related to perfectly legitimate transactions? Given that the argument of sharp 
practice does not offer answers to these questions, other reasons to explain the banks' 
record creation and keeping practices must be explored. 
Organisational Anomie and its Effects on Record Creation and Keeping 
Practices in Failed Jamaican Commercial Banks 
When an organisation has clearly defined values, beliefs and norms usually these are 
articulated as business rules in written policies, procedures, standards, guidelines and 
similar forms of documentation. The field research conducted for this study revealed 
272 
that each of the failed Jamaican commercial banks lacked a clear set of shared values, 
beliefs and norms concerning records creation and keeping as evidenced by an 
absence of well defined written business rules concerning all aspects of records 
creation and keeping. In other words, as discussed in chapter three, they suffered 
from organisational anomie with respect to creating and keeping records. 
Instead of clearly defined business rules, in the failed Jamaican commercial banks 
there existed no written policies and procedures concerning many aspects of record 
creation and keeping. For example, one interview subject noted in relation to 
computerised customer information files, "You will find that there was no 
standardisation of inputting data. So what you find is a CIF (customer information 
file), [they] were extremely variously inputted at random by different people. . )7 This 
led to critical errors and omissions in customer information records as discussed in the 
previous chapter. Moreover, even those policies and procedures relating to records 
creation and keeping that had been established were fragmented, and poorly 
communicated., monitored and enforced. These problems contributed to gaps in 
coverage and confusion in implementation. The result was poor internal 
accountability and control of record keeping processes, which ultimately led to the 
production of accounting and management information of -a quality 
insufficient to 
sustain internal accountability and control over many areas of the banks' operations 
and needed to provide directors and managers with information to support effective 
decision making. 
As mentioned in chapter three, organisational anomie often comes about as a result of 
rapid change that disrupts traditional values and norms of behaviour. 
This is a 
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situation that defined the environment in which the failed Jamaican commercial banks 
found themselves immediately before and during the financial sector problems. As 
noted in chapter six, throughout this period most banks underwent rapid growth, 
decentralisation and specialisation spurred on by Jamaica's changing economic 
environment. 
In discussions relating to inadequacies of credit and securities files in the failed banks, 
interview subjects have indicated that rapid growth, decentralisation and 
specialisation were factors in the absence of clear record creation and keeping 
business rules. Very often as the banks' branch networks expanded in response to 
competitive pressures, old business rules and structures no longer worked. 8 In many 
cases the banks failed to put in place appropriate new business rules and structures or, 
in cases when they did, failed to monitor how well these were being implemented, 
being busy with other pressing operational priorities because of the expanded scope of 
their activities. 
An account of what happened in one of the failed banks is instructive on this point. In 
this particular bank, credit administration was decentralised during a period of 
expansion in order to facilitate more efficient processing of loans in a growing branch 
network. Under this system each branch had a securities clerk, reporting to the branch 
manager, who was responsible for loan documentation. However, with 
decentralisation, securities clerks in the branches could no longer apply the banks' old 
business rules for handling these types of records. Thus, securities clerks created 
and managed records in their custody according to individualised preferences, level of 
knowledge and priorities. Moreover, branch managers - being responsible for 
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operations, credit administration and marketing - had little time and incentive to 
monitor the work of their securities clerks. Tbýs situation eventually led to a 
breakdown of order and consistency in the organisation and management of the 
bank's credit related records. The quality of credit and securities files rapidly 
deteriorated and loan documentation became incomplete and inconsistent. ' 
In 1994, to address growing loan documentation problems, the bank undertook a 
study that led to the re-centralisation of its fragmented and poorly managed credit 
related records stores as part of an exercise to re-centralise the approval of credit and, 
thus, to strengthen internal control of credit administration. The bank's experiences 
with respect to this re-centralisation exercise indicate that it was not only 
centrafisation that improved the bank's loan documentation but the re-establishment 
of clear business rules backed by a strong record keeping "regulator" to ensure 
acceptance of and compliance with those rules. In this bank, as in others, documents 
concerning loans to customers were filed on both the customer's credit file and a 
separate securities file, which held legal documentation such as mortgages. With 
restructuring, the bank moved its securities files from out in the branches to a 
centralised records store - the securities department - overseen by an experienced and 
trained securities manager supported by an assistant manager, a securities supervisor 
and eight securities clerks. In addition, the bank established detailed operating 
procedures for the unit to ensure that securities documentation was complete and 
reliable. 'O In comparison with three of the other four failed banks examined for this 
study, after the centralisation exercise this bank's secunties files were relatively 
reliable and complete. 
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The same bank's approach to handling its credit files differed notably, although it 
centralised storage of these files as well. At the time of the review conducted for this 
study, a single low level clerk without experience or training in either credit 
administration or records management was responsible for the operation of the 
registry in which these files were housed. A physical inspection of the registry 
conducted by this researcher revealed that files from a number of branches and 
subsidiaries previously absorbed by the bank had not been integrated into the 
registry's sequence of file arrangement, thereby complicating retrieval of information. 
Security was also lax: on one visit to the bank the researcher was able to enter the 
registry and explore without detection. Only just prior to the site visit conducted for 
this research project the bank had established some procedures concerning the 
organisation of the documents in the credit files, finally recognising that lack of a 
clear policy and procedures for the operation of its credit files' registry was 
contributing to problems in the organisation and retrieval of these records. The bank 
had incorporated the new policy and procedures into its credit policy manual. At the 
time of the site visit these procedures had been implemented only partially. " As a 
result, the quality of the files was poor and many were "missing in action. ") 
This bank's experience iflustrates that, despite centralising. credit administration and 
files storage, the files remained poorly controlled in the absence of clear written 
record keeping business rules and standards and a strong records management 
regulator. As a result, the bank experienced continuing difficulty in retrieving 
complete information concerning particular loan arrangements. 
12 In contrast., strong 
records control and regulation in conjunction with centralisation of records stores 
brought about improvement in the quality of the bank's securities files. Clearly 
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documented business rules and a strong records management regulator formed an 
essential part of the bank's success in regaining control over its securities files. 
Though there was an absence of clear business rules concerning many aspects of 
record creation and keeping in the failed banks, over time the banks established a 
number of policies and procedures addressing aspects of the creation and keeping of 
records. Nevertheless, the linfited scope and fragmentation of the banks' record 
creation and keeping policy and procedural fi7ameworks left many "potholes" in 
records accountabilities and controls. 
Appendix 7 provides a summary of the records management policies and procedures 
of four failed Jamaican commercial banks. As the summary indicates, only three of 
the four failed banks had established records management policies and procedures. 
Records management policies generally were of limited scope in terms of the types of 
records for which they set standards of record keeping as weH as in terms of the 
phases of the records' life cycle that they covered. The policies, for example., 
pertained strictly to paper records. Provisions concerning records generated by the 
banks' computer systems were limited to addressing the retention of computer print 
outs in paper form. That left a whole host of electronic records, such as the many 
spreadsheets created using office productivity software such as Excel, outside the 
provisions of any record keeping policies and procedures. Moreover, the banks' 
records management policies did not extend to cover even all paper records, but were 
limited to records generated as a result of specific functions or in particular business 
areas, such as customer records, internal bank transactions, operations, branch 
records, data centres and, in one case, an executive office. Record keeping in respect 
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of other functions and areas within the banks remained outside the provisions of the 
banks' records management policies. In addition, most of the records management 
policies only included provisions for the management of records after they had 
already become non-current. Only one bank had a records management policy that 
contained provisions to establish control of records while they were still in active use. 
Controls over record creation, such as existed, were not generally to be found in 
records management policies and procedures but in policies and procedures related to 
particular business functions or operational areas, as in the case of one bank where the 
creation of records linked to credit analysis and risk management was encompassed in 
the credit administration manual. 13 Managers of the specific functional areas to which 
these policies and procedures related had responsibility for the content and 
administration of such policies. The field research uncovered no evidence that the 
banks systematically integrated their records management policies - for example, 
through cross-referencing or inclusion in a unified manual - with policies relating to 
the creation of records found in operational manuals. 
Finally, in some cases the banks had established separate policies and procedures 
aimed at controlling computerised systems. Again, these policies and procedures 
were neither integrated with operational policies and procedures nor with those for 
records management. Staff with information technology expertise had responsibility 
for the content and administration of these policies. 
The fragmented nature of the banks' information related policy and procedural 
frameworks as well as fragmentation of responsibility for implementation and 
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compliance monitoring of record keeping business rules and standards indicates that 
management did not base these frameworks on any systematic examination of the 
banks' overall information requirements. Instead, policies tended to "sprout" from 
different areas to address particular aspects of records creation and keeping as the 
need became obvious. For example, records management policies seem to have 
arisen to address mounting paper records storage problems. Consequently, 
establishment of a records management policy came rather late in the day in three of 
the four failed banks included in the study and not at all in the other. 
In terms of the requirements of effective accountability and control, the result of the 
banks' gap-ridden and fragmented policy and procedural frameworks and regulation 
was undesirable. Fragmentation as well as the limited scope of their records 
management policies and procedures encouraged an uneven and splintered approach 
to controlling records creation and keeping processes. Creation and keeping of some 
categories of records were subject to corporate standards, while there existed no 
formal accountabilities for the creation and keeping of other categories, such as 
spreadsheets in electronic form. In the case of records not covered by the policies, 
management of records creation and keeping was left to the discretion of records 
creators, information technology staff or others into whose hands the records 
variously fell in the course of their existence. 
As important as it is to understand the negative organisational consequences of the 
banks' fragmented record creation and keeping policy and procedural frameworks, it 
is equally important to understand why the banks established, and 
later failed to 
change, such apparently illogical and inefficient structures. 
This can, in part, be 
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explained by the fact that no single person or group within the failed banks had 
responsibility for establishing or coordinating accountabilities and controls for 
recorded information. In other words, there was no strong records management 
regulator in the failed banks. Rather, this responsibility fell to different groups of 
operational managers and information technology specialists who, as noted above, 
promulgated records related policies and procedures as they saw the need. Each of 
these groups had only their own, arguably limited, perspective on the controls 
necessary to support the banks' operations. With increasing decentralisation and 
specialisation, their perspectives grew more and more focused. No one in these banks 
had "the big picture" and therefore information related problems went undetected, or 
even if detected the source and nature of such problems were not well understood. 
The shortcomings of the banks' policy and procedural frameworks worked against the 
production of trustworthy and timely accounting and management information. 
Another factor contributing to the fragmentation of the banks' policy and procedural 
framework lay in the mindset of the banks' operational managers. The vast majority 
of those at the managerial level in the failed Jamaican commercial banks came from a 
business and accounting background. 14 Thus, it is possible to surrmse that their 
conceptualisation of the kinds of documentation produced. in the course of accounting 
for the banks' financial transactions reflected the accounting perspective. From this 
perspective, as already mentioned in chapter three, vouchers, correspondence and 
other paper-based records are viewed as source documents. Though these records 
form a basis for the accounting process, they are a pre-cursor to it in the sense that 
formal accounting for a transaction traditionally begins with the making of aj ournal 
entry. 15 As the creation of source documents comes before what is traditionally 
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conceptualised as the start of the accounting process, it is possible to see why, in the 
failed Jamaican commercial banks, the management of source documents came to be 
dealt with in distinct records management policies and procedures and not as part of 
operational policies concerned with accounting and financial management. 
Nor did the vast majority of those responsible for managing the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks have much of an understanding of information technology. 16 With 
increasing computerisation of the banks' transaction processing and accounting 
systems, information technology specialists drove the policy and procedural 
framework governing management of the banks' computerised systems. As a result, 
this aspect of the banks' records related policy and procedural framework became 
quite distinct from financial management processes and policies. Naturally, these 
policies and procedures reflected the preoccupations and concerns of the specialist 
infonnation technology group, concerns such as the ability to protect the organisation 
against loss of data in the event of system faults and from losses due to breaches of 
system security rather than with the keeping of records as evidence of business 
transactions. 
As the above discussion indicates, there were almost insuperable divides in the banks' 
internal regulatory framework for managing records creation and keeping processes. 
Policy and procedural divides had the effect of fi7agmenting the banks' approach to 
managing records related processes- control over paper-based source documents 
generally fell to operational managers who delegated the work to low level clerical 
staff, while control over information in cOmputerised systems fell to information 
technology specialists. 
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As the regulatory fi7amework suggests, there existed no overall coordinated approach 
and set of values, beliefs and norms concerning record creation and keeping in the 
banks, but rather group approaches, values, beliefs and norms. Far fi7om generating 
clear rules of behaviour based on a systematic assessment of the information required 
to support internal accountability and control for their organisations as a whole, the 
banks' fragmented policy and regulatory frameworks produced a confusing tangle of 
directives. These proved ineffective in guiding and constraining individual record 
creation and keeping behaviour and ensuring that such behaviour met the 
requirements of internal accountability and control. 
Poor communication and weak compliance monitoring and enforcement of corporate 
policies also rendered the banks' records creation and keeping policies and procedures 
ineffective and largely meaningless. These policies and procedures suffered from the 
same weakness in their communication as other operational policies and procedures, 
discussed at length in the previous chapter. Site visits conducted during the course of 
the field research revealed that records related policies and procedures often were 
observed more in the breach than in the rule. 17 
Why was monitoring and enforcement of the banks' records related policies weak? 
As discussed in chapter seven, monitoring and enforcement of all types of policies 
and procedures in the failed banks was weak, not just those related to record creation 
and keeping. Rapid growth and decentralisation certainly contributed to the problem. 
It is possible to sunnise that these changes created an operating enviromnent in which 
managers had more difficulty obtaining the information they required to effectively 
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supervise the extent to which a growing number of staff were complying with the 
banks' business rules. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a weak to non-existent 
internal audit function in the failed banks generally tended to exacerbate already 
weakened policy monitoring and enforcement. 
Records related policies and procedures, however, appeared to suffer fi7om extremely 
weak monitoring and enforcement, if the degree to which the banks' management 
tolerated breaches in these policies and procedures is any indication. The particularly 
poor track record with respect to records related policies and procedures demands 
explanation. The reason is that, in a growth situation, managers, who were under 
greater pressure to make decisions and process transactions, had to prioritise their 
activities. Control of record creation and keeping processes was not a top priority, as 
indicated in this comment from one of the research subjects: 
Simply because I don't think that records management although it's probably 
one of our most, one of our highest risk areas it's not something that is looked 
at as a very important, although as I said once you can't find a document 
everybody starts to jump all over each other, but the time, the money et cetera 
is not something that I think people focus enough to say that this is such an 
important project let us carry it through to the bitter end. You. see? ... 
Something is always more important. There is always another major blaze 
that somebody has to go and out and put this to the back end. 18 
Managers' low prioritisation of record keeping likely was linked to their 
understanding of it as separate from the banks' core accounting and financial 
management functions and as a function concerned primarily with the storage and 
retention of paper source documents. In addition, with increasing decentralisation and 
fragmentation of responsibility for record keeping in the banks, no single person or 
group had the ability to see the combined effects that poor record creation and 
keeping practices were having on the quality of the banks' accounting and 
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management information and, ultimately, their internal control and decision-making. 
This lack of insight prevented many managers from moving the function higher up on 
their fist of priorities. The low importance managers generally assigned to the record 
keeping function contributed to the low priority assigned to monitoring and enforcing 
records-related policies and procedures. 
Contrasting Record Creation and Keeping Practices in Failed Jamaican 
Commercial Banks with those of Viable Jamaican Commercial Banks 
So far, this chapter has advanced the argument that organisational anon-ýe - the 
absence of widespread acceptance of a clear set of shared values, beliefs and norms - 
with respect to record creation and keeping contributed to the record creation and 
keeping practices of failed Jamaican commercial banks. If this is so, then we might 
expect to find that viable banks exhibited better accounting and management 
information, as measured against the requirements of effective internal accountability 
and control systems, and had stronger and less fragmented record keeping policy and 
procedural frameworks. Yet, surprisingly, in the one viable bank included in the 
research sample that did not suffer from the records related problems of the failed 
banks, the policy and procedural framework appears not to have differed significantly 
from those of the failed banks. 
While this bank's records management policy dated from much earlier than those of 
the failed banks - 1991, as opposed to 1996 being the earliest of the records 
management policies in the failed banks - it was similar in scope and coverage 
(see 
Appendix 7). Also like the failed banks, this viable bank set out business rules 
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concerning record creation in operational policies and procedures and rules 
concerning system backups and security in separate information technology policies 
and procedures, not in its records management policy nor in a unified policy on 
matters relating to records and information. 19 Similarly, this bank had no strong 
records management regulator; rather, as in the failed banks, regulation of the 
function fell to various operational managers, the internal auditor, and internal 
information technology specialists. 
Based on interviews with managers of this bank, it is possible to conclude that the 
overall scope and structure of its records related policy and procedural framework did 
not differ significantly from those of the failed banks because certain aspects of the 
ideology of its management did not differ significantly from the ideology of 
management in the failed banks. As in the case of managers of the failed banks, this 
bank's managers also primarily came from an accounting background and therefore 
shared similar conceptualisations of records. They also held similar views about 
records management; for example, one of its managers said in response to a question 
about records management- "Of course you recognise that records management per se 
is not seen as a prionty item by US. 7ý20 
Nevertheless, there were some important differences between the viable bank and the 
failed banks. First this bank had not experienced the same rapid growth, 
decentralisation and specialisation experienced by the failed banks during the period 
of the financial crisis but had remained relatively small in size and scope of 
operations. As a result, it can be argued that the bank had not experienced the same 
level of disruption in well-established business practice with respect to record keeping 
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and, moreover, was much less reliant on the promulgation of written policies and 
procedures to conununicate new record creation and keeping values, beliefs and 
norms of behaviour. In its relatively small operating environment it was still possible 
to communicate these values, beliefs and norms orally and by personal example, even 
when they were not expficitly recorded. 
Second., the bank closely monitored and enforced all of its policies, including those 
related to record keeping. The bank's internal audit area regularly audited record 
keeping practices, as these were viewed as being part and parcel of the bank's other 
internal controls. 21 The findings of internal audits were reported to the manager of the 
audited unit as well as to the bank's chief executive officer. It was expected, and 
required, that any deviations from established policy or any operational problems 
needing correction be dealt with expeditiously. Moreover, being a foreign-owned 
bank, the local operations were subject to inspection by the parent company, which 
also apparently took seriously the establishment of proper controls over records 
creation and keeping. Comments by the bank's managers indicate that oversight by 
the parent company set the tone of the bank's internal control culture at the local 
level, a culture dictating that local managers take records control seriously. This may 
seem at odds with the apparently low level priority managers assigned records 
management; however, the apparent contradiction can be explained by the fact that 
managers did not necessarily associate records control with records management but 
rather with internal control systems. 22 That the bank remained relatively small also 
permitted a level of monitoring and enforcement that the much larger failed banks 
did 
not have the management capacity to maintain. 
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That being said, at the time of the field research this bank was coming under some of 
the same pressures of growth and decentralisation that the failed banks had 
experienced earlier. This was due, in large part, to taking up some of the business of 
the collapsed indigenous commercial banks. With an increase in the scope and 
number of its transactions, the bank was beginning to show signs of some of the 
records related control strains evident in the failed banks. Managers complained of 
increasing fragmentation of information related to customers and of missing or 
inconveniently slow flowing information. 23 
It was in their reaction to the emergence of these problems that managers in the viable 
bank differed from those in the failed banks. Exhibiting a clear understanding of the 
negative effects these problems were having on their ability to manage their risks and 
provide good customer service, managers in this viable bank acted relatively quickly 
(a matter of months) to devise strategies to address the bank's emerging record 
keeping problems. At the time of the interviews for this study, the bank's managers 
were in the process of centralising record keeping under a single ýniddle-level 
manager with lengthy experience at the bank and developing new business rules for 
the operation of a proposed centralised registry unit. They were also exploring the 
24 
possibility of imaging their documentation to aid in its management and retrieval . 
The reasons for quick action on the part of the viable bank's management must be left 
to speculation, though at least three possibilities present themselves. First of all, it is 
possible to argue that because the bank was still relatively small, managers were in a 
better position to make a connection between emerging record keeping problems and 
operational inefficiencies such as weakened risk analysis and customer service. n 
larger, more decentralised organisations, wherein several different processors working 
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in a number of discrete departments or units may handle a single business transaction, 
management can experience greater difficulty in seeing how records related problems 
produce operational inefficiencies. Again, as stated earlier, they may lack "the big 
picture. " Secondly, it is possible that the bank's managers simply had a greater 
awareness and sensitivity to the effects of records related problems than managers in 
the failed banks due to exposure to foreign operations. Finally, it might be argued 
that their accountability to foreign managers, which was taken very seriously, 
prompted them to act quickly to address any threat to the efficient performance of 
their bank and its competitive position. A combination of any of these explanations 
may well have been in operation as well. 
Social and Technical Influences on Record Creation and Keeping Practices in 
Failed Jamaican Commercial Banks 
In the failed banks, there being no clear organisational record keeping value system 
and internal regulation, social actors created and kept records according to their own 
motivations and interests. Behind their individual motivations and interests lay a 
multitude of individual, group and societal values, beliefs and norms. While some 
people obviously were motivated by self-interest and therefore willing to engage in 
record creation and keeping practices that deliberately flouted organisational policies, 
many more had no conscious intention of subverting the internal accountabilities and 
controls of the banks in which they worked; they were trying to do their best. 
Regardless of underlying motivations, the influences that drove how individuals 
created and kept records, and the technologies they used in doing so, often produced 
sub-optimal results in that they led to deviations from the conditions of record 
creation and keeping that would have produced the quality of accounting and 
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management information needed to support effective operation of organisational 
systems of accountability. This, in turn, weakened the banks' internal control and 
decision-making. Some examples will serve to illustrate this dynamic. 
Influences on Record Creation 
Though it cannot be said that the failed banks had established an organisational 
culture of record keeping in any premeditated and systematic way, to a certain degree 
the value system of the banks' directors and operational managers as a definable 
group naturally influenced norms of record creation and keeping behaviour 
throughout the failed banks. Managers' value system, often unconsciously held, 
formed a de facto record keeping organisational culture. Ironically, this de facto 
culture conflicted with the value system underlying the banks' written policies and 
procedures. Moreover, rather than encouraging record creation and keeping practices 
supportive of the production of trustworthy and timely accounting and management 
information, these values and beliefs subtly encouraged record creation and keeping 
behaviour that led to the production of less trustworthy and timely recorded 
information. 
As noted above, the banks' management generally viewed record creation and 
keeping as a back office function lacking in importance and glamour as compared to 
the front office functions of banking operations. 25 Consequently, they generally 
directed little attention and resources to controlling processes of record creation and 
keeping. Field research has indicated, for instance, that the creation of initial source 
documentation for financial transactions was a duty that management generally 
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assigned to lower level clerical staff with little or no training on the proper completion 
of the documentation. Management attitudes that record keeping processes were a 
low priority filtered down to these staff. As a result, they took little care to create 
accurate and complete documentation. For the most part, the overriding concern of 
staff involved in the creation of initial documentation was an immediate need to 
process the transaction as expeditiously as possible. They exhibited little appreciation 
of the need for adequate recording of transactions to meet the requirements of internal 
accountability and control. Nor did supervisors of the junior staff insist on accuracy 
and completeness, as they often were equally ignorant of the effects of poor 
documentation on internal accountability and control, more interested in core front 
office functions, and often under pressure to market financial products and services as 
26 
well as perform administrative duties. 
Group values, beliefs and norms also influenced choices about the technology of 
record creation. In turn, ) this technology 
had its own mediating effects on the quality 
of the banks' accounts. The inadequacies of the banks' computer systems in terms of 
producing the kinds of information that management needed to maintain effective 
internal accountability and control have been discussed at length in the previous 
chapter. Far from being simply a technological failure, the results of this study 
indicate that the failure of these systems can also be attributed to the values and ideas 
of the banks' operational managers. As one interview subject noted, the systems 
related problems arose not just from the systems - "There [were] also management 
issues. , 27 
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What were these issues? The shortcomings of the banks' systems can be traced to the 
fact that they had been modified in a piecemeal fashion throughout the years to 
maintain minimum service levels but had not kept pace with technological change. 
Some banks went through three different systems in two years. Many had been 
forced to upgrade because of the Year 2000 issue, but instead of taking the 
opportunity to completely modernise the banks had been "patching" and changing the 
systems so as to be merely compliant while the overall system remained inefficient. 28 
One interview subject accounted for the banks' short-sighted information technology 
strategy as a function of lack of funds to purchase or develop new systems . 
29 This 
explanation is not entirely compelling given the amount of money that the banks 
found for other, very capital-intensive, projects such as construction and acquisition 
of office buildings. More convincing is an explanation offered by another respondent, 
who commented that the banks had not spent the money because 
... there 
is a lack of appreciation for systems and technology. You found that 
managers and even personnel didn't appreciate the value of technology. Using 
a PC was relegated to either a teller or a secretary. 30 
This lack of appreciation, which started at the very top of the failed institutions and 
filtered throughout, according to this sub ect, in turn stemmed om a general lack of j 
understanding about information technology that charactefised the attitudes of "old 
bankers. 
The responses of interview subjects also suggest that management attitudes toward 
technology in the four failed banks lay in the insularity of their managers. As 
previously mentioned in chapter six, these bankers lacked exposure to new financial 
services products and the latest methods for managing and controlling the risks 
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associated with such products. Although they were moving into new business areas in 
a liberalised market, they were not up-to-date on how to manage the new complexities 
of their business. On this basis , it 
is possible to argue that the strength of the banks 
under foreign ownership may have been the extent to which they were exposed to the 
use of information technology in the management of risks through the practices of 
their parent companies. Certainly, the much greater level of sophistication and system 
integration in one of the viable Jamaican banks supports this theory. 
Conflicting interests and attitudes among operational managers and information 
technology specialists, on whom the banks I management increasingly relied, also 
shaped how the banks" computerised systems operated and the kinds of records they 
produced. Operational management's lack of understanding of information 
technology encouraged them to delegate consideration of information systems issues 
to information technology specialists. In many cases, these specialists were 
consultants with an interest in selling their particular technology solution regardless of 
whether this solution addressed the business information requirements of the bank. 
As some subjects have suggested, information technology specialists recommended 
the wrong systems or ones that did not support the complexity of business functions. 
In the words of one interviewee., 
... the software companies, they 
have done a lot of systems for different 
banks so they have an idea that these are the general information required by 
the organisation and so these reports are normally generated by the system. It 
comes into my bank. We have our own peculiarities and we don't like the 
reports structured that way and we don't like this report, but instead of getting 
it changed we accept these reports and we use them. 32 
As a result, transaction processing and accounting systems lacked appropriate 
functionality and therefore produced sub-standard accounting and management 
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information. For example, one interview subject told of a bank in which the general 
ledger system designed for retail banking was not sophisticated enough to handle 
complex foreign exchange and treasury functions. This necessitated having two 
systems, one for the retail banking side and one for the more sophisticated general 
ledger functions, a situation that contributed directly to the system interface problems 
noted in chapter seven. 33 
Over time, the banks employed in-house systems staff to manage their computerised 
transaction processing and accounting systems. Just as the bank's directors and 
managers relied upon information technology specialists in the initial selection or 
development of their computerised systems, so too did they come to rely upon these 
specialists to make changes and adjustments to the banks' systems. As the banks 
expanded the range of their products and services in a changing econormc 
environment, the gap between organisational information requirements and the 
functionality of the banks' systems continued to grow. This increased operational 
managers' reliance on information technology specialists to make necessary systems 
changes. However, the interests of the two groups often collided in ways that limited 
the quality of available accounting and management information. One subject cited a 
case in which a new report was required to address a serious problem with fraud and 
forgeries- 
... we were 
having a problem with forgeries and ffauds to do with accounts 
that were opened where they were lodging forged cheques to account. Now, 
we designed a report that allowed us to detect those things the day after [they 
were] processed ... And, in fact, when we went to 
IT and we said we needed 
this report, they said to us "we do not see why you need this report because 
nobody else has ever asked for this. " But we insisted ... 
[and] we have saved 34 
over, I would think conservatively, $JlOO million ($US2.5 million) , 
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It is clear that information technology staff, with their own motivations and interests, 
were not responding to management's requirements for accountability and control of 
financial transactions. Managers interviewed for this study suggest that one of the 
reasons why information technology specialists were not responsive to their demands 
was that these staff lacked an understanding of the business. As one subject stated: 
... you 
[are] sitting in the back end in IT, [are] picking a system that has 
authorisation, for argument sake, online. You are not certain of all the steps 
[in the process]. All the steps that take place in processing a cheque. You are 
not privy because you have never worked in a branch. You work in IT ... all 
you know is that there is a module called cheque authorisation online, but you 
don't understand the processes that would take place before authorisation can 
happen. 35 
Whatever the reasons, there emerged an increasing rift between the attitudes and 
interests of operational managers and the banks' information technology specialists. 
Often, the information technology specialists, with their monopoly on technical 
knowledge, won out, which led to a situation in which the banks' information 
technology strategies were driven more by technological considerations than by 
business requirements. It is, therefore, not surprising that these systems in many ways 
performed sub-optimally in terms of providing the kind of trustworthy and timely 
information the banks' managers needed to maintain effective control over t eir 
banking operations. 
It is also evident, however) that the banks' management failed to clearly articulate 
their information requirements to information technology consultants and in-house 
specialists. The root of the problem was not only that management failed to 
understand the importance and application of information technology 
but also that 
managers failed to understand and appreciate the banks' record keeping requirements. 
Stepping back to look at the problem from the wider perspective of the general 
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approach to managing records and information, it is possible to see a failure on the 
part of the collapsed banks' management to consider the implications and 
requirements for records and information upon entry into new areas of business 
activity or products, or when changes were made to existing business activities or 
products. Had they done so, identification of the records and information required to 
manage the risks associated with new areas of business more likely would have 
determined the information technology requirements. Instead, the requirements of 
existing information technology drove the records and information available to 
support new business activities and the management of their associated risks. And, as 
many respondents have pointed out, the records and information that were available 
proved insufficient. 
Not only group cultures, but the culture of the wider Jamaican society also gave rise 
to the motivations that produced individuals' record creation and keeping behaviour. 
There are two ways in which the field research revealed that Jamaican culture was a 
factor in the banks' record creation practices, particularly in the failure to document 
financial transactions. First,, some commentators argue that because Jamaica is a 
small society many deals were made on the basis of personal contacts. In 
commenting on this phenomenon, Jamaica's Minister of Finance, Omar Davies, has 
stated that in a small community, decisions cannot be made dispassionately, noting 
that you can have rules but "sooner or later you get a call. ). )36 He also has observed 
that the tendency to do business with fiiends or known associates in the context of a 
small society undermines the creation of documentation (ie, because the other party is 
known to the banker and there is greater trust), adding that this was the reason why 
some of the loan documentation in the failed banks was non-existent or 
incomplete. 37 
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These comments point back to the discussion of accountability in chapter two where it 
was noted that both hierarchical and lateral forms of accountability co-exist in 
organisations. Though the literature on the subject portrays lateral forms Of 
accountability in terms of an informal relationship with co-workers, it is possible to 
argue that bank officials' informal relationship with external parties also constituted a 
forni of lateral accountability. Recalling that accountability is the liability to give 
account of, and answer for, the discharge of duties or conduct, there exists in such 
relationships an obligation on the part of one party to another. In informal lateral 
accountability relationships this obligation tends to be implied. It is, nevertheless, 
arguably no less compelling as a determinant of action on the part of accountable 
persons. For example, a person may have strong familial obligations arising fi7om 
social values. In the Jamaican context, there also exist strong bonds of social and 
political community that give rise to implied obligations. Thus, it is possible to 
speculate that in many cases family or community members would have had 
expectations of bank officers and would have held them accountable informally for 
confom-ling to those expectations. In addition, bank officers' failure to act in 
accordance with implied obligations may have resulted in family or community 
censure. In many cases, these forms of accountability appear to have had a greater 
influence on individuals' record making behaviour in the failed banks because the 
consequences of non-compliance were more compelling. Specifically, in an 
organisational culture where the enforcement of policies and procedures was weak, 
individuals in the failed banks had a greater incentive to act in accordance with 
external accountabilities in order to avoid the more imminent possibility of 
farnily, 
social or political repercussions. These lateral forms of accountability, underpinned 
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as they were by values and norms of behaviour that contradicted behaviour in keeping 
with the production of trustworthy and timely documentation, served to undermine the 
banks' internal systems of accountability by discouraging proper documentation of 
business transactions. 
In addition to the effects of a smaH society on the creation of documentation, some 
subjects point to a generally held belief that Jamaican people favour oral forms of 
communication and therefore are less likely to make records. As one interview 
subject remarked: 
... 
it is very difficult to get [employees] to put this information down on 
paper. Maybe it is because we are not very literate in that we don't like 
38 writing letters and writing memos and that sort of thing. We just don't do it. 
This cultural aversion to record making was clearly evident among the Jamaican 
employees in the banks that failed. In contrast, the research data reveals that 
Jamaican employees working in foreign-owned banks that remained viable created 
documents where their counterparts in the failed banks did not. 
This difference in behaviour among people from the same cultural background can be 
attributed to the fact that in the foreign-owned banks the cultural values of the foreign 
parent company, in part reflecting the broader cultural values of a North American 
society more oriented to making records, placed greater emphasis and importance on 
documenting transactions. Moreover, the field research has indicated that in at least 
one foreign-owned bank these cultural values were unequivocally embedded in the 
bank's business rules of operation and that these rules were clearly communicated, 
Additionally, adherence to these rules was well monitored and enforced in this 
foreign-owned bank. In other words, the bank did not suffer from the same level of 
297 
organisational record creation and keeping anomie characteristic of the failed 
Jamaican commercial banks. The research also suggests that the seriousness with 
which this bank took the making of records may, in fact, have been encouraged by the 
fact that it was subject to the oversight of a foreign regulatory and supervisory 
authority with more stringent requirements than those of the Bank of Jamaica. Thus, 
the bank's organisational culture reflected a value system that encouraged and 
required the making of records and the bank promulgated and enforced clear rules and 
structures to ensure that proper documentation was made and kept. In the failed 
banks, where documentation was poor, it was the cultural predilection not to 
document coupled with an organisational absence of effective accountability for and 
control over the making of records that led to failures to account. 39 Without polices, 
procedures, standards and guidelines in this area or because of weak communication 
and enforcement of those that existed, individual motivations and cultural 
disincentives to record making had full play. 
Influences on Record Keeping 
While it may be apparent that the failure to make a record or to do so adequately 
prevents the giving of an account and the effective operation of accountability, it may 
be less obvious that the manner in which records are kept equally influences and 
forms an inseparable part of the meaning in records and therefore of the account 
giving process. The meaning in source documents and books of original entry, for 
example, must continue to be communicated across spatial and temporal distances in 
order to verify the view of organisational actions and decisions represented in 
derivative accounting records. 
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In order for source documents and other financial transaction records to be available 
they must be stored. Storage is both one means by which records are contextualized 
(that is, linked to the financial transactions that they document and to other records 
documenting the same transaction in order to give them meaning in relation to that 
transaction) and transmitted across organisational space and time. The manner of 
records storage, therefore, as the means of contextualizing and transmitting a record, 
has an impact on the record's communicated meaning. As is the case with the initial 
inscription of records, social and technical factors influence methods of records 
storage. 
Turning to look at contextualization of records, significance imbues meaning and the 
context of records imbues significance. In other words, information revealing the 
relation of a document to the transaction that it documents and the organisational 
context and significance of that transaction gives a document meaning as a record. In 
a traditional paper record keeping environment, contextualization of documents 
entails adding them to files, in which are kept other documents relating to the same 
transaction or a similar group of transactions, and the placement of those files in an 
official record keeping system, such as a registry, according to a logical scheme of 
arrangement. The analytical process of developing a logical structure or system of 
arranging the files in records stores (ie, the development of a file classification plan) 
that reflects the functions and business processes of the organisation, followed 
by the 
establishment of a link between documents and the transactions they document 
by 
means of physical placement of the documents in files according to the 
logical 
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scheme of file arrangement (ie, the act of classifying documents) reveals the 
significance and thereby meaning of the documents as records. 
In an electronic environment, the same prmciples apply, though the link is not 
established by physical placement of the documents in relation to one another but by 
the establishment of a logical link between the system determined physical storage 
location of the digital document - or component parts of the document - and relevant 
metadata, such as a logical classification plan mirroring the organisation's functions 
and processes and the significance of these functions and processes in relation to one 
another. 
Thus, meaning is not something inherent in the record but is engendered by the social 
and technological mode of contextualization. It is dependent upon the manner in 
which the logical method of arranging documents, whether paper, digital or in some 
other form, represents them in relation to organisational functions and processes, or 
whether it does so at all. This representation will, of course, reflect individual or 
group assessments of the significance or use the records have for the organisation. In 
turn,, it depends upon choices record keepers make in creating logical file structures 
that represent organisational functions and processes, or whether they do so at all. For 
example, they must make choices about how particular transactions relate to 
organisational functions and their significance in relation to those ffinctions. In 
addition, they must decide where to place or how to fink particular documents in 
relation to a constructed logical file structure, or whether to place or link them at all. 
Contextualization of the document also depends on the limitations or possibilities that 
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the technology of record creation and storage present for linking documents to 
business transactions. 
If we look at the act of contextualizing the account in the failed Jamaican commercial 
banks., we see that, in many cases, staff at all organisational levels chose not to add 
documents to official records stores. There were a number of reasons why this was so 
related to bank employees' own perceptions and motivations as well as to the absence 
of organisational values and systems that might have overridden individual incentives 
and the limitations of the technology of record creation and storage in establishing 
logical links. Bank officials' approach to keeping management accounting reports 
produced using spreadsheet software illustrates this point. 
As the environment in which the banks operated began to change to demand more of 
the banks in terms of asset and liability management and control over operating 
expenses, as already noted, they increasingly began to employ computer technology 
to assist them with these functions. Since the banks' existing computer systems 
lacked functionality required to produce the types of reports managers needed, 
managers tended to create and rely upon ad hoc reports using popular spreadsheet 
software (eg, Excel). 40 For example, a site investigation conducted for this study 
uncovered the fact that the Finance Department in one bank stored a number of 
spreadsheets on its server. The department relied on these spreadsheets for 
completion and control of one of its core accounting processes, the reconciliation of 
accounts. These spreadsheets arguably accounted for how the department performed 
account reconciliation and provided important evidence of that business process. 
As 
such, these electronic documents were integral to accountability. 
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Though many of these spreadsheets provided important evidence of decisions 
concerning critical bank business ffinctions such as asset and liability management, 
budgeting, loan loss provisioning and the like, there were no organisational policies 
and procedures governing the creation and keeping of this type of record. Thus, 
inscribers of these documents created and kept them informally. The informal way in 
which these records were created and kept often led to dissolution of their meaning 
over time as evidence of particular financial transactions. 
This problem was due partially to the limits of individuals' choice of technology in 
creating and keeping the records. Specifically, the spreadsheet software had no 
features that automatically linked spreadsheet documents within their structure and 
content to the financial transactions and processes for which these records had been 
created. Since the meaning of records derives not only from content and form but 
also from context, over time as memories faded the context in which individuals had 
created these records became more distant and the significance of the records and 
their meaning became more obscure, even to those who had created them. Moreover, 
it is possible to speculate that the records' meaning and significance often were lost 
completely because of the ease with which the technology -used for storing 
spreadsheets permitted alterations and deletions of computer files, though no specific 
instances were cited by interview subjects. 
Furthermore, in the absence of clear corporate definitions of the term records , implicit 
assumptions about the value of these documents determined their creators' choices 
about whether to add them to more permanent and stable organisational record stores, 
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and by doing so to elevate them to the status of official records and fix their meaning 
through contextualization. Jamaican bankers found themselves in the midst of a 
shifting documentary landscape. Financial processes and accounts that once were 
documented in paper form were recorded increasingly in electronic form to facilitate 
transaction processing and the convenient manipulation of data for reporting 
purposes. Most individuals working in Jamaican commercial banks, however, still 
conceived of a record as being something in paper form. The f6flowing statement by 
one interview subject illustrates this point: 
Primarily when we think of records and files we think of a record ... and a file and we know that there are other records and files. We all are aware of 
that but it doesn't mean that we have to let go of, you know, the record and the 
file. Which is why we probably would print this piece of paper rather than to 
send it, the message, next door [via email]. The day win come when we will 
stop it, printing the paper, but I can tell you as far as [name of bank] is 
concerned probably for about a decade now we have been talking about a 
paperless office etc. There is no such thing as a paperless office. Forget it. It 
doesn't exist. We get, you know, we improve our technology and we ... 
create more paper. 41 
One of the most striking aspects of this statement is that the idea of the record was so 
integrally linked to the paper format in the subject's mind that he consistently saw 
paper as the only medium of "official"' records. 
Even subjects who were more comfortable with conceptualising of records in 
electronic form, such as one information technology specialist, saw legal limitations 
to adopting electronic documentation as official records of business transactions. 
42 
Significantly, the legal constraints to which some respondents referred are less a 
problem than might be imagined, as under Jamaican law computer generated 
documents are admissible as evidence in both criminal and civil legal proceedings as 
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long as they satisfy certain clearly specified standards of trustworthiness. These 
provisions have yet to be widely tested in a court of law, however. 43 
Vague notions about records coupled with lack of recognition of the value of these 
types of documents to the organisation in terms of accountability and control 
prevented bank officials from viewing spreadsheets and other documentation created 
in office productivity application software as official records and from therefore 
ensuring that they were added to logicafly organised records stores, whether electrork 
or manual (eg, printed out and added to a hard copy file). In hindsight, their failure to 
add these records to appropriate record keeping systems obscured the significance and 
meaning of many of these documents in relation to the transactions they documented 
and left gaps in the account of organisational decisions and actions. 
In contrast, individuals in the failed banks generally viewed paper source documents 
as records. There were, therefore, policies and procedures specifying that such 
records should be added to organised record keeping systems. The low level of 
importance that management assigned to properly controlling stores of source 
documentation, however, generally led them to delegate this function to untrained, 
low level clerical staff who were iII-equipped to manage such records effectively. 
This was primarily because these clerical officers had received no formal training in 
records management principles and practices and had little to no understanding or 
appreciation of the record keeping requirements needed to support the banks' business 
functions and accountability requirements. AdditionaHy, branch and unit managers, 
who saw the record keeping function as a low priority, provided little to no oversight 
of how well clerical staff performed their record keepitig duties. As a result, 
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individuals charged with the oversight of records stores had little incentive to ensure 
that records were properly managed, even if they did identify ways in which the 
organisation or management of the stores under their control might be improved. in 
contrast, when managers saw fit to assign responsibility for a record store to 
experienced and trained staff, as in the case discussed above of the securities unit in 
one bank, organisation, indexing and hence retrieval of records was much improved. 44 
Also typical of the values that underpinned the failed banks' organisational cultures 
was the view that paper-based records were less useful than those in electronic form 
and therefore that energy and resources should be directed not towards controlling the 
creation and keeping of paper records but towards digitisation of paper records or 
computerisation of A information. As one respondent noted: "Who wants to wade 
through the paper? -)-)45 Another commented that the stereotypical view of manual 
records is that "if you have a manual system chances are the information is not as 
timely as you want it. The level of accuracy might not be as good. "46 It must be 
emphasised that no systematic assessment of the relative value of different record 
stores in relation to risk management or the financial health of the banks, whether in 
those stores were in paper, electronic or other form, was being carried out in the failed 
Jamaican commercial banks. Thus, beliefs about the relative value of various types of 
records were unsubstantiated. These unsubstantiated beliefs had the effect of 
diverting attention and resources away from the management of paper records stores, 
which then became more and more disorganised thereby fuefling the perception that 
paper-based records were less useful. 
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The logical and physical arrangement of traditional paper records and files also 
impacted upon the significance and meaning of records over time for the purposes of 
accountmg or decisions and actions in failed Jamaican commercial banks. Even 
when manual record stores are well structured, no single method of organisation can 
anticipate or satisfy all the possible ways in which users may want or need to access 
information. This is because different decisions and actions require different 
information. A particular way of ordering a store of information, which reflects 
underlying assumptions about the significance and meaning of records in the store, 
will permit users to retrieve the information from that store more readily than other 
ways of organising records. As an organisation's external environment changes, 
however new challenges may arise in response to which new decisions and actions 
may be required. When this is the case, records may take on new meaning and the old 
view of the organisation that a particular ordering of the records presents may no 
longer be appropriate or sufficient. 
In the failed Jamaican commercial banks,, for instance, one research subject described 
frustrations experienced while trying to retrieve information from the banks' credit 
files on connected party lending, which did not become an issue of significance until 
well into the financial crisis and, indeed, until bank regulatory authorities introduced 
new remilations limiting the practice. 47 Registry staff had organised the files by C7 
branch and thereafter by customer name in order to facilitate transaction processing 
and customer account queries; however, because the records took on new significance 
after the bank's failure, the existing organisation of records no longer supported 
managers' information requirements. Similarly, at some point during the financial 
crisis when the banks began to experience losses due to guarantees, managers 
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recognised the need to track contingent liabilities in order to control credit risk more 
effectively. Since managers previously had not identified these records as being 
significant, however, no means existed to assist them in "mining" this information 
from records once they saw the importance of monitoring guarantees. One interview 
subject explained the difficulties as follows: 
But the real issue is how do you go back and identify [guarantees] that are out 
there that you don't know about when you have to go file by file by file ... 
48 
One remedy to this problem is indexing. Traditionally, manual or computerised 
indexes have provided multiple points of access to information in records stores and 
are an important means of overcoming the limitations posed by the physical 
arrangement of paper records. The creation of indexes to facilitate tracking of and 
access to information requires, however, that users first identify their information 
requirements based upon a systematic assessment of the meaning of the records in 
relation to their organisational information requirements and the access points that 
will support obtaining the required information. This was an area of weakness in the 
management of the failed Jamaican banks. Many of the persons interviewed for the 
research project made the observation that the banks' managers failed to recognise the 
significance of tracking their commitments and exposure levels. Commentators 
attribute this failure to the fact that managers - who were "old style" bankers - were 
not equipped to deal with the types and complexities of risks in a liberalised market. 
Many managers therefore failed to identify new areas of exposure and risk for their 
banks. Not having identified exposures and risks, they could not have foreseen the 
need to develop and maintain systems to monitor these risks, including the 
identification of information requirements and the related establishment of indexes 
that might have allowed them to retrieve relevant information from the banks' files. 
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That being said, those tasked with the management of the banks' records also 
contributed to the absence of either manual or computerised indexes that hampered 
the retrieval of relevant information. In the failed banks, as already discussed, 
responsibility for the management of many records stores was assigned to low-level 
clerical staff. For example, as previously indicated, the person in charge of the 
registry in which the credit files in one of the banks were kept was untrained in record 
keeping principles and techniques. Neither had this person received any training in 
the basics of credit administration. Thus, this clerical officer had little capacity to 
appreciate the significance of information in this record store and the retrieval 
requirements of the bank's credit administrators and risk analysts. Even assuming 
this level of understanding, this individual had little if any understanding of the value 
of, and techniques for, creating indexes to support managers' information 
requirements. 
Of course, ultimate responsibility for the problem lay with the banks' managers as 
they made the decisions about who to assign to manage their records. The fact that in 
many cases they assigned low-level, untrained clerical staff to manage these stores 
reflects the generally low level of importance that managers assigned to most classes 
of paper records and the function of keeping such records, as well as their lack of 
appreciation and understanding for record keeping as a discipline comprised of 
specialised techniques and methods in which those with responsibility for records in 
their banks should have received training. 
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Ironically, the absence of appropriate indexes to paper records stores further fuelled 
managers' perception of paper records as being less efficient than those in computer 
form. This has led the banks' managers to focus on computerised information and 
imaging systems as solutions to information retrieval problems. Many managers 
assumed, and stifl do, that once an information store is converted to electronic form, 
information retrieval difficulties will disappear, as for example in this exchange with 
one interview subject: 
Researcher: [The information] was there but [the retrieval system] wasn't 
functioning as it should ... 
Subject: Because of too much paper. A lot of it is based on a document, 
written rather than a process that is automated. That you can actually go and 
automate ... It is written 
down but it is not automated. 49 
While computerisation of records stores does facilitate faster retrieval of information 
and, in many cases, easier "re-presentation" of information in records stores, as with 
manual stores, if the requirements for particular access points are not identified at 
early stages of system acquisition or development and continually reviewed in light of 
a changing business environment, the resulting system will in all probability lack the 
required fields, structures or functionality to permit the desired view of the 
orgarusation. Thus, computensation does not automatically make the retrieval of 
relevant information any easier, as illustrated by interview subjects who complained 
of the lack of "reporting functionality" in the banks' core accounting systems and the 
difficulties of getting information technology specialists to make requested system 
changes so that useful presentations of data could be retrieved. 
309 
Conclusion 
Many commentators on the collapse of the Jamaican commercial banks have 
attributed the failed banks' problems, including poor record keeping, to sharp 
practice. In this chapter, an alternative explanation was presented. Though sharp 
practice was a factor in how individuals within the failed banks created and kept 
records and thus the poor quality of the banks' accounting and management 
information, the self-dealing motivations that underlay sharp practice were just one of 
many values, beliefs and norms that influenced how individuals within these financial 
institutions created and kept records. These diverse value systems, often 
unconsciously held and deeply rooted in the psyche of individual or groups of record 
creators and keepers, influenced bank officers to make choices about inscribing, 
transmitting and contextualizing records in the production of accounts of the banks 
financial transactions. In the aftermath of the banks' collapses, it is possible to see 
how these choices often undermined the production of the quality of accounting and 
management information required to sustain effective internal accountability and 
control. This was by no means always the intention of individual record creators and 
keepers, though obviously In the case of those involved in sharp practice it was 
deliberate. More often, the resultant poor quality recorded information arose because 
directors, managers and officers of the failed Jamaican commercial banks were 
unaware of the overall effects of their record making and keeping choices. From this 
perspective, the failed Jamaican commercial banks did suffer from a management 
failure. However, this was not only a failure on the part of the bank's management to 
identify and effectively manage typical banking risks, as is commonly supposed, but 
also a failure to systematically assess the quality of accounting and management 
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information required to sustain effective internal control and decision making and 
then to establish and ensure widespread acceptance of a set of shared organisational 
values, beliefs and norms of behaviour that would have encouraged or constrained 
individuals to create and keep records in such a way as to produce the necessary 
quality of information. This was a failure that management in the collapsed banks 
could not redress simply by reorganising either their reporting relationships or their 
records stores, as revealed by the example of the failed bank that sought to solve 
credit information deficiencies through first decentralising and later re-centralising its 
credit related records stores. Nor could the problem be solved by introducing 
computer technology, as exemplified in the difficulties the banks continued to 
experience in obtaining and retrieving relevant, good quality management information 
long after the introduction of computerised information systems. It was a failure that 
the banks could only have redressed by establishing sound systems of internal 
accountability and control for the processes of record creation and keeping within 
their financial institutions. That the banks failed to pursue this strategy and instead 
focused on restructuring record stores and computerisation to solve information 
problems reflects how managers' preconceived ideas about records and records 
management often prevented them from fully appreciating the causes of information 
problems and therefore devising and implementing solutions and strategies that may 
have been more effective. 
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Chapter Nine: Record Keeping in Failed Jamaican Commercial Banks - Its Impact on the Effectiveness of Bank Supervision, Intervention and 
Rehabilitation 
Introduction 
The previous chapters explored the impact of the failed Jamaican commercial 
banks' records creation and keeping on their ability to produce trustworthy and 
timely accounts of financial transactions for the banks' own internal purposes, that 
is, to produce them in support of effective operation of systems of internal 
accountability. The banks relied upon these systems to control banking 
operations, assess and manage risk exposures, monitor the banks' financial 
positions and prevent fraud. The discussion illustrated how the banks' records 
creation and keeping practices undemlined internal accountability and control and 
decision making and how this, in turn, undermined the banks' competitive 
viabflity. 
Tbýs chapter looks at the implications of the banks' records creation and keeping 
for external agencies involved in banking supervision, and after the bank failures, 
intervention and rehabilitation of the failed banks. The discussion begins wit an 
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exploration of the effects of the banks' record creation and keeping upon 
supervisory efforts. It then discusses the government intervention that took place 
in the aftermath of the bank collapses and the implications of the banks' record 
creation and keeping upon intervention and subsequent rehabilitation initiatives. 
In addition to the empirical data discussed in the previous two chapters, the 
findings presented in this chapter draw upon information supplied by the Bank of 
Jamaica and interviews conducted with the Financial Sector Adjustment Company 
(FINSAC) Limited forensic auditors. Although the research plan had included 
conducting interviews with Bank of Jamaica supervisory authorities, this proved 
to be impossible. After two years of making requests to the Bank for interviews 
with key supervisory staff, the researcher was advised that the request for 
interviews could not be granted because of the supervisory division's "heavy 
workload and extremely tight schedules/deadlines. "' Instead, the Bank 
subsequently agreed to respond in writing to a fist of questions (see Appendix 1). 
The Bank did not answer a number of questions related to specific banks "due to 
confidentiality and other legal and professional constraints. v)2 One is inclined to 
surmise that the Bank's reluctance to release performance data on individual 
failed banks is at least in part due to the fact that the data would also be very 
revealing on the subject of the Bank's own supervisory performance. In light of 
the Bank of Jamaicas refusal to release certain information, the discussion in this 
chapter is not as comprehensive as it might have been. Nevertheless, the research 
data are sufficient to make a number of observations about the relationship 
between record keeping and Bank of Jamaica supervision of the failed banks. 
316 
Weaknesses in Effective Supervision of Jamaican Commercial Banks 
The reasons for banking supervision were discussed in chapter five and a number 
of factors with the potential to undermine effective banking regulation discussed. 
To reiterate, these factors include: a weak regulatory framework, government 
interference in the operation of bank supervision, and a weak or ineffective 
supervisory authority. As discussed in chapter six, many commentators on the 
Jamaican financial crisis see these factors as having contributed in one way or 
another to ineffective regulation of the Jamaican financial sector and the eventual 
collapse of several Jamaican commercial banks. Government interference, for 
example, is cited as having been an issue, in particular with respect to the 
independence of the Bank of Jamaica. 3 In addition, many commentators argue 
that the Bank of Jamaica supervisory division did not have the capacity to 
supervise the sector effectively. The Bank had too few staff to monitor a growing 
banking sector and also lacked staff with the technical competency to monitor 
increasingly complex corporate conglomerates. 4 Finally, commentators and 
analysts also point to shortcomings of the legislative framework for the 
supervision of Jamaican banks as having been problematic. 5 
It is beyond the scope of this study to assess the degree of impact that the above- 
noted factors had on the efficacy of banking supervision and, by extension, the 
effect of the quality of banking super-vision on the health of individual banks and 
the entire Jamaican financial sector. Suffice it to say that all of these factors 
contributed to problems with effective supervision of the banking sector. That 
being said, there is still another factor that cannot be overlooked in assessing the 
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effectiveness of the bank supervisory authorities, that is, the quality of information 
that was available to them. 
Information is critical to effective banking supervision because of the agency 
problem. As discussed in chapter three, agency theory, which essentially draws 
upon Hegel's and John Stuart Mill's philosophical ideas, holds that in a 
relationship between a principal and an agent, the agent will take advantage of the 
6 
principal unless the principal is fully informed . The theory of agency suggests 
that principals need fall and complete information about the actions of agents. 
That is to say, the actions of agents must be "transparent" to the principal. This is 
the case whether the agent is a government banking supervisory authority, as 
when there is legislative regulation of an industry, or corporate shareholders, as 
when market discipline is used to regulate a sector. Without such information, the 
principal is unable to assess the performance of the agent and to hold that agent 
accountable for adhering to accepted standards. In reference to banking, society 
requires that bankers conduct their business according to certain standards in the 
best interests of depositors and overall econon& and social well-being. Banking 
supervisors act to hold bankers accountable for adhering to these standards. 
Effective banking supervision, however, is dependent upon the supervisor's 
access to good quality information about bankers' activities. The Jamaican 
supervisory authorities were no different in this regard. 
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The Relationship between Bank of Jamaica Supervisory Practices and Failed 
Bank Record Keeping 
According to information provided to this researcher &om the Bank of Jamaica, 
the stated purpose behind the Bank of Jamaica's supervision of commercial banks 
and other deposit-taking financial institutions is to: 1) promote their safety and 
soundness so as to protect the confidence in, and integrity of, the banking system 
and 2) promote an efficient and effective banking system that finances economic 
growth, allocates credit and meets the needs of customers and the community at 
large. 7 Towards realising these objectives, the Bank assesses how much risk each 
bank is undertaking; the resources available to manage these risks, such as capital, 
internal control systems, and management experience and competence; and 
whether the identified level of resources is sufficient to manage the risks. The 
Bank's supervisory activities include. ensuring compliance with all applicable 
laws and regulations; enforcing guidelines and performance standards; providing 
guidance through promulgation of best practice standards; verifying and assessing 
the quality of activities through at least annual on-site examinations and ongoing 
off-site monitoring; and seeking to achieve as much disclosure as possible. The 
Bank maintains that, "Although regulations and guidelines are important, the 
cornerstone to the bank supervisory process is through on-site examinations 
conducted annually, along with off-site surveillance on an ongoing basis. ). )8 Thus, 
the efficacy of the Bank's supervisory programme is highly dependent on the 
availability of trustworthy and timely information as the basis of holding bankers 
to account for their banking operations. 
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According to the Bank, "Off-site supervision provides an important complement 
to on-site examinations by providing early warnings to actual or potential 
problems, and a means of assessing broader patterns and trends within the systems 
as a whole. "9 A review of Bank of Jamaica annual reports indicates that from at 
least 1987, the bank was taking this approach. 10 The off-site inspection process 
involves collecting data and verification checks; data analysis; reporting findings 
to the Governor of the Bank of Jamaica and the NEnister of Finance; making 
recommendations on corrective action and monitoring of corrective action. 
Data are obtained from a variety of sources, the primary one being regular (ie, 
weekly, monthly, quarterly and annual) prudential returns. The particular data the 
Bank of Jamaica supervisory authorities require the banks to supply have varied 
over time. In 1988, according to the Banks annual report, it required the 
following: the reporting of loans, advances and discounts, accounts receivable, 
investments and fixed assets, net provisions for losses and depreciation; the 
reporting of all forms of credit extensions, including leasing business under one 
category "Loans, Advances and Discounts; " the reporting of total liquid holdings 
in the absence of statutory liquid assets requirements; monthly reporting of 
delinquent and non-performing loans; and more detailed reporting of contingent 
accounts and other off-balance sheet business. In the 1992 Banking Act, the Bank 
of Jamaica stipulated that banks submit the following returns: monthly statements 
of assets and liabilities; non-performing loans; renegotiated loans amounting to a 
certain percentage of the bank's capital base; and analyses of customers' liabilities 
with the bank in respect to bills discounted, loans and advances as well as annual 
statements of income and expenses for the year; all debts payable in Jamaica and 
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elsewhere; outstanding unpaid cheques, drafts, and bills of exchan e; all dividends 91 
remaining unpaid in excess of five years; and land acquired by the bank in the 
satisfaction of debts. " 
As of 1996 an enhanced set of financial returns was required. These included 
more detailed reporting on certain critical areas of bank operations such as: 
foreign currency transactions, non-performing and renegotiated loans, connected 
party exposures, and connected party credit breaches. 12 At November 2000, the 
types of reports required by the Bank and specified in the financial legislation 
included: balance sheets; details on contingent and prospective liabilities; details 
on passed due loans; sectoral distribution of loans and advances; and quarterly and 
annual statements of earnings and expenditure. The law also currently allows the 
Minister of Finance to prescribe additional returns in order to provide more 
detailed information on certain balance sheet items. At the time of writing, banks 
were expected to supply information relating to cash reserve and liquid asset 
returns (domestic and foreign); maturity profile of assets and liabilities; 
distribution of assets by maturity; foreign currency assets and liabilities; update on 
breaches of credit and investment limits; renegotiated credits; connected persons 
exposure; and interest rates payable on deposits and loans. Other than the returns, 
data currently are obtained fi7om findings of on-site examinations; correspondence 
with the banks; audited financial statements; media reports; and various local and 
international publications. 
13 
As noted in a Ministry of Finance and Planning paper, written in the aftermath of 
the financial sector coflapse, and in the 1996 Bank of Jamaica annual report, many 
321 
of the returns submitted to the Bank of Jamaica immediately before and during the 
financial sector crisis were not done so on a timely basis and were unreliable. 14 
The fact that as of 1997 the Bank of Jamaica required that quarterly balance sheet 
data supplied by banks now had to be certified as presenting a true and fair view 
of the state of banks"' operations at the respective reporting dates in addition to the 
customary monthly declaration of accuracy of prudential data submitted to the 
Bank provides some indication of what the Bank supervisory authorities thought 
of the data being supplied by the banks. Again, to ensure better quality financial 
returns,, the Bank stipulated that, where a licensee's audited financial statement 
significantly differs from earlier data submitted to the bank, licensees were now 
required to provide detailed notation indicating the nature of the discrepancy and 
the reasons. 
15 
As noted in previous chapters, there has been a tendency in the public debate 
surrounding the problems experienced in Jamaica's financial sector to lay blame 
for the untrustworthiness of the bank's financial reports at the door of the bank's 
external auditors or to attribute the problem to the "creative accounting" practices 
of Jamaican bankers. 16 No less than the former Governor of the Bank of Jamaica 
publicly stated that the failed banks' problems stemmed, among other things, from 
creative accounting, particularly with respect to asset valuation and income 
recognition and that their auditors let them get away with these practices. 
17 
However, as is evident from the results of the field research data presented in 
chapters seven and eight, while both of these factors contributed to the 
unreliability of the bank's financial accounting reports, the manner in which the 
banks' accounts were produced resulted in often unintentional distortions and 
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omissions in accounts of their financial positions and risks. These unintentional 
distortions and omissions were the result of largely uncontrolled record creation 
and keeping practices in the banks which allowed individuals within the banks to 
inscribe,, transmit and contextualize records in accordance with their own 
motivations and standards. In conjunction with limitations of the technologies 
chosen for record inscription, transn-ýission and contextualization, these unchecked 
record creation and keeping behaviours led to a level of capriciousness in the 
formation of views of the banks' financial transactions as presented in their 
accounts. 
Based on the field research, it is possible to surniise that the poor quality of 
financial information supplied by the banks must have made it very difficult for 
the supervisory authorities to obtain a clear picture of the banks' financial 
positions and risk exposures. Given the unreliability of the supplied data it is 
questionable wh - ether bank supervisors always had a full appreclation of the 
degree of difficulty some of these banks were facing. 
This must be viewed as a serious shortcoming in the Jamaican bank regulatory 
system since, as the Director of 11-1, v-search at the Central Bank of Nigeria 
M. Ojo 
explains, in a system of indirect instruments of monetary and credit control (ie, 
which relies on market-based instruments such as cash reserve and liquidity ratio 
requirements and open market operations to regulate the monetary base and 
therefore the banks' money creation capability), there is a need for prompt 
availability of reliable data on the liquidity position of banks. 
18 As the Jamaican 
system matches the type of system that Ojo describes, the importance of reliable 
323 
and prompt liquidity information from the banks is clear. Ojo goes on to note that 
"Furthermore, one would expect that, since the effective use of instruments of 
indirect monetary and credit control would require prompt supply of reliable data 
from banks, bank executives must have to ensure that the accounts of their banks 
are balanced properly. " 19 As the field research revealed, the banks' accounts were 
not properly balanced and the banks could not obtain timely and reliable balance 
sheet information. Moreover, they lacked clear and timely information related to 
their cash positions. Given what is known about the quality of the accounting and 
management information that was available to the failed banks' directors and 
managers, one can only form a very gloomy picture of the quality of the 
information that the banks were supplying to the Bank of Jamaica and, by 
extension, of the impact of poor quality financial information on the efficacy of 
bank supervision and regulation. 
Even in the best cases of financial reporting, which was certainly not the situation 
that obtained in the failed Jamaican commercial banks, as Chris Barltrop and 
Diana McNaughton observe, the published financial statements of a bank should 
be treated with scepticism because it is not in the interests of a bank to disclose 
information. Baltrop and McNaughton maintain that banks will always use 
accounting practices creatively to cast a favourable light on their profitability. For 
this reason, they insist that inspection of the veracity of financial reporting Is 
essential . 
20 Barltrop's and McNaughton's assertions are supported by banking 
expert Gerald Corrigan who, in respect of assessing and managing credit risk 
exposures, argues that while banks and banking supervisors need new and 
forward 
looking loan classification schemes, this can only be implemented by a loan by 
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loan review. 21 In Corrigan's opinion, "On the supervisory side, only effective, on- 
site examination can provide reasonable assurance that the loan classification 
process and the system of reserves and provisions are working satisfactorily. 
As stated by the Bank of Jamaica in its response to questions posed by the 
researcher, on-site examinations conducted by Bank supervisory staff involved the 
collection of "on-the-spot" information indicating the current financial condition 
of a bank and the situation obtaining in its various operational areas and 
portfolios, verification of financial data already furnished to the Bank of Jamaica 
in the form of financial returns, as well as review of a bank's compliance with 
laws, regulations and standards of best practice. The goal of such reviews is to 
evaluate the bank's overall exposure to risk by uncovering possible areas of 
capital inadequacy; credit and investment risks and poor asset quality; poor 
quality board, management and internal controls; weak earnings; and insufficient 
liquidity. In doing so, the Bank uses the "CAMEL system" of evaluation. 23 This 
system includes reviewing five aspects of a bank's operations with an emphasis on 
internal control; these are: 
-Capital adequacy - ratings are based not only on a bank's capital relative 
to the capital of other banks, but also on the riskiness of bank assets, 
prospects for growth, management strength, and the ability to augment 
capital through earnings retention. 
-Asset quality - ratings are determined by such considerations as the 
volume of and severity of classified assets, asset yields relative to market 
rates and risks, diversification of asset risks, and the bank's lending and 
investment policies. 
-Management - ratings are assessed according to banking knowledge and 
experience, proficiency in setting and following internal policies, ability to 
follow regulations and statutes, the avoidance of self-dealinga, and service 
to the community in general. 
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-Earnings - ratings include consideration of factors such as the overall 
level of earnings compared with other banks, the composition of such 
earnings, such as whether income is largely accrued or actually realised, 
whether the bulk of income is extraordinary income, for example gain on 
disposal of an asset or proceeds from the sale of an insurance claim, and 
the adequacy of such earnings in supplying internal capital and meeting 
possible losses. 
-Liquidity - rated according to the maturity structure of the bank assets, 
stability of deposits and access to additional funding. 
In their response to the researcher's questions, Bank of Jamaica officials noted 
that the Bank's on-site assessments currently concentrate on the credit and 
investments portfolios, both being areas where the highest risk of loss is 
encountered. However, greater focus also is being placed on the quality and 
adequacy of risk management systems in key areas of operations such as capital 
adequacy; asset portfolio management; earnings; liquidity; internal controls, and 
overall management. The Bank also notes that, with growth in the number of 
financial conglomerates and banks that form Part of corporate groupings, and the 
resulting increase in the risk of financial losses or damaged reputation due to the 
(. (. contagion" effect, relevant information about related non-bank companies is also 
required on a regular basis. 
24 
Unfortunately, no precise information was forthcoming from the Bank as to 
whether it concentrated on-site assessments on the credit and investments 
portfolios immediately before and during the period of the financial crisis 
(roughly 1992-1998), though the 1992 Bank of Jamaica annual report does make 
particular reference to capital adequacy; asset quality; management expertise; 
earnings; and liquidity as being focal points of the activities of its inspection 
staff. 25 Nevertheless, it is difficult to say with exactitude what information the 
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Bank's supervisory staff may have been looking for during on-site investigations 
throughout this period. This is because the focus of the Bank's inspection 
programme differed slightly for each bank so that the Bank's supervisory staff 
looked for specific and different information during each bank's on-site 
examinations. For the sake of argument, this discussion wifl assume that the 
Bank's supervisory inspections concentrated on credit and investment during the 
penod that is the focus of this study. 
In terms of other areas of attention, the Bank of Jamaica's response to questions 
from the researcher suggests that supervisory attention to the quality and adequacy 
of risk management systems in respect to capital adequacy, portfolio management, 
and related non-bank companies is relatively new and therefore it is assumed that 
the Bank's supervisory staff did not pay close attention to evaluating these 
systems during on-site examinations from 1992-1997. Since the 1997 amendment 
to the Banking Act required additional reporting on connected party relationships, 
Bank supervisory staff may have turned some attention to assessing connected 
party risks during their on-site examinations from 1997 onwards. 
The Bank's written response to the researcher's questions indicates that its on-site 
examinations entail a number of phases. During the planning phase, supervisory 
division officials determine the scope of the examination, the extent of testing and 
verification to be done, the human resources needed to complete the inspection 
and other factors. At this point, the relevant Bank staff review a number of 
records in their custody, including directors' and committee minutes; previous 
inspection reports or any special reports; memoranda and working papers related 
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to earlier examinations; and the latest Comprehensive Financial and other returns. 
During the planning phase, the examiners also make a formal request for records 
and other information that the bank should have available for examiners on 
arrival. These records might include: a compilation of policy directives; 
procedures manuals; balance sheet and income statement; credit files; 
management information reports; and internal and external audit reports. 
The second phase of the examination is the actual on-site inspection. This phase 
is led by an examiner in charge of a team leader who is responsible for developing 
the main focus points for the team. The review proceeds on the basis of 
evaluating selected areas of the bank's operations. 
The final phase of the on-site examination involves reporting the results. This 
entails the completion of a written report outlining the findings and, where 
necessary, stating required corrective action and the time lines for completion. 
This report is sent to the board of directors of the bank. In extreme situations, 
where serious problems exist, the bank's board of directors and executive 
management are put under an "undertaking" to correct deficiencies. This 
represents a legal obligation on the parties concerned to take required action. The 
bank's board and management also are required to issue a formal response to the 
report on the exaniination within a specified time frame. 
Assuming that the focus of on-site inspections preceding and during the bank 
collapses was on credit and investments and given the types of records that the 
Bank's examiners generally request, the state of the commercial banks' record 
328 
keeping in these areas should have given Bank of Jamaica supervisory authorities 
cause for concern. Here again, whether they encountered any difficulties in 
obtaining the information they sought or what their reaction was to the quality of 
the information that was available to them must be left to speculation, as no 
comment was forthcoming from the Bank. Nevertheless, it is possible to conclude 
that supervisory authorities should have been alarmed at the state of the records. 
Given what is known from the field research about record keeping with respect to 
the failed banks' policies and procedures, it must have proven difficult for bank 
staff to supply supervisory authorities with a complete and accurate version of 
operating rules. Assuming the bank being inspected was able to pull together a 
policy and procedures manual fi7om disparate sources, if the supervisory 
authorities had taken the time to compare the supplied information with what was 
available to branch or operating staff, they would surely have found that the 
documentation differed. Supervisory staff should also have been concerned that 
the banks were not able to supply up-to-date balance sheets and income statements 
on a timely basis, but only rough estimates. 26 Moreover, they might also have 
been sceptical of the management information reports they received, generated as 
they were in an ad hoc manner using standalone spreadsheet packages. The 
disorder of the failed bank's credit files and incompleteness of their secunties files 
should have indicated to the supervisory authorities that there were problems with 
the banks' records and information. As such, they should have concluded that 
accounts and financial returns related to the quality of the banks' loan portfolio 
coming from such disorganised and incomplete records must be treated with 
suspicion and that, given a high number of non-performing loans, the banks were 
going to run into trouble recovering their losses in the absence of proper evidence 
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of collateral. 27 As observed by Gerald Corrigan, in cases where banks are unable 
to present supervisors with loan files or information about them, this in itself can 
be used as an early warning signal that the bank is not effectively monitoring its 
credit systems, policies, and procedures and that its loan classification may be 
erroneous. 28 At the very least, the state of the credit related records should have 
caused the supervisory authorities to question the banks' internal control systems. 
It is possible to draw similar conclusions respecting the investment area, where 
documentation of investment transactions was also incomplete. 29 Supervisory 
authorities might also have been concerned about the observations of one of the 
bank's own internal audit units, which noted that improper documentation, in 
combination with other problems, was leading to losses in the treasury and foreign 
exchange trading operations. 30 In short, the state of the bank's records should 
have served as an early warning sign for the Bank of Jamaica supervisory 
authorities of the banks' operating problems. 
As the above discussion indicates, the absence of trustworthy and timely 
information from several Jamaican commercial banks very likely hampered the 
Bank of Jamaica's efforts to monitor the sector and should have given early 
indications that the banks were experiencing serious problems. It is evident from 
Bank of Jamaica annual reports that as early as 1994, despite the poor quality of 
financial returns bank supervisory authorities were receiving from some of the 
banks, that the Bank was aware of problems in a number of the financial 
institutions. The Bank's report for that year notes that unnamed institutions went 
on a "watch fist" to be closely monitored due to breaches in statutory requirements 
for capital adequacy and liquidity and that there were also breaches of statutory 
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credit exposure limits and capital adequacy as a result of the 1992 legislative 
requirements. 31 This suggests that the absence of trustworthy and timely 
information cannot, in itself, account for the manner in which the supervisory 
authorities responded during the Jamaican financial crisis. Such information 
related problems should have raised alarms with supervisory authorities that the 
banks' management were not in control of their portfolios, management reports, 
and assets. Thus, other factors, such as regulatory forbearance or the absence of 
strong regulatory sanctions, may also explain the Bank of Jamaica's inaction. 
Notwithstanding, it is possible to infer from the field research data that the quality 
of information available to the supervisory authorities did hamper their efforts to 
regulate the sector properly and should, at least, have alerted them that all was not 
right with Jamaica's domestic commercial banks. 
The Aftermath of the Financial Sector Collapse - The Relationship between 
FINSAC Intervention and Rehabilitation and Record Keeping in the Failed 
Jamaican Commercial Banks 
As previously mentioned in chapter six, the Government of Jamaica established 
the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) Limited in January 1997 to 
intervene in the ailing Jamaican financial sector. Upon its formation, FINSAC 
embarked on a three-phased course of action'. intervention, rehabilitation and 
divestment. The intervention phase required FINSAC to infuse additional capital 
into the failed banks in exchange for equity and board seats. This phase, which 
was largely completed by April 1998, left FINSAC with equity and/or 
board seats 
in four of the island's rune commercial banks. 
32 FINSAC's first phase also aimed 
at ending what it described as the "unhealthy pattern"' of common ownership and 
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control and connected party lending between Jamaica's banks and insurance 
comparýes. 
33 
The objective of FINSAC's second phase was the rationalisation and 
reorganisation of the entities in which it had intervened. Its goal was to sustain 
depositor and policyholder confidence in the country's banking and insurance 
sectors. When FINSAC initiated this phase , it recognised that it was necessary in 
order to build greater confidence, greater transparency and improve the capability 
of financial institutions to assess market conditions and make appropriate 
decisions. This entailed requiring the banks to strengthen their credit evaluation 
systems and loan portfolio management, and to implement improved accounting 
controls. As part of the rehabilitation plan, FINSAC also purchased non- 
. -Jo- 
34 
performing loans from banks receiving assistance. With purchase of the loans, 
FINSAC assumed responsibility for monitoring these non-performing portfolios. 35 
The final phase of the FINSAC action plan involved divestment of FINSAC assets 
to private hands. At the time of writing, this phase is ongoing and entails seeking 
potential purchasers for its bank and insurance company holdings and certain 
collateral assets. At 30 June, 1999, FINSAC had completed the sale of $J2.6 
billion ($US65 million) worth of assets such as motor vehicles, art work, furniture 
and equipment, properties, hotels, resorts and company shares. 
36 In March 2001, 
the sale of the four collapsed banks that were merged to form Union bank went 
37 38 
through. FINSAC aims to complete this phase of its operations by 2005 . 
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Upon intervention in the failed financial entities, FINSAC inunediately had to 
undertake a "due diligence") exercise to review the accuracy of the banks7 
financial statements so as to determine the total extent of the entities' holdings and 
the net present value of all assets and the entities as a whole . 
39 The information 
gathered during the due diligence exercise was extremely important from the 
standpoint that it was on this basis that international consultants McKinsey and 
Company and FINSAC officials together made decisions about whether to 
immediately liquidate certain holdings or rehabilitate and later merge or divest 
them. 40 As one FINSAC official observed, "' ... when you make some decisions 
like that you have to be so right because it impacts the entire company. .. 
-)741 The 
decision not only impacted the entire company, but the economic and social 
welfare of the entire country, since with intervention in the failed Jamaican 
financial entities FINSAC had come to own 60 percent of all the country's 
banking assets. 
The process of due diligence, as explained by one FINSAC official, included an 
overall net present value and cash flow analysis to determine which strategy 
would be better to pursue with respect to the failed banks: liquidation, merger and 
42 
rehabilitation, or rehabilitation of each entity and sale. . As part of this analysis, 
FINSAC officials had to develop an ongoing cash flow model to simulate the 
merger and rehabilitation. The results of the analysis indicated that merger and 
rehabilitation was a slightly better option. As explained by a FINSAC offic, al, 
-. going with the merger and rehabilitation 
was less of a loss [net present value]- 
wise than the liquidation option. 
, 43 
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Clearly, given the importance of these decisions it was necessary that FINSAC 
officials have access to reliable information on which to base their analyses and 
decision-making. When asked about the quality of data to which they had access, 
one FINSAC official commented that, "Quite frankly, the information available to 
us was awful. It really was awful. "44 One interview subject explained that 
because the quality of the data was poor, FINSAC officials had to review it line by 
line and try to access supporting data about assets and liabilities. This entailed 
searching in boxes or files to verify information in the banks' financial statements. 
In some cases the information was not complete. As one subject noted, they 
experienced difficulties tracing transactions because these transactions had not 
been properly documented. For example, in the case of inter-company 
transactions, the amount of the transfer might have been given but the instructions 
on and origination of the transfer were not clear. This subject also stated that 
there were problems in veriýdng information because systems were mostly 
manual and some schedules were on Excel. This official further observed that 
verification of information was difficult because the banks' filing structure had 
broken down. Within one year information was getting "turned over" and placed 
in boxes, which for the most part were not properly labelled and from which 
retrieval was difficult if not impossible. As a result, information on a 
correspondent account from two or three years back could not be foun . 
45 
Owing to difficulties experienced with verifýring the banks' financial information, 
in some cases FINSAC officials had to undertake a time-consuming and costly 
exercise to gather the quality of information needed to undertake proper analysis. 
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In relation to decisions about what to do with the failed Jamaican commercial 
banks, this entailed forming, 
... templates that we needed to input and we mandated all the different institutions try and fill out these templates. At best we 
also had to go on what was in there. We did an awful lot of 
research in terms of some of the larger accounts. We ordered the 
statements and things like that in terms of looking and then we did 
an analysis of what we should write off in terms of assets ... We certainly tried to go through the major items and make some form 46 of account for that . 
This interviewee noted that in some cases, the work of collecting reliable 
information involved a manual process of collecting data to enter into the 
templates from individual bank branches. 47 
In addition to gathering reliable financial information, FINSAC officials also had 
to unravel the complex corporate structures of the collapsed banks. Financial 
conglomerates in Jamaica had an extremely complicated and intricate ownership 
structure. In some instances, it took FINSAC officials a substantial amount of 
time to uncover all the links between connected institutions in order to assess the 
true extent of the financial support needed for these institutions. This was due to 
the fact that information about obligations to connected parties was extremely 
difficult to locate. One interview subject stated quite plainly that the failed 
financial conglomerates actually had no accurate idea about even the number of 
s hey actually owned . 
He also remarked that these subsidiary companie t 48 
companies had no central repository for the legal documentation on their 
subsidiary companies and that there were no minutes or board records available. 
The poor state of record keeping on subsidiary companies and connected parties in 
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the failed banks created a need to identify all subsidiaries and connected parties 
and to uncover the extent and amount of the banks' obligations to these entities. 
Each new discovery about a connected party as FINSAC officials sifted through 
the available documentation tended to lead to an increase in the total assistance 
package to the failed banks. The continual upward shift in the figures did nothing 
to reassure the Jamaican public that FINSAC knew what it was doing and had the 
financial crisis under control. 
The additional work sorting out the failed banks' accounts and connected party 
relationships added to the overall cost of resolving the financial crisis in Jamaica. 
FINCAC debt as of July 2000 stood at V127 billion ($US 3.1 million), making 
the Jamaican bank failure resolution exercise one of the most expensive to date. 
In the final analysis, FINSAC simply had to make its decisions about the best way 
to deal with the financial crisis on the basis of the best information it could put 
together in the available time. As one interviewee commented, "My satisfaction 
with the numbers will never be as good unless I know that it has come fi7om a 
solid database where everything is reconciled. ')-49 Lingering questions about the 
quality of the information used in the decision-making -process cannot but leave 
some doubt about whether FINSAC's decision to merge and divest the failed 
banks was really the best course of action. 
As part of the rehabilitation process, FINSAC purchased non-performing loan 
portfolios fforn three banks - $J12.7 billion ($US317 million) from National 
Commercial Bank, $J800.9 million ($US20 million) from NCB Trust and 
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Merchant Bank, and $JI. 7 billion ($US42.5 million) from Citizens Bank (and its 
subsidiaries including Citizens Building Society, Horizon Merchant Bank and 
Horizon Building Society) - in exchange for FINSAC bonds. 50 
In the initial phase, FINSAC asked the banks to act as agents to collect the loans, 
but later it established its own collection unit. 51 Poor documentation of asset and 
collateral on assets has prevented the banks and later FINSAC from collecting on 
many of these loans. As described in the previous chapters, the banks' loan files 
often lacked key documentation or contained documentation that was 
52 incomplete. According to one subject: 
... when someone wants a 
loan you take security such as a 
guarantee, a mortgage, a lien on the house, a chattel mortgage 
something like that [and] they sign a promissory note. You then 
arrange to debit their account for the payment, or the interest 
payments. You have agreed on the interest rates. In some of the 
records we received on the loans we took over ... the 53 
documentation of loans was [poor] ... 
This subject went on to note that, even when the documentation was created 
and/or gathered initially, that 
... sometimes 
[we are ] not even being able to find the files on 
thoseloans ... 
Some [loan files] did not have signed notes ... 
[For] some the title had been lost or the title, they had taken it to 
the Title's Office to have the assignment noted and it is not 
computerised at the Title's Office or it got lost. Or it was never 
there. So as a banker you would have no proof that you took that 
security. Or it had gone down to the Bureau to have the stamp duty 
put on it and it never came back. Or it got stuck in the black box 
because the branches may be computerised but they are totally 
reliant on the supporting agencies on the lateral security side for 
their, to have their security in order. 54 
The banks, and subsequently FINSAC, often were unable to recover on their 
assets due to inadequate documentation in their credit and securities files. 
" The 
337 
inadequacy of their documentation was due to the banks' poor record keeping in 
combination with the inadequacies of record keeping in government agencies to 
which some of the documentation had to be sent. The result was that a high 
number of non-perforn-fing loans on which the banks could not recover have had 
to be written off, which has pushed up the cost of the Government of Jamaica's 
bank bail out exercise. 
As the Jamaican financial crisis unfolded, the government also recognised that 
fraud and corruption had contributed to the problems of several institutions. To 
address these allegations , it established a team of foreign and local forensic 
auditors to work with the police fraud squad to reveal and take action on instances 
of fraud. Due to inaccessibility of source documentation and other accounting 
records, however, the auditors have found their work extremely difficult. As one 
forensic auditor commented, "What you are finding is that our work is being 
severely hampered by the record keeping or the lack thereof -)-)56 The subject went 
on to observe that the work of reconstructing what in some cases were very 
convoluted financial transactions was made extremely difficult by the fact that 
critical records, such as general ledgers for specific periods, journal entry files and 
57 
cheque disbursement registers were missing. This interviewee further said that. 
I am looking at a particular company now where I thought that I was told 
that all the servers there that I could run off the information. When 
somebody attempted to do that they realised that the diskette was bad or 
something. I can't remember what it was. The information was 
contaminated. So you have a whole year's gone by that you cannot access 
... 
I have tried so I have now left to do, is to utilise some of the 
hardcopies. But it is not consistent. You have one month, you can't find 
two months and you have another month. So it is gonna be very difficult to 
trace these transactions. 
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Explaining the consequences of poor record keeping, this subject went on to state 
that 
The court demands that you have certain types of evidence and if you don't 
have that, it jeopardises the whole case support, literaRy up front 
supporting documentation. They need to see the books and all that sort of 
information and if you don't have things like returned cheques then you 
know it goes a long way in subverting the whole process. 58 
FINSAC has been able to pursue legal action against very few of the owners, 
directors and managers of the failed commercial banks as a result of the lack of 
59 documentary evidence with which to build cases. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the implications of the banks' records creation and 
keeping for external agencies involved in banking supervision, and after the bank 
failures, in intervention and rehabilitation of the failed banks. It has been argued 
that the failed Jamaican commercial banks' inability to produce trustworthy and 
timely accounts of financial transactions for the banks' own internal purposes, a 
result of their record creation and keeping practices and systems, also hampered 
Bank of Jamaica supervisors' efforts to monitor the banks' financial positions and 
risks and reign in directors and managers engaging in ill advised and risk taking 
behaviour counter to the continuing viability of the banks and the overall health of 
the Jamaican financial system. The banks' poor record keeping has also 
hampered FINSAC's efforts to accurately assess the banks' value and decide an 
appropriate course of rehabilitation, to recover losses on non-performing loans 
and to pursue cases of fraud. These problems also have complicated efforts to 
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return the banks and the Jamaican financial system to a state of competitive 
viability and health. 
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Therefore, new consultants would have to be hired to re-cost the project, which would be 
too expensive and time consuming. 
7) Horizon - FINSAC is discussing the investigator's report with legal counsel. Legal 
counsel is saying that the evidence is not good enough or not of the right type. Work 
continues to gather better evidence. 
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Chapter Ten: Lessons from Experience and Future Directions 
Introduction 
The previous chapters have sought to define the set of relationships among 
competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. Chapters two and three 
discussed these relationships from a theoretical perspective. Chapter four looked 
to research on the role of record keeping in public sector reform initiatives in 
Africa for initial empirical evidence in support of the argument for relationships 
among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping. Chapter five, 
prefatory to looking at the experiences of failed Jamaican commercial banks, 
found some support in the literature on banking for links among competitive 
viability, internal control, accountability and record keeping. Finally, chapters 
six, seven, eight and nine were used to illustrate how record keeping is implicated 
in the failure of Jamaica's indigenous commercial banks and thereby to provide 
empirical evidence of the theorised relationships among competitive viability, 
accountability and record keeping. 
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The aim of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, it seeks to provide a summary of the 
findings of the Jamaican field research in relation to the theoretical framework 
outlined in chapters two and three. Secondly, it aims to compare the results of the 
field research with the initial assumptions of this study and the conclusions of the 
public sector research while drawing out from these comparisons lessons about 
record keeping and its relationship to accountability and competitive viability. 
Finally, the lessons learned will be followed by, and form the basis of, a proposed 
record keeping control framework. The aim in this section will be to suggest a 
model approach that organisations might adopt in order to avoid records and 
information related problems similar to those experienced by the failed Jamaican 
banks and to ensure that record keeping practices support effective accountability 
and, by extension, continuing competitive viability. 
Competitive Viability, Accountability and Record Keeping and the Dynamics 
of the Jamaican Commercial Bank Failures 
As defined in chapter two, competitive viability is the ability of a firm to operate 
with sufficient efficiency to avoid failure and ensure survival in a competitive 
market. This, all but one of Jamaica's indigenous commercial banks was unable 
to do. Data gathered for the study clearly indicate that the banks" record creation 
and keeping practices can be implicated in their spiral of decline. The field 
research data have shown how record creation and keeping practices of directors 
and officers of the failed banks undermined the banks' and external regulators7 
accountability systems by failing to produce the quality of accounting and 
management information these systems required to operate effectively. Weakened 
systems of accountability led to poor decision making and loss of control over 
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bank operations that, in combination with other factors, undermined the banks' 
competitive positions. 
As noted in previous chapters, the tendency has been to account for the poor 
decision making of directors and managers and operating problems of the failed 
banks as being the result of either senior management self-dealing and corruption 
or management failure to establish appropriate accountabilities and controls for 
new business areas and risks. Nevertheless, self-dealing or corrupt actions on the 
part of some directors and managers does not provide a full explanation of the 
extent of the banks' internal operating problems. Similarly, though the banks' 
directors and managers did fail to establish appropriate accountabilities and 
controls for all their business areas and risks, even those accountabilities and 
controls that they had in place failed to operate effectively. In the face of these 
facts, it is clear that other factors also contributed to weaknesses in the banks 1) 
systems of accountability and control. 
This study has argued that one of the triggers for the banks' downward spiral of 
decline was their expansion, both in size and type of business, in the period 
leading up to their collapse. Ironically, the very expansion that helped trigger 
their eventual collapse was viewed as being equally essential to their ultimate 
survival in the economic environment at the time. Liberafisation opened the door 
to new types of business, such as foreign exchange trading, and new entrants to 
the financial sector. Banks had to innovate and expand or face being pushed out 
of the market. The opening of new branches and the creation of subsidiaries 
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required a greater degree of decentralisation while the banks' foray into new 
products and lines of business led to more specialisation. 
Greater decentralisation and specialisation led to increased delegation of decision- 
making and action to a growing number of employees. At the same time, the 
banks also began to computerise their operations in order to handle growth in the 
number and diversity of transactions for processing. Together, these changes 
resulted in the types of operational inefficiencies discussed in chapter two as 
arising from decentralisation of information processing, decentralisation of 
information, and decentralisation of incentives, that is, information asymmetry 
and bounded rationality. These information problems undermined the banks' 
control of their operations and the effectiveness of their decisions. 
Strong systems of accountability might have reversed the downward direction that 
r the banks' internal controls and decision making were taking. Unfortunately, 
these systems either were not established or not functioning well. The field 
research data indicate that the failed banks" accountability systems suffered from 
several weaknesses: Directors and managers, some of whom were engaged in 
sharp practice, failed to set a tone of high ethical standards and integrity, which 
would have been needed to encourage and support adherence to operating 
standards. In some cases, management also overrode existing operating standards 
and controls, which had the effect of undem-iining the efficacy of the banks I 
accountability systems. Management often failed to monitor adherence to and 
effectiveness of accountability systems as well. 
348 
While there is clear evidence to indicate that all of the above factors weakened the 
effectiveness of the banks' accountability systems, the field research data also 
clearly point to the fact that weaknesses in the banks' information and 
communication, the result of the record creation and keeping practices that had 
evolved in the banks as their operations became more decentralised, also 
contributed to the ineffectiveness of their systems of accountability and 
consequent problems of weak internal controls and poor decision-making. 
First, though the banks had, in a number of cases, written operating standards and 
controls, lack of centralised coordination and control over the creation, 
distribution and retention of these documents contributed to inefficiencies in the 
communication of this critical dimension of the banks' accountability systems. As 
the banks grew and expanded, lack of coordination and control over these types of 
documents worsened, since inscription, transmission and contextualization of 
documents communicating the banks business rules became increasingly 
fragmented and uncoordinated. 
Second, when the banks began to decentralise, information about decisions and 
actions also became more decentralised and, indeed, fragmented because those to 
whom work had been delegated were responsible for creating and keeping 
information related to the decisions and actions they took. For example, records 
documenting actions and decisions delegated to staff in the branches, such as loan 
agreements, were retained in the branches. 
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This situation made access to adequate information more difficult in two ways. 
First, it grew more challenging for the banks' senior management to pull together 
all relevant information from disparate sources for decision-making or even for all 
the banks' decision makers to know of the existence of relevant information. 
Secondly, it opened the door to record creation and keeping practices that 
undernlined the quality of the banks' accounting and management information. 
The reporting systems upon which managers relied for information both to 
monitor subordinates and make effective decisions depended upon reliable 
recording of the actions and decisions taken by subordinates and upon the storage 
of evidence of business transactions in a manner that ensured later retrieval of 
reliable records. This became a problem in banks that eventually collapsed. 
Deliberate and unintentional failure to create records,, inaccuracies and 
incompleteness in records caused both by human and systems errors, and failure 
to keep records in an orderly manner in support of information retrieval 
requirements all led to a breakdown in the communicated meaning of the banks' 
accounts and a skewed presentation of their financial positions and risks. 
Deterioration of the quality of the banks' accounting and management information 
came about in part because the banks failed to develop requirements and standards 
to ensure reliable recording of their business transactions and proper storage of 
records until no longer needed for operational and accountability purposes. In 
other cases, although the banks had developed requirements and standards for 
recording and storing records, because of weak management oversight and 
control, bank managers and personnel were not being held accountable for policy 
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and procedural compliance. The twin problems of absence of procedural controls 
over some aspects of record creation and storage processes and weak 
communication, monitoring and enforcement of any existing controls led to a state 
of organisational record keeping anornie that permitted the banks' officers to 
record and store evidence of business transactions according to their own 
motivations, preferences and standards. Many of these practices undermined the 
production of the quality of recorded information needed to support effective 
internal accountability and control. 
In the case of records creation, as the field research uncovered, some managers 
and personnel did not make records because they were motivated by self-interest 
or the desire to take advantage of legal loop-holes; some did not make records 
because of an inherent cultural-based preference to transact business orally and 
informally; and others recorded unreliably because of a lack of training and 
understanding of the importance of proper documentation coupled with the 
pressures of attending to other business functions viewed as being more critical. 
The absence of reliably recorded evidence of business transactions undermined 
the banks' reporting systems and, thereby, managers' efforts to monitor the 
actions and decisions of their subordinates as a means of maintaining effective 
internal control as well as gathering the infonnation needed to assess risks and 
take appropriate action to manage those risks. 
In the case of proper storage of records, managers to whom decisions and actions 
had been delegated and who were, by default, responsible for the storage of 
records documenting those actions and decisions saw record keeping - associated 
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with the storage of paper source documents - as unimportant in comparison to the 
many other demands on their time and the time of their staff. For the most part, 
therefore, they delegated responsibility for record keeping to low-level, untramed 
clerical staff ill-equipped to put in place the controls needed to ensure that the 
banks' records were stored properly so that adequate information for 
accountability and control would be accessible in an appropriate form when 
needed. This prevented the retrieval of records, such as source documents, for 
such purposes as account verification, fraud detection and prevention, and non- 
performing loan monitoring and recovery. Here again, the absence of reliably 
recorded evidence of business transactions undermined the banks' reporting 
systems and managers' efforts to monitor the actions and decisions of their 
subordinates to maintain effective internal control. 
At the same time, use of computers was on the rise in the banks. As they 
expanded, the banks had acquired computer-based transaction processing and core 
accountmg systems to improve the efficiency of their transaction processing and 
the ease with which they could manipulate accounting data for reporting purposes. 
Increasing use of computers further decentralised and fragmented the banks' 
evidence of business transactions. In addition, poor management control over 
the information technology function resulted in system limitations that also 
contributed to the deteriorating quality of the banks' accounting records. In an 
attempt to redress these problems, the banks' managers began to rely more on ad 
hoc applications to supplement the management information available from their 
main systems. The introduction of ad hoc systems exacerbated the banks 5 
information problems in that it further fragmented information stores between 
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manual and electronic systems and among different types of electronic systems. 
Moreover, managers did not see electronic documents generated by ad hoc 
systems as records and therefore did not ensure that these were added to official 
record stores. Ironically, therefore, rather than making information retrieval 
easier, over the long term increasing computerisation in the four failed banks 
made it more difficult for managers to pull together a complete and accurate view 
of their banks' financial positions and risk exposures and to monitor the decisions 
and actions of subordinates. Fragmentation of record stores coupled with the poor 
quality of a great deal of the information in these systems meant that managers 
had less access to reliable information as time passed. 
As a consequence of the banks' record creation and keeping practices, bank 
directors and managers and, by extension, shareholders and regulators, lacked the 
type and quality of inforination they required to know the banks' financial 
positions with accuracy and identify and manage risks, particularly fraud, credit 
risk, market risk and liquidity risk. As a consequence, directors and managers, 
even when they made a conscious effort to, were unable to maintain adequate 
control over their bank's operations and make effective decisions about usmess 
strategy. This in turn contributed to operational inefficiencies - such as a high 
degree of non-performing assets, mismatches between assets and liabilities and 
high costs of operation - that, in combination with other internal management 
weaknesses and exogenous factors, contributed to a liquidity crisis and erosion of 
capital of a magnitude that eventually resulted in the banks' failures. 
The poor quality of much of the failed banks' accounting and management 
information not only undermined accountability and, thereby, internal control and 
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decision making in the banks. It also hampered the efforts of Bank of Jamaica 
regulators in providing effective supervision of the banks' activities. This allowed 
the banks to continue along their path of self-destruction and eventual non- 
viability. Later, the absence of trustworthy and timely accounting and 
management information also made FINSAC's intervention into and rehabilitation 
of the banks more difficult and has undermined efforts to sue or prosecute in cases 
of suspected fraud and corruption. 
The Jamaican case points to clear linkages among record keeping, accountability 
and competitive viability. Indeed, it shows that the way in which a bank creates 
and keeps its records affects the quality of its accounts and the effectiveness of its 
accountability systems, which in turn affect its ability to maintain internal control 
and make effective decisions. Both of these impact upon competitive viability. 
As such, the case calls attention to the need to give greater recognition to 
uncontrolled record creation and keeping practices as a potential source of risk for 
banks. 
The findings of the study are also significant in terms of what they reveal about 
the dynamics of bank failures. Explanations of bank crises drawing upon theories 
of information asymmetry focus on lack of transparency in financial transactions 
as a source of market imperfection. For example, banks' inability to assess with 
accuracy the risk of default associated with a given borrower may tighten up the 
money supply and reduce economic activity. This study points to how problems 
of information asymmetry and bounded rationality within banks also can 
contribute to the dynamics of bank failure. Additional research may reveal that 
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these findings are equally applicable to explaining failures of other types of 
commercial enterprises. 
Drawing Lessons from the Jamaican Experience and Comparing the 
Research Findings with Initial Assumptions and Public Sector Research 
Generally speaking, the results of this study mirror many of the research findings 
on record keeping and the effectiveness of pubtic sector reform initiatives and 
good govemance. On the basis of the findings of this study it is possible to 
conclude that, just as Wamukoya, Akotia and the International Records 
Management Trust have found to be the case in public sector organisations, if 
important information is not available to support internal control and decision- 
making in a private sector context, competitive viability is likely to be affected. 
The study highlighted a number of critical bank functions and processes that were 
affected negatively by the record creation and keeping practices and the absence 
of quality accounting and management information in failed Jamaican commercial 
banks. These included decision making; credit risk management; market nsk 
management; cash flow management; cost of operations; liquidity risk 
management; capital adequacy; proofing and reconciliation of transactions and 
accounts; internal control and audit; corruption and fraud prevention; and financial 
reporting. A detailed operational impact assessment is presented in Appendix 
6 of 
this study. A number of these business functions are areas that the public sector 
research also pointed to as areas affected by poor record keeping. 
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Ae Importance of Identifying Information and Record Keeping Requirements 
Like the public sector findings, the field research revealed that directors and 
managers of the failed Jamaican commercial banks did not have a clear idea of the 
information required to manage their risks, especially as they moved into new 
business areas. This not only reflected a management failure to systematically 
assess the risks arising from new business activities but also management failure 
to determine the accounting and management information that would be required 
to keep those risks within acceptable lin-tits. It also reflects management's failure 
to assess whether there were sufficient record creation and keeping systems, 
including records related accountabilities and controls, to generate the type and 
quality of accounting and management information needed to maintain internal 
control and make effective business decisions. This finding matches with those of 
the International Records Management Trust, which concluded that even when 
officials understand the value of records they often overlook the need for records 
management. The situation in these failed banks pinpoints one of what is 
arguably a frequently overlooked aspect of management weakness: record 
keeping. Lessons from the Jamaican experience strongly indicate the need to 
establish a systematic methodology and practice not only for reviewing 
organisational. information requirements but also the record creation and keeping 
requirements needed to support the production of appropriate information. Any 
methodology for doing so, moreover, must entail regular reviews, recognising that 
requirements can change quickly in volatile external environments, such as that 
experienced by the Jamaican commercial banks. 
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The process of analysing information requirements of business processes and 
related record keeping requirements must include a determination of what quality 
characteristiCs the information should bear. For example, what standard of 
accuracy and completeness does the transaction and related controls and legal 
requirements dictate? What procedural controls are necessary to achieve the 
I -z quality standards desired of the records? That being said, establishing control. 
can be expensive. It is important that the level of control established over record 
creation and keeping is commensurate with the level of risk (both in terms of the 
likelihood of occurrence as well as the impact that such occurrence would have on 
the organisation) that is acceptable to the organisation should the records be 
unavailable or fail to be of the requisite quality. 
The Jamaican experience also suggests that identification of information 
requirements must assess all organisational interests in and need for information, 
that is, immediate operational interests and needs as well as those of 
accountability in support of internal control, decision-making and compliance 
with regulatory requirements. All too often, only immediate operational needs are 
taken into consideration by those with responsibility for creating and keeping 
records. Ideally such an assessment should involve all key organisational 
stakeholders, in recognition of the fact that attitudes and beliefs about 
requirements for information are likely to vary between different organisational 
groups. Stakeholder involvement will help to forge an organisational consensus 
on information requirements and how best to support these. It will also 
limit the 
degree of influence that individual or group record keeping interests - which may 
not be in alignment With organisational interests - can have on the meaning of 
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organisational accounts of business transactions. Appendix 8 outlines a model 
methodology that organisations may use to assist them in the process of 
identifying their information requirements and assessing the degree to which 
current record creation and keeping practices support those requirements. This 
methodology is discussed in greater detail below. 
During the information requirements review process every attempt must be made 
to bring out into the open the hidden assumptions that, as revealed in the case of 
the failed Jamaican banks, can influence ideas about the significance of records 
and practices with respect to their creation and keeping. The kinds of assumptions 
that this study uncovered echo those uncovered by the public sector research. 
Banking sector officials, with little exposure to records management as part of 
their education and training in accounting and business, viewed record keeping as 
a low level clerical function concerned with filing or storage and destruction of 
paper source documents. In contrast, information, associated in subjects' n-finds 
with computer data not paper records was seen as being useful and its 
management therefore of greater importance though technically complicated. 
These conceptualisations were critical to the information related problems that the 
banks experienced because they prevented managers from seeing the way that 
different records in different media and systems interconnected to affect the 
overall quality and meaning of their accounts. Moreover, it diverted attention and 
resources from the management of criticaRy important paper records stores, such 
as credit files and vouchers, with negative repercussions for the function of 
reconciliation and credit risk management. The Jamaican experience clearly 
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shows that any assumptions about records that remain tacit may undermine the 
production of good quality information needed to support accountability. 
7he Importance of Identifying and Establishing Record Keeping Accountabilties 
The process of properly documenting business transactions also includes 
determining accountabilities for record creation and keeping. That is, who will be 
responsible for creating and keeping the required documentation to set standard 
and, equally importantly, who will be responsible for defining documentation 
standards and controls as well as ensuring that these are met? Accountabilities for 
records creation and keeping must be established at all levels of the organisation, 
from the employee who creates a record, to the supervisor who checks it for 
accuracy and completeness and verifies the validity and authenticity of the 
transaction, to the internal auditor who ensures that employees and supervisors are 
following established controls and ensures that controls are working as they 
should. 
There are significant barriers to assigning responsibility and accountability for 
records creation and record keeping in contemporary organisations. One such 
barrier arises from the fact that decentralisation creates a situation in which many 
managers have an interest in different aspects of records and information 
management. For example, in the Jamaican setting, operations managers were 
concerned with transaction processing records, financial controllers with 
accounting records, and information technology staff with records generated and 
stored electronically. 
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Fragmentation of interests in the record keeping function can prevent proper 
control over records. There was a tendency in Jamaican banks to separate 
management of information by medium (ie, responsibility for aspects of managing 
records in electronic form fell to a computing department while paper records fell 
to a registry or (carchives" under the control of the operations department) that led 
to inconsistencies and gaps in the management of the banks" records. Ultimately, 
this undermined the quality of their accounting and management information. 
Managers often are unaware of the dangers that fragmentation poses in terms of 
being able to access necessary management information. Nevertheless, the field 
research reveals that there do exist dangers. 
To counteract these dangers most large organisations require an integrating 
mechanism for their record keeping function. ' Integration can be achieved by 
means of assigning responsibility for oversight and coordination of the record 
keeping function to a strong internal record keeping regulator. The person or 
group most appropriate to taking on the records control function is a matter of 
debate, however. As found in the public sector studies, no one individual or group 
has the capacity to take on the role. 
Those responsible for what bank officials in the failed banks perceived as record 
keeping lacked the training, education and organisational stature to take on 
responsibility for organisational record keeping. Records professionalism in the 
failed banks was limited, the function having been assigned by managers, who 
thought of it as relatively unimportant, to low-level clerical staff untrained in 
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records management principles and practices. But even had they identified the 
need to assign the function to professional records managers, they would have 
found few such persons with the capacity to take on this role due to limited local 
educational opportunities in the discipline. Being a private sector entity, the banks 
had no recourse to cafling upon the record keeping expertise of staff at the 
National Archives either, as some public sector entities have been able to do. 
Similarly, information technology specialists in the banks were not equipped to 
take on the record keeping role, since they were not concerned with record 
keeping per se but focused more on improving the efficiency of transaction 
processing through computerisation and on information risks such as system 
failures and security breaches. Nor were operations managers ideally suited to the 
task, being primarily concerned with day-to-day transaction processing. One of 
the failed Jamaican commercial banks made an effort to establish a committee of 
stakeholders in record keeping processes comprised of the operations manager, 
financial controller, internal auditor, legal counsel and compliance officer. The 
focus of the committee, however, being primarily on paper records retention, was 
too narrow to address more fundamental information related problems. 
Some organisations have a chief information officer (CIO) or a chief knowledge 
officer (CKO) to which regulation of the record keeping function might be 
assigned. 2 However, the focus of these positions often is on information 
technology infrastructure. This may mean that while ClOs and CKOs may be 
aware of the underlying business information requirements they may tend to focus 
solely on information technology to deliver the required information and fail to 
look more broadly at the need for control systems to address how information in 
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all forms is created and kept. To be effective governors of organisational records 
control systems, ClOs and CKOs need to broaden their focus to move beyond 
technological tools of information management and a concern with transaction 
processing systems to encompass in their thinking concepts, systems, procedures 
and behaviour to better control the organisation's record keeping processes so as 
to produce not only accessible but reliable evidence of business transactions. 
Chief Operating Officers (COOs) within organisations also may be well-suited to 
taking prime responsibility for the record keeping function. Often, they are seen 
as being responsible for being able to produce an end-to-end auditable trail of the 
transactions that make up the whole business. This may entail reproducing from 
first principles all records and processes to rebuild the business if all or parts of 
the data are polluted or lost. As in the case of the Jamaican banks, however, 
COOs may focus too narrowly on transaction records at the expense of other types 
of operational records. 
The fact that there is at present no single person or group with the focus, capacity 
and special skills required to effectively serve as a strong internal regulator of the 
record keeping function suggests that professional re-orientation, education and 
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training are needed to build up capacity. Appropriate training and education, 
however, is unlikely to be widely available until organisational recognition and 
demand of the need for such persons becomes stronger. 
Whether the person is called a chief information officer, a knowledge manager, a 
records manager or something else, some person or body within each large 
organisation should be charged with responsibility for identifying the 
organisation's information requirements and ensuring that there are in place 
necessary people, systems, standards and practices to support these requirements. 
This person or body also must have a fink to the organisation's senior 
management team to ensure that information requirements reflect and support 
changes in business strategy, operating environment or size and scope of business 
and also to ensure that the person or body wields enough influence within the 
organisation to make any changes to record keeping and other systems that might 
be needed to meet the organisation's information requirements for effective 
accountability and control. In addition, this person will need to work closely with 
other managers, such as an operations officer, to ensure that record keeping 
systems support the information requirments of business functions and processes. 
. 
The Need to Establish Clear Record Keeping Business Rules 
Having identified records related requirements and accountabilities, boards and 
sernor management must take steps to document procedural controls and 
accountabilities for each business process in clearly written policies and 
procedures. Establishing clear business rules regarding records creation and 
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keeping is a significant part of promulgating a sound record keeping 
organisational culture. This culture should underscore the importance of properly 
documenting business transactions and constrain individualised record creation 
and keeping behaviour that contributes to distortions or gaps in the meaning of 
accounts. Another important means of creating a strong record keeping culture is 
the provision of ongoing training at all levels emphasising the importance of 
sound record keeping and the consequences of poor record keeping. 
As directors and managers may themselves lack an understanding of the 
importance of establishing and ensuring the effective implementation of clear 
business rules for records creation and keeping, they also may require sensitisation 
to the issues. This is likely to be a long term path to achieving organisational 
change as it takes time to shift fundamental and long-held management attitudes 
and beliefs. This shift is likely only to take place if the education and training that 
they receive places greater emphasis on the systems (ie, structures, staff, standards 
etc. ) needed to manage records effectively in all media and formats. 
Clearly, the reliability of records as evidence of transactions depends to a great 
degree on boards and senior management - to establish business rules requiring 
the making of proper records and to foment a culture that encourages this practice. 
This begs the question of interest and motivation. What happens when directors 
and managers are not interested in what is best for the organisation, but only in 
what is best for themselves or their associates? As comments by several interview 
subjects and observers of the Jamaican situation reveal, when this is the case 
directors and managers may avoid establishing and promoting clear business rules 
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for records creation. In fact, evidence coflected for this study, which is also 
supported by the findings of others writing on the subject of the link between 
record keeping and accountability, indicates that directors and managers are likely 
to shun the making of records of business transactions to avoid implicating 
themselves in the conduct of questionable practices. 3 What then can be done? 
The solution lies in holding directors and managers to account for ensuring that 
business transactions are properly documented. As boards are accountable to 
shareholders, it makes sense for shareholders to demand accountability in this 
respect. However, there are barriers to such market-based monitoring and 
discipline. Shareholders may have inadequate information to properly assess the 
degree to which the businesses in which they have invested are ensuring that all 
business transactions are properly documented. Their main source of information 
about the state of their investments is annual financial reports, but banks and other 
companies under current legal frameworks are not required to report on the state 
of their record keeping. The statements of external auditors sometimes provide 
clues about record keeping practices; however, auditors seldom are concerned 
with assessing the adequacy of record keeping systems as part of producing 
audited financial statements. 4 How then could a shareholder be expected to know 
whether the bank was failing to document properly? 
One solution might be to require banks to include a statement about their business 
rules for records and information control as part of a wider statement in their 
annual reports on internal controls and corporate governance. Such a requirement 
would be akin to that under UK regulation requiring banks to include a statement 
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on internal control in their annual financial reports, though in the UK requirement 
5 there is no specific directive to discuss record keeping practices. As in the LTK 
where the requirement to report on governance systems has encouraged many 
banks to adopt better practices and establish their own internal codes of best 
practice, not only might a similar requirement for record controls provide more 
information to shareholders but it could encourage banks to adopt better practice. 
While it is believed that this approach has merit, it is likely to be a long-term 
strategy for change. Moreover, it does not address the need to provide guidance to 
shareholders so that they can assess banks' business rules for record keeping 
properly, nor does it provide guidance to the banks as to what kind of business 
rules to put in place. Consequently, this study takes the view that there is a role 
for bank regulators and supervisors to play in encouraging best practice and 
discouraging sharp practice as part of their regulatory and supervisory regimes. 
One way of encouraging better record keeping practices is through the 
establishment of best practice guidelines. The Bank of Jamaica has established 
guidelines that address information and communication practices in banks. So has 
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. However, in both these cases the 
guidelines are too general in scope and focus. Provisions relating to policies and 
procedures state merely that they should be established for all areas of risk but do 
not address how their creation, distribution and retention should be managed to 
ensure effective communication and compliance monitoring. In calling for 
adequate internal financial, operational and financial data, the Basle Committee 
flamework merely states that such information should be part of record keeping 
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and nothing about what those record keeping processes should entail aside fi7om 
addressing records retention. The Bank of Jamaica standards are similarly silent 
on the subject of what appropriate record keeping controls entail. Regulatory 
authorities need to become more specific and prescriptive in terms of the 
management of records to give banks a better idea of what record keeping controls 
should include. That being said, however, regulatory guidelines should not aim to 
spell out exactly what controls must be in place as each institution's requirements 
will vary with the services and products it offers, the type and scope of its 
business, its particular business strategies and the external enviromental 
conditions in which it finds itself operating. Rather, it is suggested that it will be 
more helpful to provide directors and managers with a control framework that 
they can adopt to ensure effective management of records creation and keeping. 
To this end, a proposed framework is presented in the f6flowing section. 
How Good Record Keeping can Contribute to the Control o Operational ýf 
lnefjýficiencies Caused by Growth and Expansion 
The study also has shown that rapid organisational expansion - both in terms of 
size and scope of activity - helped to trigger the loss of accountability and internal 
control leading to the operational inefficiencies experienced by the failed 
Jamaican commercial banks. The experiences of these banks serve to highlight 
that organisations need to be wary of emerging operational problems during 
periods of rapid growth and expansion. While such growth and innovation may 
be necessary to competitive viability it can bring about loss of accountability and 
internal control and operational inefficiencies due to problems of decentralised 
information processing, decentralised information and decentralised incentives. In 
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times of rapid growth and innovation, therefore, it is critical B or an organisation to 
pay particular attention to the effectiveness of its internal controls, an important 
element of which is accountability. Since, as has been shown, an organisation's 
record creation and keeping practices play an important role in the effectiveness of 
internal systems of accountability and control, organisations must be especially 
vigilant that these practices support effective operation of such systems. 
Unfortunately, the same forces that undermine other internal controls during a 
period of rapid growth and expansion are likely to have a similar effect on record 
keeping accountabilities and controls, as seen in the Jamaican example. This 
suggests that organisations will need to take time to reassess the information 
required to support their accountability and control systems in fight of 
environmental or organisational changes. They then must take steps to establish a 
set of clear, shared organisational values and standards of behaviour to encourage 
the record creation and keeping practices that best meet the organisation's 
identified needs for information under changing circumstances. 
7he Place of Good Record Keeping versus Restructuring in Addressing 
Information Related Operating Inefficiencies 
Organisations often turn to restructuring operations - for example, flattening the 
organisational structure - or restructuring of information stores 
(eg, by 
centralising information stores) - to address the common information 
inefficiencies of large hierarchies. If the Jamaican experience gives any 
indicationI these efforts are likely to prove ineffective unless accompanied by the 
establishment and implementation of clear accountabilities and controls over 
record creation and keeping in the new organisational arrangement. As seen in the 
case of the failed bank which decentralised its credit administration operations, 
in 
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the absence of business rules and accountabilities relating to the creating and 
keeping of loan documentation to support the new arrangement, the bank's credit 
related records quickly became disorganised, incomplete and untrustworthy 
thereby undermining credit risk management. In an effort to solve the problem, 
the bank then centralised its store of credit records. The centralisation exercise 
was, however, only effective in the case of securities files because the bank also 
established clear business rules concerning the creation and keeping of these 
records and put in place a strong records regulator to ensure adherence to the 
rules. Credit files, on the other hand, for which business rules were established 
only after the collapse of the bank and management oversight was weak, remained 
in a disastrous state. The findings of the field research suggest that organisations 
should assess the efficacy of their record creation and keeping accountabilities and 
controls as improvements in this area may resolve organisational information 
inefficiencies without resort to disruptive and expensive corporate reorganisations 
of people or records. 
7-he Place of Good Record Keeping versus Computerisation in Addressing 
Information Related Operating Inefficiencies 
It is possible to draw a similar conclusion with respect to the introduction of 
computers. Computerisation often is seen as a panacea for organisational 
information problems and, as a result, organisations regularly spend a great deal of 
money introducing computensed systems only to be disappointed with the results. 
There are many reasons for the failure of information technology projects. The 
results of this research support one of the more commonly found reasons for their 
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failure,, that is, failure to ensure that business requirements rather than 
technological considerations drive choice, development and implementation of 
systems. As discussed in chapter eight, the Jamaican experience indicates that this 
"disconnect" between operational requirements and technological solutions often 
results from a lack of knowledge and understanding about technology on the part 
of operational managers who then abdicate technology decisions to information 
technology specialists with an insufficient understanding of business 
requirements. Ultimately, this disconnect can prevent systems from functioning 
optUnally and create information problems during processes of record inscription, 
transmission or contextualization, such as the unintentional accounting errors 
found in the failed Jamaican commercial banks. The findings clearly support the 
notion that operational management must drive the introduction of computer 
systems. They also must take responsibility for developing a clear understanding 
of the organisation's information requirements. Such an understanding requires 
deliberate, careful and systematic analysis along the lines proposed in Appendix 8. 
The Jamaican experience also yielded another insight into the reasons why 
computerisation often fails to solve organisational information problems. 
Organisations generally introduce these systems in order to increase the number of 
transactions and speed with which they can be processed as well as the ability to 
conveniently manipulate data for reporting purposes, as was the impetus to 
computense transaction processing and introduce computerised core accounting 
systems in the failed Jamaican commercial banks. The introduction of these 
systems had two unintended consequences that contributed to the information 
problems experienced by the failed banks, however. First , introduction of such 
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systems contributed to the problem of decentralisation, or fi7agmentation, of 
information in the failed banks. Accounting information became scattered 
between manual accounting records and those in computerised form, introducing 
greater complexity and opportunities for error into the banks' account production 
process. These complexities undermined both trustworthiness and timely retrieval 
of relevant accounting and management information. As the banks' managers and 
employees began to develop ad hoc computer systems to produce management 
reports unavailable from the banks' larger systems, further fragmentation of 
information occurred. Thus, ironically, while intended to improve information 
processing in the banks, these computer systems unintentionally introduced 
information problems that had the opposite effect. 
Second, the introduction of computer systems rendered business rules concerning 
the creation and keeping of manual records obsolete. In many cases, the banks did 
not establish new accountabilities and controls over record creation and keeping in 
the new electronic environment. This, too, undermined the trustworthiness and 
timeliness of the banks' accounting and management information. The banks I 
computerised customer information files, for example, for which there were no 
data entry controls were quite unreliable. Similarly, the banks had no rules for 
how records generated by ad hoc systems should be created and stored. 
By drawing attention to the unintended problems created by these systems it is not 
meant to suggest that those involved in rehabilitating the failed banks have been 
mistaken to make it a priority to improve the banks' information technology 
infrastructure. Clearly, improvements to information technology vAll be critical to 
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the competitiveness of the banks if it leads to faster and more effective transaction 
processing and better management information. However, computerisation should 
move ahead keeping in mind three important lessons from the experiences of the 
failed Jamaican banks. First, management must look not only at the impact these 
systems will have on transaction processing but what effect they will have on the 
production of information required to support the enterprise's systems of internal 
accountability and control. Second, whenever existing business rules for record 
creation and keeping are displaced, as they inevitably are when new systems are 
introduced, new accountabilities and controls must be established in order to 
ensure that record creation and keeping practices support the aims, objectives and 
accountability requirements of the organisation and that the organisation's records 
do not become less trustworthy or less timely - no matter the media and means by 
which they are inscribed or stored. Third, since the introduction of new computer 
systems can lead to fragmentation of information, managers must pay close 
attention to system integration, including the integration of information in manual 
and electronic form. 
Along with the trend to rely on computers to solve all information related 
problems, it has become fashionable to think of paper records as cumbersome and 
often useless and therefore to seek to digitise them. Many of the subjects 
interviewed for this study, including those involved in the rehabilitation of the 
failed banks, have expressed this view. From the standpoint of improving the 
quality of recorded information in support of accountability and internal control, 
however, the perception that the establishment of better control over more 
traditional forms of records is of little importance or even a waste of time shows a 
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lack of appreciation for how paper-based source documents ultimately provided a 
critical foundation for the banks' management information systems. For many 
types of transactions, banks still rely on the completion of paper forms, such as 
deposit vouchers, cheque vouchers and internal transaction vouchers, to initiate 
transactions. Bank officers then use these forms to post financial transactions to 
computer-based transaction processing and core accounting systems and, later, to 
verify the reliability of those postings. Until banks no longer use these paper 
source documents, management must turn their attention to improving control 
over source documentation to ensure that information derived from their 
computer-based transaction and accounting systems is reliable. 
As discovered in the course of the research, the low priority given to managing It 1-0 
paper records has come from managers' preconceived ideas about paper records 
rather than a systematic and rational evaluation of the value of the records in 
relation to overall information requirements for transaction processing and 
internal accountability and control. These preconceived ideas about paper records 
in conjunction with management's tendency to ignore the need to preserve such 
records for purposes other than the immediate processing of operational 
transactions fed a culture of neglect for these types of records that, ultimately, 
served as a self-fulfilling prophecy. In contrast to the received wisdom, many of 
these records - credit files, for example - contained information critical to 
managing the banks" risks and controlling their financial positions. From this 
standpoint, they were extremely valuable regardless of their paper format. 
Management neglect of the creation and keeping of these records affected t eir 
accessibility, not their essential value to the orgarusation. 
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This suggests that changing the fonnat of paper records, in itself, would not have 
affected the value of the records, though it may have improved their accessibility. 
However 
, improved accessibility is not necessarily only achieved by changing 
records' format. Digitisation projects often also serve as an opportunity to 
establish clear accountabilities and controls over paper records previously 
neglected and fragmented. This is one of the ways in which such projects can 
increase the accessibility of records. However, similar results may be achieved by 
establishing accountabilities and controls over the records without converting 
them into computerised form. Better organised records stores and the use of 
information locating indexes, whether manual or computerised, can improve the 
rate of retrieval significantly. Conversely, digitisation projects that fail to 
establish appropriate records accountabilities and controls can reduce the 
reliability and accessibility of records. This is in no way to suggest that 
digitisation of paper records does not offer some tremendous advantages in terms 
of reintegrating information while at the same time allowing timely local access to 
remote record stores. Nevertheless, in advance of moving into what are often very 
expensive digitisation projects, organisations should explore the option of 
improving management of the records in their paper format. In addition, 
organisations are warned that digitisation projects are likely to prove unsuccessful 
unless new business rules for record creation and keeping that work with the new 
technology are established and implemented. 
Ultimately, the solution to the "bothersome" need to organise and store vast 
quantities of paper source documentation may he in generating these documents 
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electronically. Certainly, with the growmg trend toward e-commerce more of 
these documents will be produced in digital form in the first instance. Increased 
use of technology is likely to raise the bar on the need to control the processes of 
record creation and keeping, however, not lower it. Controls must be established 
to ensure that electronicaRy generated transaction documents are authentic and 
reliable, that they are contextually linked to the transactions which they document 
and that they can be retrieved as needed to meet operational, accountability or 
legislative requirements. Technology, such as electronic records management 
software, can facilitate the process of control but it will not drive it. Management 
must assess the types of controls that are necessary to produce recorded 
information of an appropriate quality and take steps to implement systems and 
strategies to ensure that effective control is achieved or see the meaning of their 
records disintegrate and succumb to system-generated distortions. Standards 
concerning the creation and keeping of reliable and authentic electronic records 
and the functionality of electronic record keeping systems can assist in ensuring 
that electronically generated records are more trustworthy, for example, the US 
Department of Defense Standard 5015.2-STA "Design Criteria Standard for 
Electronic Records Management Software Applications" and the UK Public 
Record Office's "Functional Requirements for Electronic Records Management 
Systems, " to name but two. 6 
Timely access to relevant information was a significant problem in the Jamaican 
case. The findings of the field research suggest that, whether a records store is 
manual or computer-based, those responsible for the design and management of 
these stores must take steps at early stages to identify the types of access points by 
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which users will want to retrieve information. This requires ongoing consultation 
with users to discuss the ways in which they plan to use the information. It is then 
the task of those responsible for acquiring or developing the system to ensure that 
it possesses the appropriate functionality (eg, fields and/or indexing capacity) to 
support the organisation's information retrieval requirements. 7 Such a 
consultative process is unlikely to work effectively, however, if operational 
management and information technology specialists are unwilling or unable to 
communicate effectively, as was apparently the case in the Jamaican commercial 
banks that failed. 
As it is impossible to predict all of the ways in which the users of records stores 
may want to retrieve information over time, managers should seek to acquire or 
develop systems that allow some flexibility in how data can be retrieved and 
presented. Clearly, the goal of flexibility is much easier to achieve with 
computer-based records stores than with those in manual form, but managers 
should never assume that computerisation automatically makes information easier 
to retrieve. Without a shared understanding between managers and information 
technology staff about information required to support business objectives, 
retrieval problems will persist. 
To ensure long-term accessibility of quality information for accountability 
on periods and final dispositions for purposes, the setting of appropriate retenti I 
records in electronic fonn also will be necessary. Due to the relatiVe volatility of 
electronic records, the earlier that decisions about retention and disposition are 
made the greater the likelihood that appropriate records wifl be accessible for 
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future reference. Early consideration must also be given to preservation methods, 
such as migration to new formats and storage media, for those electronic records 
having long-term significance. Unless these strategies are decided upon from the 
outset of the record's creation, there will be a greater chance that the quality of 
information needed to support organisational and social accountability will be 
irretrievable. In addition, such strategies are unlikely to prove effective in the 
absence of a weH-structured record keeping system supported by a strong record 
keeping regulator, as there will be no one to ensure that migration strategies are 
implemented effectively and on a timely basis. 
The Need to Incorporate Good Record Keeping into Economic Development 
Policy and Strategy 
Effective corporate governance and oversight by regulatory and supervisory 
bodies depends upon access to trustworthy and timely information about the 
operations of a commercial enterprise as the Jamaican case clearly shows. 
Organisations like the World Bank argue that the availability of reliable 
accounting information is supported by strong systems of accountability. In turn, 
these systems of accountability are strengthened by the introduction of accepted 
accounting standards and regular audits, the argument being that these will help to 
ensure the reliability of financial information coming from commercial. 
enterprises. While accounting standards and audits will help, this study has shown 
that, on their own, they are unlikely to produce the sought after degree of 
trustworthiness and timeliness. This is because accounting standards and audits 
address and attempt to control only a small part of the total account production 
process. Exploration of the account production process in the f"ed Jamaican 
commercial banks has revealed its complexity and how weaknesses at any stage of 
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the process of record inscription, transmission and contextualization can have 
knock on effects that alter the intended meaning of accounts and reduce their level 
of trustworthiness and timeliness. This suggests that policies and strategies aimed 
at increasing the reliability of management and financial accounting information 
coming from commercial enterprises, such as banks, must aim to establish 
accountability for and control over all aspects of the inscription, transmission and 
contextualization of the account. This is likely to require a major paradigm shift 
on the part of economic development policy makers whose policies and strategies, 
up to now, have tended to reflect received accounting wisdom about the 
accounting process rather than a deeper understanding of the sources of 
information related problems arising from the complexities and realities of 
accounting in the practical circumstances of particular commercial enterprises. 
A Record Keeping Control Framework 
When we explore the record empirically, as this study has done, we see that the 
production of meaning in records takes shape over time through the choices made 
by individuals, including record creators and record keepers, involved in processes 
of inscription, transmission and contex-tualization. The end result can be messy 
and accidental, as in the case of the failed Jamaican commercial banks, because 
individuals often are blind to the overall organisational implications of their 
decisions. They may be caught up in the daily pressures of their work and 
operating on the basis of cultural values deeply embedded in their consciousness. 
In other cases, individuals may be acting more consciously in their own self- 
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interest at the expense of the organisation. In large, complex organisations where 
there is a multitude of social actors making, keeping and using records according 
to an equal multitude of motivations, it is the chaotic collision of these 
motivations and choices that produces the meaning and significance of the 
organisation's accounts of business transactions. 
As seen in the discussion of problems experienced by the failed Jamaican 
commercial banks in the production of accounting and management information, 
the accidental production of meaning in records can be a far cry from what is 
necessary to support the effective operation of organisational accountabilities and 
controls (eg, reliable, authentic and accessible records). Unacknowledged and 
uncontrolled social and technical influences on the creation and keeping of 
records distorted the meaning of the banks' accounts. Of course, as already 
pointed out, these distortions alone did not cause the collapse of six indigenous 
Jamaican commercial banks. Nevertheless, the research indicates that they were 
an aggravating and contributing factor. It is therefore possible to see that, in 
combination with other factors, the organisational. and social consequences of 
uncontrolled records inscription, transnussion and contextualization can be high. 
Thus it would appear necessary, in the interests of serving organisational 
accountability and control and, by extension, viability, to attempt the "precarious 
structuration of chaos. ,8 That is, to aim to introduce accountabilities and controls 
over record inscription, transmission and contex-tualization that, to the extent 
possible, encourage individuals to make choices that produce meaning in records 
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which serve organisational (and in many cases broader social) ends as opposed to 
other interests. 
Ao the function of establishing accountability and control is the same w .1 ILa hether 
applied to record keeping or wider organisational operations, it should be possible 
to draw from general models of organisational accountability and control to arrive 
at strategies and systems to establish effective accountability for and control over 
processes of record inscription, transmission and contextualization. In 1991, the 
Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (a US- 
based national commission on fraudulent financial reporting henceforth referred to 
as COSO) presented a report outlining an integrated internal control framework. 9 
The report was the result of inputs from corporate executives, legislators, 
regulators, consultants, auditors and academics on the requirements for internal 
organisational accountability and control. This report later formed the basis of the 
Basle Committee's framework for evaluating bank internal control systems, 
discussed in chapter five. 
The COSO report concluded that when there are accountability and control 
failures in an organisation they often result from deficiencies in one or more of 
five areas: lack of integrity, or ignoring ethical values on the part of top 
management; a weak or negative control environment; failure to link top-level 
objectives with objectives for operating and support units; poor communication 
within the organisation, and the inability to understand changing conditions. 
' 0 On 
the basis of their analysis, the Conunittee developed five interrelated internal 
control components as Mows: 1) control environment, 2) risk assessment, 
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control activities, 4) information and communication and 5) monitoring. " The 
Conunittee argued that, working together, these five components result in an 
effective internal control system. 
These same five elements can be applied to establishing accountability and control 
in the area of record keeping. Indeed, many records management texts and 
guidefines, such as ISO 15489 an international records management standard, C7-- 1 
Australian Standard 4390 on records management, and the International Records 
Management Trust's Principles and Practices in Managing Financial Records 
recommend similar strategies, though they present them in a slightly different 
format. 12 The five elements can be applied to record keeping in the following 
way: 
-Control Environment. The record keeping control environment 
comprises the set of shared values, beliefs and nonns that define how 
records will be inscribed, transmitted and contextualized throughout their 
existence within the organisation. As such, it is the foundation for aH 
other components of record keeping control, providing both discipline 
and structure. Organisations with effective record keeping control 
enviromnents set a positive "tone at the top", hire and retain people with 
the requisite records management skills and competencies at all levels, 
and foster records integrity and control consciousness through ongoing 
training and appropriate rewards and sanctions. They set and effectively 
communicate, monitor and enforce formalised records related policies and 
procedures, resulting in shared values and teamwork. 
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-Information Requirements and Risk Assessment. Risk assessment for 
record keeping first involves the process through which management 
identifies the type and quality of information required to support 
completion of and accountability for all of its business transactions and 
assesses the likelihood and impact of risks to the organisation if the 
require riformation is not available or of adequate quality. it then 
entails assessing how well currently available types and quality of 
information match organisational information requirements and deciding 
on the strategies to be pursued to rectify any deficiencies. Since there is 
no practical way to eliminate all risk, management must decide how much 
risk it is willing to tolerate and determine how those tolerance levels can 
be maintained through appropriate record keeping controls. The decision 
making process will need to weigh the cost of controlling records related 
risks against the cost to the organisation if the risks are not controlled. 
Risk assessment should be undertaken on an ongoing and regular basis, 
especially in a volatile external environment. A model assessment tool is 
presented in Appendix 8. 
This assessment tool comprises an eight step metholodgy for evaluating 
an organisation's records related risks and requirements. Step one entails 
identifying and ranking key business functions. This is followed by 
identiffing and ranking the key business processes for each business 
function. Upon identification of key business processes, these are 
assessed to determine the records and information required to support 
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them and the qualities that such records and information ideally should 
possess (eg, levels of completeness, reliability, timeliness, etc. ). 
Following this assessment, organisations should determine the degree to 
which these quality requirements are satisfied and, if not being fully 
satisfied, the type and degree of risk that this poses to the organisation. 
From these assessments it is possible to arrive at a quality level and risk 
assessment profile for each type of required information or record as well 
as to calculate the category of record for which it will be of the greatest 
strategic importance to correct quality deficiencies through appropriately 
strengthening record keeping systems. 
-Control Activities. Control activities are the policies and procedures put 
in place to assure management's record keeping directives are carried out. 
Control activities should encompass all phases of the records fife cycle, 
including prescribing and proscribing the terms of record creation to 
ensure that these meet the conditions that produce authoritative and 
trustworthy records needed for efficient business administration and 
accountability. Control activities also must support the establishment and 
maintainance of record keeping systems that appropriately contextualize 
records, for in the process and technologies of contextualization record 
keepers minimise the possibility of alternative readings or misreading of 
the meaning in records by capturing and fixing original authorial intent 
in 
the meaning of records over distances and time. 
13 Control activities 
permeate the entire organisation, at all levels and in all functions, and 
include a range of possible actions that 'should fit the orgarusation's needs 
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and be influenced by the way the organisation is structured and managed, 
and by the type and complexity of its transactions and commitments. 
Though specific control activities must match organisational requirements, 
the following can be singled out for special attention: 1) organisational 
record keeping structure and lines of authority; 2) monitoring procedures 
(eg, over the destruction of records to ensure that unauthorised 
destructions do not take place; 3) segregation of duties (eg, between those 
responsible for designing a system, maintaining it, and transacting 
business); 4) authorisation and approval (eg, appropriate authorisation and 
approvals for record creation and destruction); 5) completeness and 
accuracy (eg, in documenting all business transactions; 6) safeguarding of 
records; 7) personnel (eg, to ensure that staff have received appropriate 
training to perform records control activities and understand the 
importance of these controls). 
-Information and Communication. Systems for capturing and 
communicating relevant information about how records are created and 
kept are an essential component of the records control process. These 
systems are essential because they produce reports containing operational 
and compliance information needed to control the record keeping 
function. Examples of the type of information required for records 
control include. records management policies and procedures; file 
classification plans, registers and indexes; file movement tracking 
registers; document and file metadata; system backup and archiving daily 
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activity logs; system error reports; system access audit logs; records 
retention and disposition authorities; and records destruction certificates. 
-Monitoring. There should be ongoing monitoring of adherence to records 
controls, which occurs during nonnal operations, as well as separate 
evaluations by management of compliance with records controls, often 
with the assistance of the internal audit function. 
Even the best efforts to build a dam against chaos often fail, however. In other 
words, it is not realistic to expect that even the best practices will ever result in the 
perfect preservation of some inviolate original meaning in records and that records 
will ever be perfectly reliable and impartial evidence of either the "facts" of a 
transaction or an inscriber's original intended meaning. There are simply too 
many diverse mediations affecting record making and keeping over space and 
time in complex organisations and record keepers are simply too human and apt to 
impose their own (often unconscious) interests. 
For this reason, attempts to contain chaos must be accompanied by the ability to 
give the record a critical reading, a reading based on an understanding of how 
both designed and accidental social and technological influences structure the 
meaning of the record. Only by listening to the virtual clamour of voices making 
choices behind the record is it possible to form impressions about and map the 
complex relationship and interplay between the act or fact that is the subject of the 
record; the inscriber's intended meaning; the meaning required to serve 
organisational and social ends; and all subsequent layers of meaning produced 
385 
through mediated processes of re-inscription, transmission, contextualization and 
subsequent use. 
Conclusion 
This study has sought to demonstrate a link between competitive viability, 
accountability and record keeping by presenting a proposed theory of relationship 
between these phenomena and then exploring this theory empirically using a case 
study of the failure of several Jamaican commercial banks. While it cannot be 
argued that bad filing habits resulted in the collapse of these banks, this study has 
shown how record creation and keeping practices in the failed banks contributed 
to the poor quality of their accounting and management information and how, in 
the absence of good quality accounting and management information the banks' 
systems of accountability could not operate effectively. As a result, directors and 
managers in the failed banks were unable to maintain internal control and make 
effective decisions. This, in turn, led to operational inefficiencies that, in 
combination with external conditions, contributed to the banks' collapse. This 
same absence of good quality accounting and management information also 
affected the ability of bank regulators to provide effective supervision and, later, 
complicated FINSAC's intervention and rehabilitation efforts. 
in this chapter, management lessons were drawn fi7om the Jamaican experience 
and used to suggest strategies and policies that directors and managers might 
follow in order to avoid the types of records and information related problems that 
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undermined the accountability systems of the failed banks. Studies of bank 
failures in other developing countries, though not focusing on records and 
information related problems, suggest that lessons from the Jamaican experience 
may be equally applicable. For example, studies of the Nigerian banking crisis 
indicate that similar external and internal factors affected banks in that country. 14 
Further research into the underlying causes of information related weaknesses in 
the case of other bank failures might provide additional support for the 
relationships among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping 
presented in this study. In addition, the fact that the results of the case study on 
Jamaican banks match many of the findings of research into the relationship 
between record keeping and public sector reform initiatives suggests that the 
management lessons drawn from the Jamaican experience are applicable to a wide 
range of organisational settings and contexts. Further research will, no doubt, 
shed additional light on the dynamics of how poor record keeping can contribute 
to the dynamics of other types of business failures. 
There are also several other areas that this research suggests might be worth 
further investigation. First, the research revealed how bank directors and 
managers' ideas about records, information and management information systems 
shaped their record creation and keeping practices and their understanding of and 
solutions for the banks' information related problems. These findings highlight 
the fact that root causes of information problems are often misunderstood as a 
result of preconceived ideas. Further research comparing ideas about the sources 
of organisational information problems with actual on-site investigations of those 
problems may shed additional light on the causes of such problems and, thus, lead 
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to more effective solutions. For example, many managers assume that 
information related problems arise from poorly structured organisations or 
inadequate computerisation. Corporate restructuring and computerisation are 
therefore popular business strategies for dealing with information related 
operational inefficiencies associated with decentralisation and specialisation. This 
study suggests, however, that attention to record creation and keeping practices 
must accompany restructuring and computerisation if these strategies are to be 
effective. Moreover, expensive restructuring and computerisation exercises may 
be unnecessary if good record keeping practices can be used to IMprove the flow 
and quality of information supporting internal control and decision-making. 
Causes of market imperfections is another area that this research indicates may be 
worth further investigation. Many current econon-fic theories focus on information 
related market imperfections arising from information assymetry between an 
enterprise and agents external to it. This study supports the idea, however, that 
information assymetry and bounded rationality within an organisation created by 
poor record keeping equally may render an enterprise less competitive and thereby 
contribute to market imperfections. This study suggests that further research also 
could be done into the "objectivity" of accounting data. Current policy usually 
focuses on the reliability of accounting and financial reporting as being influenced 
by accounting rules about the presentation of data and the quality of report 
auditing and not on how that data is inscribed, transmitted and contextualized 
throughout the accounting process. In contrast, this study suggests that record 
creation and keeping practices are factors determining reporting quality and 
reliablity and therefore that business and economic development policy and 
strategy aimed at improving the quality and reliability of financial reporting must 
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ensure good record keeping practices. Further research into the relationships 
among competitive viability, accountability and record keeping may assist in 
revealing the limitations of a number of existing business and economic 
development theories and, thus, lead to more effective business and economic 
development policy and strategy in the future. 
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Interview Question Guide 
The following list of questions and the order of their presentation were used as a guideline In 
conducting interviews for this study. The exact wording and order of presentation was changed to 
suit particular circumstances (eg, the orgarusational structure of a particular bank or the 
circumstances of an interview). 
To ensure that the questions dealt with the initial assumptions with which the study began, as part of 
the interview question design process each assumption was assigned a code (see Appendix 4). The 
codes matching the assumption about which the question was designed to gather data appear in brackets at the end of each question. However, by allowing interview subjects scope to elaborate on 
points, questions directed towards supplying data for particular questions also supplied data for other 
questions. Those questions marked 'facilitative' supported the process of data collection and were 
not intended to provide data in support of particular assumptions. 
It should be noted that some of the questions provided data directly about the assumption, while 
others aimed to collect data related to an assumption mdirecdy. The choice of direct versus indirect 
questioning depended upon the degree to which it was thought that a direct question would yield a 
reliable answer or that the respondent would know what answer to provide. When it was thought that 
the respondent was unlikely to know the answer or the answer would be unreliable, the questions 
were framed with a view to gathering data that are indicative (ie, questions about file loss explore the 
factors contributing to high incidents of file loss,, such as poorly organised filing areas). 
A. Banks 
Various banks were approached to participate in the study. As part of the research process, the 
researcher offered to produce a confidential report assessing the level of business risk ansmg from a 
bank's information management practices In order to convince the banks of the benefit of 
participating III the study. Use of the data for the purposes of the study was negotiated with each 
Chief Executive or their delegate. In each case it was agreed that the banks would not be identified 
specifically and that the study would rely on using only general references and aggregate data (eg, 
one of four banks surveyed ... or one head of internal audit stated that ... ). 
The strategy followed in conducting the interviews was to begin with the Chief Executive or an 
executive level manager who was asked to identify the bank's key legal units, business umts and 
geographic areas and markets. Preliminary research into the bank's structure was done Prior to the 
interview using information from annual reports and statements of account so that the information 
that the Chief Executive or executive manager provided confirmed and/or clarified information from 
other sources. 
Once the key legal units, business units, etc. were identified, the remaining interviews were 
scheduled. In frammg the guidelme for the interview questions, it was envisioned that important 
information relating to the assumptions to be tested in this study could be gathered Erom a non- 
executive director, an audit committee; a chief financial officer responsible for overseeing the 
treasury management function; a head of branch operations; a head of risk management (In some 
cases credit risk management is dealt with separately from other risks and other risks may be 
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managed by an Assets and Liabilities Management Group; however, the same questions are 
appropriate); a head of internal audit; a head of compliance responsible for ensuring that the bank is 
complying to all legislative and regulatory requirements; a head of human resources; and a head of 
information technology. A standard set of questions, outlined below, was developed for each of 
these hypothetical managers and the functional areas of the bank's operations for which theýý are 
responsible. The questions and the order of their presentation was altered dependuig on the 
organisational structure and governance of a particular bank. 
A. 1 Chief Executive or other Executive Level Manager 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal traming and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HC I, HC2) 
2. Identify the key legal units, business units, geographic areas and markets. (Facilitative) 
3. What role do you see information playing in tei s of the competitive viability of the bank? Explain. 
What about information technology? Explain. (HB I, HB4, HE I) 
4. What are the bank's current strategies to ensure that this information is available? (HB2, HB3, HB5, 
HB6) 
5. What kinds of information do you rely on to meet your own management information requirements? 
In what form is this information when you receive it? From whom do you receive it? What do you 
do with it when you are finished with it? If it is kept, where and who is responsible for keeping it? 
(HA2, HA3, HD7, HD8, HE5) 
6. Are you satisfied with the quality of the management information you receive from the bank's 
business units, etc? If not, how are you addressing the situation? (HAI, HA8, HD7, HD8) 
7. Is there someone in the bank and,, if so who, responsible for: (HD 1; HD 11; HD 12; HD 14) 
-IT systems development and/or procurement 
-IT systems implementation 
-IT systems security and backup 
-auditing the operation of IT systems 
-writing policy manuals 
-distributing policy manuals 
-version control of policy manuals 
-mamtaining and storing master copies of policy manuals 
-designing fiIMg systems for paper records 
-implementing filing systems for paper records 
-security of filing systems for paper records 
-auditing the operation of filing systems for paper records 
-mail systems and distribution 
-deciding on records retention policy 
-records disposal 
-records storage 
-disaster preparedness and recovery 
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8. What policies, if any, has the bank established relating to information creation and management? 
Are these policies part of a broader policy (eg, a credit policy or support services policy). (HA2, 
HA9, HD 1) 
9. Do you view information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational risk to the 
bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps" Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? (HB 1; HD23) 
A. 2 Non-Executive Director 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HC I, HC2) 
2. What role do you see information playing in the competitive viability of the bank? Explami. 
Information Technology? Explami. (BB 1, HB4, HE 1) 
3. What kinds of information do you rely on to meet your own management information requirements? 
In what form is this information when you receive it? From whom do you receive it? What do you 
do with it when you are finished with it? If it is kept, where and who is responsible for keeping it? 
(HA2, HA3, HD7, HD8, BE5) 
4. Are you satisfied with the quality of the management information you receive from the bank's 
management and business units, etc? If not, what do you think should be done to address the 
situation? (HAI, HA8; HB5) 
5. Do you viCW information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational nsk to the 
bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps? Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? (HB 1; HD23) 
A. 3 Chairman of the Audit Committee (if an Audit Committee exists) 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HCI, HC2) 
2. What role do you see information as playing In internal control of the bank? Explain. Information 
technology? Explain (HB 1, HB4, HE 1) 
3. What kinds of information do you and the other Committee members rely on to meet your 
management information requirements? In what form is this information when you receive it? From 
whom do you receive it? What do you do with it when you are finished with it? If it is kept, where 
and who is responsible for keeping it? (HA2, HA3, HD7, HD8, HE5) 
4. Are you satisfied with the information you receive from the bank's management and business units, 
etc from the perspective of the Audit Commuce's information requirements? If not, what do you 
think should be done to address the situation? (HAI, HA8; HB5) 
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5. Do you view information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational risk to the 
bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps? Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? (HB I; HD23) 
A. 4 Chief Financial Officer and Head of Branch Operations 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HCI, HC2) 
2. What role do you see information as playing in the competitive viability of the bank? Explain. 
Information technology? Explain. (HBI, HB4, HEl) 
3. What kinds of information do you rely on to meet your own management information requirements? 
In what form is this information when you receive it? From whom do you receive it? What do you 
do with it when you are finished with it? If it is kept, where and who is responsible for keeping it? 
(HA2, HA3, HD7, HD8, HE5) 
4. Are you satisfied with the quality of the management information you receive from the bank's 
management and business units, etc? If not, what do you think should be done to address the 
situation? (HAI, HA8; HB5) 
5. What kinds of records do you generate in the course of performmg your daily bus. ess and core 
operations? (RAI, HD 18) 
6. In what form are these records kept? (Eg, paper or electromc) (HE3, IHD9) 
Who is responsible for keeping these records? (Eg, central filing unit or clerical staff) (HDI, HD3) 
8. On average, how often do departmental staff refer to these records (eg, once per week) and for what 
purpose? (HD 16, facilitative) 
9. Do staff of any other department ever refer to these records? If so, how often and for what purpose? 
(HD 16, HD2 1, facihtative) 
10. How long does the department generally keep these records? Is there an established policy which 
sets out the period for which these records must be retained? How are retention periods decided? 
Who authonses them? (HD3; HD15, HD22) 
Do you view information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational risk to the 
bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps? Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? CFiB I; HD23) 
A. 5 Head of Risk Management 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HC I, HC2) 
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2. Identify the risks that you see as being critical for the bank to manage eMetively order to remain 
competitive. (Facilitative) 
3. For each major category of risk (eg, credit, liquidity, interest rate), how is information used 'in the 
management of that risk? (HAI) 
4. From what source(s) is this information gathered (eg, bank's mainframe)? (HD9, HE3, HE4) 
5. In what form is the information (eg, verbal, paper, electronic)? (HD9, HE3, HE4) 
6. Are you satisfied with the quality of the management information you have at your disposal for the 
purposes of risk management? If not, what do you think needs to change in order to bring 
improvement? (HAl, HB2, HB3, HB5, HD7, HD8) 
What kinds of records do you generate in the course of performing your daily business and core 
operations? (HD 18, facilitative) 
8. In what form are these records kept? (Eg, paper or electroMc) (HD9, HE3, HE4) 
9. Who is responsible for keeping these records? (Eg, central filing unit or clerical staff) (HD1, HD3, 
HDI 1) 
10. On average, how often do departmental staff refer to these records (eg, once per week) and for what 
purpose? (HD 16, facilitative) 
Do staff of any other department ever refer to these records? If so, how often and for what purpose? 
HD 16, HD2 1, facilitative) 
12. How long does the department generally keep these records? Is there an established policy which 
sets out the period for which these records must be retained? How are retention periods decided? 
Who authonses them? (HD3, HD 15, HD22) 
13. Is it possible and, if so, how easy, for you to pull together views of the financial status of individual 
customers, branches and business areas? (HA7) 
14. Do you view information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational risk to the 
bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps? Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? (BB1, HD23) 
A. 6 Head of Internal Audit 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HC I, HC2) 
2. What types of audits do you perform (eg, branch, business function, IT)? (HB 1, facilitative) 
3. Briefly describe your audit methods and procedures. (HB6, facilitative) 
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For each type of risk category (eg, credit, liquidity and interest rate), what kinds of information do 
you rely on to monitor compliance with policies and standards and the effectiveness of internal 
control structures? (HAI, HAIO) 
5. Where or from whom do you obtain this information? (IHE3, HE4) 
6. In what form is the information? (Eg, verbal, paper or electronic? (HD9, HE3, HE4) 
7. Are you satisfied with the quality of the information you have at your disposal for the purposes of 
conducting internal audits? If not, what do you think needs to change in order to bring improvement? 
(HAI, HB2, HB3, HD7, HD8) 
8. To whom do you report your findings and in what form? (Eg, Audit Committee in the form of a 
report). (HAI) 
9. Do you viCW information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational risk to the 
bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps? Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? (HD23) 
10. Do any of the standards and policies you monitor concern records and/or information (including IT)? 
If so, can you give examples? What is the level of conformance with these policies? (HA9, HD1, 
HD3) 
Do any of these standards concern how records are to be kept or managed? (Eg, who is responsible 
for their safekeeping or how long they are to be retained? ) (HDI, HD2, HD3) 
12. Is it possible and, if so, how easy, for you to pull together views of the financial status of individual 
customers, branches and business areas? (HA7) 
13. Describe the major categories of records that you create m conducting internal audits? (HD 18, 
facilitative) 
14. In what form are these records kept? (Eg, paper or electromc) (HD9, HE3, HE4) 
um 15. Who is responsible for keeping these records? (Eg, central filing or clerical staff) (HD 
I, HD3, 
HDI 1) 
16. On average, how often do departmental staff refer to these records (eg, once per week) and 
for what 
purpose? (141316, facilitative) 
17. Do staff of any other department ever refer to these records? If so, how often and 
for what Purpose? 
(HD 16, HD2 1, facilitative) 
18. How long does the department generally keep these records? Is there an established policy which sets 
out the period for which these records must be retained? How are retention periods 
decided? Who 
authonses them? (HD3, HD 15, HD2 2) 
19. Do you view information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational nsk 
to the 
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bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps? Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? (HB I, HD23) 
20. Are you satisfied that all significant bank transactions and decisions are being adequately 
documented? (HD 18). 
A. 7 Head of Comphance 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HC I, HC2) 
2. What role do you see information playing in terms of the competitive viability of the bank? Explain. 
Information technology? Explain. (HBl, HB4, HE I) 
3. What kinds of information do you rely on to meet your own management information requirements? 
In what form is this information when you receive it? From whom do you receive it? What do you 
do with it when you are fniished with it? If it is kept, where and who is responsible for keeping it? 
(HA2, HA3, HD7, HD8, HE5) 
4. Are you satisfied with the quality of the management information available to you? If not, what do 
you think should be done to address the situation? (HAI, HA8, HB5, HD7, HD8) 
5. Do you view information failures or gaps as presenting a source of business or operational risk to the 
bank? If so, why and to what do you attribute the cause of these information failures or gaps? Have 
you proposed policies or standards to address these? (HB I, HD23) 
6. Are there any legal, regulatory or industiy standards relating to record keeping to which the bank 
must adhere? (HD 15) 
A. 8 Head of Human Resources 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HC I, HC2) 
2. What role do you see information playing in terms of the competitive viability of the bank? Explam. 
Information technology? Explain. (HB 1, HB4, HE 1) 
3. What kids of information do you rely on to meet your own management information requirements? 
In what form is this information when you receive it? From whom do you receive it? 
What do you 
do with it when you are fuiished with it? If it is kept, where and who is responsible 
for keeping it? 
(HA2, HA3, HD7, HD8, BE5) 
4. Are you satisfied with the quality of the management information available to you? 
If not, what do 
you think should be done to address the situation? (HAI, HA8, HB5, 
HD7, HD8) 
5. Does the bank offer internal training prograrnmes to its stafv. If so, do any of those training 
programmes contain a component(s) relating to records creation/documentation or record 
keepmig9 
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If so, which ones? (HC 1, HC2, HD 1, HD2, HD3) 
6. Describe the major categories of records that you create m peiforming your core ftuictions? (HD 18, 
facilitative) 
7. In what form are these records kept? (Eg, paper or electronic) (HD9, HE3, HE4) 
8. Who is responsible for keeping these records? (Eg, central filing unit or clerical staff) (HDI, HD3, 
HDI 1) 
On average, how often do departmental staff refer to these records (eg, once per week) and for what 
purpose? (HD 16, facilitative) 
10. Do staff of any other department ever refer to these records? If so, how often and for what purpose? 
(HD 16, HD2 1, facilitative) 
How long does the department generally keep these records? Is there an established policy which sets 
out the period for which these records must be retained? How are retention periods decided? Who 
authonses them? (HD3, HD 15, HD22) 
A. 9 Head of IT 
What is your view on the role of information and information technology Mi terms of the competitive 
viability of the bank? (BB 1, HB4, HB6, HEI) 
2. What percentage of total information holdings in the bank are in electronic form? (BE3, facilitative) 
3. Are you In the process of converting any manual systems/records into electronic form? If so, have 
specific procedures for data conversion been developed and documented? (HE3, ITE6, HE8) 
4. What systems and applications are in use III the bank for transaction processing? For the provision 
of management information? Have these systems/applications mostly been developed in-house or 
purchased from external agents? (HE5) 
5. What is your impression about how the new computer systems and applications have changed work 
processes (eg, more/less centralised)? (HA6, HA7, HE4, HE8) 
61 What lessons have you learned from the implementation of these systems? (Facilitative) 
7. What is the level of integration between existing systems? Are you satisfied with this level of system 
integration? (HE3) 
8. Have you established strategic IT objectives for the bank. If so, what are they? (HAI, HB6) 
9. Have you established bank-wide computing standards? If so, m what areas? (HD I, HD3, HE4, HE8) 
10. What is the level of centralisation/decentrahsation of IT development, procurement and 
implementation in the bank? Is this a situation that has evolved over time or is this a conscious 
policy objective? (HD 12, HD 11) 
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11. Can you give some examples of some of your recent IT projects? (HB6, HEI, facilitative) 
12. Within the business units, what is the decision making process for the development or procurement 
of new computer systems or software? What is the implementation process? (HE2, HD 12) 
13. Is system security and integrity an important objective? If so, how is this being achieved (eg, what 
checks and balances have been built into systems)? Do you think that executive management shares 
your attitudes toward system security and integrity? (HB6, HE7, HE8) 
14. Do you view linking new systems with paper source data as an important objective? If so, how is 
this being achieved? (HE6, HB6) 
15. Do you have any areas of responsibility that are not specifically IT related? If so, what are they? 
(HDI) 
16. With whom or what units in the bank do you liase most often? For what purpose? (HD 1, facilitative) 
17. Once systems are set up, who is responsible for the management of the data m them? (If not the IT 
unit) Is this an area that you view as appropriately an IT responsibility? (HDI, HDI 1) 
18. Who is responsible for designing systems for the orgarusation and retrieval of non-electromic 
idormation systems? Is this an area that you view IT as having any responsibility for? If so, M what 
way? (HD 1, HD 12) 
19. Who is responsible for the management of that percentage of information that is not in electronic 
form? Is this an area that you view IT as having any responsibility for. If so, In what way? (HD I) 
20. Are procedures in place for data archiving. If so, provide details. (HD I, HD3, HD20, HE4) 
B. FINSAC Officials 
What is your view on the role of information in terms of the competitive viability of a bank? In 
terms of risk management? In terms of effective internal control? In terms of fraud prevention.? 
What about information technology? (HE I, HG I, H142) 
2. What are your general observations about information management in Jamaican commercial banks? 
(HA4, facilitative) 
3. What management information from banks have your required in order to perform your functions? 
Has this information been readily available to you on a timely basis? What is your view of the 
general quality of this information (eg, is it reliable)? (HAI 0, HF I, HF2) 
CA Bank Supervisors - Proposed Questions 
Can you provide a brief overview of your background? Has any of the formal training and education 
you have taken ever focused on information management? If so, can you recall what topics were 
covered? (HHl, HH2) 
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2. Can you provide a general overview of Bank of Jamaica's bank supervision practices? (Facilitative) 
3. What kinds of information do supervisors use to determine the health of a bank (eg, supplied 
financial information, information from external auditors, etc. ) (HAIO, HFI, HF3) 
4. What is your general assessment of the quality of this information? (BY I) 
Do supervisors ever refer directly to the raw data for supplied financial information, that is, the 
bank's own information. and records? (Facilitative) 
6. How common is it to find that supervisors have inadequate info to make a proper assessment. Why" 
(IfF I, HIF2) 
7. What are your general observations about information management in Jamaican commercial banks? 
(HA4, facilitative) 
What is your view on the role of information in terms of the competitive viability of a bank? In 
terms of risk management? In terms of effective internal control? In terms of fraud prevention? 
What about information technology? (HEI, HGI, FIF12) 
C. 2 Bank Supervisors - Actual Questions 
As interviews were not permitted with Bank of Jamaica supervisory authorities, the researcher obtained 
permission to submit a list of written questions to Bank of Jamaica officials. A reply to some, but not all, of 
the questions was later received. The questions submitted are as follows: 
Can you provide a brief outline of the Bank of Jamaica's supervisory practices for the period 1993- 
1998 with particular reference to the type of financial information required from commercial banks? 
2. Can you provide an assessment Erom the point of view of the supervisory authorities of whether the 
absence of adequate financial information was a problem for supervisors in terms of being able to 
adequately supervise commercial banks during the period 1993-1998? 
3. Can you provide an assessment of other factors that posed difficulties for supervisors Mi terms of 
being able to adequately supervise commercial banks during the period 1993-1998? 
4. What measures have been taken to address/correct factors that posed previous difficulties in 
supervising commercial banks? 
5. To what extent did the Bank of Jamaica carry out on-site inspections of commercial banks during the 
period 1993-1998? 
6. To what extent did the banks comply with financial reporting requirements? Can you provide an 
assessment of the supervisory authority's confidence in the financial reports that were received? 
7. What was the quality of information and documentation that was available to the inspectors from the 




1. Use of Qualitative Data Analysis Software (QSR NLJD*IST) in the Study 
This study utilises, qualitatiVe data analysis software known as QSR NUD*IST, which 
stands for Qualitative Solutions and Research Non-numerical Unstructured Data 
Indexmg Searching and Theorizing. QSR NUD*IST is a computer package designed 
to aid users in handling non-numerical and unstructured data in qualitatiVe analysis, by 
supporting processes of coding data in an index systen-ý searching text or patterns of 
coding and theorising about data. 
QSR NUD*IST supports the management of qualitative sources of evidence. Those 
used in this study include: verbatlM transcriptions of tape recorded interviews and 
conference proceedings; researcher's interview notes; notes on bibliographic sources; 
full text online journal articles and web pages; notes on and excerpts from standards, 
policies, procedures, regulations, and statutes; and researcher's ana ic notes. 
QSR NUD*IST also consists of an indexing system. The indexing system is 
comprised of nodes, which serve as contamers for thoughts about the data. Nodes 
store the index categories constructed by the researcher and by the system. Within the 
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node is stored information such as its title, definition, a memo of ideas about it, and 
references to the parts of documents coded at the node. 
There are four types of nodes M QRS NUD*IST. Free nodes and Index Tree nodes 
are constructed by the researcher, while Text Search and Index Search nodes are 
system generated. The index system can contaln any number of nodes, at which the 
researcher can do any amount of coding of documents and sorting of ideas by: 
-Creating Free Nodes (nodes which are free of structure) for unconnected 
ideas. Free nodes support the application of a Grounded Theory methodology 
by allowing the researcher to create as many new nodes as necessary to reflect 
emergent themes in the research data. 
-Storing ideas in a hierarchical Index Tree to help orgam'Se data, clarify 
concepts and store their relationship. For example, this research project used 
the assumptions outlined in chapter one as the basis of the first generation of 
Index Tree nodes. 
The process of analysis included several distinct steps. First, it involved importing all g --- 
sources into the database, which then contained the full text of the document or 
annotations of ft. The researcher then read and analysed documents in order to code 
parts of them (usuaffy paragraphs) at an existmg node in -the Index Tree or create a 
new node in the Free Nodes area, as appropriate. The coding stage also entailed 
recording emerging theoretical understanding and explanations in memos at nodes. 
The next stage entafled a restructuring of the midex. This process was made easy by 
the fact that QSR NUD*IST is designed for flexible reorganisation as ideas emerge 
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and codes are rethought in relation to the data. The researcher first conducted a 
further analysis of aH parts of documents coded at Free Nodes m order to incorporate 
them logically into the hierarchical structure of the Index Tree. Next the researcher 
reviewed all coding done at Index Tree nodes to deternune how they fit together to 
support a coherent argument. Once their relationsl-iip was determined, the Index Tree 
was restructured again as nodes were grouped under appropriate and related chapter 
headmgs. 
The final stage, which was ongoing from the point of the initial restructuring of the 
index, MV01ved searching and exploring text and coding. QSR NUD*IST has a wide 
set of search tools to explore either the text of imported documents or the coding done 
by the researcher or the system. These tools are also linked and allow the researcher to 
build cumulatively on discoveries by saving the results of searches for further 
exploration. 
Most of the analysis of the data was done by means of an exploration of the 
documentation associated with each node or cluster of nodes. However, in some 
cases it also proved useful to conduct a full text search or search by index terms to 
gather supporting evidence relating to a particular argument and to test the validity of 
emerging ideas. Both text and index searches are automatically saved by the system at 
Index and Text Search nodes to provide an audit trail of hypothesis development. 
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Text searches proVided the researcher with a way of asking questions about the 
contents of documents, such as words people are using, recurring themes and the like. 
This facility was used to explore data to pursue hunches and test emergmig theories or 
hypotheses as well as to gather material about a topic for browsing and recoding. 
QSR NUD*IST can conduct a slMPle string search (for a string of specified 
characters), for example the characters m the word "record" or the word "cheque", M 
order to discover what the data reveal about these objects of analysis. Additionally, it 
can perform any of a wide variety of complex pattern searches to ask for occurrences 
of any of a range of wild cards or to seek alternate spellings. This proved useful In 
testing hypotheses. For example, the search (record/paper) found all parts of 
documents containing either the word record or paper and was used to find out if 
inter-view subjects tended only to use the word record in reference to documentation in 
paper forrm 
Index searches provide ways of asking questions about categories of ideas in nodes. 
The index search tools in QSR NUD*IST offer an extensiVe set of tools for asking 
questions about the coding at nodes in the index systern'The index search tools will 
perform the full range of Boolean searches, but they also provide ways to: 
-Collect up material on a related topic to rethink and recode. For example, an 
intersect Search (eg, find all documents coded at lack of documentation and 
treasury function) could be used to find all text units coded at all of a given set 
of two or more nodes. 
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-Analyse themes by using search operators that pull apart and establish patterns 
of coding in data. An Intersect search also could be used to test a hypothesLis 
that can be expressed in terms of the coding at two or more nodes. For 
example, the search in the example above was particularly useful M finding 
examples of how poor quality information affected dffferent aspects of banks' 
treasury operations. 
There are seventeen different search operators offered by QSR*NUDIST; however, a 
need was found only to use the Intersect and Union searches for the purposes of this 
study. 
2. A Discussion of the Validity of Observations about Interview Subjects' Values 
and Beliefs 
A. S. chapter eight explores social actors' motivations, it raises questions about the 
extent to which the field research data, mainly interviews, can be relied upon to reveal 
underlying motivations, beliefs and attitudes. The analytical approach taken in this 
chapter is grounded in the tradition of interpretive social science, which can be defmed 
as the systematic analysts of socially meanirigful action through the direct detailed 
observation of people in natural settings in order to arrive at understandings and 
interpretations of how people create and maintain their social worlds. ' This approach 
can be traced back to German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) and German 
pHosopher Wilhem Dilthey (1833-1911). In his work, Einleitang in die 
Geisteswissenshaften antroduction to the Human Sciences), published in 1883, 
Dilthey argued that human sciences rely upon an empathetic understanding, or 
Verstehen, of the everyday lived experience of people in specific historical settings. 
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Thus, the arguments In this chapter come from the perspectiVe that the field research 
data can be used to gain an empathetic understandmig of the motivations behind 
individuals' record creation and keeping practices in Jamaican commercial banks. 
Positivists accustomed to hard facts and observable phenomenon easily reduced to 
statistical representations may have some difficulty with this approach, since they 
consider an explanation to be true if it can be replicated. In contrast, the interpretive 
approach holds that a theory or description is accurate if the researcher conveys a deep 
understanding of the way others reason, feel, and see things. An interpretative 
explanation describes a social actor's point of view and attempts to translate it into a 
form that readers can understand. ' Clearly, then, the interpretiVe approach rests upon 
an analysis of social actor's own descriptions of their context and the meaning they 
ascribe to it. For the purposes of this chapter, such descriptions derive from the 
interviews conducted with a wide range of social actors in the Jamaican financial 
sector as outlined in the introduction to this study. 
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Nevertheless, interviews are not seen as an ideal research method . 
Questionnaires 
and participant observation generally are viewed as being more reliable and valid. 
Despite this, interviews represent one of the most fleXible types of information as they 
can be used to ask people about, or reveal, their attitudes, beliefs and motives, which 
cannot be observed directly. ' Critics of this method point out, however, that this data 
may be neither valid nor reliable. Respondents may lie, forget, or sunply not 
consciously be aware of their feelings, motives or behaviour. Furthermore, their 
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answers may be influenced by the presence of the researcher or they may consciously 
or unconsciously be directed by the interviewer to give certain responses. In an effort 
to address these shortcornings, the researcher must remain constantly vigilant and, In 
analysing the data, ask such critical questions as: does this subject have a reason to lie; 
how does this subject's account of motives and events mesh with other subjects' 
accounts; does this subject have all the information needed to give a full account of 
events; and did the interview question or the researcher's response prompt this 
particular answer from the subject? Every effort was made during the interview 
process and the data analysis carried out for this study to keep these questions firmly 
in nund. Despite the flaws, interview data in generaL and the interviews conducted for 
this study in particular, stil-I provide critical and valuable insights and perspectives on 
how social actors view and order their social world. 
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Appendix 3 
RECORDS MANAGEMENT REVIEW FORM 
This form was used during the field research as a guide and aide de memoire in the 
coflection of information about Jamaican commercial bank record keeping systems. The 
researcher obtained answers to the questions listed on the form either during site visits at 
the banks or through interviews with bank officials. The alphanumerical codes appearing 
next to questions on the form are keyed to the central assumptions explored in the study. 
The particular assumption assigned to each code appears at Appendix 4. 
Dept/Business Unit.: 
1. Contact Names Contact Positions 
2. General Problem Areas: (HAI, HA8) 
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3. Perceived Needs: (HA2. BB59 IRB6) 
4. Major Records Series (IIID18) 
A. Transaction Processing 
1. Manual or Automated? (HE3) 
If Manual, go to section B. If Automated, 
go to section C. If mixed, complete both 
sections. 
B. Manual Transaction Processing 
1. Centralised system (eg, riles stored together in a Yes/No? 
registry)? (HE3) Yes/No 
If yes, evidence of breakdown (eg, riles should be 
stored in registry but officers keep some)? 
2. Mixture of centralised and decentralised? Yes/No 
If yes, are there linkages between systems? Yes/No 
(HD9, HE3) 
3. Level of duplication between record stores (eg, 
410 
do the contents of registry files and files retained by 
officers overlap)? (BE3) 
4. Classification system? (HAI, HD2. ) HD3. HD99 None/Partial, Registry HD18, HD20) onlyAPartiaVrotal 
5. Type of classification system? (Obtain sample) 
(IEID9) 
6. Age of classification system? (HA5) 
7. Observations re: retrieval problems? (HA1, 
HD5, HD6, HD9) 
8. Indexes? (Obtain samples) (1][Al. Numerical/Alphabetical/Other: 
9. Data elements included in indexes? (HA1, HD9, File title/Part No. /Part 
HA7) datesALocation/Retention and 
Disposal information 
10. Indexes cover both active and inactive files? Yes/No 
(HA19 HD9) 
11. Indexes are automated? (HAI, HA9) Yes/No/Partial 
12. Number of Registry/File Clerical staW. (1EID11, 
facilitative) 
13. Describe positions and classification level: 
(HD 11) 
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14. Job descriptions? (HDI) Yes/No 
15. RM training? (HC3) Yes/No 
If yes, number of staff trained, where and when? 
16. Staff turnover? (HD4, HD7) Yes/No 
17. Registry/Filing area physically tidy? (Proxy for Yes/No 
HA4, HA5) 
18. Type of storage equipment/supplies? (Proxy for Registry: 
HA4, HA5, HDIO) 
Other: 
19. Condition of storage equipment/supplies? Registry: Good/Fair/Poor 
(HA4, HA5, UDIO) 
Other: Good/Fair/Poor 




Automated Transaction Processing 
1. System Description (eg, platform, 
operating system, application software, 
version, network configuration) 
(Facilitative) 
2. Age of system? (Facilitative) 
3. In-house development? (IRE5) Yes/No 
4. System inputs (Facilitative) 
5. Input procedures or protocols? (IRD17, Yes/No 
HE8) 
Describe: 
6. Regular training on input procedures? Yes/No 
(HD17,1EIE8) 
7. Daily volume of transactions? 
(Facilitative) 
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8. Transaction logs and reports? Describe. 
(BD17, HE8) 
9. Regular checking of transaction 
reports? 
HD17, HE81 
10. System outputs (including regular 
printouts and feeds into other systems? 
(HE8, facilitative) 
11. Types of queries allowed (HA7, HE3) 
12. Use of passwords? (HD19, HD21, IIIE7) Yes/No 
How changed: 
13. Use of data encryption? (HE7) Yes/No 
14. Backup procedures? (HD14, HD22) Yes/No 
How often: 
Location of backup tapes: 
15. If backup procedures are in place, are Yes/No 
backup logs maintained? (IRD14, HD22, 
HE8) Observations: 
16. System usage audits? (IEID13, HE3) Yes/No 
17. If system is linked to external Yes/No 
organizations via network, are there 
system security measures in place (eg, 
L rewalls)? (HD13) rI 
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D. Management Information 
1. Describe (BE5, facilitative) 
E. Automated Management Information System 
1. System Description (eg, platform, 
operating system, application software, 
version, network configuration) 
(Facilitative) 
2. Age of system? (Facilitative) 
3. In-house development? (ILIE5) Yes/No 
4. System inputs (Facilitative) 




6. Regular training on input procedures? Yes/No 
HD 17, HE8) 
7. System outputs (including regular 
printouts and feeds into other systems? 
(HE8) 
8. Types of queries allowed 
(HA7, HE3) 
9. Use of passwords? (HE7) Yes/No 
How often changed: 
10. Use of data encryption? (IFIE7) Yes/No 
11. Backup procedures? (IHDI4) Yes/No 
How often: 
Location of backup tapes: 
12. If backup procedures are in place, are Yes/No 
backup logs maintained? (HD14, UE8) 
Observations: 
13. System usage audits? (HD13, BE8) Yes/No 
14. If system is linked to external Yes/No 
organizations via network, are there 
system security measures in place (eg, 
firewalls)? (HD13) 
F. Mail Management 
1. Man uaUAutomated/Mixed? 
_ff 
manual. go to section G. If automated, 
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go to section H. If mixed, complete both 
sections. 
(HE3) 
Manual Mail Management 
1. Mail Handling System Description: 
(HD4, HD7) 
2. Mail registers? (HD4) Incoming/Outgoing/Other: 
3. Data elements in registers? (Obtain Date of mail/name of sender/name of 
sample) (HD4) addressee/subject/file number/action 
officer/date of action/date action 
completed/other: 
4. Indexes automated? (HD4) 
5. Comments: 
H. Automated Mail Management 
1. System description (HD4, HD7f 
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Facilitative) 
2. Email policy? (HD1, HD39 HE4) Yes/No 
3. Use of Passwords? (IRE7, HD13) Yes/No 
How often changed: 
4. Use of Encryption? (HE7, HD13) Yes/No 
5. Network security? (HD13) Yes/No 
Describe: 
6. Integration with manual records (eg, 
print off copy for file)? (HE3, HE6) 
L Manual Information Distribution and Tracking 
1. File Tracking System? Yes/No 
If yes, compass of system? All/Partial, registry only/Partial/Total 
(IRD2) 
2. If yes, system description: 
(HD2) 
3. Tracking is automated? (HD2) Yes/No 
4. Loan limitations? (HD2, IRD6) Yes/No 
5. Evidence of breakdown? (HD2, HD6) Yes/No 




J. Management and Storage of Semi-current Manual Records 
1. Criteria for rile closure? (11AI, HD3, Yes/No 
HD20) 








3. Evidence of space constraints? HD5, 
HD6, HD20-, facilitative) 
Yes/No 
Observations: 
4. Designated closed file area(s)? Yes/No 
If yes, where? Location(s): 
(HD5, HD6, HD20, facilitative) 
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. 
5. Physical condition? (Take photos if Good/Fair/Poor 
possible) Observations: 
(HD5, HD6, HD20) 
6. Files regularly and systematically Yes/No 
transferred to closed file area(s)? (HD3) 
7. Records in closed file area(s) well Yes/No 
organised? (HD5, HD6, HD20) 
8. Standardised storage containers used? Yes/No 
(HAI, HD5, HD6, HD20) 
9. Tracking system? (HAI, UD5, HD6, Yes/No 
HD20) 
10. Listings available? (HAI, HD5,111D6, Yes/No 
HD20) 
11. Indexes? (HAI, HD6, HD20) Yes/No 
12. Comments: 
K Off-site Storage 
1. Is there an off-site storage area(s) Yes/No 
(HD22) 
2. If so, leased facility? (1HD2 1, ]EID22) Yes/No 
Location: 
3. Assigned responsibility for operation? Yes/No 
(HD21, HD22) 
4. Procedures for operation? (HDI, HD3, Yes/No 
HD21, HD22) 
5. Procedures for records transfer? (HDI, 
420 
HD3, HD21, HD22) Yes/No 
6. Access controlled? (HD13, HD21) Yes/No 
7. List or index to holdings? (IL4,1, IJD22) Yes/No 
8. Turnaround time for retrieval (IIAI, 
HD22) 
L. Non-Current Records 
9. Appraisal is systematic? (HD3, HD21, Yes/No 
HD22) 
10. Retention scheduling in place? (11ID3, Yes/No 
HD21, HD15, HD22) 
11. If yes, for which records? (HD3, HD21, 
HD22) 
12. If yes, who approves? (HD3, HD21) 
13. If no, are retention periods applied at Yes/No, ad hoc 
all? 
If yes, how? (HD21, HD22) 
14. Destructions? (HD2 1, HD22) 
15. If destructions have taken place, who 
approved? (HD21) 
16. Transfers to Archival storage? (HD22) 
17. Comments: 
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M. Disaster Preparedness and Recovery 
Plan in place? Yes / No 
Covers Documents and Records? Yes/ No/ Partial 
Comments: 
N. Policy Management 
1. Policies documented as a matter of Yes/No 
course? 
(HAI., HA2, HA9) 
2. Assigned responsibility for policy Yes/No 
management? 
(BA1, HA2, HA9) 
3. Procedures for policy distribution and Yes/No 
updating? (HAI, HA2, HA9) 




TABLE OF ASSUMPTIONS 
This table fists the alphanumerical codes (used in Appendix I and 3) and the particular 
assumptions to which they relate. It also shows the source that was used to gather 
data about the assumption. For example, QA. I indicates that answers to interview 
question (listed at Appendix 1) A. I provided data related to this assumption, while 
SBA indicates that the Records Management Survey Form (see Appendix 3) question 
BA provided relevant data. 
Code Question Data Source 
HA Banking Operations - Records Availability and 
Use in Risk Management, Assessment of Financial 
Position and Fraud Prevention 
HAI The necessary information is available to manage QA. I -Q6; A. 2-Q4; 
risk, prevent fraud and accurately assess a bank's A. 3-Q4; A. 4-Q4, 
financial position Q5, Q6; A. 6-Q41, 
A. 6-Q4; A. 6-Q7; 
A. 6-Q8; A. 7-Q4; 
A. 8-Q8. 
SO. 1; B. 4; B. 7; 
B. 8; B. 9; B. 10; 
B. 11; J. 1; J. 2; J. 8) 
J. 9; J. 10; J. 11; K. 7; 
K. 8; N. 1; N. 2; N. 3; 
NA 
H_A2 Bank shareholders, directors, managers and QA. I -Q5, Q8; 
supervisors know what information they need A. 2-Q37- A. 3-Q3-1 
A. 4-Q3; A. 7-Q31 
A. 8-Q3. 
SO. 3; N. 1; N. 2; 
N. 3; N. 4. 
HA3 Shareholders, directors, managers and supervisors A. I -Q5; A. 2-Q3; 
use records for decision-making, to manage risks, A. 3-Q3; 
A. 4-Q3; 




HA4 Banks in good financial standing have better record All HD and HE keeping practices than those that have failed or are questions, plus B2. in poor financial health C7 and D5. 
All survey 
questions. 
HA5 Banks with foreign connections have better record All HD and BE keeping than those that are local questions 
comparing local 
banks with banks 
with foreign 
connections and 
with UK data. 
A comparison of 
the survey data of 
local with foreign 
connected banks. 
HA6 Complete financial transactions can be tracked QA. 9-Q5. 
easily through records 
All survey 
questions. 
HA7 Information providing an integrated overview of QA. 5-QI3; A. 6- 
customer, branch and business unit positions is Q12; A. 9-Q5. 
easily accessible and reliable 
SB. 7; C. 11; E. 8. 31 
HA8 Due to tight regulatory control banking QA. 6-Q7; A. 2-Q4; 
administrative structures are hierarchical, with A. 3-Q4; A. 4-Q4; 
highly structured vertical flows of information and A. 7-Q4- A. 8-Q4. 
consequently information often reaches the 
executive level of the organization too slowly or in SO. 2 
too digested a form to be of use. 
HA9 Internal accountability systems are clearly defined, QA. 1 -Q8; A. 6-Q 10 
well-documented, implemented and specify the 
types of records that must be kept to sustain them SB. 8; B. 11; N. 1-4. 
HA10 Records are more critical in dealing with situations QA. 6-Q4; B-3; 
of greater risk (eg, high end loans or valuation and C. 3; D. 1. 
sale of assets in the case of a faltering bank). 
HB Banking Operations -Attitudes to Records Use and 
Management 
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Shareholders, directors and bank managers QA. I -Q3; A. I -Q9) 
understand the importance of good information A. 2-Q2; A. 2-Q5; 
management practices and, in particular, good A. 3-Q2; A. 3-Q5; 
record keeping M terms of establishing A. 4-Q2; A. 4-Q 11; 
accountability to manage risks, prevent fraud and A. 5 -Q 11; A- 6-Q2; 
monitor their financial position A. 6-Q19; A. 7-Q2- 
A. 7-Q5; A. 8-Q2; 
A. 9-Q 1. 
BB2 Keeping records is not an issue as bank managers QA. I -Q4; A. 5 -Q61 
and employees will automatically want records to A. 6-Q7. 
be kept that document their actions and decisions 
BB3 No special systems need to be put in place to ensure QA. I -Q4; A. 5 -Q6; 
that, once documented, information about actions A. 6-Q7. 
and decisions is maintained in a retrievable and 
reliable form 
HB4 Attitudes and approaches to accountability and QA. I -Q4; A. 2-Q2; 
record keeping are the same at all levels of the A. 3-Q2; A. 4-Q2; 
organizational hierarchy A. 7-Q2; A. 8-Q2) 
A. 9-Q 1. 
HB5 Introduction of automated technology, that is, more QA. I -Q5; A. 2-Q4; 
computers, will automatically solve information A. 3-Q4; A. 4-Q4; 
problems for commercial banks and their regulators A. 5-Q6; A. 7-Q4; 
A. 8-Q4. 
SO. 3. 
HB6 Useful information is seen as being in automated QA. I -Q4; A. 6-Q2; 
form, while the term records connotes inaccessible A. 6-Q31 A. 9-Q 1 *7 
hard copy papers. Similarly, information A. 9-Q8; A. 9-Q 11; 
management is seen in terms of computerization A. 9-QI3- A-9- 
and something of value to the strategic position of Q 14. 
the organization, while records management is seen 
as being primarily to do with filing and as. an SO. 3 
organizational overhead cost which may not yield 
value. 
HC Banking Operations - Training of Bank 
Professionals 
HC1 Training of banking professionals influences QA. I -Q 1; A. 2-Q 1; 
attitudes and approaches to the use and A. 3-Ql; A. 4-Ql; 
management of information and records in banking A. 5-Ql; A. 6-Qll 
operations A. 7-Ql; C. I- 
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HC2 Training of banking professionals covers QA. I-Ql; A. 2-Ql; 
management control systems and their relation to A. 3-Q 1 -7 A. 4-Q 1 -1 
information management (both allocative and A. 5-Ql; A. 6-Ql; 
authoritative aspects) A. 7-Ql; A. 8-Q1, 
C. 1. 
HC3 Staff responsible for record keeping have SB. 15 
appropriate qualifications and training (eg, suitable 
training in records management) 
HD Banking Operations - -Information and Records Management Practices 
HD I Responsibility and authority for record keeping is QA. I -Q7; A. I -Q8; 
clearly designated and documented at all levels and A. 4-Q7; A. 5-Q9-, 
these policies are being implemented A. 6-Q 10; A. 6- 
Q1 1; A. 6-Q15; 
A. 8-Q5; A. 8-Q8. 
A. 9-Q9; A. 9-Q 15; 
A. 9-Q16; A. 9- 
Q17; A. 9-Q18; 
A. 9-Q19; A. 9- 
Q20. 
SB. 14 - H. 2; K. 4. 
HD2 File control and tracking procedures have been QA. 6-Q 11; A. 8- 
articulated, documented and implemented Q5. 
SB. 4; 1.1; 1.2 - 1.3: 
1.4; 1.5; 1.6. 
HD3 Guidelines on the creation, maintenance, use and QA. 4-Q7- A. 4- 
disposition of records have been articulated, Q10; A. 5-Q9; A. 5- 
documented and are being implemented Q 12; A. 6-Q 10; 
A. 6-Q 11; A. 7- 
Q15; A. 7-Q18; 
A. 8-Q8; A. 8-Q 11; 
A. 9-Q9; A. 9-Q20. 
SB. 4; H. 2; J. 1; J. 2; 
J. 6; K. 4; K. 5; L. 9; 
L. 10. 
HD4 Correspondence is delivered, actioned and filed SB. 16; G. L) G. 2 
promptly G. 3; G. 4; H. 1. 
HD5 Incidents of misfiling are low and of little SB. 7)- J. 3; J. 4, J. 57- 
consequence J. 7; J. 9; J. 10; J. 11. I 
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HD6 Incidents of file loss are low and of little SB. 7; IA; 1.5; J. 3; 
consequence J-4; J. 7; J. 8; J. 9; 
J. 10; J. 11. 
HD7 Information flows with ease through the QA. I -Q5; A. I -Q63 
organization A. 2-Q3; A. 3-Q3, - 
A. 4-Q3; A. 5-Q6; 
A. 5-Q7; A. 7-Q3; 
A. 7-Q4; A. 8-Q4. 
SB. 16; G. 1; H. 1. 
HD8 Officers appropriately share relevant information QA. I -Q5; A. 2-Q3; 
and information systems support such sharing A. 3-Q3; A. 4-Q37 
A. 5-Q6; A. 6-Q7; 
A. 7-Q3; A. 8-Q3. 
HD9 Valuable information can easily be retrieved using QA. 4-Q6; A. 5-Q4; 
one integrated source in one medium A. 5-Q8; A. 6-Q6; 
A. 8-Q7. 
SB. 2; BA; B. 5; 
B. 7; B. 9; B. 10. 
HDIO Poor or unethical organizational culture spawns All questions in 
poor or unethical record keeping subcultures. comparison with 
Alternatively, poor and unethical record keeping is data indicative of 
a sign of poor or unethical organizational cultures fraud or other 
unethical behaviour 
from other sources 
(eg, newspaper 
reports). 
HDI I The organizational structure is designed with a QA. I-Q7- A. 6- 
clear distinction between specialist record keeping Q153- A. 8-Q87 A. 9- 
staff and users Q10; A. 9-Q17- 
SB. 12; B. 13. 
HD12 The organizational structure is designed so that at QA. I -Q7; A. 9- 
the operational level there is a separation between Q 10; A. 9-Q 12; 
record keeping, custody of assets and system design A-9-Q18. 
HD13 Systems and procedures are in place to prevent SB. 20; C. 6 -, C. 17; 
unauthorized access to record stores E. 13; E. 14; H. 3, 
H. 4; H. 5. 
427 
HD14 Disaster preparedness and recovery plans are QA. I -Q7. 
clearly defined and documented 
SC. 14; C. 15; E. 11; 
E. 12; M. 1-3. 
HD15 The bank is compliant with legal and administrative QA. 4-QlOi A. 5- 
requirements for record keeping and has an Q12ý A. 6-QI8ý 
awareness of best practices for their business sector A. 7-Q6; A. 8-Q 11. 
SL. 10. 
HD16 Record keeping systems are exclusively employed QA. 4-Q8; A. 4-Q9; 
in the normal course of business A. 5-QIO; A. 5- 
Q1 I; A. 6-QI6; 
A. 6-Q 17; A. 8-Q9; 






HD17 Record keeping systems process information in a All SB questions; 
fashion that assures that the records they create are C. 5; C. 6; C. 8; C. 9; 
credible E. 5; E. 6. 
HD18 The bank creates records to document all business QA. 6-QI3; A. 6- 
transactions so that that documentation is Q20. 
identifiable, complete and meaningful 
SOA 
HD19 Only authorized persons originate records for Only the 
particular transactions probability of this 
assumption can be 
tested. All 
questions related to 
assumption HD 13 
should provide 
relevant data. 
HD20 Records continue to reflect content, structure and QA. 9-Q20. 
context over time 
SJ. 3; J. 4; J. 5; J. 9; 
J. 10; 111; J. 20. 
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HD21 Records are preserved in a manner which protects QA. 4-Q9; A. 5- 
them from accidental or intended damage or Q1 1; A. 6-Q17; 
destruction and from any modification over time A. 8-Q 10. 
SB. 20; L. 9; L. 10; 
11) L. 12; L. 131 
14; L. 15. 
HD22 Records are preserved in a manner that pern-iits QA. 4-Q10; A. 5- 
their use over time Q12; A. 6-Q187 
A. 8-Q 11. 
SC. 14; C. 15; K. 1; 
K. 2; K. 3; K. 4; K. 5; 
K. 77 K. 81 L. 10; 
L. 11; L. 13; L. 14; 
L. 16. 
HD23 Risk associated with organizational record keeping AA. I -Q9; A. 2-Q5; 
practices are known and have been assessed A. 3 -Q5; A. 4-Q 11; 
A. 5-Q14; A. 6- 
Q19; A. 7-Q5. 
HE Banking Operations - Information and Records 
Management Practices - Technology Use 
BE I Introduction of computer technology is more QA. I -Q3; A. 2-Q2; focused on the allocative aspects of information and A. 3-A2; A. 4-Q2; 
records (eg, information as resource to improve the A. 7-Q2; A. 8-Q2; 
overall efficiency and effectiveness of the business) A. 9-Q 1; B. I 
than on the authoritative aspects of information and 
records (eg, information as evidence of business 
transactions in support of internal management 
control and accountability) 
HE2 New computer systems have been introduced as QA. 9-QI2. 
separate projects and as a result there is little 
coordination between them 
BE3 Fragmentation of data stores (both electronic and QA. 4-Q6; A. 5-Q5; 
hard copy) makes it difficult to pull together A. 5-Q8; A. 6-Q6; 
important information A. 6-Q14; A. 7-Q3; 
A. 8-Q7; A. 9-Q2; 
A. 9-Q'3; A. 9-Q7. 
SA. 1; B. 1; B. 2; 
B. 3; C. 11. 
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HE4 Bank management and employees create and QA. 5-Q4; A. 5-Q5; 
manage records in electronic form according to A. 5-Q8; A. 6-Q5; 
their own practices A. 6-Q6; A. 6-QI4, 
A. 8-Q7; A. 9-Q7; 
A. 9-Q5; A. 9-Q9. 
A. 9-Q20. 
SH. 2. 
HE5 MIS systems tend to be ad hoc and user developed QA. 3-Q3; A. 2-Q-"); 
and implemented A. 3-Q3; A. 4-Q3; 
A. 7-Q3; A. 8-Q3; 
A. 9-Q4. 
SC. 3; E. 3. 
HE6 Computer systems, particularly MIS, are linked to QA. 9-Q3; A. 9- 
the paper-based records from which their data are Q. 14. 







HE7 Personal user security systems have been QA. 9-QI3. 
established 
S C. 12; C. 13; E. 9; 
E. 10. 
HE8 Appropriate input, processing and output controls QA. 9-Q3; A. 9-Q5; 
have been clearly established A. 9-Q9; A. 9-QI3. 
SC. 5; C. 6; C. 8; 
C. 9; E. 5; E. 6; E. 7; 
E. 12; E. 13. 
HF Banking Supervision - Records Availability and 
Use 
I-IF I The necessary information is available to effectively QB. 31 C. 3; C. 61 
monitor commercial banking operations to the D. 1; D. 2. 
extent required under Jamaican law 
HF2 Bank inspectors/supervisors/auditors experience QB. 2; C. 6; D. 3; 
problems in accessing the necessary information to D. 4. 
monitor commercial banks, in particular to verify 
the integrity of financial reporting 
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IBT3 The existing Jamaican bank supervision framework Legislation and 
is sufficiently explicit on the subject of sources of regulatory 
information to support effective supervision documentation 
coupled with data 
from QB. 33, C. 3. 
HG Bank Supervision -Attitudes to Records Use and 
Management 
HGI Bank inspectors/supervisor/auditors are aware of QB. 1 11 C. 81 D. 7. the importance of good internal information 
management practices, particularly good record 
keeping, in commercial banks in terms of managing 
risks, preventing fraud and monitoring the bank's 
financial status 
HH Banking Supervision - Training of Supervision 
Professionals 
HHI Training of banking supervisory professionals QC. I. 
influences attitudes and approaches to the use of 
management information and records in banking 
operations 
BH2 Bank supervisors see poor records and record QC. 2. 
keeping as an important aspect of operational risk 
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Operational Impact Assessment of Records Creation and Keeping Practices 
in Failed Jamaican Commercial Banks 
This appendix summarises the discussion in chapter 7 relating to how the failed 
banks' record creation and keeping practices affected their accountability systems, 
operations, and competitive viability. 
Decision Making The quality of management decisions 
was weakened by the fact that record 
creation and keeping practices 
undermined the creation of records 
needed to support the effective 
operation of accountability systems. 
Directors and managers depended on 
these systems for accounting and 
management information on which they 
could base their decisions. 
Credit Risk Management Weaknesses in the documentation and 
communication of policies and 
procedures undermined effective credit 
risk management. Credit risk 
management also was weakened by 
failure to book loans and guarantees, 
which presented a distorted picture of 
the banks' asset portfolios. Gaps and 
errors in customer information files also 
prevented banks from keeping adequate 
track of customers" credit exposures 
and histories. System related errors 
resulted in additional distortions due to 
accounting errors that undermined the 
banks' efforts to track past due and 
non-performing loans. NEssing and 
incomplete loan documentation made 
recovery of credit-related losses 
difficult to impossible. 
Market Risk Management The banks' management information 
systems were not geared toward 
tracking the impact of interest and 
foreign exchange rate fluctuations on 
their financial positions and risk 
exposures. Even so, the unreliability 
and lack of timeliness resulting from 
the banks' records creation and keeping 
practices undermined the degree to 
which the banks' accounting and 
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management . ormation could be used 
to manage market risks. 
Cost of Operations Cost of operations was pushed up due 
to ineffective cash flow management, 
which was itself as a result of poor 
quality accounting and management 
information. Failure to manage 
liquidity effectively resulted in non- 
compliance with statutory reserve ratios 
for which there were substantial 
financial penalties and excess expenses 
incurred by having to purchase funds to 
cover liabilities at higher rates. In 
addition, poor documentation of 
investments, loans and guarantees all 
resulted in direct losses for the banks. 
Cash Flow and Liquidity Risk Due to weaknesses in accounting and 
Management management information that prevented 
the banks fi7om monitoring the financial 
positions and risk exposures coupled 
with lack of sophisticated reporting in 
support of asset and liability 
management (ALM) - which was a 
function both of management failure to 
establish ALM processes and system 
limitations - it was difficult for them to 
assess the level of liquidity they 
required to cover operating expenses, 
daily liabilities and, very importantly, 
unexpected liabilities due to operating 
losses. 
Capital Adequacy Losses due to ineffectively managed 
risks eventually ate into the banks' 
capital bases. 
Proofing and Reconciliation Proofing and reconciliation of 
transactions, necessary to ensure the 
integrity of-the banks' accounting and 
management information, was 
hampered by missing or irretrievable 
source documentation. One 
manifestation of this problem was the 
high number of suspense and 
unreconciled accounts discovered in the 
failed banks. 
Internal Control and Audit The results of this study provided no 
specific examples of internal auditors 
not being able to complete an audit due 
to the absence or poor quality of 
records, as in Akotia's public sector- 
based research. However, it is easy to 
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surmise that internal auditors in the 
failed banks must have experienced 
such difficulties because the banks' 
policies and procedures were either 
missing or disorganised and source 
documents often were a mess. Auditors 
tended to point to areas of concern such 
as a high number of suspense accounts, 
losses due to fraud or in connection 
with trades, which they attributed in 
art to i)oor record 
Corruption and Fraud Prevention As in the public sector, the results of 
this study show that prevention of 
corruption and fraud is weakened by 
ineffectively managed records creation 
and keeping practices. Increasing 
decentralisation of information 
processing, information and incentives 
created a situation in which it was 
difficult for directors and managers to 
keep track of all the banks' transactions 
and commitments and to monitor 
whether these were in compliance with 
policies and procedures. Creation, 
distribution and storage of policies and 
procedures had deteriorated as the 
banks grew, creating confusion about 
what was acceptable practice and 
making it more difficult to hold 
officials to account. Moreover, in many 
cases directors and managers simply 
could not obtain the management 
information they needed to monitor 
subordinates effectively. Gaps, errors 
and inconsistencies in the creation of 
source documents and entry of records 
of transactions in manual and 
computerised accounting systems 
rendered much of the information on 
which directors and managers relied 
untrustworthy and inaccessible on a 
timely basis. In addition, functional 
limitations of computer systems 
prevented directors and managers from 
obtaining with ease management 
reports that might have revealed 
ftaudulent activity. The general 
disarray of records and fragmentation 
of records creation and storage lent 
itself to transactional irregularities. It 
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also practically guaranteed that 
perpetrators would not be detected. 
Cases of failure to create documents 
and deliberate destruction of records 
clearly indicate that there were no 
mechanisms in place to ensure that 
transactions were properly documented 
and that that documentation was 
safeguarded. Finally, microfilining 
practices led to n-fissing copies of 
cheques that prevented the banks from 
. ng cases of fraud. 
Financial Reporting Here again the results of this study 
match those of the public sector studies. 
Financial reports relied on the same 
accounting data as management 
reporting. Consequently, the same 
problems with trustworthiness and 
timeliness that affected management 
information also affected financial 
reporting to shareholders and 
regulators. The quality of this 
information determined what 
shareholders and regulators understood 
about the banks' operations. In many 
cases, the information was quite 
misleading though, as discussed in 
chapter eight, not necessarily always 
deliberately so. The quality of financial 
reporting highlights the dangers if 
regulators rely solely on this type of 




Summary of Records Management Policies and Procedures in Studied Jamaican 
Commercial Banks 
Area of Coverage Bank A (Failed Bank B (Failed Bank C (Failed Bank D (Failed Bank E (Viable Bank) Bank) Bank) Bank) Bank) 
Date of Policy July 1996 May 19917 May 1996 (Note Draft policy only June 1991 - that this policy is a dating from Administrawn 
direct copy of BNS October 1998 Policy on Records 
Canada's policy) arid Files 
Scope of Coverage customer records operations hard records of vouchers, registers, Prune records 





Responsibilities "It is the No "Branch Yes - extensive "Senior Branch 
responsibility of Managem/Departm statement to the Operations Officer 
each Branch and ent Heads must effect that adopting responsible for 
Department designate an and maintaining ensuring that 
Manager and individual to be records retention current and non- 
Operations responsible for procedures rests current records 
Personnel to filing and the with the receive proper 
become familiar orderly department head to care" and for 
with the Types of maintenance of all be coordinated by establishing a 
records generated records and ensure designated schedule for 
mid their that the filing department records 
appropriate systern/records employees. Role 
handling" management of internal auditors Country Corporate 
procedures is and compliance Officer responsible 
reviewed on a officers also stated for making 
quarterly basis for adequate 
compliance. - provisions for the 
storage of old 
records 
Records Creation No No No No No 
Filing while Active No Yes - vouchers to No No Yes - storage and 
be filed in access only 
numerical order 
Retention Yes Yes Yes No Yes - policy 
Scheduling provides for the 
establishment of a 
Records and Files 
Comrmttee. Fairly 
extensive with an 
emphasis on legal 
compliance. Also 
of note: only bank 
to have specified 
the documentation 
and control of 
retention decisions 
Transfer of Inactive Yes - including No Yes Yes - not as Yes 
Records detailed detailed as Bank A 
procedures for and B 
boxing, labelling 




Secondary Storage Yes - including No Yes - though not as No Yes 
Facility operation of a extensive as Bank 
Records Centre A 
Database and for 
the conduct of a 
periodic record 
centre audit 
Retrieval of Yes - including No Yes No Yes 
Records from use of Records 
Secondary Storage Request Form 
Destruction of Yes - including a No Yes - including use Yes - not as Yes Records statement that the of forms for detailed as Bank A 
record owner requesting and and B 
must authorize authonzing; 
destruction by destructions 





Mcrofibuing of No No No No Yes - extensive 
Records provisions 
Security of Records No No No No Yes 
Vital Records No No No Yes Yes - separate 





Sanctions for Non- only for causing No No No No 
compliance Records Centre 
overflow and 
congestion which 
were to result in 





A Record Keeping Risks and Requirements Self-Assessment Tool 
Introduction 
The author originally developed a version of this assessment tool during a records 
management consultancy for Grace Kennedy & Co. Ltd of Kingston, Jamaica. Over 
the course of the research for this study, the usefulness of such a tool in assessing the 
information requirements of banks and other types of organisations became 
increasingly apparent. Subsequently,, the author has made modifications to the 
assessment tool based on information derived from the field research, ongoing 
consulting experience and feedback fi7om the staff of Barclay's Records Services on 
the usefulness and layout of the tool. 
It should be noted that the International Records Management Trust also has 
developed a records management assessment tool as part of its Principles and 
Practices in Managing Financial Records. ' The ER_MT assessment tool and the 
assessment tool presented below are complimentary and can be used in conjunction 
with one another. It is recommended that the assessment tool presented below first be 
used to determine organisational records-related risks and requirements. The ERMT 
assessment tool then can be used to determine if organisation record keeping systems 
possess the appropriate infrastructure and resources to meet identified organisational 
information and record keeping requirements. As the IRMT assessment tool was 
developed for public sector agencies, some adaptation may be required to apply the 
tool in private sector contexts. 
The Assessment Methodology 
The board and management of a commercial enterprise ultimately are responsible for 
assessing the enterprise's accounting and management information requirements. 
Such an assessment becomes particularly critical to the competitive viability of an 
enterprise when the external environment is volatile or if the enterprise is expanding 
the size or scope of its business. Although the board and management of an enterprise 
are ultimately responsible for assessing its information requirements, it is more 
manageable to have key staff in each of the enterprise's business areas conduct an 
information requirements and risks review, facilitated by an appropriate member of 
senior management. 
Steps in the Self-Assessment Worked ExampleQ. 
Step 1. Senior management should The f6flowing shows possible rankings 
identify and rank key business functions. for a hypothetical set of bank business 
Business functions ranked most important functions- 
1 KimberlyBarata, Piers Cain and Dawn Routledge. Principles and Practices in Managing Financial 
Records: A Reference Model andAssessinent Tool (London: International Records Management Trust, 
2001). 
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should be given a score of five and those 
that are least important should receive a 
score of one. Note that this step may be 
skipped if management wishes to 
concentrate the self-assessment on a 
specific business function. 
Step 2. Step 2 entails identifying and 
ranking all of a business function's key 
business processes. The relative 
importance of the business process should 
be ranked from one to five on the basis of 
how critical that process is to the 
realisation of the aims and objectives of 
the business function. Business processes 
ranked most important should be given a 
score of five and those that are least 
important a score of one. 
Step 3. Following identification of key 
business processes, the records/ 
information required to support these 
processes should be assessed in terms of 
the type of information required to (1) 
complete all transactions associated with 
the business process and (2) effectively 
support internal and external 
accountabilities and controls for those 
transactions. The type and quality of 
records required will vary according to 
the type of commercial activity in which 
the enterprise is engaged and the 
particular manner in which it conducts its 
business. Directors and managers of 
commercial enterprises therefore can only 
rely to an extent on industry guidelines or 
standards to determine their information 
requirements, as these may overlook 
important requirements that are specific 
to their particular enterprise. 
Business Function Ranking 




Commercial Credit 5 
Financial Control 5 
Treasury Mgmt. 5 







General Services 2 
Legal 3 
The following shows possible rankings 
for the above-fisted Commercial Credit 
area: 
Business Process Ranking 
Credit Poticy Admin. 5 
Credit Extension 5 
Credit Servicing 4 
Credit Collection 3 
The following lists possible types of 
information needed to meet the 
information requirements of the Credit 
Extension business process. Note that the 
bulk of this information should be found 
in the Credit File. 
Details of each transaction, including the parties to 
the loan, advance or other credit exposure (Note: 
must be careful to ensure that the parties are 
identified as this may affect the ability to recover on 
a non-performing asset. Also must obtain full name, 
address and contact info for all borrowers which 
must be kept up'to date) and also whether and, if so, 
to whom sub-participated, the amount and currency, 
the contract, roll-over, value and settlement or 
repayment dates; the contractual interest rates of an 
interest rate transaction or commitment, the 
contractual exchange rate for a foreign exchange 
transaction or commitment; the contractual 
commission or fee payable or receivable together 
with any other related payment or receipt; the nature 
and current estimated value of any security for a 
loan or other exposure; the physical location and 
documentary evidence of such security; the nature 
and book value of any asset upon which the loan or 
other credit exposure is secured, information about 
margins of securities accepted for collateral as a 
ratio of asset value to value of security. All 
securities documentation must be 100% perfect 
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Step 4. For each type of information or 
record, assess the quality characteristics 
that are required to meet the requirements 
of completing and controlling the 
transaction. This step will entail ranking 
the relative importance of the quality 
characteristic from five for most 
important to one for least important. The 
worked example offers a list of possible 
quality characteristics though these may 
not reflect the requirements of particular 
organisations and therefore should not be 
taken as representing a definitive list of 
quality characteristics. 
Step 5. For each quality characteristic, 
identify the degree to which it is satisfied 
by current record creation and keeping 
systems. Those quality characteristics 
that are fully satisfied should receive a 
ranking of five, while those least satisfied 
should receive a ranking of one. Time 
should also be taken at this stage to 
analyse the underlying reasons why 
quality characteristics are not being 
satisfied if this is the case. 
Information indicating the full extent of credit 
facilities extended to each individual client and the 
status of those facilities; also information relating to 
the full extent of credit guaranteed by a single 
individual 
Details of any off-balance sheet asset origination, 
sale and servicing of various types of credit, 
including contractual fee arrangements 
Details of credit limits authorized by management 
that are appropriate to the type, nature and volume 
of the business undertaken. Where relevant the 
limits should include counterparty, industry sector, 
country, settlement, liquidity, interest rate mismatch 
and securities position limits. 
Information concerning the factors considered, the 
analysis undertaken and the approval or rejection by 
management of a loan or other credit facility 
On a memorandum basis, details of every 
transaction entered into m the name of and on behalf 
of another party on an agency or fiduciary basis 
where it is agreed that the bank is not legally or 
contractually bound by the transaction 
Reports to management on the number, type, 
industry, counterparty, amount and other details of 
credit facilities granted to track various risks 
The following shows possible quality 
characteristics and rankings for Credit 
Files: 








The f6flowing shows possible levels of 
satisfaction with the degree to which each 
quality characteristic is being met: 
Quality Ranking of Ranking of 
Quality Level of 
Importance Satisfaction 
Created 5 4 
Completeness 5 3 
Accuracy 5 3 
Authenticity 5 4 
Accessibility 4 3 
Cnmnairahilitv 2 
Step 6. Step 6 consists of identifying and The foHowing shows possible types of 
assessing the risks to the organisation if risk and the ranking of those risks 
for 
the information required to transact and each quality characteristic_,. 
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control the area's business processes is 
not available or of the desired quality. 
Each risk should be given a ranking of 
from one to five based on the perceived 
consequences to the area or the 
organisation as a whole, with one being 
the least consequential (eg, minor loss) 
and five being the most (eg, devastating 
loss with extremely high impact). 
Additionally, each risk should be ranked 
in terms of its likelihood of occurrence, 
from five for most likely to occur to one 
for least likely. 
Quar" Type of Risk Ranking Ranking 
of Con- of 
sequence Probabflit 
Y 
Created Potential for 5 











Complete- Legaland 5 3 






can lead to 
uncertainty 
aboutthe 
parties to a 
loan, the terms 
of the loan and 




Accuracy Same as above 5 3 
Authenti- Documents 4 
city may be altered 
after the fact 
and my not be 
suitable as 
evidence in a 
legal dispute 
Accessib- If file cannot 5 
ility be found the 
parties to, 
terms and 
status of the 
loan cannot be 
determined 
which can 
result in loss 







Comparabil Can lead to 3 
-ity uncertainty 
aboutthe 
quality of the 
loan and its 
legal status 
Step 7. Step 7 is a calculation to arrive at 
the Quality Level and Risk Profile for The following shows a worked example 
each type of information or record. First, based on the data supplied above- 
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add up the rankings for all identified 
quality characteristics at Step 4. Next, 
add up the rankings for the degree to 
which the quality characteristics are 
satisfied at Step 4. Subtract the total for 
the degree of satisfaction from the total 
for the quality rankings. This will 
provide you with a figure that indicates 
the gap between the importance of the 
information/record quality characteristics 
and the level to which these are being 
satisfied. Next, add up the rankings 
assigned in Step .6 for risk consequences 
and risk probability. Add these two 
figures together to obtain the risk profile. 
Then, multiply the figure indicating the 
quality gap by the figure for the risk 
profile in order to arrive at the Quality 
Level and Risk Profile for each 
information/record type. 
Formula: (Sum of Rankings for 
Quality Characteristics at Step 
4- Sum of Rankings for Level 
of Satisfaction at Step 4) x (Sum 
of Rankings at Step 6) = Quality 
Level and Risk Profile for Each 
Record Type 
A) Rankings for Qualities 
5+5+5+5+4+2=26 
Minus 
Rankings for Level of Satisfaction= 
4+3+3+4+3+4=21 




B) Rankings for Risk Consequences 
5+5+5+4+5+3=27 
Plus 
Rankings for Risk Probabilities 
1+3+3+1+4+1=13 
27+13=40 (Risk Profile) 
5x4O=200 (Quality Level and Risk 
Profile) 
Step 8. Step 7 involves multiplying the The following shows a worked example 
ranking for each business function based on the data supplied above- 
assigned at Step 1, the ranking for each 
business process assigned at Step 2, with 
the Quality Level and Risk Profile score 
arrived at for each record in Step 7. This 
figure will result in the Overall Priority 
Profile for each type of information, a 
score that will indicate the category of 
record for which it will be of the greatest 
strategic importance to ensure adequate 
record keeping systems and controls are 
in place because of the high overall 
importance of the business function and 
process with which the record is 
associated, the low satisfaction with the 
current quality of the records and 
information in relation to required quality 
and the high risk to the organization due 
to failures to meet quality requirements. 
Ranking for Commercial Credit =5 
Ranking for Credit Extension 5 
Quality Level and Risk Profile 200 
5x5x2OO=5000 (Overall Priority Profile) 
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Using the Results 
The Overall Priority Profile provides an indication of the level of risk associated with 
a particular type of information or record, based on the significance of the business 
function and process in relation to the strategic objectives of the enterprise, the level 
to which the qualities required of the information/record to meet business 
requirements are being met, and the impact and probability of the risks associated 
with failure to meet information requirements. 
Once the Overall Priority Profile has been determined, the management of an 
enterprise should then analyse whether the level of risk is acceptable. This task can 
be achieved by preparing a Risk Acceptability Matrix, as outlined by Barry I 
Terenna. 2 The process involves assessing whether, for each of the risks associated 
with failure to meet a particular required information/record quality characteristic, the 
level of risk is acceptable or unacceptable. 
If the level of risk is deemed unacceptable, usually because of high risk of loss even if 
there is a low probability of occurrence, steps must be taken to bring the level of risk 
to an acceptable point. Note that management should begin to address unacceptable 
levels of risk for information/records with the highest Overall Priority Rating. The 
work of lowering levels of risk can be achieved by reviewing the work done to 
identify the possible reasons why quality characteristics are not being met (at Step 5) 
and working out possible solutions to deficiencies in records and information systems 
and controls. The IRMT assessment tool can be used to assist management in the 
process of identiýdng areas of record keeping deficiency. Once solutions are 
identified, they should be implemented and their impact assessed and regularly 
monitored. 
2 Barry J. Terenna, "Risk Business: Proactive Strategies Help Reduce Records-related risks, " Infopro 
3.1 (March 2001): 28. 
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